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REALISM, REFERENCE AND THE 
GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
A b s tra c t
In  C hap ter 1, I  d is c u s s  th e  background to  th e  problem s which 
c o n fro n t a  r e a l i s t  accoun t o f  th e  grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge.
At th e  b e g in n in g  o f  C h ap te r 2 , I  e x p la in  in  what sen se  r e la t iv i s m  
c o n s t i t u t e s  a  c h a lle n g e  to  t h i s  a c c o u n t. Four in te rc o n n e c te d  q u e s tio n s  
a re  th e n  posed  w hich a re  s a id  to  u n d e r l i e  th e  r e a l i s t  p o s i t i o n .  The 
c h a p te r  f in i s h e s  w ith  an e x p la n a tio n  o f  how some o f  them a r i s e  in  an 
a c tu a l  case  s tu d y .  C h ap te r 3 d e a ls  w ith  a  g e n e ra l argum ent o f  Quine* s 
f o r  th e  v iew  th a t  r e f e r e n c e  i s  in s c r u t a b le .  In  r e p ly  I  m a in ta in  t h a t  
th e  argum ent does n o t h o ld  good, e i t h e r  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  in t e r p r e t i n g  
o u r own language o r  when i t  comes to  t r a n s l a t i n g  an a l i e n  language*
W ith C h ap te r 4» I  b e g in  to  answ er th e  fo u r  q u e s t io n s .  I  e x p la in  
how T a rsk i* s  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  can be seen  as  a  co rrespondence  th e o ry .
I t  i s  a rg u ed , how ever, t h a t  T a rsk i * s th e o ry  i t s e l f  p resu p p o ses  th e o r i e s  
o f  r e fe re n c e  and e x te n s io n , and c e r t a i n  r e c e n t a tte m p ts  to  overcome 
t h i s  la c u n a  a re  c r i t i c i z e d .  In  th e  n e x t c h a p te r  I  draw an analogy  
betw een n a t u r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s ,  w hich a re  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  im portance in  
s c ie n c e ,  and p ro p e r  nam es, and o f f e r  c l u s t e r  th e o r ie s  o f  r e fe re n c e  fo r  
b o th .  T h is answ ers th e  t h i r d  m ost b a s ic  o f  th e  fo u r  q u e s t io n s .  These 
th e o r i e s  a re  defended  a g a in s t  c r i t i c i s m s  made by  K ripke and Putnam . 
C h ap te r 6 aim s to  answ er th e  second  most b a s ic  q u e s tio n  by  c o n s id e r in g  
in  d e t a i l  how we can u n d e rs ta n d  what e a r l i e r  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  were 
a b o u t. I  develop  some argum ents o f  D av id so n 's  a s  a  c o u n te r  to  Q u in e 's  
d o c t r in e  o f  th e  in d e te rm in a c y  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  s e n te n c e s .  I  c laim  
th a t  a lth o u g h  t r a n s l a t i o n  m ight in  f a c t  be in d e te rm in a te ,  Q uine,
,11,
th ro u g h  c o n c e n tra t in g  on b e h a v io u ra l ev idence  to  th e  e x c lu s io n  o f  
o th e r  p h y s ic a l  e v id e n c e , has f a i l e d  to  show th a t  i t  i s ,  and th a t  in  
any ca se  in d e te rm in a c y  o f  s e n te n c e  t r a n s l a t i o n  does n o t im ply 
i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  r e fe re n c e  o f  term s# F in a l ly ,  in  C hap ter 7» I  sum up 
my e x p l ic a t io n  o f  th e  r e a l i s t ' s  acco u n t o f  th e  grow th o f  s c ie n c e  w ith  
r e s p e c t  to  n a t u r a l  k in d  p re d ic a te s #  I  th e n  c o n s id e r  two o ases  o f  
th e o ry  change o f  d i f f e r e n t  s o r t s  and su g g e s t how my work m ight be 
extended#
I ,  P e te r  James SMITH, hereby  d e c la re  th a t  t h i s  t h e s i s  has 
been composed by m y se lf , t h a t  th e  work o f  w hich i t  i s  a  
re c o rd  i s  my own, and th a t  i t  has n o t been a cc ep ted  in  any 
p re v io u s  a p p l ic a t io n  fo r  a  h ig h e r  d e g re e .
In  Jan u a ry , 1975» 1 was sidm itted  u n d er O rdinance G eneral
No. 12 as  a  R esearch  S tud en t o f  th e  U n iv e r s i ty  o f  S t .  Andrews.
I  su b se q u en tly  became e n ro l le d  f o r  th e  deg ree  o f  D octor o f
P h ilo so p h y . S ince Jan u a ry , 1975» I  have been a  f u l l - t im e
s tu d e n t o f  th e  U n iv e r s i ty .  My su p e rv is o r  has been
Mr. L .P . S tevenson  o f  th e  Departm ent o f  Logic and M etaphysics.
S igned
I  hereb y  c e r t i f y  th a t  th e  c o n d itio n s  o f  th e  R e so lu tio n  and 
R eg u la tio n s  fo r  th e  degree  o f  D octor o f  P h ilo so p h y  in  th e  
F a c u lty  o f  A rts  o f  th e  U n iv e r s i ty  o f  S t .  Andrews have been 
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P h ilo so p h e rs  o f  s c ie n c e  have alw ays been  e x e rc is e d  by th e  problem s 
o f  to  what e x te n t  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s  may be s a id  to  d e s c r ib e  th in g s  
t h a t  e x i s t  in  th e  w orld  and in  what s e n se , i f  an y , s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  
may be th o u g h t o f  a s  tru e #  The f i r s t  problem  can be c h a ra c te r iz e d  a s  
one o f  r e f e r e n c e # I t  may be posed  a s  a  q u e s tio n  —  what can we s a y , 
on th e  b a s is  o f  o u r s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s ,  about what th e re  i s  in  th e  
w orld? Or a l t e r n a t i v e l y  —  what k in d s  o f  th in g s  i s  s c ie n c e  com petent 
to  d is c o v e r?  Some te rm s w hich o ccu r in  ty p i c a l  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  a re  
'p l a n e t ' ,  ' g a s ' ,  'b a c te r iu m ' and 'mammal'# There would be l i t t l e  
re lu c ta n c e  to  sa y in g  th a t  th e re  were th in g s  o f  th e s e  k in d s  in  th e  w r ld #  
A f te r  a l l ,  we a re  mammals t h a t  l i v e  on a  p la n e t ,  b re a th e  in  v a r io u s  
g a s e s ,  and become in f e c te d  by b a c t e r i a .  But what about th e  te rm s 
'g e n e ' ,  'm u o n ', 'g r a v i t a t i o n a l  f i e l d '  and 'b la c k  h o le '?  Are th e r e  a lso  
th in g s  o f  th e s e  k in d s?  P erhaps we sho u ld  be wary h e re  l e s t  th e y  be 
l a t e r  re g a rd e d  a s  we have now come to  re g a rd  'p h l o g i s t o n ',  ' c a l o r i c ' ,
' lu m in ife ro u s  e t h e r ' ,  and th e  l i k e .
The second problem  can be c h a ra c te r iz e d  as  one o f  p r e d ic a t io n .
In  so d is t in g u is h in g  i t  from th e  problem  o f  r e fe re n c e  I  do n o t w ish to  
su g g es t th a t  th e y  a re  d iv o rce d  from each o th e r .  In f a c t ,  th e  o p p o s ite  
i s  th e  case# One way o f  e x p la in in g  what i t  i s  f o r  any s ta tem en t to  be 
t r u e  i s  by showing how th in g s  in  th e  w orld can be as  i t  say s  th e y  a r e .  
A ccording to  such  an a c c o u n t, what i t  means to  sa y  th a t  th e  s ta tem en t 
'Some b a c t e r i a  r e q u ir e  oxygen to  s u rv iv e ' i s  t r u e ,  i s  t h a t  th e re  a re  
such  th in g s  as b a c t e r i a  and oxygen and th a t  some o f  th e  form er r e q u ire  
th e  l a t t e r  i f  th e y  a re  to  s u rv iv e . T h is form o f  r e l a t i o n  betw een words
• 2#
and th e  w orld  i s  o f te n  c a l l e d  a  co rrespondence r e l a t i o n ,  and a  th e o ry  
o f  t r u t h  b ased  on i t  a  co rrespondence  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h .  I  s h a l l  d is c u s s  
t h i s  th e o ry  more f u l l y  in  C hap ter 4*
The p o s i t io n  one ad o p ts  on th e  problem o f  p r e d ic a t io n ,  how ever, 
need  n o t be so c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d  to  o n e 's  view s on r e f e r e n c e .  One who 
m a in ta in s  a  coherence th e o ry  o f  t r u t h ,  fo r  exam ple, acc o rd in g  to  which 
a  s ta tem en t i s  t r u e  o r  f a l s e  depending  on w hether i t  co h ere s  o r  f a i l s  
to  cohere  w ith  a  system  o f  o th e r  s ta te m e n ts , m ight th in k  th a t  m ature 
s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  a re  t r u e  w ith o u t th e re b y  com m itting  th em selves to  
h o ld in g  t h a t  th e  w orld  c o n ta in s  th e  k in d s  o f  th in g s  th e  th e o r ie s  
p o s tu la t e .
P h ilo so p h y  o f  s c ie n c e  in  t h i s  c e n tu ry  has seen  a  number o f  
d i s t i n c t i v e  approaches to  th e s e  p rob lem s. P e rh ap s th e  most i n f l u e n t i a l  
have been re a lis m  and in s tru m e n ta lism . A th u m b -n a il sk e tc h  o f  each 
m ight go as  fo llo w s . The r e a l i s t  m a in ta in s  th a t  th e  s ta te m e n ts  o f  a  
th e o ry  a re  e i t h e r  t r u e  o r  f a l s e  and t h a t  most o f  th e  th in g s  m entioned 
in  a  th e o ry  o f  an e s ta b l i s h e d  sc ie n c e  do e x i s t .  He th e re fo re  ad h ere s  
to  a  co rrespondence  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h .  The in s t r u m e n ta l i s t ,  on th e  o th e r  
hand , d en ies  t h a t  th e r e  a re  such  th in g s ,  and m a in ta in s  th a t  w h ile  i t  
makes sen se  to  a s c r ib e  t r u t h  o r  f a l s i t y  to  r e p o r ts  o f  o b s e rv a tio n s ,  i t  
does n o t make sen se  to  a s c r ib e  them to  s ta te m e n ts  o f  th e o ry .  A th e o ry , 
acc o rd in g  to  th e  in s t r u m e n ta l i s t ,  f ig u re s  m ere ly  as  a  r u le  o r  p r in c ip le  
f o r  th e  a n a ly s is  and r e p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  observed  phenomena, and a s  an 
in s tru m e n t in  th e  t r a n s i t i o n  from one s e t  o f  ex p erim en ta l d a ta  to  
a n o th e r  s e t .
I t  i s  n o t my in te n t io n  to  d is c u s s  in  d e t a i l  in  t h i s  th e s i s  th e  
r e l a t i v e  m e r i ts  o f  th e se  c o n f l i c t i n g  ac c o u n ts . In C hapter 1, I  s h a l l
►3.
in d ic a te  some shortcom ings o f  b o th ,  though i t  w i l l  become c l e a r  th a t  
I  th in k  th a t  th o se  f a c in g  in s tru m e n ta lism  a re  c o n s id e ra b ly  g r e a te r  and 
t h a t  re a lism  has much more i n t u i t i v e  p l a u s i b i l i t y .  My main i n t e r e s t  
l i e s  in  g iv in g  a  d e t a i l e d  s ta te m e n t o f  how a  r e a l i s t  e x p la in s  th e  
grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge. Here too  I  th in k  th a t  h is  account i s  
f a r  more p la u s ib le  th a n  th e  in s t r u m e n ta l i s t ’ s .  Both ty p i c a l l y  t a l k  o f  
a  th e o r y 's  b e in g  w e ll-c o n firm e d , o f  i t s  p r e d ic t iv e  pow er, o f  i t s  
s im p l ic i ty  and e le g a n c e . The d i f f e r e n c e  i s  th a t  th e  r e a l i s t  i s  in  a  
p o s i t io n  to  say  th a t  o u r knowledge in c re a s e s  because  we le a rn  more and 
more about th e  k in d s  o f  th in g s  th e re  a re  in  th e  w orld . S uccessive  
t h e o r i e s ,  say s  th e  r e a l i s t ,  a re  in  some sense  about th e  same th in g s ;  
th e y  ju s t  g iv e  a  b e t t e r  account o f  t h e i r  n a tu r e s .  S ince th e  in s tru m ­
e n t a l i s t  d e n ie s  t h a t  most o f  th e  te rm s u sed  in  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  
r e f e r  to  th in g s  in  th e  w o rld , such  an account i s  n o t open to  him . 
H ila ry  Putnam p u ts  th e  p o in t  l i k e  t h i s ,
A n a tu r a l  account o f  th e  way in  which s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  succeed  
each o th e r  —  sa y , th e  way in  w hich E i n s t e in 's  R e la t i v i ty  succeeded  
N ew ton 's U n iv e rs a l G ra v ita t io n  —  i s  t h a t  a  p a r t i a l l y  c o r r e c t /  
p a r t i a l l y  in c o r r e c t  account o f  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  o b je c t  —  sa y , the , 
g r a v i t a t i o n a l  f i e l d ,  o r  th e  m e tr ic  s t r u c tu r e  o f  sp a c e - tim e , o r  
b o th  —  i s  r e p la c e d  by  a  b e t t e r  account o f  th e  same o b je c t o r  
o b je c t s .  But i f  th e s e  o b je c ts  d o n 't  r e a l l y  e x i s t  a t  a l l ,  th e n  i t  
i s  a  m ira c le  t h a t  a  th e o ry  w hich speaks o f  g r a v i t a t i o n a l  a c t io n  a t  
a  d is ta n c e  s u c c e s s fu l ly  p r e d ic t s  phenomena; i t  i s  a  m ira c le  th a t  a 
th e o ry  which speaks o f  cu rved  sp ace -tim e  s u c c e s s fu l ly  p r e d ic ts  
phenomena; and th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  laws o f  th e  form er th e o ry  a re  
d e r iv a b le  ' i n  th e  l i m i t '  from th e  laws o f  th e  l a t t e r  th e o ry  has no 
m e th o d o lo g ica l s ig n if ic a n c e .^
1 . H. Putnam , M eaning and th e  M oral S c ie n c e s , p . 19.
.4 -
In re c e n t t im e s , c o n s id e ra tio n s  from th e  h is to r io g ra p h y  o f  s c ie n c e  
have le d  to  th e  r e a l i s t ' s  view s b e in g  c h a lle n g e d  from a n o th e r  q u a r te r .
We have seen  th e  emergence o f  r e l a t i v i s m . A ccording to  th e  r e l a t i v i s t  
th e r e  i s  no one e x te rn a l  r e a l i t y  which m ight be invoked to  e x p la in  th e  
t r u t h  o r  f a l s i t y  o f  s ta te m e n ts  due to  members o f  l i n g u i s t i c  com m unities 
more o r  l e s s  d i s t a n t ,  in  space  o r  tim e , from o u r own. He d en ie s  th e  
co rrespondence  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h .  N ick  J a rd in e  d e s c r ib e s  th e  c o n f l i c t  
a s  fo llo w s ,
Each p a r ty  has sought to  c o n v ic t th e  o th e r  o f  a  d i s to r t e d  i n t e r p r e t ­
a t io n  o f  th e  su c c e ss io n  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s .  R e a l i s t s  charge 
r e l a t i v i s t s  w ith  commitment to  an account w hich in  e x p la in in g  
su c c e ss io n  u n d u ly  su b o rd in a te s  human r a t i o n a l i t y  to  e x te rn a l  
s o c io lo g ic a l  and id e o lo g ic a l  f a c t o r s ,  and which by  denying th a t  i t  
makes sen se  to  t a l k  o f  cum u la tiv e  grow th o f  t r u e  s c i e n t i f i c  b e l i e f  
re n d e rs  th e  f a c t  o f  human te c h n o lo g ic a l  p ro g re s s  in e x p l ic a b le .  
R e l a t i v i s t s  charge r e a l i s t s  w ith  ' t h e  chauvinism  o f  t i m e ',  w ith  
commitment to  acco u n ts  o f  th e  c o n te n ts  o f  p a s t  th e o r ie s  and o f  t h e i r  
su c c e ss io n  w hich a re  d i s to r t e d  by  th e  im p o s itio n  o f  ou r p re s e n t 
c o n ce p tu a l framework and o u r p re s e n t  c r i t e r i a  f o r  th e  assessm en t o f  
th e o r ie s .^
A gain, i t  i s  n o t my o b je c t iv e  to  a s s e s s  a l l  t h a t  can be s a id  fo r  
and a g a in s t  th e s e  c o n t r a s t in g  v ie w s . At th e  b eg in n in g  o f  C hapter 2 ,
I  s h a l l  make some c r i t i c i s m s  o f  r e la t iv i s m .  P u tnam 's  o b je c tio n s  to  
n o n - r e a l i s t  view s a lso  have to  be fa c e d . But I  s h a l l  n o t t r y  to  somehow 
r u le  o u t r e la t iv i s m  on a  p r i o r i  g ro u n d s. My concerns a re  r a th e r  to  
e x p la in  re a lism  and defend  i t  a g a in s t  c r i t i c i s m .  What I  s h a l l  a ttem p t 
to  do , th e n , i s  to  e x p la in  how th e  su ccess  o f  th e  r e a l i s t ' s  account o f  
th e  grow th o f  s c ie n c e  i s  dependent on c e r t a in  c o n tin g e n t f e a tu re s
1 . " 'R e a l i s t ic *  R ealism  and th e  P ro g re s s  o f  S c ie n c e ,"  A ction  and 
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , e d . C. Hookway and P .  P e t t i t ,  p . 107.
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  in t e r p r e t i n g  th e  th e o r ie s  o f  p re v io u s  s c i e n t i s t s .  T his 
n e c e s s i t a t e s  g iv in g  a  d e t a i le d  s ta te m e n t o f  th e  r e a l i s t ' s  v iew  o f  
s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s .
At t h i s  p o in t  I  s h a l l  ta k e  up a  number o f ' i s s u e s  in  th e  p h ilo so p h y  
o f  lan g u ag e . The r e a l i s t  h a s  to  be  a b le  to  e^qplain how we can come to  
u n d e rs ta n d  t h a t ,  s a y , Newton had a  th e o ry  about g r a v i t a t i o n a l  f i e l d s ,  
o r  t h a t  Mendel had a  th e o ry  about g en es . He needs to  e x p la in  how we 
can in t e r p r e t  p re v io u s  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s ;  he needs to  g iv e  a  th e o ry  o f  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  Such a  th e o ry ,  I  w i l l  a rg u e , p resu p p o ses  an e x p la n a tio n  
o f  what i t  i s  f o r  a  term  l i k e  ' p l a n e t ' o r  'g e n e ' to  r e f e r .  Thus, we 
need  to  c o n s id e r  some co n ce p tu a l problem s to  do w ith  th e  n o tio n  o f  
r e f e r e n c e .  C hap ters  5 and 6 a re  d’ev o ted  to  th e s e  m a t te r s .
The f i r s t  c h a p te r  i s  m ain ly  h i s t o r i c a l ,  lo o k in g  a t  th e  emergence 
o f  th e  th r e e  ' - i s m s ' .  In  C hap ter 2 , I  pose fo u r  in te rc o n n e c te d  
q u e s tio n s  w hich, I  a rg u e , a  r e a l i s t  w i l l  have to  answ er i f  he i s  to  
p ro v id e  a  firm  fo u n d a tio n  fo r  h i s  v ie w s . T his s e t s  th e  s ta g e  fo r  th e  
r e s t  o f  th e  t h e s i s .  But b e fo re  we can s t a r t  to  canvass f o r  p ro s p e c tiv e  
an sw ers, i t  i s  n e c e s s a ry  to  be more p r e c is e  about th e  co rrespondence 
r e l a t i o n .  In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  th e  r e a l i s t  has to  defend  h i s  c la im s about 
r e fe re n c e  a g a in s t  c e r t a in  p rag m a tic  o b je c t io n s .  T h is i s  th e  su b stan ce  
o f  C hap ter 3 .
By th e  tim e  we g e t to  C hap ter 7 , I  hope to  have shown th a t  th e  
a p p aren t p l a u s i b i l i t y  o f  re a lis m  i s ,  in  f a c t ,  w e ll-fo u n d e d . Through 
r e s o lv in g  a  number o f  problem s in  th e  p h ilo so p h y  o f  lan g u ag e , a 
co n v in c in g  account o f  th e  grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge i s  se c u re d .
The r e a l i s t ,  m oreover, need  n o t be  a  c h a u v in is t .  He can make sense  o f  
th e  c o n ce p tu a l schemes o f  e a r l i e r  s c i e n t i s t s ,  even though he a c c e p ts
.6 .
t h a t  by  o u r own s c i e n t i f i c  l i g h t s  th e y  were wrong on many p o in t s .
T his i s  f u r th e r  s u b s ta n t i a te d  by a  c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  two case s  o f  th e o ry  
change.
ï b r  en cou rag ing  me in  my work f o r  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  and fo r  commenting 
on d r a f t s  o f  each  o f  th e  c h a p te r s ,  I  shou ld  l i k e  to  th an k  my s u p e rv is o r , 
Mr# L e s l ie  S tevenson . I  am a lso  in d e b te d  to  D r. N ick Ja rd in e  o f  
Darwin C o lle g e , Cambridge f o r  d is c u s s in g  w ith  me some o f  th e  s p e c i f i c  
p rob lem s. Both gave most g e n e ro u s ly  o f  t h e i r  t im e . For p ro v id in g  my 
main so u rce  o f  f in a n c ia l  su p p o rt d u rin g  th e  r e s e a rc h  I  am v e ry  g r a te f u l  
to  th e  U n iv e r s i ty  o f  S t .  Andrews. F in a l ly ,  I  w ish to  ex p ress  my 
d eep e s t g r a t i tu d e  to  my w ife , C h r is t in e ,  f o r  h e r  c o n s ta n t su p p o rt and 
encouragem ent. In  many ways h e r  la b o u rs  were more th a n  th e  eq u a l o f  
m ine.
CHAPTER 1 ■ CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS OF THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES
S e c tio n  ( i ) ;  L o g ica l P o s i t iv is m ; I t s  Background and O r ig in a l  
F o rm u la tion
The word 're a lism *  has been  u se d  to  connote s e v e ra l  d i f f e r e n t  
d o c tr in e s  in  th e  h i s to r y  o f  ph ilosophy*  I t  i s  n o t my in te n t io n  to  
su rv ey  th e s e  v a r io u s  c o n n o ta tio n s , b u t i t  would be u s e fu l  to  lo o k  a t  
re a lism  in  th e  b ro a d e r  c o n te x t o f  modem p h ilo so p h y  to  see  how t h i s  
r e l a t e s  to  what I  s h a l l  c a l l  th e  r e a l i s t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  
th e o r ie s *
S ince th e  m edieval p e r io d ,  re a lism  has g e n e ra l ly  been u n d e rs to o d  
a s  th e  view  th a t  m a te r ia l  o b je c ts  e x i s t  e x te r n a l ly  to  u s  and 
in d e p en d en tly  o f  o u r sense  e x p e r ie n c e . As such i t  has t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
been opposed by id e a lis m , th e  v iew  th a t  no such o b je c ts  e x i s t  a p a r t  
from o u r knowledge o r  aw areness o f  them , and by  phenom enalism , which 
d e n ie s  th a t  m a te r ia l  o b je c ts  e x i s t  excep t as  groups o r  sequences o f  
sen se  im p re s s io n s , e i t h e r  a c tu a l  o r  p o s s ib le .  C le a r ly  t h i s  d eb a te  b e a rs  
some r e l a t i o n  to  what I  c h a ra c te r iz e d  in  th e  In tro d u c t io n  as  th e  problem  
o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  th e  problem  o f  what we can sa y , on th e  b a s is  o f  ou r 
s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s ,  about what th e r e  i s  in  th e  w orld . The d i f f e r e n c e ,  
how ever, i s  t h a t  w hereas th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  d is p u te  was o v e r th e  s t a t u s  o f  
th in g s  in  g e n e ra l ,  th e  more r e c e n t  one in  th e  p h ilo so p h y  o f  s c ie n c e  has 
ten d ed  to  fo cu s on t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s as d i s t i n c t  from s o -c a l le d  
o b s e rv a tio n  te rm s .  I  s h a l l  have more to  say  about t h i s  p u rp o rte d  
d i s t i n c t i o n  s h o r t ly .  For th e  p r e s e n t ,  s u f f ic e  i t  to  say  th a t  t h e o r e t i c a l  
te rm s a re  to  be th o u g h t o f  as th o se  which ty p i c a l l y  o ccu r in  a  th e o r y 's
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la w - l ik e  s ta te m e n ts ,  term s l i k e  'e le c t r o n * ,  'g r a v i t a t i o n a l  f i e l d * ,
'mass* and 'p l a n e t* ,  w h ils t  o b s e rv a tio n  term s a re  to  be thou g h t o f  a s  ' 
th o se  which ty p i c a l l y  o ccu r in  o b s e rv a tio n  r e p o r t s ,  te rm s l i k e  ' w a te r* , 
* red* , ' b i l l i a r d  b a l l * , and so o n .
As an i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  d is p u te ,  we m ight ta k e
B e rk e le y 's  r e j e c t i o n  o f  L o ck e 's  a to m is t ic  r e a l is m . Locke b e l ie v e d  th e re
was a  r e a l  w orld  o f  atom s, b u t t h a t  because  o f  t h e i r  extrem e m inu ten ess
we a re  ig n o ra n t o f  t h e i r  c o n f ig u ra t io n s  and m otions* As an analogous
1 *case  he c i t e s  a s  c o n tin g e n t o u r ig n o ran ce  o f  v e ry  d i s t a n t  bod ies*  
B e rk e le y 's  c h a lle n g e  to  Locke was n o t so much o v e r w hether th e r e  a re  
p la n e ts  o r  e le c t r o n s  as  w e ll as w a te r  and b i l l i a r d  b a l l s ,  b u t o v er what 
th e  s t a tu s  o f  any e x i s t e n t  th in g  i s .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  he weis concerned  
a s  to  th e  grounds we c o u ld  have f o r  sa y in g  th a t  th e r e  was a n y th in g  more 
th a n  a c tu a l  sen se  im p re s s io n s . He was a rg u in g  a g a in s t  re a lism  to u t  c o u r t 
r a th e r  th a n  (question ing  w hether th e r e  were " th e o r e t i c a l  e n t i t i e s " .
More g e n e ra l ly  we can say  t h a t ,  as  re g a rd s  th e  p e r io d  from th e  tim e o f  
D e sca rte s  u n t i l  th e  end o f  th e  e ig h te e n th  c e n tu ry , i t  was assumed th a t  
th e  s o r t s  o f  th in g s  th a t  co u ld  be d isc o v e re d  by s c ie n c e  were o f  th e  
same k in d  as  th o se  o b se rv ed  in  n a tu r e . C onsequen tly  th e y  were thou g h t 
to  be d e s c r ib a b le  u s in g  th e  same v o cab u la ry  and to  s a t i s f y  th e  same la w s .
The p o s i t io n  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  what I  c h a r a c te r iz e d  as  th e  problem  
o f  p r e d ic a t io n ,  i . e . ,  th e  problem  o f  w hether, and i f  so in  what s e n se , 
s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  can be c o r r e c t ly  d e sc r ib e d  a s  t r u e ,  i s  n o t q u i te  as  
c l e a r  d u rin g  t h i s  p e r io d .  Bacon had argued th a t  t h e i r  t r u t h  co u ld  n o t 
be e s ta b l is h e d  a  p r i o r i  b u t r a th e r  had to  be e s ta b l i s h e d  by e m p ir ic a l
* A ll n o te s  a re  to  be found a f t e r  th e  end o f  th e  f i n a l  c h a p te r .
t e s t ,  by  p u t t in g  q u e s tio n s  to  n a tu r e .  A lthough i t  was g e n e ra l ly  r e a l iz e d  
t h a t ,  s t r i c t l y  sp eak in g , th e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  p re d ic te d  phenomena cou ld  
a t  b e s t  o n ly  convey a  v e ry  h ig h  p r o b a b i l i t y  on th e  p r e d ic t in g  th e o ry , 
th e  q u e s tio n  o f  i n t e r e s t  was how, r a th e r  th a n  w heth er, th e  t r u t h  o f  a 
th e o ry  co u ld  be a t t a in e d .  H erein  l i e s  one o f  th e  main p o in ts  a t  is s u e  
betw een th e  e m p i r ic i s t s ,  fo llo w in g  Bacon, and th e  r a t i o n a l i s t s ,  fo llo w in g  
D e sc a r te s , The d if f e r e n c e  betw een ' h ig h ly  con firm ed ' and ' t r u e '  was n o t 
d eb a ted  to  n e a r ly  th e  e x te n t t h a t  th e  d if f e re n c e  betw een a r r iv in g  a t  
s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s  by  in d u c tiv e  g e n e ra l iz a t io n  and by a  p r i o r i  d e d u c tiv e  
re a so n in g  w as.
P a r t  o f  th e  rea so n  f o r  t h i s  i s  und o u b ted ly  th e  su ccess  o f  b o th
E u c lid ean  geom etry and Newtonian m echan ics. In  th e  ca se  o f  th e  l a t t e r ,
t h i s ,  to g e th e r  w ith  th e  la c k  o f  any e q u a lly  good com peting th e o ry ,
su g g es ted  th a t  t r u e  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  co u ld  a c tu a l ly  b e  a t ta in e d .
N a tu ra l ly  th e  p h ilo so p h y  o f  th e  p e r io d  a ttem p ted  to  accommodate such a
r e a l i s t  view  o f  s c ie n c e .  T h is  i s  p e rh ap s c l e a r e s t  when we look  a t  K a n t's
C r i t iq u e  o f  P u re  R eason, th e  second e d i t io n  o f  w hich appeared  in  1707*
Even from th e  P re fa c e  to  t h i s  e d i t io n  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  Kant was
p ro fo u n d ly  im pressed  by th e  scope and power o f  E u c lid ean  geom etry and
2N ewtonian m echan ics. T h is scope and power he a t t r i b u t e d  to  th e  
d e d u c tiv e  s t r u c tu r e  o f  th e s e  d i s c i p l i n e s ,  th e  d ed u c tio n s  b e in g  c a r r ie d  
o u t in  accordance w ith  th e  A r i s to te l i a n  s y l l o g i s t i c .  A ccord ing ly  Kant 
sought to  e s t a b l i s h  as s y n th e t ic  a  p r i o r i  t r u t h s  n o t o n ly  a l l  
a r i th m e t ic a l  t r u t h s  b u t a lso  th e  p o s tu la te s  o f  E u c lid ean  geom etry and 
c e r t a in  b a s ic  p r in c ip le s  o f  p h y s ic s ,  such a s  " in  a l l  com munication o f  
m o tion , a c t io n  and r e a c t io n  must alw ays be e q u a l —  rough ly  N ew ton 's 
t h i r d  law o f  m o tion . In  c h a r a c te r iz in g  such p o s tu la te s  and p r in c ip le s  
a s  a  p r i o r i  « Kant was e x p re s s in g  th e  view  th a t  th e y  were t r u e  o f
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n e c e s s i ty ,  in d e p e n d e n tly  o f  any e m p ir ic a l knowledge o f  th e  w orld .
Subsequent d e v e lo p m e n ts 'in  p h y s ic a l  s c ie n c e , how ever, le d  to  
c o n s id e ra b le  changes in  t h i s  o u tlo o k . Towards th e  end o f  th e  e ig h te e n th  
c e n tu ry  th e r e  was a  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  p h y s ic a l and chem ical th e o r ie s  
w hich made i t  more and more d i f f i c u l t  to  r e l a t e  th e  p o s tu la te d  s t r u c tu r e  
o f  m a tte r  w ith  th e  o b serv ed  phenomena. As a  r e s u l t ,  u n o b se rv ab le  
e n t i t i e s  l i k e  atom s, and u n o b se rv ab le  p ro c e sse s  l i k e  m o lecu la r i n t e r ­
a c t io n ,  ten d ed  to  be re g a rd e d  r a th e r  a s  h e u r i s t i c  models th a n  as 
d is c o v e r ie s  p e r ta in in g  to  th e  r e a l  w o rld .^  Locke’ s analogy  w ith  d i s t a n t  
b o d ie s  was d is s o lv e d .  T h is  developm ent was encouraged by  s i t u a t io n s  in  
which th e re  were too  many th e o r ie s  in  th e  f i e l d  as  w e ll as o th e rs  in  
which th e re  were too  few . As H esse has commented,
Sometimes th e r e  were a number o f  a l t e r n a t iv e  th e o r ie s  more o r  l e s s  
a g re e in g  in  t h e i r  ex p e rim en ta l co n sequences, betw een which i t  was 
v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  o r  im p ra c tic a b le  to  d ev ise  c r u c i a l  ex p e rim en ts . T h is 
was th e  case  o v e r long  p e r io d s  w ith  one o r  two f l u i d  th e o r ie s  o f  
e l e c t r i c i t y  and m agnetism , w ith  f l u i d  v e rsu s  dynamic th e o r ie s  o f  
h e a t ,  and w ith  Newtonian fo rc e  m odels in  ch em is try  v e rsu s  D a lto n ian  
atom ic t h e o r i e s .
By th e  end o f  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  th e  assum ption  th a t  
t h e o r e t i c a l  e n t i t i e s  and p ro c e s s e s  were o f  th e  same k in d  as  o b s e rv a tio n a l  
ones was n o t su p p o rted  by  any chem ical o r  p h y s ic a l  th e o ry .  The s i tu a t io n  
became even more a c u te  w ith  th e  f u r th e r  developm ent o f  e lec tro d y n am ics  
and th e  emergence o f  quantum th e o ry  e a r ly  in  t h i s  c e n tu ry . In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
th e  w a v e /p a r t ic le  d u a l i ty  o f  l i g h t  and th e  d isc o v e ry  by  H eisenberg  o f  
th e  u n c e r ta in ty  r e l a t i o n s  su g g es ted  th a t  o b se rv a b le  p h y s ic a l  o b je c ts  
and n o n -o b se rv ab le  t h e o r e t i c a l  ones were c e r t a in l y  n o t d e s c r ib a b le  in  
th e  same v o cab u la ry  and d id  n o t s a t i s f y  th e  same law s. The ch o ice  th en  
became one o f  a c c e p tin g  th a t  t h e o r e t i c a l  term s r e f e r  to  r e a l  b u t
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n o n -o b se rv a b le  o b je c ts  w hich d i f f e r  in  fundam ental p r o p e r t i e s  from th e  
o b se rv a b le , o r  deny ing  th a t  th e r e  i s  a n y th in g  more th a n  th e  e m p ir ic a lly  
o b s e rv a b le .
T his same p e r io d  saw th e  d o u b tin g  o f  th e  assum ption  th a t  s c ie n c e  
co u ld  a t t a i n  t r u e  th e o r i e s  in  p r a c t i c e .  In  p la c e  o f  Newtonian m echanics 
and E u c lid ean  geom etry , whose d e d u c tiv e  s t r u c tu r e s  r e s te d  on th e  
p r in c ip le s  o f  A r i s to te l i a n  lo g i c ,  th e r e  a ro se  r e l a t i v i s t i c  and quantum 
m echan ics, and n o n -R ic lid e a n  g e o m e tr ie s , whose d ed u c tiv e  s t r u c tu r e s  
r e s te d  on th e  lo g ic  o f  F reg e , R u s s e ll  and W hitehead. The q u e s tio n  
became one o f  w hether i t  even made sen se  to  t a l k  about t r u e  s c i e n t i f i c  
th e o r i e s .  P e rh ap s  th e  o n ly  t r u e  s ta te m e n ts  were th o se  in v o lv in g  
r e fe re n c e  to  e m p ir ic a lly  o b se rv a b le  o b je c t s ,  and th e  most th a t  cou ld  
be s a id  about a  th e o ry  would be t h a t  i t  i s  adequate  ju s t  in  case  i t  
c o n ta in e d  a  c e r t a in  number o f  such  s ta te m e n ts  and no f a l s e  o n es .
In  th e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  th e  l a s t  c e n tu ry , E rn s t Mach p roposed  an 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s  which was s t ro n g ly  in c l in e d  
tow ards th e  in s t r u m e n ta l i s t  p o s i t io n  on th e  problem s o f  re fe re n c e  and 
p r e d ic a t io n .  I n i t i a l l y  Mach had  h e ld  som ething l i k e  a  K antian  view  
a c c o rd in g  to  which ev ery  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry  i s  b ased  on c e r t a in  a  p r i o r i  
e le m e n ts .^  L a te r  he r e j e c te d  t h i s ,  ad o p tin g  th e  phenom enalist view  
th a t  s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge c o n s is t s  o n ly  o f  c o n ce p tu a l r e f l e c t i o n  upon 
sen so ry  e le m e n ts . The Laws o f  N a tu re , s a id  Mach, a re  sim ply  " th e
7mnemonic re p ro d u c tio n  o f  f a c t s  in  th o u g h t."  The ex p e rien ces  which
th e y  summarize and en ab le  u s  to  a n t ic ip a te  a re  sen so ry  elem ents o r  
s e n s a t io n s ,  l i k e  th e  p e rc e p tio n  o f  a  c o lo u r o r  a  sh ap e , o r  th e  f e e l in g  
o f  p r e s s u re .  On t h i s  th e o ry  we ought n o t ,  l i k e  th e  r e a l i s t ,  to  t r e a t  
o u r ex p e rie n c e s  as  e x p e rie n c e s  o f  th in g s ,  n o r shou ld  we suppose th a t  we 
have knowledge o f  th in g s .  H arre summarizes i t  a s  fo llo w s .
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Knowledge i s  o n ly  o f  e le m e n ts , and c o n s id e re d  in  r e l a t i o n  to  o u r s e lv e s ,  
t h i s  i s  knowledge o f  th e  o rd e r  and sequence o f  o u r s e n s a t io n s .  
S e n sa tio n s  a re  th e  u l t im a te  phenomena and knowledge o f  s e n s a tio n sgth e  o n ly  t r u e  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge.
Thus, a l l  e m p ir ic a l s ta te m e n ts  o c c u r r in g  in  a  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry  must 
he cap ab le  o f  b e in g  reduced  to  s ta te m e n ts  about s e n s a t io n s .  Here we 
see  th e  emergence o f  th e  pow erfu l id e a  t h a t  s c i e n t i f i c  s ta t a n e n ts  sho u ld  
be e m p ir ic a l ly  v e r i f i a b l e .  T h is  l a t e r  formed th e  b a s i s  f o r  th e  more 
g e n e ra l " v e r i f i a b i l i t y  th e o ry  o f  m eaning", a cc o rd in g  to  which th e  meaning 
o f  a  (n o n -a n a ly tic )  sen ten c e  i s  in  a  c e r t a in  sense  id e n t i c a l  w ith  i t s  
means o f  v e r i f i c a t i o n .  For Mach, such  means n e c e s s a r i ly  in v o lv ed  
re d u c in g  th e  se n te n c e s  to  ones s o le ly  about s e n s e -d a ta .
E a r ly  in  t h i s  c e n tu ry , two groups o f  p h ilo so p h e rs  and s c i e n t i s t s  
began to  fo rm u la te  th e  body o f  d o c tr in e  now g e n e ra l ly  r e f e r r e d  to  as 
lo g i c a l  p o s it iv is m  —  th e  V ienna C i r c le ,  u nder th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  M o ritz  
S c h lic k , and th e  B e r l in  S choo l, u n d er t h a t  o f  Hans R eichenbach. They 
r e a d i ly  adop ted  as a  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  th e  m ean ing fu lness  o f  a t h e o r e t i c a l  
s ta te m e n t ,  i . e . ,  any s ta te m e n t in  which a  t h e o r e t i c a l  term  i s  u se d , 
t h a t  i t  sho u ld  be e m p ir ic a l ly  v e r i f i a b l e .  With two o th e r  a s p e c ts  a f  
Maoh’ s v ie w s , how ever, th e y  were n o t so happy. The f i r s t  was h i s  
em phasis on a  p h en o m en a lis tic  language which t r e a t e d  sen ten c es  about 
s e n s e -d a ta  as  b a s ic .  Why sh o u ld  t h i s  be p r e f e r r e d  to  a  p h y s i c a l i s t i c  
language which t r e a t e d  se n te n c e s  about o rd in a ry  p h y s ic a l  o b je c ts  and 
t h e i r  p r o p e r t i e s ,  as b a s ic ?  The p o s i t i v i s t s  soon came to  see th e s e  as 
a l t e r n a t iv e  language fo rm s. The im p o rtan t q u e s tio n  was w hether th e  
language form was adequa te  f o r  th e  needs o f  e m p ir ic a l d e s c r ip t io n  o f  
th e  w orld , n o t w hether one language form re v e a le d  some u l t im a te  
m e tap h y s ica l t r u t h  about th e  w orld ; th e  l a t t e r  th e y  condemned as 
m ere ly  a  " p se u d o -q u e s tio n " .
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A f u r th e r  d i f f i c u l t y  was t h a t  d e s c r ip t io n s  o f  s e n s a tio n s  co u ld  
n o t be made to  account f o r  th e  m ath em atica l r e la t io n s h ip s  u n d e r ly in g  
s c i e n t i f i c  la w s . W ith th e  grow th o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  p h y s ic s  t h i s  became 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  p r e s s in g .  M oreover, th e r e  was th e  g e n e ra l problem o f  
acc o u n tin g  f o r  th e  t r u t h s  o f  m athem atics and lo g ic  w ith o u t in tro d u c in g  
unw anted m e tap h y s ica l n o t io n s .  As a  s o lu t io n  to  th e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  
th e  p o s i t i v i s t s  tu rn e d  to  th e  co n v en tio n a lism  o f  H enri P o in c a re .
P o in c a ré  came to  adopt a  c o n v e n t io n a l is t  view  th ro u g h  c o n s id e ra tio n  
o f  non -E u c lid ean  g e o m e tr ie s .^  G auss, B olyai and Lobachewski were ab le  
to  show t h a t ,  i f  E u c lid ean  geom etry i s  c o n s i s t e n t t h e r e  a re  o th e r  
c o n s is te n t  g eo m etrie s  c o n ta in in g  axioms c o n tra ry  to  I h c l i d 's  p a r a l l e l  
p o s tu la t e .  Hence, rea so n ed  P o in c a re ,  Kant must be wrong in  m a in ta in in g  
th a t  th e  axioms o f  a  system  o f  pu re  geom etry co u ld  be known to  be t r u e  
a  p r i o r i , s in c e  t h i s  would mean t h a t  t h e i r  d e n ia l  would r a th e r  be s e l f -  • 
c o n t r a d ic to r y .  On th e  o th e r  hand , he a rgued , g e o m e tr ic a l axioms cou ld  
n o t be  t r u e  a  p o s t e r i o r i , s in c e  th e y  would th e n  be open to  c o n t in u a l  
r e v is io n .  He th e r e f o r e  concluded  th a t  th e y  must be con v en tio n s  o f  some 
k in d , " d e f in i t io n s  in  d is g u is e " .  W hether P o in ca re  was r ig h t  to  so 
conclude i s  n o t o u r concern  h e re .  What i s  o f  concern  i s  t h a t  he a lso  
went on to  m a in ta in  t h a t  such  t h e o r e t i c a l  p r in c ip le s  a s  th e  law o f  
i n e r t i a  and th e  law  o f  c o n se rv a tio n  o f  energy  s im i la r ly  re p re s e n te d  
c e r t a in  agreem ents o r  co n v en tio n s  as to  how sc ie n c e  shou ld  t a l k  about 
phenomena.
Combining th e  v iew s o f  P o in c a re  w ith  th o se  o f  Mach, th e  lo g ic a l  
p o s i t i v i s t s  p roposed  th e  fo llo w in g  in t e r p r e ta t io n  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s .  
R e g u la r i t i e s  and i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  in  observ ed  phenomena c o n s t i tu te  th e  
s u b je c t -m a t te r  o f  s c ie n c e .  The fo rm er a re  c h a ra c te r iz e d  by th e  u se  o f  
t h e o r e t i c a l  laws which c o n ta in  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s . These term s a re
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e x p l i c i t l y  d e f in e d  v i a  th e  o b s e rv a tio n  language and a re  n o th in g  more 
th a n  co n v e n tio n a l a b b re v ia tio n s  f o r  d e s c r ip t io n s  o f  phenomena. These 
a b b re v ia tio n s  a llo w  f o r  th e  e x p re s s io n  o f  m ath em atica l r e l a t io n s h ip s ,  
b u t a re  in  tu r n  m ere ly  co n v en tio n s  u se d  in  fo rm u la tin g  c e r t a in  r e l a t i o n s  
h o ld in g  betw een phenomena.
T his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  su g g e s ts  an even-handedness w ith  re s p e c t  to  
th e  problem  o f  r e f e r e n c e .  S ince th e  m eaning o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s i s  
to  be e x p l ic a te d  v ia  th e  o b se rv a tio n  lan g u ag e , th e  q u e s tio n  o f  w hether 
th e r e  a re  e n t i t i e s  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  k in d  co rresp o n d in g  to  such te rm s does 
n o t a r i s e .  With re s p e c t  to  th e  problem  o f  p r e d ic a t io n ,  th o u g h , i t  was 
w ide ly  h e ld  by  th e  p o s i t i v i s t s  e a r ly  on th a t  e m p ir ic a l s ta te m e n ts  d id  
adm it o f  c o n c lu s iv e  v e r i f i c a t i o n .  They thou g h t i t  made sense  to  t a l k  
o f  th e  t r u t h  o r  f a l s i t y  o f  b o th  o b se rv a tio n  and th e o r e t i c a l  s ta te m e n ts ,  
and hence o f  th e  t r u t h  o r  f a l s i t y  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s .
The f i n a l  to u c h  which needs to  be added to  f u l l y  c h a ra c te r iz eI— _____ ^
t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  th a t  th e  whole o f  th e  th e o ry  shou ld  be 
a x io m a tiz a b le  in  th e  f i r s t - o r d e r  p r e d ic a te  c a lc u lu s  w ith  i d e n t i t y .
The d e t a i l s  o f  t h i s  c a lc u lu s  had been worked o u t f i r s t  by F reg e .
F u r th e r  work by R u s s e ll  and W hitehead showed t h a t  a  s u b s ta n t i a l  p a r t  
o f  m athem atics co u ld  be reduced  to  i t ,  and so i t  seemed th a t  th e  
l a t t e r - d a y  p o s it iv is m  o f  Mach and P o in c a re  co u ld  be ex p ressed  in  th e  
modern id iom , hence d e se rv in g  th e  t i t l e  lo g ic a l  p o s i t iv is m .
I t  appears, t h a t  th e  e a r l i e s t  p u b l ic a t io n  which open ly  advoca ted
such  a  view  was a  1923 p ap e r by  R udolf Gamap on th e  ta s k  o f  p h y s ic s .
A more form al v e r s io n ,  which draws on l a t e r  fo rm u la tio n s  and
11developm ents by  C arnap , Hempel and o th e r s ,  i s  g iven  below . In 
p a r t i c u l a r ,  th e  o b se rv a tio n  language i s  p h y s i c a l i s t i c .  Throughout th e  
tw e n t ie s ,  Gamap n o t o n ly  th o u g h t a Machian p h en o m en a lis tic  language
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p o s s ib le ,  b u t a c tu a l ly  p r e f e r r e d  i t  a s  a  b a s is  f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry .
By th e  m i d - t h i r t i e s ,  how ever, i t s -  la c k  o f  i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v i t y ,  th e  
req u ire m en ts  o f  m athem atic s, and v a r io u s  argum ents o f  P o p p e r 's ,  had 
conv inced  him o th e rw is e .
A ccording to  th e  e a r ly  v iew s o f  th e  lo g i c a l  p o s i t i v i s t s ,  th e n , 
s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s  a re  to  be fo rm u la ted  a x io m a tic a l ly  in  a  f i r s t - o r d e r  
c a lc u lu s  w ith  i d e n t i t y ,  L, in  such  a way th a t  th e y  s a t i s f y  th e  c o n d it io n s :  
( i )  th e  n o n - lo g ic a l  te rm s o f  L a re  d iv id e d  in to  two d i s j o i n t  c la s s e s  
c a l le d  ' v o c a b u la r ie s ' :
(a )  th e  'o b s e rv a t io n  v o cab u la ry * , , c o n ta in in g  o b se rv a tio n  te rm s .
(b )  th e  ' t h e o r e t i c a l  v o c a b u la ry ',  7.^, c o n ta in in g  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s ,
( i i )  th e  te rm s in  7^ a re  in t e r p r e te d  as  r e f e r r in g  to  d i r e c t l y
o b se rv a b le  p h y s ic a l  o b je c ts  o r  d i r e c t l y  o b se rv a b le  p r o p e r t i e s
o f  p h y s ic a l  o b je c t s .
( i i i )  th e r e  i s  a  s e t  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s tu la te s  o r  b a s ic  laws T whose
o n ly  n o n - lo g ic a l  te rm s a re  from 7 ^ .
( iv )  th e  te rm s o f  7^ a re  e x p l i c i t l y  d e f in e d  in  te rm s o f  7^ by
'c o rre sp o n d e n c e  r u l e s '  G; i . e . ,  f o r  every  term  'F ' in  7 ^ , a  ,
d e f in i t i o n  o f  th e  fo llo w in g  form must be g iven  ; (x )(P x  = O x),
where 'O x' i s  an e x p re s s io n  o f  L whose o n ly  n o n - lo g ic a l  term s
a re  c o n ta in e d  in  V .o
Taken to g e th e r ,  c o n d itio n s  ( i ) ,  ( i i )  and ( iv ) ' en su re  M ach's c r i t e r i o n  
f o r  th e  m ean in g fu ln ess  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s .
O bviously  s e v e ra l  assum ptions a re  made in  t h i s  fo rm u la tio n : th a t  
th e r e  i s  a  v a l id  d i s t i n c t i o n  to  be drawn between o b se rv a tio n  and 
th e o r e t i c a l  te rm s , t h a t  we can fo rm a liz e  th e o r ie s  in  th e  way p re s c r ib e d ,  
t h a t  th e o r e t i c a l  term s can be g iven  e x p l i c i t  d e f in i t i o n s ,  and th a t  such 
d e f in i t i o n s  can ta k e  a  c e r t a in  form . B efore ta c k l in g  th e s e  assum ptions
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in  s e c t io n  ( i i ) ,  l e t  u s  pause to  see  how th e  p o s i t i v i s t s '  c o n s tru a l  
works in  p r a c t i c e .
By way o f  exam ple, suppose t h a t  we u n d e rs ta n d  T to  be th e  law s 
o f  c l a s s i c a l  m echanics and G to  be co rrespondence r u le s  which e x p l i c i t l y
d e f in e  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  co n cep ts  o f  T in  te rm s o f  o b se rv a b le  phenomena.
12Both T and G a re  fo rm u la ted  in  an a p p ro p r ia te  lo g i c a l  language .
Suppose t h a t  we want to  ap p ly  th e  th e o ry  TO, i . e . ,  th e  c o n ju n c tio n  o f  
T and C, to  an experim ent in v o lv in g  a  s o l id  b a l l  in  un ifo rm  m otion on 
a  f l a t  f r i c t i o n l e s s  p la n e  c o l l id in g  w ith  a  s ta t io n a r y  b a l l .  To p r e d ic t  
th e  subsequen t b eh av io u r o f  th e  two b a l l s ,  we would f i r s t  have to  
de term in e  c e r t a in  f e a tu r e s  o f  th e  experim en ta l, s i t u a t i o n ,  such a s  th e  
m asses o f  th e  b a l l s ,  th e  v e lo c i ty  o f  th e  f i r s t ,  and th e  ang le  o f  im p ac t. 
These v a r io u s  f e a tu r e s  can be d e te rm in ed  by p erfo rm in g  c e r t a in  s im ple 
o b s e rv a t io n a l  o p e r a t io n s ,  such a s  n o t in g  what numbers th e  in d ic a to r  on 
a  b a la n c e  p o in ts  to  when th e  b a l l s  a re  w eighed. Such o b se rv a tio n s  can 
be s p e c if ie d  in  te rm s o f  7 ^ , and th e n  in c o rp o ra te d  in to  correspondence 
r u le s  which c o r r e l a t e  th e s e  v a r io u s  o b se rv a tio n s  w ith  term s o f  7_^  in  
th e  fo llo w in g  m anner,
An o b je c t  x  has a  mass 2  i f f  x  i s  p la c e d  on a  b a lan ce  and th e  
p o in te r  o f  th e  b a la n c e  c o in c id e s  w ith  th e  num eral d e s ig n a t in g  number 
In  g e n e ra l ,  what i s  happen ing  h e re  i s  th a t  v a r io u s  o b se rv a tio n s  a re  
b e in g  conducted  which may be d e sc r ib e d  by  c e r t a in  t r u e  se n te n c e s  o f  7 ^ . 
U sing  th e  co rrespondence  r u le s  0 th e s e  a re  c o r r e la te d  w ith  v a r io u s  
t h e o r e t i c a l  s ta te m e n ts  o f  L such  as ' The mass o f  b a l l  a  i s  b ' . These 
t h e o r e t i c a l  s ta te m e n ts  in  tu r n  p ro v id e  a c h a r a c te r iz a t io n  o f  th e  
ex p erim en ta l s i t u a t i o n  p r io r  to  th e  c o l l i s i o n ,  and, when ta k en  to g e th e r  
w ith  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  laws T, a llo w  u s  to  p r e d ic t  th e  s t a t e s  o f  th e  
b a l l s  a t  subsequen t t im e s .
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I t  sho u ld  he c l e a r  t h a t  th e  p o s i t i v i s t s *  c o n s tru a l  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  
th e o r i e s  i s  n o t in te n d e d  to  he  a  h i s t o r i c a l  account o f  how th e o r ie s  
a c tu a l ly  come to  he formed*- At th e  tim e Gamap and th e  o th e r  
p o s i t i v i s t s  were fo rm u la tin g  t h e i r  v ie w s, a x io m a tiz a tio n  was co n fin e d  
to  m a th em atic s. A number o f  th e o r ie s  in  th e  e m p ir ic a l s c ie n c e s  have 
s in c e  been p u t in to  ax io m atic  form ; among them , p a r t s  o f  c l a s s i c a l  and 
r e l a t i v i s t i c  m echan ics, c e r t a in  segm ents o f  b io lo g ic a l  th e o ry , and th e  
concep t o f  u t i l i t y  in  economic th e o ry .  But i t  i s  s t i l l  v e ry  much th e  
e x c e p tio n  r a th e r  th a n  th e  r u l e .  S econdly , co rrespondence r u le s  a re  
n o t s t a t e d  e x p l i c i t l y ,  even in  ax io m atized  th e o r i e s ;  th e  co n n ec tio n  
betw een and 7^ i s  more a  m a tte r  o f  im p l ic i t  u n d e rs ta n d in g . I  s h a l l
d is c u s s  t h i s  more a t  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  th e  n ex t s e c t io n .  The p o in t  I
w ish to  make h e re  i s  t h a t  th e  p o s i t i v i s t s ’ view  i s  in te n d e d  as. an 
e x p l ic a t io n  o f  th e  concept o f  a  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry , n o t as a  d e s c r ip t io n  
o f  th e  p r a c t ic e  o f  s c i e n t i s t s  when f i r s t  fo rm u la tin g  th e o r i e s .  To th e  
e x te n t to  which such an e x p l ic a t io n  i s  f r u i t f u l ,  i t  i s  in te n d e d  to  
fu n c tio n  as  a  r e g u la t iv e  id e a l :  th e  b e s t  way to  u n d e rs ta n d  a  th e o ry  i s  
by  p u t t in g  i t  in  t h i s  form , f o r  in  so doing  i t  i s  made lo g i c a l ly
p e rsp ic u o u s  and th e  m eaning o f  any t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s i t  c o n ta in s  can
be u n d e rs to o d  v i a  th e  a lre a d y  known o b s e rv a tio n  language .
S e c tio n  ( i i ) :  R ev is io n s  Made to  th e  O r ig in a l F orm ula tion
Over th e  p e r io d  o f  th e  n e x t f o r ty  y e a r s ,  th e  lo g ic a l  p o s i t i v i s t s *  
v iew  underw ent c o n s id e ra b le  m o d if ic a t io n . P erh ap s th e  most im p o rtan t 
changes were th o se  r e l a t i n g  to  c o n d itio n  ( i v ) , which s p e c if ie d  th e  r o le  
o f  th e  co rrespondence  r u l e s .  The r u le s  were s a id  to  have th e  form o f  
e x p l i c i t  d e f in i t i o n s  which p ro v id e  n e c e ssa ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  o b s e rv a tio n a l
• 18.
c o n d it io n s  f o r  th e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  th e o r e t i c a l  te rm s . In th e  exam ple, 
th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  term  f o r  w hich I  p ro v id ed  a  co rrespondence  r u le  was 
’m ass’ . In  h i s  1936 p ap e r " T e s ta b i l i ty  and M eaning," Carnap drew 
a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  te rm s such as 's o l u b l e ' ,
' f r a g i l e ’ , ’v i s i b l e '  and ' co m b u s tib le ' do n o t adm it o f  e x p l i c i t  
d e f in i t i o n s  u s in g  o b s e rv a t io n a l  te rm s , y e t a re  f r e q u e n t ly  to  be found 
in  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s  and a re  c l e a r l y  m e an in g fu l. To see  why, l e t  u s  
c o n s id e r  how th e  term  'c o m b u s tib le ' m ight be d e f in e d  in  te rm s o f  
o b s e rv a b le s .  An obv ious f i r s t  c a n d id a te  would b e ;
A th in g  X i s  co m b u stib le  i f  and o n ly  i f  i t  s a t i s f i e s  th e  fo llo w in g  
c o n d it io n ;  f o r  any tim e j t ,  i f  x  i s  p la c e d  in  c o n ta c t w ith  a  ( s u i ta b ly )  
ho t o b je c t  a t  t , th e n  x w i l l  b u m  a t  
An ig n i te d  wax ta p e r  m ig h t, f o r  exam ple, be a  s u i ta b ly  ho t o b je c t .  
R endering  t h i s  d e f in i t i o n  in  f i r s t - o r d e r  p r e d ic a te  c a lc u lu s ,  we g e t ;
(x )(O x = ( t ) (Oxt D B x t) )  
where ’£ '  i s  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  term  ' i s  c o m b u s t ib le ',  'O ' th e  o b se rv a tio n  
term  ' i s  p la c e d  in  c o n ta c t w ith  a  s u i ta b ly  ho t o b je c t  a t ' ,  and 'B ' th e  
o b se rv a tio n  term  'b u m s  a t* .  But t h i s  would n o t g iv e  th e  in te n d e d , 
m eaning o f  '£ '  , f o r  th e  u n iv e r s a l ly  q u a n t i f ie d  m a te r ia l  c o n d i t io n a l  on 
th e  r ig h t-h a n d  s id e  o f  th e  b ic o n d i t io n a l  w i l l  be t r u e  by th e  o rd in a ry  
t r u th - f u n c t io n a l  d e f in i t i o n  o f  ' o '  whenever th e  a n te c e d e n t, in  t h i s  
c a se  O x t, i s  f a l s e .  That i s ,  ' ^ '  w i l l  be t r u e  o f  a n y th in g  which i s  
n ev e r p la c e d  in . c o n ta c t w ith  a  ( s u i ta b ly )  ho t o b je c t .
The o rd in a ry  m a te r ia l  c o n d i t io n a l  i s  u n s a t i s f a c to r y .  What i s  
r e q u ire d  i s  som ething  which e x p re sse s  n o t th e  id e a  o f  what happens i f  
som ething ^  p la c e d  in  c o n ta c t w ith  a  ho t o b je c t ,  b u t what would happen 
i f  i t  were so p la c e d . The form o f  e x p re ss io n  e x e m p lif ie d  h e re  i s  th e  
s u b ju n c tiv e  c o n d i t io n a l .  In  o rd e r  to  c a p tu re  i t s  s e n se , Carnap
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in tro d u c e d  what he c a l le d  " re d u c tio n  se n te n c e s"  and u se d  them to
c o n s tru c t  more complex " b i l a t e r a l  re d u c tio n  s e n t e n c e s " . T h e  l a t t e r
were th e n  u se d  to  p ro v id e  p a r t i a l  d e f in i t i o n s  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s .
An example o f  a  b i l a t e r a l  re d u c tio n  sen ten c e  which p a r t i a l l y  d e f in e s
* com bustib l e ’ would b e :
( x ) ( t ) (O x t  3  (C x s B x t) )
w hich may be re a d  a s  ' i f  any th in g  x  i s  p la c e d  in  c o n ta c t w ith  a  s u i ta b ly
h o t o b je c t  a t  tim e  _t th e n , i f  x  i s  co m b u stib le , x  b u m s  a t  , and i f
X i s  n o t co m b u stib le  i t  does n o t* . The one f u r th e r  s t ip u l a t i o n  made
by Carnap i s  t h a t  * ( x ) ( t  ) -^Oxt* sh o u ld  n o t be v a l id ,  i . e . ,  i t  sh o u ld
n o t be th e  ca se  t h a t  e v e ry th in g  i s  such  th a t  th e r e  i s  no tim e a t  which
i t  has been p la c e d  in  c o n ta c t w ith  a  s u i ta b ly  ho t o b je c t .  U n lik e  th e
a ttem p ted  e x p l i c i t  d e f in i t i o n ,  i f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  th in g  a  i s  non -co m b u stib le
y e t  h as  n ev e r been p la c e d  in  c o n ta c t w ith  a  s u i ta b ly  ho t o b je c t ,  i t
does n o t fo llo w  th a t  *Ca* i s  t r u e ;  a lth o u g h  * ( t ) (O a t  d (C a s B a t) )*  w i l l
be  t r u e .  The rea so n  why i t  i s  av o ided  i s  th a t  th e  b i l a t e r a l  re d u c tio n
sen ten c e  does n o t co m p le te ly  d e f in e  what i t  i s  f o r  som ething to  be
co m b u stib le . I t  r a th e r  s t i p u l a t e s  a  t e s t  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h a t  th e  th in g  be
15p la c e d  in  c o n ta c t w ith  a  s u i ta b ly  h o t o b je c t .
R eduction  se n te n c e s  p ro v id e  o n ly  p a r t i a l  d e f in i t i o n s  o f  th e o r e t i c a l  
te rm s because  o th e r  t e s t  s i t u a t io n s  co u ld  e q u a lly  w e ll be s t i p u l a t e d .
Thus we can say  th a t  i f  a  th in g  i s  h e a te d , th e n  w hether o r  n o t i t  b u r s t s  
in to  flam e w i l l  be an e q u a l ly  good t e s t  o f  i t s  c o m b u s t ib i l i ty .  H eating  
in  some k in d  o f  oven m ight be im agined h e re .  T h is  su g g e s ts  th e  fo llo w in g  
b i l a t e r a l  r e d u c t io n  se n te n c e ;
(x ) ( t ) (H x t  3 (Cxt = B x t))  
where *H* i s  th e  o b se rv a tio n  term  ’ i s  h ea ted  a t * .  Here we have an 
a l t e r n a t iv e  co rrespondence r u le  w hich a lso  may be s a id  to  p a r t i a l l y
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d e f in e  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  term  'c o m b u s tib le * . A lthough e i t h e r  co rrespondence 
r u le  c o n s t i tu te s  a  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d itio n  f o r  th e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  th e  
te rm , n e i th e r  s t i p u l a t e s  a  n e c e s s a ry  c o n d it io n . A ll t h a t  i s  r e q u ire d  
i s  t h a t  th e  th in g  would a c t a c c o rd in g  to  th e  r u le  i f  i t  were p la c e d  in  
th e  t e s t  s i t u a t i o n .  O ther exam ples where more th a n  one co rrespondence 
r u le  i s  a p p ro p r ia te  would b e ; * exp losive*  —  th e  th in g  may be s u b je c te d  
to  h e a t ,  d e to n a te d  by  a n o th e r  e x p lo s io n , o r  have an e l e c t r i c  c u r re n t 
p a sse d  th ro u g h  i t ;  * f r a g i le *  —  th e  th in g  may be s t r u c k ,  tw is te d  s h a rp ly , 
o r  su b je c te d  to  sounds o f  a  h ig h  freq u en cy .
A n a tu r a l  r e p ly  to  t h i s  l i n e  o f  argument i s  to  say  t h a t ,  a lth o u g h  
ta k e n  in d iv id u a l ly  th e  r u le s  do n o t s t i p u l a t e  n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t io n s ,  th e  
lo g i c a l  d is ju n c t io n  o f  them d o e s . But t h i s  r a i s e s  f u r th e r  p rob lem s.
F o r one th in g ,  i t  i s  d o u b tfu l t h a t  one cou ld  sim ply  s t a t e  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  
s e t  o f  d i s ju n c t s .  More im p o r ta n tly  though , we need  to  remember th a t  we 
a re  a f t e r  a l l  t a lk in g  about a  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry  which has a  d e f in i t e  
o b se rv a tio n  v o cab u la ry  u se d  in  th e  s p e c i f i c a t io n  o f  i t s  correspondence 
r u l e s .  As th e  l i s t  o f  d i s ju n c ts  grow s, so does th e  scope o f  th e  th e o ry .
I t  i s  d o u b tfu l t h a t  any s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry  cou ld  meet th e se  l i m i t a t i p n s .
A nother r e p ly ,  t h i s  tim e to  th e  whole d e b a te , would be t h a t  i t
seems l i k e  a  l o t  o f  t r o u b le  to  go to  f o r  th e  sake o f  d is p o s i t i o n a ls  —
can we n o t ju s t  d isp e n se  w ith  them a l to g e th e r ,  o r  a t  any r a t e  t r e a t
them as  s p e c ia l  c a se s?  P ro sp e c ts  f o r  e i t h e r  a l t e r n a t iv e  a re  gloomy
in d e e d . Both P opper and Goodman have u rg ed  th a t  a l l  p r o p e r t ie s  o f
16th in g s  a re  d i s p o s i t i o n a l .  O th ers  have m a in ta in ed  t h a t  what d i s -
17p o s i t i o n a ls  th e re  a re  in  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  a re  in d is p e n s a b le .
M oreover, we sh o u ld  a ls o  n o te  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t o n ly  d i s p o s i t io n a l s  which 
imbue s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  w ith  a  su b ju n c tiv e  c h a ra c te r  —  la w - lik e  
s ta te m e n ts  do anyway. To say  t h a t  le a d  m e lts  a t  327“ 0 i s  to  im ply
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t h a t ,  f o r  any o rd in a ry  p ie c e  o f  le a d ,  i f  i t  were h e a te d  to  327*C, th e n  
i t  would m e lt .  L ikew ise , to  say  th a t  th e  c h i ld re n  o f  b lu e -e y e d  human 
p a re n ts  a re  b lu e -e y e d  i s  to  im ply t h a t ,  i f  a  c h i ld  were bom  to  such 
p a r e n t s ,  th e n  i t  would be b lu e -e y e d . The problem  o f  su b ju n c tiv e  
c o n d i t io n a ls  i s  w ider th a n  t h a t  o f  d i s p o s i t i o n a l s .  A s a t i s f a c to r y  
s o lu t io n  has to  e x p la in  n o t o n ly  how th e  m eaning o f  d is p o s i t io n a l  
t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s can be s p e c i f i e d ,  b u t a lso  how s c i e n t i f i c  law s can , 
v i a  co rrespondence  r u le s  which r e l a t e  them to  p a r t i c u l a r  in s ta n c e s ,  
su p p o rt such c o n d i t io n a l s .
An i n t e r e s t i n g  s p e c ia l  c a se  o f  th e  su b ju n c tiv e  i s  p ro v id ed  by
th e  example a t  th e  end o f  s e c t io n  ( i ) .  In  th e  c o n te x t o f  th e  th e o ry
o f  c l a s s i c a l  m echanics to g e th e r  w ith  th e  co rrespondence r u le  I  gave,
i t  i s  tem p tin g  to  conclude th a t  what i t  means to  say  th a t  th e  mass o f
cui o b je c t  X i s  2  i s  t h a t ,  i f  x  were to  be p la c e d  on a  b a la n c e , th e n  i t
would have mass 2  i^ ' and o n ly  i f  th e  p o in te r  on th e  b a la n c e  p o in te d  to
th e  num eral To do so would be to  t r e a d  d an g ero u sly  c lo s e  to  th e
th in  ic e  o f  B ridgm an 's o p e ra t io n a l is m . a cc o rd in g  to  which co n cep ts  l i k e
'mass* and * le n g th ' a re  synonymous w ith  th e  s ta te m e n ts  d e s c r ib in g  th e
s e t  o f  o p e ra t io n s  u se d  in  t h e i r  d e te rm in a tio n .^ ^  Presum ably  th e r e  a re
o th e r  ex p erim en ta l p ro ced u re s  a p a r t  from w e i r i n g  on a  b a la n c e  which
may be u sed  to  de term ine  an o b j e c t 's  m ass, a lth o u g h  Bridgman th o u g h t
th a t  h e re  s c ie n c e  was confused  and t h a t  to  each p ro ced u re  th e re
19corresponded  a  d i f f e r e n t  c o n c e p t. I  s h a l l  n o t r e h e a rs e  th e  ag o n ies
o f  o p e ra t io n a lism  h e re ,  b u t r a th e r  s ta n d  by  H em pel's argum ents fo r  th e
20p a r t i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  such  m easurab le  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s . In  
consequence, th e  o r ig i n a l  co rrespondence  r u le  needs to  be re p la c e d  by  
one such as th e  fo llo w in g :
I f  o b je c t  X i s  p la c e d  on a  b a la n c e , th e n  th e  mass o f  x  i s  i f f  th e
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p o in te r  o f  th e  b a la n c e  c o in c id e s  w ith  th e  num eral d e s ig n a t in g  th e  
number y . '
In  th e  c o n te x t o f  th e  laws o f  c l a s s i c a l  m echanics T ^ d  th e  o th e r
co rrespondence  r u l e s ,  t h i s  p a r t i a l l y  d e f in e s  th e  m eaning o f  'mass* in
th e  sense  t h a t  i t  s p e c i f i e s  one p o s s ib le  ex p e rim en ta l p ro ced u re  f o r
i t s  d e te rm in a tio n .
We have seen  t h a t  th e  o ccu rren c e  of- d is p o s i t i o n a l  t h e o r e t i c a l
te im s  le d  Gamap to  i n t e r p r e t  co rrespondence  r u le s  as  re d u c tio n  se n te n c e s
w hich d e f in e  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s o n ly  im p l i c i t l y .  F u r th e r  re a so n s  fo r
abandoning th e  g o a l o f  e x p l i c i t  d e f in i t i o n  came to  l i g h t  when we looked
a t  th e  w ider r o le  p la y ed  by  s u b ju n c tiv e  c o n d i t io n a ls  in  s c ie n c e . The
o r ig i n a l  c o n d itio n  ( iv )  cannot be  m et; th e re w ith  th e  lo g ic a l  p o s i t i v i s t s
were fo rc e d  to  r e j e c t  th e  id e a l  o f  a  s y n th e s is  th e y  saw in  com bining
th e  view s o f  Mach and P o in c a ré .  A t h e o r e t i c a l  term  co u ld  no lo n g e r  be
h e ld  to  be n o th in g  more th a n  a  c o n v e n tio n a l d e s c r ip t io n  o f  phenomena
whose m eaning c o n s is ts  s o le ly  in  i t s  means o f  v e r i f i c a t i o n .  As Carnap
p u t i t ,  " i f  by v e r i f i c a t i o n  i s  meant a  d e f in i t i v e  and f i n a l  e s ta b lish m e n t
o f  t r u t h ,  th e n  no ( s y n th e t ic )  sen ten c e  i s  ev e r v e r i f i a b l e .  We c a n ,o n ly
21confirm  a  sen ten c e  more and m ore ."
Let u s  now lo o k  b r i e f l y  a t  what l a t e r  became o f  re d u c tio n  se n te n c e s
and s u b ju n c tiv e  c o n d i t io n a ls .  I t  m ight seem th a t  c o n d itio n  ( iv )  co u ld
be re p la c e d  by  one b ased  on th e  id e a  o f  re d u c tio n  s e n te n c e s .  I t  was
l a t e r  argued  by  H anpel, how ever, t h a t  t h i s  i s  s im ply  n o t p o s s ib le  fo r
such  te rm s as  th e  'Ÿ  ( x , t )  fu n c tio n  in  quantum m echanics, 'e le c t r o n * ,
* r i g i d  body*, *p o in t-m a ss*, and m easu rab les l i k e  * fo r c e * , 'mass* and 
22'p r e s s u r e * .  What was re q u ire d  was a  b ro a d e r view  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  
such  as th a t  su g g es ted  by Norman Campbell* s co n cep tio n  o f  a  p h y s ic a l  
th e o ry  as c o n s is t in g  o f  a  " h y p o th e s is " ,  r e p re s e n te d  by  a s e t  o f  se n te n c e s
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in  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s , and a  " d ic t io n a r y " ,  which r e l a t e s  th e  l a t t e r  to
23co n ce p ts  o f  e x p e rim en ta l s c ie n c e .  C am pbell's  d ic t io n a r y  was n o t o f  
th e  norm al k in d , how ever. I t  d id  n o t so much d e f in e  t h e o r e t i c a l  term s 
a s  fu rn is h  s ta te m e n ts  to  th e  e f f e c t  th a t  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  sen ten c e  o f  a 
c e r t a in  k in d  i s  t r u e  i f  and o n ly  i f  a  co rresp o n d in g  o b se rv a tio n  sen ten c e  
o f  a  s p e c i f ie d  k in d  i s  t r u e .  The d ic t io n a r y  th u s  p ro v id ed  r u le s  o f  
t r a n s l a t i o n  r a th e r  th a n  e x p l i c i t  d e f in i t i o n s ;  and p a r t i a l  r u le s  a t  t h a t ,  
f o r  no c la im  was made th a t  a  t r a n s l a t i o n  must be s p e c i f ie d  fo r  each 
th e o r e t i c a l  s e n te n c e .
Suppe sum m arises th e  r e s u l t a n t  p o s i t i v i s t  p ic tu r e  o f  a  s c i e n t i f i c  
th e o ry  a s  fo llo w s .
The th e o ry  . . .  h as v a r io u s  o b se rv a b le  consequences which make i t  
t e s t a b l e ;  b u t th e s e  consequences a re  n o t d e f in i t i o n a l  o f  any p a r t i c u l a r  
t h e o r e t i c a l  te rra s , b e in g  r a th e r  th e  e m p ir ic a l m a n ife s ta t io n s  o f  
t h e o r e t i c a l  e n t i t i e s  in t e r a c t in g  in  th e  ways s p e c i f ie d  by  th e  laws 
o r  axioms o f  th e  th eo ry #  The correspondence r u le s  may be c o n s tru e d  
as  th e  sum t o t a l  o f  a d m iss ib le  ex p erim en ta l p ro ced u res  fo r  a p p ly in g  
th e  th e o ry  to  o b se rv a b le  phenomena. They do n o t p ro v id e  com plete 
d e f in i t i o n s  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s; r a th e r ,  to g e th e r  w ith  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
p o s tu la te s  T, th e y  p ro v id e  th e  th e o r e t i c a l  te rm s w ith  a  p a r t i a l  
o b s e rv a tio n a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .^ ^
Given t h i s  p ic tu r e ,  an obv ious and im p o rtan t q u e s tio n  a r i s e s  as to  what
co u ld  be meant by  sa y in g  t h a t  a  th e o r e t i c a l  term  has o n ly  a  " p a r t i a l
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " .  How does i t  a c q u ire  some o f  i t s  m eaning from th e
t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s tu la te s  o r  b a s ic  law s o f  a  th e o ry ?  T his i s  a  d i f f i c u l t
q u e s tio n  to  answ er, so d i f f i c u l t  in  f a c t  t h a t  some p o s i t i v i s t s  even
chose to  fo rsa k e  th e  p ic tu r e  w hich g iv e s  r i s e  to  i t ; .w e  s h a l l  see  why
in  th e  n e x t s e c t io n .  L a te r ,  in  s e c t io n  ( i v ) ,  we s h a l l  a lso  see how t h i s
id e a  came to  form , somewhat i r o n i c a l l y ,  an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  o f  th e  more
re c e n t c r i t i c i s m s  o f  p o s i t iv is m .
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R etu rn in g  to  G am ap*s r e d u c t io n  s e n te n c e s , i t  can a lso  be  shown 
th a t  th e y  f a i l  to  g iv e  a  com plete  account o f  s u b ju n c tiv e  c o n d i t io n a ls  
in  g e n e ra l .  I  have a lre a d y  p o in te d  o u t t h a t  a  number o f  re d u c tio n  
se n te n c e s  co u ld  be g iven  f o r  a  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  p ro p e r ty  *P*, s a t i s f a c t i o n  
o f  any o f  which by  an o b je c t  would b e  a  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d itio n  f o r  *P* to  
be t r u l y  p r e d ic a te d  o f  t h a t  o b je c t .  I t  seems in e v i t a b l e ,  th ough , t h a t  
th e r e  w i l l  be c a se s  where we re c o g n iz e  an o b je c t  as  p o s se s s in g  *P*, 
d e s p i te  i t s  n o t h av in g  been p u t to  any o f  th e  t e s t s  in v o lv ed  and hence 
i t s  n o t s a t i s f y i n g  any o f  th e  c o n d i t io n s .  These w i l l  be case s  where 
th e  d i s p o s i t io n  i s  n o t a c tu a l ly  m a n ife s te d . The re d u c tio n  sen ten c es  
w i l l  th e n  f a i l  to  f u l l y  s p e c ify  w hat, e . g . ,  'e x p lo s iv e *  means, though 
we shou ld  say  we knew p e r f e c t ly  w e ll what i t  meant —  th a t  were th e  
o b je c t  to  s a t i s f y  c e r t a in  c o n d i t io n s ,  i t  would ex p lo d e . These days a 
more p ro m isin g  accoun t o f  s u b ju n c t iv e s  i s  thou g h t to  depend on th e  u se  
o f  an in te n s io n a l  lo g ic ,  much r i c h e r  th a n  th e  (e x te n s io n a l)  f i r s t - o r d e r  
c a lc u lu s  m entioned  in  my c h a r a c te r i z a t io n  o f  th e  p o s i t i v i s t s *  e a r ly  
c o n s tru a l  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s .  C le a r ly ,  t h i s  too  c a l l s  fo r  some 
r e v is io n  o f  th e  e a r l i e r  c o n s t r u a l ,  b u t to  d eb a te  i t  f u r th e r  would ta k e  
me to o  f a r  a f i e l d .
At th e  b eg in n in g  o f  s e c t io n  ( i ) ,  I  in tro d u c e d , in  an i n t u i t i v e  
way, th e  id e a  o f  a  dichotom y betw een th e o r e t i c a l  te rm s and o b se rv a tio n  
te rm s . Throughout t h a t  s e c t io n  I  co n tin u ed  to  work w ith  th e  i n t u i t i v e  
id e a ,  n o te d  i t s .  im portance f o r  Mach, and made u se  o f  i t  in  fo rm u la tin g  
th e  lo g ic a l  p o s i t i v i s t s *  e a r ly  v iew . We saw t h a t  th e  p o s i t i v i s t s  came 
to  adopt a  p h y s i c a l i s t i o  language r a th e r  th a n  a  p h en o m en a lis tic  one, 
b u t t h i s  was shown to  have l i t t l e  b e a r in g  on th e  problem  o f  th e  e x is te n c e  
o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  e n t i t i e s ,  f o r  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s were to  be e x p la in e d , 
v i a  th e  v e r i f i a b i l i t y  th e o ry  o f  m eaning, in  te rm s o f  th e  o b se rv a tio n
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lan g u ag e , w hatever i t  was* I n  t h i s  s e c t io n  we have seen th a t  such a  
re d u c t io n  w i l l  n o t g e n e ra l ly  h e  p o s s ib le .  C onsequen tly , th e  m eanings 
o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s a re  o n ly  p a r t i a l l y  d e f in e d  u s in g  th e  co rrespondence 
r u le s  to  r e l a t e  them to  o b se rv a b le  d a ta .  They a re  a ls o  supposed to  be 
p a r t i a l l y  d e f in e d  in  an im p l ic i t  way by  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s tu la te s  o r  
b a s ic  law s.
As f o r  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een th e  o b s e rv a tio n a l  and th e  
t h e o r e t i c a l ,  th e  o n ly  r e a l  a tte m p t a t  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  was made by  C arnap, 
ag a in  in  h is  p a p e r " T e s ta b i l i ty  and M eaning." Both th e re  and e lsew here  
he m a in ta in e d  th a t  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  was n e c e s s a r i ly  v ague , b u t chose to
2«5make i t  sharp  fo r  th e  sake o f  s im p l i c i ty .  For th e  p h ilo so p h e r , s a id  
C arnap , th e  c l a s s  o f  o b s e rv a t io n a l  p r o p e r t i e s  in c lu d e s  ones l i k e  ' r e d ' , 
'h a r d ' and ' h o t ' ,  w h ile  f o r  th e  p h y s ic i s t  i t  a lso  in c lu d e s  q u a n t i t a t iv e  
m agnitudes l i k e  ' l e n g t h ' , 'te m p e ra tu re ' and 't im e ' which can be m easured 
in  a  s tr a ig h tfo rw a rd  way; f o r  n e i th e r  does i t  in c lu d e  'a n  e l e c t r i c  f i e l d  
o f  such and such an am ount' .  Given a  p re d ic a te  o f  a  language L and 
an o b je c t  a ,  ju s t  so lo n g  as a  p erso n  can q u ic k ly  co n firm , on th e  b a s is  
o f  few o b s e rv a t io n s ,  u s in g  l i t t l e ,  b u t p r e f e r a b ly  n o , a p p a ra tu s  e i t h e r  
'P a ' o r  ' ~ P a ' to  such a  h ig h  degree  th a t  he w i l l  e i t h e r  accep t o r  
r e j e c t  ' ^ '  , 'P '  i s  a n -o b se rv a tio n  p r e d ic a te .  Not s u r p r i s in g ly ,  i t  was 
l a t e r  th o u g h t t h a t  t h i s  e x p la n a tio n , even p re fa c e d  by C a rn ap 's  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  would n o t do; b u t i t  s a t i s f i e d  th e  p o s i t i v i s t s  u n t i l  th e  
s i x t i e s ,  and i t  w i l l  do fo r  u s  u n t i l  th e  n e x t s e c t io n .
We a re  now in  a  p o s i t io n  to  e x p la in  more f u l l y  th e  d is p u te  between 
th e  r e a l i s t s  and th e  in s t r u m e n ta l i s t s  g iven  th e  p o s i t i v i s t s '  r e v is e d  
c o n s t r u a l .  Suppose we ag a in  ta k e  a  th e o ry  TC and t h i s  tim e c o n s id e r  
i t s  s e t  o f  e x p e rim en ta l consequences —  th e  p r e d ic t io n s  i t  can make 
abou t n o t ju s t  a  s in g le  e x p e rim en ta l s e t-u p  l i k e  th e  c o l l id in g  b a l l s
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example in  s e c t io n  ( i ) ,  b u t about a l l  experim en ts  o f  th e  r e le v a n t  k in d .
A ccording to  th e  r e a l i s t ,  th e  t r u t h  o f  t h i s  s e t  o f  p r e d ic t io n s  i s  a
n e c e s s a ry , b u t n o t a  s u f f i c i e n t ,  c o n d itio n  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  TC, I t  i s
n o t s u f f i c i e n t  b eca u se , s in c e  th e  te rm s o f  a re  c o n s tru e d  as  r e f e r r in g
to  (p o s s ib ly  n o n -o b se rv a b le )  p h y s ic a l  e n t i t i e s ,  th e  members o f  T a lso
have to  be e m p ir ic a l ly  t r u e  g e n e r a l iz a t io n s  about th o se  e n t i t i e s .  The
members o f  0 ,  in  c o n ju n c tio n  w ith  T, p a r t i a l l y  s p e c ify  th e  m eanings o f  .
th e  te rm s o f  and a ls o  p ro v id e  f a c tu a l  s ta te m e n ts  about th e  o b se rv a b le
m a n ife s ta t io n s  o f  th e  e n t i t i e s  r e f e r r e d  t o .  The in s t r u m e n ta l i s t , on
th e  o th e r  hand , d e n ie s  t h a t  th e  te rm s o f  r e f e r  to  a n y th in g , and so
does n o t a ttem p t to  p ro v id e  a  t r u th - v a lu e  fo r  TC, C e r ta in ly  th e
ex p e rim en ta l consequences w i l l  tu rn  o u t to  be t r u e  o r  f a l s e ,  b u t th a t
i s  because  th e y  c o n ta in  o n ly  te rm s from V^, T h eo rie s  b e lo n g  to  a
d i f f e r e n t  l i n g u i s t i c  c a te g o ry  from th a t  o f  s ta te m e n ts .  As N agel p u ts
i t ,  " th e o r ie s  fu n c tio n  as  r u le s  o r  p r in c ip le s  in  accordance w ith  which
e m p ir ic a l m a te r ia ls  a re  an a ly zed  o r  in fe re n c e s  drawn, r a th e r  th a n  as
p rem ises  from which f a c tu a l  c o n c lu s io n s  a re  d e d u c e d , T h e  p e r t in e n t
q u e s tio n  fo r  th e  in s t r u m e n ta l i s t  i s  w hether th e  th e o ry  i s  adequate  ,in
th e  sense  th a t  i t  en a b le s  one to  d e r iv e  ju s t  th o se  ex p erim en ta l
27consequences which a re  e m p ir ic a l ly  t r u e .
How adequa te  a re  th e s e  c o n f l i c t i n g  view s o f  th e  c o g n itiv e  s t a tu s  
o f  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s ?  The in s t r u m e n ta l i s t  view  r e c e iv e s  a  m easure 
o f  supp o rt from . th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e o r ie s  a re  o f te n  fo rm u la ted  in  te rm s 
o f  id e a l  co n cep ts  l i k e  th e  p h y s ic a l  ones o f  ' f r i c t i o n l e s s  s u r fa c e * ,
* p e r f e c t  e l a s t i c i t y ' ,  'in s ta n ta n e o u s  v e l o c i t y ' ,  e t c . ,  o r  th e  more 
m a th em atica l ones o f  ' s t r a i g h t  l i n e ' ,  ' p o i n t ' ,  and so o n . A ll t h a t  he 
r e q u ir e s  i s  t h a t  th e  th e o r ie s  in  which th e y  o ccu r prove to  be e f f e c t iv e  
in  r e p re s e n t in g  and im p ly ing  ex p e rim en ta l d a ta .  The u se  o f  such co n cep ts
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m ight even be c i t e d  by way o f  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  r e a l i s t ,  f o r  i t  would 
seem d i f f i c u l t  to  m a in ta in  t h a t  th e r e  a re  such p r o p e r t ie s  as p e r f e c t  
e l a s t i c i t y  and in s ta n ta n e o u s  v e l o c i ty ,  o r  such th in g s  as  f r i o t i o n l e s s  
s u r fa c e s  and p o in t m asses. In  r e p ly  i t  cou ld  be s a id  t h a t  a  p ro p e r ty  
such  as  p e r f e c t  e l a s t i c i t y ,  o r  o b je c ts  such as f r i o t i o n l e s s  s u r f a c e s ,  
a re  u sed  as  s im p lify in g  d ev ices  in  th e o ry  c o n s tru c t io n  and t h a t ,  when 
i t  comes to  a c tu a l ly  u s in g  th e  th e o r i e s  in  p r a c t ic e  and c o l le c t in g  
d a ta ,  a llow ance has to  be made f o r  th e s e  s im p l i f ic a t io n s ,  A p ro p e r ty  
l i k e  ' in s ta n ta n e o u s  v e lo c i ty * , on th e  o th e r  hand , fu n c tio n s  as a  
l im i t in g  c o n c e p t. Even though  we may n o t be a b le  to  m easure i t ,  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  a  th e o ry  in  which i t  o c c u rs  p ro v id e s  a c c e p ta b le  d a ta  (and 
why e l s e  would we co n tin u e  to  u se  th e  th e o ry ? )  shows th e  th e o ry  to  be 
a d e q u a te , and i s  th u s  s u f f i c i e n t  re a so n  fo r  th e  r e a l i s t  to  a s c r ib e  th e  
p ro p e r ty  to  o b je c t s .  To r e p ly  t h a t  m e a s u ra b i l i ty  i s  a  n e c e ss a ry
c o n d itio n  f o r  a p ro p e r ty ’ s b e in g  " s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  a c c e p ta b le "  — 
w hatever t h a t  may mean —  i s  sim ply  to  beg  th e  q u e s tio n  a g a in s t  th e  
r e a l i s t .
A more d i f f i c u l t  problem  fo r  r e a l is m , though ag a in  one th a t  ,
in s tru m e n ta lism  can ta k e  in  i t s  s t r i d e ,  i s  th a t  a p p a re n tly  in co m p a tib le
th e o r ie s  a re  sometimes u se d  in  th e  same ex p e rim en ta l domain. N agel
p re s e n ts  i t  l i k e  t h i s .
In in q u i r ie s  in to  th e  th e rm a l p r o p e r t ie s  o f  a  gas we u se  a  th e o ry  
which a n a ly zes  a  gas as an a g g re g a tio n  o f  d i s c r e t e  p a r t i c l e s ,  
a lth o u g h  when we s tu d y  a c o u s t ic  phenomena in  co n n ec tio n  w ith  gases  
we employ a  th e o ry  which r e p re s e n ts  th e  gas as a  co n tin u o u s medium. 
C onstrued  as  s ta te m e n ts  t h a t  a re  e i t h e r  t r u e  o r  f a l s e ,  th e  two 
th e o r ie s  a re  on th e  face  o f  i t  m u tu a lly  in c o m p a tib le . But c o n s tru e d  
as  te c h n iq u e s  o r  le a d in g  p r in c ip le s  o f  in f e r e n c e ,  th e  th e o r ie s  a re  
sim ply  d i f f e r e n t  though com plem entary in s tru m e n ts , each o f  which 
i s  an e f f e c t iv e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  to o l  f o r  d e a lin g  w ith  a  s p e c ia l  range 
o f  q u e s t io n s . 28
.28.
He a ls o  o f f e r s  a  tw o - f o ld 'r e p ly  on b e h a l f  o f  th e  r e a l i s t .  The f i r s t
p a r t  c o n s is t s  in  n o tin g  th a t  som etim es one o f  th e  th e o r ie s  i s  more
complex th a n  th e  o th e r  b u t "does n o t y ie ld  co n c lu s io n s  in  b e t t e r
29agreem ent w ith  th e  f a c t s . "  In  such  a  case  " th e  s im p le r  th e o ry  can
be re g a rd e d  a s  in  a  sen se  a  s p e c ia l  case  o f  th e  more complex on e , r a th e r
th a n  a s  a  c o n t r a r y . A n  obv ious example h e re ,  though n o t one g iven
by  N agel, i s  th e  f re q u e n t u se  o f  th e  laws o f  N ewtonian m echanics in s te a d
o f  th e  more com plex, though more a c c u ra te ,  laws o f  s p e c ia l  r e l a t i v i t y .
A nother i s  t h a t  m entioned  by  N agel —  a  p a r t i c l e  th e o ry  and a  l i q u id
or^ co n tin u o u s medium th e o ry  b o th  u se d  to  d e s c r ib e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  th e
same s u b s ta n c e . The l a t t e r  i s ,  in  a  s e n s e , a  s p e c ia l  case  o f  th e  form er
s in c e  p r o p e r t ie s  o f  l i q u id s  a re  th o se  o f  la rg e  numbers o f  p a r t i c l e s
a c t in g  to g e th e r ;  th e  law s govern in g  ag g reg a te s  approxim ate th o se
g o vern ing  c o n tin u a  " in  th e  l a r g e " .
The second p a r t  o f  N a g e l 's  r e p ly  concerns c a se s  where th e r e
ap p ea rs  to  be n o t d e r i v a b i l i t y  " in  th e  l i m i t " ,  b u t genuine in c o n s is te n c y ,
l i k e  t h a t  seen  in  atom ic th e o ry  a t  th e  tu rn  o f  t h i s  c e n tu ry . N agel say s
th a t  h e re  th e  r e a l i s t  can t r e a t  b o th  as  tem porary  f o r  a s  lo n g  as p ro v es
n e c e ss a ry ; "he can i n s i s t  on th e  c o r r ig ib le  c h a ra c te r  o f  every  th e o ry
31and re fu s e  to  c la im  f i n a l  t r u t h  f o r  any th e o ry ."  For th e  tim e b e in g , 
p e rh a p s , th e y  fu n c tio n  a s  th e  in s t r u m e n ta l i s t  says  —  th e y  a re  in s tru m e n ts  
u se d  to  a c q u ire  f u r th e r  e x p e rim en ta l d a ta .  M eanwhile, as  N agel o b se rv e s , 
th e r e  i s  a  pow erfu l in c e n t iv e  f o r  th e  c o n s tru c t io n  o f  a  more in c lu s iv e  
b u t c o n s is te n t  t h e o r e t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e .  He can a ls o  p o in t  to  th e  re a so n s  
f o r  say in g  t h a t  th e  p re s e n t  th e o r ie s  a re  in c o n s i s t e n t ,  i . e . ,  to  th e  
re a so n s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  t r u th - v a lu e s  b e in g  a ss ig n e d  to  th e  same s ta te m e n t.
I  s h a l l  d is c u s s  t h i s  more a t  th e  b eg in n in g  o f  C hap ter 2 .
The r e a l i s t  has h i s  p rob lem s, bu t th e re  does seem to  be hope o f
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s o lv in g  them . By com parison , th e  i n s t r u m e n ta l i s t 's  problem s can be
shown to  be f a r  more s e r io u s .  An obv ious q u e s tio n  to  p u t to  th e
in s t r u m e n ta l i s t  i s  why he sh o u ld  th in k  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s n e c e s sa ry  a t
a l l .  We have seen  t h a t  th e y  canno t be  e x p l i c i t l y  d e f in e d  u s in g
o b s e rv a t io n a l  te rm s o n ly , b u t a l l  t h a t  th e  in s t r u m e n ta l i s t  w ants to
u se  them f o r  i s  d e r iv in g  th e  c l a s s  o f  ex p e rim en ta l consequences from
TC w hich can th e n  be te s te d *  Could t h i s  c l a s s  n o t be s p e c i f ie d  s t r a i g h t
o f f ,  w ith o u t re c o u rse  to  TC? The s c i e n t i s t  does u se  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s ,
b u t in  a  r a t i o n a l  r e c o n s tru c t io n  o f  h i s  th e o ry  i s  th e r e  any rea so n  to ?
In  th e  p a s t ,  some in s t r u m e n ta l i s t s  th o u g h t t h a t  an ap p ea l to  e i t h e r
C r a ig 's  Theorem o r  th e  u se  o f  s o - c a l l e d  Ramsey se n te n c e s  would j u s t i f y
a  n e g a tiv e  answ er to  th e  l a t t e r  q u e s t io n .  I t  has s in c e  come to  be
re c o g n iz e d , how ever, t h a t  th e  c o r r e c t  answ er i s  in  th e  a f f i r m a t iv e .
C oncluding h i s  a u th o r i t a t iv e  s tu d y  o f  th e  d e b a te , Hemp e l  w r i te s ,  " i f  i t
i s  reco g n ized  t h a t  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  th e o ry  sh o u ld  p ro v id e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s
a lso  fo r  in d u c tiv e  e x p la n a to ry  and p r e d ic t iv e  u se  and th a t  i t  sho u ld
ach iev e  s y s te m a tic  economy and h e u r i s t i c  f e r t i l i t y ,  th e n  i t  i s  c l e a r
t h a t  t h e o r e t i c a l  fo rm u la tio n s  cannot be re p la c e d  by e x p re ss io n s  in ,
32te rm s o f  o b se rv a b le s  o n ly ."  As a  consequence, in s tru m e n ta lism  seems 
to  be in  th e  r a th e r  u n co m fo rtab le  p o s i t io n  o f  a c c e p tin g  th e  fo llo w in g  
th e s e s  about t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s ;
( i )  th e y  a re  n e c e ss a ry  f o r  th e  fo rm u la tio n  and in t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  ■ 
s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s ,
( i i )  th e y  a re  n e i th e r  r e d u c ib le  to  n o r r e p la c e a b le  by  o b s e rv a tio n  
te rm s , y e t
( i i i )  th e y  do n o t r e f e r  to  a n y th in g , and
( iv )  th e y  do n o t mean a n y th in g  ( s in c e  i t  makes no sense  to  a s c r ib e  
a  t r u th - v a lu e  to  s ta te m e n ts  o f  th e o ry ) .
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H appily  i t  i s  n o t th e  o b je c t  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  to  e x t r i c a t e  
in s tru m e n ta lism  from t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y .  In  l i k e  m anner, I  s h a l l  sim ply  
c i t e  some o f  P o p p e r 's  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  in s tru m e n ta lism  in  th e  n ex t s e c t io n  
w ith o u t a tte m p tin g  to  r e p ly  to  any o f  them . What I  want t o e v e n tu a lly  ^  
move on to  i s  a  problem  co n ce rn in g  th e  grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge 
t h a t  i s  posed  by  a  t h i r d  v iew  o f  th e  c o g n itiv e  s t a t u s  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  
th e o r i e s  —  r e la t iv i s m  (o r  's u p e r - r e a l i s m ' as  i t  has a lso  been c a l l e d ) .
In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  I  want to  e x p la in  how I  th in k  a  r e a l i s t  shou ld  respond  
to  i t .  But b e fo re  do ing  so , I  s h a l l  end t h i s  s e c t io n  by o u t l in in g  th e  
i n t u i t i v e  id e a s  about th e  grow th o f  s c ie n c e  which th e  lo g ic a l  p o s i t i v i s t s  
combined w ith  t h e i r  r e v is e d  accoun t o f  th e  n a tu re  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s .  
The r e s u l t a n t  com bination  became th e  p rim ary  s ta lk in g -h o r s e  f o r  th e  
r e l a t i v i s t .
Suppose we have some w e ll-c o n firm e d  th e o ry  TC, i . e . ,  one which 
e x p la in s  a  la rg e  number o f  o b se rv ed  r e g u l a r i t i e s  and has p assed  a  
s u f f i c i e n t  v a r i e ty  o f  t e s t s .  In th e  h is to r y  o f  s c ie n c e  many such 
th e o r ie s  have come to  be re p la c e d  by  o th e r s .  How i s  t h i s  to  be u n d er­
s to o d ?  The p o s i t i v i s t s '  r e p ly  was tw o - fo ld . In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e  we 
may ex tend  TC in  o rd e r  to  p r e d ic t  new phenomena. T h is n e c e s s i t a t e s  
e i t h e r  th e  in t ro d u c t io n  o f  new correspondence r u le s  o r  th e  supplem en ting  
o f  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s tu la te s ,  which g iv e  th e  c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d  new 
th e o r i e s  TC and T'C r e s p e c t iv e ly .  We can th e n  t e s t  th e s e  new th e o r ie s  
a g a in s t  t h e i r  p r e d ic t io n s ;  i f  th e y  prove in c o r r e c t  we r e j e c t  TC o r  
T'C,  a lth o u g h  we a re  f r e e  to  r e t a i n  TO; i f  th e y  prove c o r re c t  we accep t 
TC o r  T'C and we a re  th e n  f r e e  to  p r e s s  on to  TC ' ,  e t c .  Once we have 
e s ta b l is h e d  a  th e o ry  l i k e  TC we can work from i t  and so in c re a s e  ou r 
s to c k  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge. An example o f  s u c c e s s fu l  th e o ry  e x te n s io n  
i s  th e  developm ent o f  th e  th e o ry  o f  m echanics. O r ig in a l ly  i t  was
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fo rm u la ted  to  d e s c r ib e  th e  m otions o f  p o in t-m a sse s , and was l a t e r  
ex tended  to  encompass th e  m otions o f  r i g i d  b o d ie s .
Every so o f te n  i t  tu r n s  o u t t h a t ,  o f  two th e o r ie s  which were 
o r i g i n a l l y  fo rm u la te d  in  d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s ,  one may be reduced  t o ,  o r  - 
subsumed u n d e r , th e  o th e r .  As exam ples o f  t h i s  i t  i s  common to  c i t e  
th e  re d u c tio n  o f  therm odynam ics to  s t a t i s t i c a l  m echan ics, th e  subsum ption 
o f  th e  laws o f  p h y s ic a l  o p t i c s  to  quantum m echan ics, and th e  re d u c tio n  
o f  K e p le r 's  p la n e ta ry  laws and G a l i l e o 's  t e r r e s t i a l  laws to  Newtonian 
dynam ics. T h is su g g e s ts  a  second way in  which w e ll-c o n firm ed  th e o r ie s  
come to  be r e p la c e d .
What makes th e o ry  re d u c t io n  much more complex th an  th e o ry  e x te n s io n  
i s  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  th e o r ie s  a re  from d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s .  As N agel s a y s , 
" th e  secondary  sc ie n c e  [ i . e . , th e  th e o ry  b e in g  reduced  o r  subsum edj 
employs in  i t s  fo rm u la tio n s  o f  law s and th e o r ie s  a  number o f  d i s t i n c t i v e  
d e s c r ip t iv e  p r e d ic a te s  th a t  a re  n o t in c lu d e d  in  th e  b a s ic  th e o r e t i c a l  
te rm s o r  in  th e  a s s o c ia te d  r u le s  o f  co rrespondence o f  th e  p rim ary  
s c i e n c e . T h i s  means t h a t  n o t a l l  o f  th e  te rm s o f  th e  secondary  
th e o ry  a re  c o n ta in e d  in  th e  p rim ary  o n e . 'H eat* , 'te m p e ra tu re ' and 
'e n tro p y * , f o r  exam ple, a l l  o ccu r in  therm odynam ics w hereas none o f  
them o ccu r in  s t a t i s t i c a l  m echan ics. N agel, in  r e f in in g  th e  c l a s s i c  
tre a tm e n t o f  th e  problem  by Kemeny and O p p e n h e i m , ^ ^  i g  th u s  le d  to  
s p e c ify  th e  fo llo w in g  c r i t e r i a  a s  n e c e ssa ry  f o r  e f f e c t in g  such re d u c tio n s :
(a )  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s o f  b o th  th e o r ie s  must have "meanings
unam biguously  f ix e d  by c o d i f ie d  r u le s  o f  u sage o r  by  e s ta b l is h e d
35p ro ced u res  a p p ro p r ia te  to  each  d i s c i p l i n e ;"
(b ) when a  t h e o r e t i c a l  term  'A* o ccu rs  in  th e  secondary  th e o ry  b u t 
n o t in  th e  p rim ary  th e o ry , " ( l )  A ssum ptions o f  some k in d  must be 
in tro d u c e d  w hich p o s tu la te  s u i t a b le  r e l a t i o n s  betw een w hatever i s
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s ig n i f i e d  by *A* and t r a i t s  r e p re s e n te d  by  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s a lre a d y  
p re s e n t  in  th e  p rim ary  s c ie n c e .  . . .  ( 2 ) With th e  h e lp  o f  th e s e  a d d i t io n a l  
assu m p tio n s, a l l  th e  laws o f  th e  secondary  s c ie n c e , in c lu d in g  th o se  
c o n ta in in g  th e  teiro 'A*, must be  l o g i c a l ly  d e r iv a b le  from th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
p rem ises  and t h e i r  a s s o c ia te d  c o o rd in a tin g  d e f in i t i o n s  in  th e  p rim ary  
d i s c i p l i n e .
S e c tio n  ( i i i ) ;  P a ls i f ic a t io n is r a  and th e  A pparent Demise o f  P o s itiv is m
U n d ers tan d in g  th e  background and developm ent o f  lo g ic a l  p o s it iv is m  
has so f a r  been th e  main co n ce rn . A lthough th e  p o s i t i v i s t s '  account 
o f  th e  n a tu re  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  dom inated d is c u s s io n  in  th e  
p h ilo so p h y  o f  s c ie n c e  f o r  much o f  th e  e a r ly  p a r t  o f  t h i s  c e n tu ry , i t  
sh o u ld  n o t be th o u g h t t h a t  even d u rin g  t h i s  p e r io d  i t  was n o t w ith o u t 
i t s  s tau n ch  c r i t i c s  who had t h e i r  own accoun ts  to  o f f e r .  The s ta u n c h e s t 
o f  th e s e ,  who o f f e r e d  what p roved  to  be a  f r u i t f u l  r i v a l  a cc o u n t, was 
K arl P o p p er.
Prom th e  e a r ly  days o f  th e  V ienna C ir c le ,  Popper r e je c te d  th e  
v e r i f i a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  o f  m eaning on th e  ground th a t  Home's argum ents 
a g a in s t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  l o g i c a l l y  ju s t i f y in g  in d u c tio n  showed th a t  
s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s  cannot be v e r i f i e d  by any p o s s ib le  accum ula tion  o f  
o b s e rv a t io n a l  e v id e n c e . In deed , he was convinced  th a t  " th e  problem  o f  
m eaning" was o f  no r e a l  im p o rtan ce . The p o s i t i v i s t  a ttem p t to  f in d  a 
c r i t e r i o n  o f  c o g n it iv e  s ig n if ic a n c e  co u ld  le a d  to  no p o s i t iv e  r e s u l t s ,  
o n ly  to  th e  se ttin g M ip  o f  a r b i t r a r y  s t i p u l a t i o n s ,  w h ils t  le a v in g  
u n touched  th e  im p o rtan t problem  o f  d is t in g u is h in g  sc ie n c e  from "pseudo­
s c ie n c e " .  "P se u d o -sc ie n c e " , a c c o rd in g  to  P opper, in c lu d e s  n o t o n ly  
t r a d i t i o n a l  m e tap h y sics  b u t a lso  a s tro lo g y ,  which c la im s to  be e m p ir ic a l ,
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37and such, o s te n s ib ly  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  as  p s y c h o -a n a ly s is .  As a  means 
o f  s o lv in g  t h i s  problem  o f  d em arca tio n , he in tro d u c e d  th e  " c r i t e r io n  o f  
f a l s i f i a b i l i t y " : a  th e o ry  o r  h y p o th e s is  i s  " s c i e n t i f i c "  i f  and o n ly  i f  
i t  can be r e f u te d  by  o b s e rv a t io n a l  e v id en ce .
Popper i s  a ls o  s t ro n g ly  c r i t i c a l  o f  th o se  who, l i k e  th e  p o s i t i v i s t s ,  
s eek  to  an a ly ze  th e o r ie s  u s in g  a r t i f i c i a l  lo g ic a l  c a l c u l i .  The c e n t r a l  
problem  n o t o n ly  in  th e  p h ilo so p h y  o f  s c ie n c e  b u t a lso  in  th e  whole o f  
ep istem o logy  i s  th e  grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge. T his cannot be 
reduced  to  a  s tu d y  o f  lo g i c a l  c a l c u l i ,  n o r can any such "model language" 
have a  b e a r in g  on th e  prob lem .
Not s u r p r i s in g ly .  P o p p e r 's  em phasis on f a l s i f i c a t i o n  le a d s  him 
to  g iv e  a  d i f f e r e n t  accoun t o f  th e  grow th o f  s c ie n c e .  I t  was n o te d  a t  
th e  end o f  th e  p re v io u s  s e c t io n  th a t  one way in  which th e  p o s i t i v i s t s  
saw sc ie n c e  p ro g re s s in g  was by  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  p re v io u s ly  w e ll-c o n firm ed  
t h e o r i e s .  But c o n f irm a tio n , a c c o rd in g  to  P opper, i s  as  weak a  n o tio n  
a s  v e r i f i c a t i o n ,  s in c e  i t  i s  n e a r ly  always p o s s ib le  to  f in d  c o n firm a tio n  
f o r  a  h y p o th e s is  o r  th e o ry .  The im p o rtan t q u e s tio n  i s  w hether a  th e o ry  
h as  been th o ro u g h ly  t e s t e d .  I f  so th e n  th e  e x te n t to  which th e  th e o ry  
has p assed  th e  t e s t s  i s  th e  e x te n t to  which i t  has been " c o r ro b o ra te d " . 
R ig h tly  u n d e rs to o d , th e o r ie s  a re  c o n je c tu re s ,  i . e . ,  th e y  a re  " h ig h ly  
in fo rm a tiv e  g u esses  about th e  w orld  which a lth o u g h  n o t v e r i f i a b l e  ( i . e . ,  
cap a b le  o f  b e in g  shown t r u e )  can be su b m itted  to  sev e re  c r i t i c a l  t e s t s .  
They a re  s e r io u s  a tte m p ts  to  d is c o v e r  th e  t r u t h  . . .  even though we do 
n o t know, and may p erh ap s n e v e r  know, w hether [ th e y  a r e ]  t r u e  o r  n o t ." ^ ^  
C onsequen tly  s c ie n c e  ought to  encourage th e  g r e a t e s t  p o s s ib le  p r o l i f ­
e r a t io n  o f  th e o r i e s ,  s u b je c t in g  a  wide v a r i e ty  o f  th e o r ie s  to  p o s s ib le  
e m p ir ic a l f a l s i f i c a t i o n *
In  p r a c t i c e ,  how ever, i t  i s  n ev e r th e  case  t h a t  a  th e o ry  i s
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r e j e c te d  sim ply  on th e  b a s i s  o f  i t s  f a i l i n g  one o r  more e m p ir ic a l t e s t s .  
For one th e o ry  to  be  r e j e c te d  th e r e  has to  be an o th e r which ta k e s  i t s  
p l a c e T h e  id e a l  s i t u a t io n  i s  where we have two th e o r ie s  w hich b o th  
e x p la in  a la rg e  number o f  o b se rv ed  r e g u l a r i t i e s  b u t which p r e d ic t  
d i f f e r e n t  outcom es g iven  th e  same ex p erim en ta l s i t u a t i o n .  In  such  c a se s  
we may ap p ea l to  " c r u c ia l  ex p erim en ts"  to  dec id e  betw een them . Some 
f r e q u e n t ly  c i t e d  exam ples o f  c r u c i a l  ,e ^ e r im e n ts  a r e ;  th e  anomalous 
b eh av io u r o f  M ercu ry 's  p e r ih e l io n ,  which was u se d  as a  c r u c ia l  p ie c e  
o f  ev idence in  fav o u r o f  E i n s t e i n 's  th e o ry  and a g a in s t  N ew ton 's; Y oung's 
t w o - s l i t  ex p erim en t, which su p p o rted  Huyghen's wave o p t i c s  a g a in s t  
N ew ton 's se m i-c o rp u sc u la r  th e o ry ;  M ichelson and M o rley 's  experim ent 
w hich was u sed  to  d isc o u n t th e  th e o ry  o f  th e  lu m in ife ro u s  e th e r  in  
fav o u r o f  th e  th e o ry  o f  r e l a t i v i t y .  In  each case  a  p re v io u s ly  h e ld ,  
w e ll-c o r ro b o ra te d  th e o ry  was re p la c e d  by a n o th e r .
What Popper i s  t r y i n g  to  em phasise i s  t h a t  " sc ie n c e  i s  n o t a 
system  o f  c e r t a i n ,  o r  w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d ,  s ta te m e n ts ;  n o r i s  i t  a  system  
which s t e a d i ly  advances tow ards a  s t a t e  o f  f i n a l i t y . T h e  o p p o s ite  
view  ap p ea rs  to  be th a t  e n c a p su la te d  in  th e  p o s i t i v i s t s '  account o f  
th e  grow th o f  s c ie n c e  as c o n s is t in g  o f  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  w e ll-c o n firm ed  
th e o r ie s  and th e  re d u c tio n  o f  one w e ll-c o n firm ed  th e o ry  to  a n o th e r .  
R ath e r th a n  a t te m p tin g  to  assess  th e  r e l a t i v e  m e r i ts  o f  th e s e  a c c o u n ts , 
th o u g h , I  s h a l l  e x p la in  how th e  r e l a t i v i s t ' s  c r i t i c i s m s  app ly  to  b o th .
The em phasis on t e s t a b i l i t y  has f a r - r e a c h in g  e f f e c t s ;  i t  a lso  
le a d s  Popper to  r e j e c t  th e  in s t r u m e n ta l i s t  view  o f  t h e o r i e s .  As we 
have s e e n , th e  in s t r u m e n ta l i s t  v iew s them m ere ly  as in s tru m e n ts  which 
en ab le  th e  s c i e n t i s t  to  i n f e r  f u r th e r  phenomena from phenomena a lre a d y  
g iv e n . Popper e x p re sse s  t h i s  by  say in g  th a t  th e  in s t r u m e n ta l is t  
a s s im i la te s  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  to  com putation  r u le s  o r  r u le s  o f
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in fe re n c e .  H is c r i t i c i s m  o f  such  an a s s im i la t io n  i s  th r e e - f o ld :  th e
t e s t i n g  o f  a  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry  i s  c a r r i e d  ou t in  a  d i f f e r e n t  way from
th e  t r y in g  o u t o f  a  com putation  r u l e ;  th e  s k i l l  which th e  a p p l ic a t io n
o f  com putation  r u le s  r e q u ir e s  i s  q u i te  d i f f e r e n t  from th a t  needed  fo r
th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  d is c u s s io n ,  and th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  d e te m in a t io n ,  o f  th e
l i m i t s  o f  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  t h e o r i e s ;  f i n a l l y ,  th e  t h e o r i s t ' s  i n t e r e s t
i s  in  t e s t a b l e  e x p la n a to ry  th e o r i e s ,  " a p p lic a t io n s  and p r e d ic t io n s
i n t e r e s t  him o n ly  f o r  t h e o r e t i c a l  re a so n s  —  b ecause  th e y  may be u sed
4.2as  t e s t s  o f  t h e o r i e s . "
A ccording to  P o p p er, th e  d e n ia l  o f  in s tru m e n ta lism  re q u ire s
accep tan ce  o f  th e  view  th a t  th e  s c i e n t i s t  aims a t  f in d in g  a  t r u e  th e o ry
o r  d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  r e g u l a r i t i e s  o f  th e  w orld , a  th e o ry  which w i l l
a ls o  be an e x p la n a tio n  o f  th e  o b se rv a b le  f a c t s .  He f u r th e r  su p p o rts
th e  r e a l i s t  by  a rg u in g  t h a t ,  a lth o u g h  c o n je c tu r a l ,  th e o r ie s  a t  l e a s t
c la im  to  d e s c r ib e  som ething  r e a l .  Indeed , i t  i s  when a  th e o ry  i s
f a l s i f i e d  t h a t  we can say  r e a l i t y  h as  been to u c h ed .
T h eo rie s  a re  o u r own in v e n tio n s ,  o u r own id e a s ;  th e y  a re  n o t fo rc e d  
upon u s ,  b u t a re  o u r se lf-m ad e  in s tru m e n ts  o f  thou g h t : t h i s  has been 
c l e a r ly  seen  by th e  i d e a l i s t .  But some o f  th e s e  th e o r ie s  o f  o u rs  
can c la s h  w ith  r e a l i t y ;  and when th e y  do, we know th a t  th e re  i s  a  
r e a l i t y ;  t h a t  th e r e  i s  som ething  to  rem ind u s  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  o u r 
id e a s  may be m is ta k e n . And t h i s  i s  why th e  r e a l i s t  i s  r ig h t
In  k eep in g  w ith  t h i s  i s  P o p p e r 's  " s e a r c h l ig h t"  th e o ry  o f  know ledge, 
ac c o rd in g  to  w hich o u r d is c o v e r ie s  a re  gu ided  by  th e o ry ,  r a th e r  th a n  
th e o r i e s  b e in g  d is c o v e r ie s  due to  o b s e rv a tio n .  In th e  l a s t  s e c t io n  I  
n o te d  th e  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  c h a r a c te r  o f  th e o r ie s  and la w - lik e  s ta te m e n ts .
I  a lso  n o te d  th a t  Popper h e ld  a l l  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  o b je c ts  to  be 
d is p o s i t i o n a l  —  even ' r e d '  i s ,  he s a y s , s in c e  "a  th in g  i s  re d  i f  i t  
i s  a b le  to  r e f l e c t  a  c e r t a in  k in d  o f  l i g h t . H e  adm its t h a t  th e r e
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a re  d eg rees  o f  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  c h a r a c te r ,  c o rre sp o n d in g  f a i r l y  c lo s e ly
to  th e  c o n je c tu r a l  o r  h y p o th e t ic a l  c h a ra c te r  o f  th e o r i e s ,  h u t th e r e  i s
no r i g i d  d i s t i n c t i o n  to  he drawn betw een o b s e rv a tio n  and t h e o r e t i c a l
te rm s . A ll te rm s , b e in g  d i s p o s i t i o n a l ,  su p p o rt la w - lik e  s ta te m e n ts .
Hence, " a l l  te rm s a re  t h e o r e t i c a l  to  some d e g re e , though some a re  more
th e o r e t i c a l  th a n  o th e r s
T his n a t u r a l ly  le a d s  to  an obv ious and c r u c i a l  q u e s tio n s  a  th e o ry
i s  r e f t i te d  as  a  r e s u l t  o f  o b s e rv a tio n s  c o n tra ry  to  th o se  i t  p r e d i c t s ,
b u t i f  a l l  te rm s a re  t h e o r e t i c a l  to  some d e g re e , what g u a ran tee  do we
have t h a t  an o b s e rv a tio n  r e p o r t  o f  a  c r u c ia l  experim ent w i l l  enab le
u s  to  d ec id e  betw een two d i f f e r e n t  th e o r ie s ?  To make t h i s  p o in t
1 2c l e a r e r ,  suppose we have two com peting th e o r ie s  T and T , and a  c r u c ia l  
experim ent E i s  p roposed  to  d ec id e  betw een them . The te rm s u se d  in  
r e p o r t in g  o b se rv a tio n s  o f  E w i l l  h av e , acc o rd in g  to  P o p p er, some 
th e o r e t i c a l  c o n te n t;  p e rh ap s  t h i s  c o n te n t w i l l  be d e r iv e d  from T^,
2But in  t h a t  case  why sh o u ld  we even suppose t h a t  i t  co u ld  su p p o rt T 
1r a th e r  th a n  T ? We a re  on th e  b r in k  o f  what P eyerabend f o r e s e e s .
Each th e o ry  w i l l  p o s se ss  i t s  own e x p e rie n c e , and th e re  w i l l  be no 
o v e rla p  betw een th e s e  e x p e r ie n c e s .  C le a r ly ,  a  c r u c ia l  experim ent 
i s  now im p o ss ib le . I t  i s  im p o ss ib le  n o t,b e c a u se  th e  ex p erim en ta l 
dev ice  would b e  to o  complex o r  ex p en siv e , b u t b ecause  th e re  i s  no 
u n iv e r s a l ly  a c c e p te d  s ta te m e n t cap ab le  o f  e x p re s s in g  w hatever 
emerges from o b s e rv a tio n .^ ^
P o p p er’ s argum ent a g a in s t  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een o b se rv a tio n
and th e o r e t i c a l  te rm s can be av o ided  i f ,  as Gamap h e ld , th e o r e t i c a l
te rm s can be d is t in g u is h e d  w ith o u t re c o u rse  to  d i s p o s i t i o n a l s .  But.
th e r e  i s  a  problem  w ith  C arnap’ s account even a t  th e  o u t s e t .  I t  w i l l
b e  remembered th a t  he d is t in g u is h e s  betw een th o se  p r o p e r t ie s  co n s id e re d
o b s e rv a tio n a l  by  th e  p h ilo so p h e r  and th o se  c o n s id e re d  o b s e rv a tio n a l
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by  th e  p h y s ic is t*  T h is  a lre a d y  su g g e s ts  a  f o u r - f o ld  d i s t i n c t i o n .  
G e n e ra liz in g  t h i s  p o in t ,  A c h in s te in  w r i te s ,  "how many a s p e c ts  o f  an 
ite m , and w hich o n e s , I  must a t te n d  to  b e fo re  I  can be  s a id  to  o b serv e  
i t  w i l l  depend upon my conce rn s  and k n o w l e d g e . I t  b e g in s  to  sound 
a s  though w h a t.c o u n ts  as  an o b s e rv a tio n  v a r ie s  from o b se rv e r  to  o b se rv e r  
w ith  th e  amount o f  knowledge each  b r in g s  w ith  them .
N.R. Hanson co in ed  a  v e ry  u s e f u l  word h e re :  he u rg e s  t h a t  what 
we o r d in a r i ly  c o n s id e r  to  be d e s c r ip t iv e ,  o b se rv a tio n  te rm s a re  " th e o ry -  
la d e n " .^ ^  That i s ,  we ap p ly  them s p e c i f i c a l l y  in  th e  l i g h t  o f  th e  
th e o r i e s  and laws th a t  we happen to  s u b sc r ib e  t o .  As an example he 
c o n s id e rs  a  p h y s ic i s t  lo o k in g  a t  a  p ie c e  o f  a p p a ra tu s  and s e e in g  an 
X -ray  tu b e . The n eo p h y te , lo o k in g  a t  th e  same o b je c t ,  o b se rv es  r a th e r  
• " a  g la s s  and m e ta l in s tru m e n t r e p l e t e  w ith  w ire s ,  r e f l e c t o r s ,  screw s, 
lam ps, and p u s h b u t t o n s . Some have in t e r p r e te d  Hanson as sa y in g  th a t  
th e  th e o r ie s  we u se  in  d e s c r ib in g  th e  w orld  th em se lv es  d e term ine  what 
o b je c ts  th e r e  a re  and what p r o p e r t i e s  th e y  h av e . But one s e t  o f  o b je c ts  
does n o t su dden ly  d isa p p e a r  and a n o th e r  s e t  m a te r ia l iz e  sim ply  b ecau se  
we change o u r th e o ry  I P ro p e r ly  c o n s tru e d , what i s  b e in g  q u e s tio n e d  i s  
th e  e x te n t to  which b o th  th e  k in d s  o f  o b je c ts  th e r e  a re  o bserved  to  be 
and th e  p r o p e r t ie s  th e y  a re  o b serv ed  to  have a re  dependent on th e  
th e o r ie s  presum ed by th e  o b s e rv e r .
A f u r th e r  w eakness w ith  C a rn a p 's  a ttem p t to  draw th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  
i s  th a t  th e r e  a re  f r e q u e n t ly  c a se s  where we can d e c id e , on th e  b a s i s  
o f  few o b s e rv a t io n s ,  u n a id ed  by  a p p a ra tu s ,  th a t  a  sen ten ce  'Pa* i s  t r u e ,  
even though 'P* would o r d in a r i l y  be re g a rd e d  as  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm .
We o f te n  d ec id e  changes in  k in e t i c  en ergy , mass and e l e c t r i c  charge  in  
t h i s  way. (im agine your h a i r  s ta n d in g  on end as you approach  an 
o p e ra t in g  Van d e r  G ra ff  a c c e le r a to r  —  have you o b served  an e l e c t r i c
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f i e l d ? )  More g e n e ra l ly ,  how many o b se rv a tio n s  a re  to  be r e q u ire d ,  and 
what a re  th e y  o b s e rv a tio n s  o f?  A p h y s ic i s t  q u ic k ly  i d e n t i f i e s  a  t r a c k  
in  a  c loud  chamber as  t h a t  o f  a  decay ing  ^ - p a r t i c l e ;  an a r t i s t  examines 
a  b lo b  o f  p a in t  f o r  some tim e  and s t i l l  cannot d ec id e  w hether i t  i s  
aqua o r  u l t r a m a r in e .
50S tro n g  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  a lso  comes from Putnam.
To b e g in  w ith , he c la im s th a t  " w r i te r s  l i k e  Gamap must be n e g le c t in g  
th e  f a c t  t h a t  a l l  te rm s —  in c lu d in g  th e  'o b s e rv a t io n  te rm s ' —  have 
a t  l e a s t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a p p ly in g  to  u n o b se rv a b le s ."^ ^  In su p p o rt 
o f  t h i s  he p o in t s  o u t t h a t  'red *  was so u se d  by  Newton when he p o s tu la te d  
th a t  re d  l i g h t  c o n s is t s  o f  r e d  c o rp u s c le s .  Putnam a lso  n o te s  th a t  
o b se rv a tio n  s ta te m e n ts  may w e ll c o n ta in  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s and g iv e s  as  
an example th e  s ta te m e n t * We a lso  observ ed  th e  c r e a t io n  o f  two e l e c t r o n -  
p o s i t r o n  p a i r s * .  T his l a t t e r  c la im  re c e iv e s  su p p o rt from H anson 's  
argum ent n o te d  above.
Such argum ents p roved  c o n c lu s iv e  a g a in s t  th e  o b s e rv a t io n / th e o r ­
e t i c a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  a s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  conceived  by  Gamap and th e  o th e r  
p o s i t i v i s t s .  They do n o t show th a t  no d i s t i n c t i o n  o f  th e  k in d  can be 
drawn, b u t one has to  q u e s tio n  th e  p o in t  o f  h av in g  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  anyway; 
what do we want i t  f o r?  We have uncovered  one p o s s ib le  rea so n  —  to  
p ro v id e  a  n e u t r a l  language in  w hich to  compare r i v a l  th e o r ie s  u s in g  
c r u c i a l  ex p e rim en ts . T h is  n eed , how ever, a ro se  th ro u g h  th e  c o n s id e ra t io n  
o f  P o p p e r 's  m ethodology; what d id  th e  p o s i t i v i s t s  want i t  fo r?  The 
answ er ta k e s  u s  back  to  a  d o c tr in e  o f  Mach*s. The p rim ary  r a t i o n a le  
f o r  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  was to  p ro v id e  an e m p ir ic is t  m ethodology, and i t  
aimed to  do so by showing how th e  se n te n c e s  o f  a  language s u i ta b le  fo r  
th e  e x p re s s io n  o f  a  fo rm a liz e d  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry  were c o g n i t iv e ly  
s i g n i f i c a n t .  The c o g n it iv e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th o s e  n o n -a n a ly tic  se n te n c e s
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c o n ta in in g  te rm s from th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  v o cab u la ry  o f  a  th e o ry  was 
supposed to  be en su red  by t h e i r  p a r t i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  u s in g  th e  
co rrespondence  r u le s  o f  a  G am p b e llia n -s ty le  d ic t io n a r y .  As th e re  i s  
no c le a r  way o f  d is t in g u is h in g  from fo r  a  th e o ry  TC, a  f o r t i o r i  
no c l e a r  sen se  can b e  g iven  to  th e  ta s k  o f  s p e c ify in g  th e  m eanings o f  
th e  members o f  th e  form er c l a s s  u s in g  members drawn from th e  l a t t e r .
Two f u r th e r  p o in ts  need  to  be added . As a  consequence o f  i t s  
r e l i a n c e  on a  c l e a r  o b s e r v a t io n / th e o r e t ic a l  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  G am ap*s id e a  
o f  p a r t i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  a c c o rd in g  to  which p a r t  o f  th e  m eanings o f  
t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s i s  g iven  th ro u g h  co rrespondence  r u le s  and p a r t  th ro u g h  
th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s tu la te s  o r  b a s ic  law s, came to  be abandoned. As w ith  
th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  i t s e l f ,  th e  argum ents a g a in s t  p a r t i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  do 
n o t show th a t  c o n te n t can be g iven  to  th e  n o tio n  t h a t  th e  meaning o f
52a  teiTO l i k e  'e le c tro n *  i s  s p e c i f i e d ,  in  p a r t ,  by  th e  th e o ry  o f  e l e c t r o n s .^  
In deed , th e  n o tio n  does seem to  c o n ta in  an elem ent o f  t r u t h ,  and t h i s  
le n d s  su p p o rt to  th e  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  Hanson and o th e r s ,  I  s h a l l  d is c u s s  
t h i s  f u r th e r  in  th e  n e x t c h a p te r .  As a  p o in t  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t ,  th ough , 
th e  common r e a c t io n  amongst th e  p o s i t i v i s t s  was t h a t  o f  Hemp e l  who 
concluded  t h a t ,  w hichever way one looks a t  i t ,  th e  n o tio n  o f  p a r t i a l  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  in c o r r e c t  as a  p ic tu r e  o f  th e  way in  which a  s c i e n t i f i c  
th e o ry  w orks; c o n se q u e n tly , " th e  d o c tr in e  t h a t  th e  m eanings o f
th e o r e t i c a l  te rm s a re  im p l i c i t l y  s p e c i f i e d ,  a t  l e a s t  in  p a r t ,  by th e
53th e o r e t i c a l  c a lc u lu s  m ust th e r e f o r e  be r e j e c t e d . "
The second p o in t  i s  t h a t  th e  v e ry  e x is te n c e  o f  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  
betw een what i s  and what i s  n o t c o g n i t iv e ly  s ig n i f i c a n t  was shown to  
be what Quine term ed a  "dogma o f  e m p i r i c i s m " . W e  saw in  th e  f i r s t  
s e c t io n  th a t  th e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  c r i t e r i o n  o f  m eaning was one a ttem p t a t  
s p e c ify in g  th e  c o g n i t iv e ly  s ig n i f i c a n t  se n te n c e s  which were n o t a n a ly t i c ,
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i . e . ,  th o se  whioh were s y n th e t ic .  The change from v e r i f i c a t i o n  to
co n firm a tio n  and th e  a t te n d a n t lo o se n in g  o f  th e  req u irem en ts  imposed
on th e  co rrespondence r u le s  p a r a l l e l s  a  lo o se n in g  in  th e  p o s i t i v i s t s *
c r i t e r i o n  o f  c o g n it iv e  s ig n if ic a n c e  and hence o f  which sen ten c es  a re
to  he reg a rd ed  as  s y n th e t ic .  But e i t h e r  way, a  s p e c i f i c a t io n  o f
c o g n itiv e  s ig n if ic a n c e  amounts to  n o th in g  more th a n  th e  requ irem en t
th a t  every  sen ten c e  o f  a  th e o ry  TC sho u ld  he e i t h e r  a n a ly t ic  o r  s y n th e t ic
and n o t b o th .  Thus c o g n it iv e  s ig n if ic a n c e  and th e  a n a ly t ic / s y n th e t ic
d i s t i n c t i o n  b o th  se rv e  th e  same p u rp o se . As Quine p u ts  i t ,  " th e  two
55dogmas a r e ,  in d e ed , a t  ro o t i d e n t i c a l . T o  th e  e x te n t to  which th e  
dogna i s  d i s c r e d i te d ,  so th e  o b s e r v a t io n / th e o r e t ic a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  
u n d e r ly in g  i t  i s  i l l - m o t iv a t e d .
S e c tio n  ( i v ) ;  A R e l a t i v i s t  View o f  th e  H is to ry  o f  S cience
A f u r th e r  r a d ic a l  c h a lle n g e  to  lo g ic a l  p o s it iv is m  was o v e r th e  
account i t  adop ted  o f  th e  grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge. Towards th e  
end o f  s e c tio n  ( i i ) ,  i t  was p o in te d  ou t th a t  Hempel, Oppenheim and 
N agel embraced th e  id e a s  o f  th e o ry  e x te n s io n  and th e o ry  r e d u c t io n .  We 
have been g iven  good reaso n  f o r  b e l ie v in g  th a t  t h i s  i s  n o t th e  whole 
s to r y ;  P o p p e r 's  f a l s i f i c a t i o n i s t  account needs to  be re c o g n ise d  to o .
But s u r e ly ,  P o p p e r 's  c r i t i c i s m s  n o tw ith s ta n d in g , i t  i s  a t  l e a s t  p a r t  
o f  th e  s to r y .  A s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry , be i t  w e ll-co n firm ed  o r  w e ll -  
c o r ro b o ra te d , can sometimes be ex tended  to  o th e r  domains in  which i t  
has so f a r  n o t been a p p lie d  o r  t e s t e d .  L ikew ise i t  i s  u n doub ted ly  th e  
case  th a t  we do have ap p are n t in s ta n c e s  o f  one w e ll-co n firm ed  o r  w e l l -  
c o rro b o ra te d  th e o ry  which i s  re d u c ib le  to  a n o th e r .  The r e a l i s t  can 
g iv e  a  p la u s ib le  e x p la n a tio n  b o th  o f  what makes such p ro g re ss  p o s s ib le
.41 .
and o f  how i t  comes a b o u t. H is b a s ic  c la im  i s  t h a t  th e o r ie s  o f  a  m ature 
s c ie n c e  d e s c r ib e  th e  b eh av io u r o f  th in g s  in  th e  w o rld . S c i e n t i s t s  a c t  
in  accordance w ith  t h i s  v iew  in  a t te m p tin g  to  p ro v id e  th e o r ie s  which 
b e t t e r  e x p la in  th e  b eh av io u r o f  th e  same k in d s  o f  th in g s  d e a l t  w ith  by 
e a r l i e r  t h e o r i e s .  The p ro g re s s  o f  s c ie n c e  i s  ev idence  t h a t  such  a  
m ethodology w orks. Thus, th e  r e a l i s t  w ants to  say  such  th in g s  as  t h a t  
what Bohr i d e n t i f i e d  a s  e l e c t r o n s  e a r l i e r  in  t h i s  c e n tu ry , modem 
p h y s ic i s t s  do t o o ,  t h a t  m ost o f  th e  th in g s  D alton  c l a s s i f i e d  a s 'a c i d s  
a re  s im i la r ly  c l a s s i f i e d  by  o u r c h e m is ts , t h a t  te m p e ra tu re  i s  n o th in g  
more th a n  th e  m easure o f  th e  mean k in e t i c  energy  o f  m o lecu le s , and t h a t  
th e  p la n e ts  K ep ler re c o g n ise d  th ro u g h  Tycho B ra h e 's  o b s e rv a tio n s  and 
to  w hich he a p p lie d  h i s  law s o f  m otion a re  ju s t  th o se  to  which Newton 
a p p lie d  h i s  laws o f  dynam ics. P o p p er, as  we have se e n , i s  sym p ath e tic  
to  th e  r e a l i s t  c la im . Yet b o th  p o s i t i v i s t  and f a l s i f i c a t i o n i s t  a c c o u n ts , 
and in  consequence th e  r e a l i s t  c la im , have been p la c e d  in  d o u b t. We 
saw t h i s  in  p a r t  w ith  P e y e ra b e n d 's  c h a lle n g e  to  f a l s i f i c a t i o n i s m .  I  
now want to  move o n to  h i s  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  p o s i t iv is m .
At th e  end o f  s e c t io n  ( i i ) ,  I  n o te d  th e  c o n d it io n s  N agel s p e c i f i e s
f o r  th e  re d u c t io n  o f  one th e o ry  to  a n o th e r .  The second p a r t  o f
c o n d itio n  (b ) was t h a t  a l l  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  and e x p e rim en ta l law s o f  th e
red u ced  sc ie n c e  sh o u ld  be l o g i c a l l y  d ed u c ib le  from th e  th e o r e t i c a l  laws
and co rrespondence  r u le s  o f  th e  re d u c in g  s c ie n c e .  Peyerabend has
q u e s tio n e d  w hether t h i s  c o n d i t io n ,  which he u s u a l ly  c a l l s  th e  c o n d itio n
56o f  " c o n s is te n c y " , i s  e v e r  f u l f i l l e d ." ^  He has a ls o  c h a lle n g e d  a  second 
c o n d i t io n ,  w hich he says i s  "an im m ediate consequence" o f  th e  f i r s t .
I t  i s  t h a t  " th e  m eanings o f  th e  p r im it iv e  d e s c r ip t iv e  te rm s o f  th e
57secondary  sc ie n c e  . . .  w i l l  n o t be  a f f e c te d  by th e  p ro c e ss  o f  r e d u c t io n ."  
T h is  he c a l l s  th e  c o n d itio n  o f  "meaning in v a r ia n c e " ,  and he i n t e r p r e t s
.42 .
N a g e l 's  c o n d itio n  (a )  as a  s ta te m e n t o f  i t .  Taken to g e th e r ,  what 
Peyerabend i s  c a l l i n g  in to  q u e s tio n  i s  th e  whole p o s i t i v i s t  account 
o f  th e  grow th o f  s c ie n c e .
Peyerabend does n o t d i r e c t  h is  c r i t i c i s m s  a t  th e  p o s i t i v i s t
c o n d i tio n s  as th e y  r e l a t e  to  e m p ir ic a l g e n e ra l iz a t io n s  o f  th e  ’A l l -
ra v e n s -a re -b la c k *  ty p e ,  "which abound in  th e  more p e d e s tr ia n  p a r t s  o f
th e  s c i e n t i f i c  e n t e r p r i s e ,"  b u t to  " u n iv e rs a l  th e o r ie s "  l i k e  " th e
A r i s to te l i a n  th e o ry  o f  m o tion , th e  im petus th e o ry ,  N ew ton 's c e l e s t i a l
m echan ics. M axw ell's  e le c tro d y n a m ic s , th e  th e o ry  o f  r e l a t i v i t y ,  and
58th e  quantum t h e o r y . T h e  c o n d i t io n s ,  he c la im s , a re  in a p p lic a b le  
to  advancem ents in v o lv in g  such  genuine s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s .  In an 
a ttem p t to  dem on stra te  t h i s  he g iv e s  a  s e r i e s  o f  case  s tu d ie s  o f  
p u rp o r te d  re d u c t io n s  w hich, he a rg u e s , show th e  C o n d itio n s  to  be 
v io l a te d .
Let u s  b r i e f l y  rev iew  some o f  h i s  exam ples co n ce rn in g  th e  
c o n s is te n c y  o r  d e d u c ib i l i ty  c o n d i t io n .  C onsider th e  s ta tem en t t h a t  
G a l i l e o 's  p h y s ic s  i s  r e d u c ib le  to  th e  p h y s ic s  o f  Newton, an example 
commonly c i t e d  by N agel and o th e r s .  P a r t  o f  what i s  meant by  t h i s  
s ta te m e n t i s  t h a t  th e  laws o f  th e  form er may be lo g i c a l l y  deduced from 
th e  l a t t e r .  C onsequently  G a l i le o 's  th e o ry  o f  th e  m otion o f  o b je c ts  
n e a r  th e  s u r fa c e  o f  th e  e a r th  sh o u ld  be d ed u c ib le  from N ew ton 's laws 
o f  dynam ics. A b a s ic  assum ption  o f  G a l i le o 's  th e o ry  i s  t h a t  v e r t i c a l  
a c c e le r a t io n s  in  f r e e  f a l l  n e a r  th e  e a r t h 's  s u r fa c e  a re  c o n s ta n t ov er 
any f i n i t e  ( v e r t i c a l )  i n t e r v a l .  Given N ew ton 's th e o ry ,  however, v e r t i c a l  
a c c e le r a t io n s  in  f r e e  f a l l  a re  in v e r s e ly  p ro p o r t io n a l  to  d is ta n c e  f r om . 
th e  e a r th .  A d m itted ly , th e  d i f f e r e n c e  may be e x p e rim e n ta lly  in d i s t in g ­
u is h a b le ,  b u t t h a t  has no b e a r in g  on th e  f a c t  t h a t ,  s t r i c t l y  sp eak in g ,
59th e  two th e o r ie s  a re  l o g i c a l l y  in c o n s i s t e n t .  As re g a rd s  f a r th e r  c a s e s .
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Feyerabend rem arks, ’’t h a t  s t a t i s t i c a l  therm odynam ics i s  in c o n s is te n t  
w ith  th e  second law  o f  th e  phenom enological th e o ry ; t h a t  wave o p t ic s  
i s  in c o n s i s te n t  w ith  g e o m e tr ic a l o p t i c s ;  and so o n .”^^
T urning  to  th e  c o n d itio n  o f  m eaning in v a r ia n c e ,  Feyerahend ta k e s  
as  a  p a rad ig n  example th e  re d u c t io n  o f  c l a s s i c a l  m echanics to  r e l a t i v i t y  
t h e o r y . T h e  c l a s s i c a l  th e o ry  assum es th a t  th e  mass o f  a  p a r t i c l e  i s  
c o n s ta n t and i s  co n serv ed  in  a l l  r e a c t io n s  in  a  c lo se d  system .
A ccording to  r e l a t i v i t y  th e o ry ,  how ever, th e  mass o f  a  p a r t i c l e  i s  
p ro p o r t io n a l  to  i t s  v e lo c i ty  r e l a t i v e  to  a c o -o rd in a te  system  in  which 
th e  o b se rv a tio n s  a re  c a r r i e d  o u t .  To a p p re c ia te  t h a t  what i s  a t  is s u e  
h e re  i s  a  change in  th e  m eaning o f  th e  term  ’m a s s ' , one has to  examine 
th e  s t r u c tu r e s  o f  th e  th e o r ie s  and the, r o le s  p la y e d  by  th e  term  in  b o th .  
In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e ,  d i f f e r e n t  and (a p p a re n t ly )  in c o m p a tib le  eq u a tio n s  
abou t mass h o ld  in  th e  two th e o r i e s .  Secondly , r e l a t i v i s t i o  mass i s  
a  r e l a t i o n ,  in v o lv in g  r e l a t i v e  v e l o c i t i e s ,  betw een an o b je c t  and a 
c o -o rd in a te  system , w hereas c l a s s i c a l  mass i s  a  p ro p e r ty  o f  th e  o b je c t  
i t s e l f  and independen t o f  i t s  b e h a v io u r in  c o -o rd in a te  sy stem s. Nor 
w i l l  i t  do, he ad d s , ”to  id e n t i f y  th e  c l a s s i c a l  mass w ith  th e  r e l a t i v -  
i s t i c  r e s t  mass . . .  f o r  a lth o u g h  b o th  may have th e  same n u m erica l v a lu e , 
th e y  cannot be r e p re s e n te d  by  th e  same c o n ce p t.
In th e  same c o n te x t ,  F eyerahend c o n s id e rs  N ag e l’ s c o n d itio n  ( b ) ( l ) ,  
in  which assum ptions o f  some k in d  a re  p o s tu la te d  in  o rd e r  to  e s t a b l i s h  
r e l a t i o n s  betw een co n cep ts  o f  th e  two th e o r i e s .  P resum ably t h i s  would 
amount to  re c o g n is in g  th a t  ’’u n d er c e r t a in  c o n d itio n s  th e  o ccu rren c e  o f  
r e l a t i v i s t i o  mass o f  a  g iven  m agnitude i s  accom panied by th e  o ccu rren ce  
o f  c l a s s i c a l  mass o f  a  c o rre sp o n d in g  magni t ude . Yet  t h i s  too  i s  
in c o n s i s te n t  w ith  r e l a t i v i t y  th e o ry  which a s s e r t s  t h a t  th e r e  a re  no 
a b s o lu te  ( c l a s s i c a l )  m asses and hence th a t  m ass, a s  u n d e rs to o d  in
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c l a s s i c a l  p h y s ic s ,  does n o t e x p re s s  an a c tu a l  p ro p e r ty  o f  a  p h y s ic a l 
oh j e c t .
O ther exam ples t r e a t e d  a t  le n g th  hy  Feyerahend concern  th e  concep t
o f  im petus a s  i t  o ccu rs  in  A r i s t o t l e ’ s  th e o ry  o f  m otion and in  Newton’ s
m echan ics, and th e  concep t o f  te m p e ra tu re  as i t  o ccu rs  in  phenom enological
therm odynam ics and as  i t  m ight he  re p re s e n te d  in  s t a t i s t i c a l  m echanics*
In  a l l  th e s e  c a s e s ,  th e  c o n c lu s io n s  he a r r iv e s  a t  r e s u l t  from h i s  ta k in g
s e r io u s ly  th e  v iew  o f  N agel and th e  l a t e r  p o s i t i v i s t s  t h a t  th e  m eaning
o f  a  teiTO depends upon th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n te x t in  which i t  o c c u rs .  That
i s ,  h i s  argum ents r e l y  on th e  p o in t  s t r e s s e d  hy .N agel in  c o n d itio n  (a )
and e lsew here  t h a t ,  ”i t  i s  . . .  o f  u tm o st im portance to  n o te  t h a t
e x p re s s io n s  b e lo n g in g  to  a  s c ie n c e  p o sse ss  m eanings th a t  a re  f ix e d  by
i t s  own p ro ced u re s  o f  e x p l i c a t i o n .”^^ We sho u ld  a lso  r e c a l l  h e re  t h a t
h i s  co n c lu s io n  o f  th e  im p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  co n d u c tin g  c r u c i a l  experim en ts
r e s u l t e d  from fo llo w in g  th ro u g h  w ith  P o p p er’ s adherence to  a  s im i la r
t h e s i s  about th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n te n t o f  te rm s u se d  in  o b se rv a tio n
r e p o r t s .  The r a d ic a l  c o n c lu s io n  w hich ap p ea rs  to  fo llo w  i s  t h a t  r i v a l
o r  su c c e s s iv e  th e o r ie s  may u se  th e  same term s b u t in  p r in c ip le  th e r e  i s
no way o f  d e c id in g  w hether o r  n o t th e y  mean th e  same th in g s  by them .
Feyerahend and Kuhn d e s c r ib e  such  a  s i tu a t io n  a s  b e in g  one in  which th e
65th e o r ie s  c o n ce rn ed -a re  incom m ensurable.
What now becomes o f  th e  r e a l i s t  claim  t h a t  r i v a l  o r  su c c e s s iv e  
th e o r ie s  can be about th e  same th in g s ?  Feyerahend defends th e  view  th a t  
th e  o n to lo g y  o r  domain o f  an e a r l i e r  th e o ry  i s  co m p le te ly  re p la c e d  by 
t h a t  o f  a subsequen t o n e ,^^  S t r i c t l y  sp eak in g , th e  o n ly  e n t i t i e s  th e re  
a r e ,  a re  th e  ones c o n ta in e d  in  th e  o n to lo g ie s  o f  th e  th e o r ie s  we 
c u r r e n t ly  a c c e p t .  To quo te  Feyerahend , ’’in tro d u c in g  a  new th e o ry  
in v o lv e s  changes o f  o u tlo o k  b o th  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e  o b se rv a b le  and
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w ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e  u n o b se rv ab le  f e a tu r e s  o f  th e  w orld , and c o rre sp o n d in g
changes in  th e  m eanings o f  even th e  most ’ fundam ental* term s o f  th e
67language em ployed.”
On th e  b a s i s  o f  a  r a th e r  d i f f e r e n t  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  h i s to r y  o f
s c ie n c e ,  lûihn re a c h e s  a  s im i la r  view  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e o r ie s  s e p a ra te d
by a ’S c i e n t i f i c  r e v o l u t i o n ” . A n  o ld  s c i e n t i f i c  ’’paradigm ” i s
o c c a s io n a l ly  d is p la c e d  by  a  new o n e , w ith  th e  r e s u l t  t h a t ,  in  some sen ses
a t  l e a s t ,  th e  p o s t - r e v o lu t io n a r y  s c i e n t i s t  f in d s  h im se lf  w orking in  a
’’d i f f e r e n t  w o rld ” . ^ O ther p h ilo so p h e rs  to  have ex p ressed  g e n e ra l
70 71agreem ent w ith  t h i s  l i n e  o f  argum ent in c lu d e  S e l l a r s  and M axwell.
U n lik e  th e  in s t r u m e n ta l i s t s ,  th e y  do n o t d is p u te  th e  r e a l i s t s ’ view
th a t  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  a re  t r u e  d e s c r ip t io n s  o f  what th e re  i s .  By
c o n jo in in g  t h i s  v iew  w ith  th e  p o s i t i v i s t  t h e s i s  t h a t  th e  m eaning o f  a
te rra  i s  to  be e x p l ic a te d  v i a  th e  th e o ry  (o r  t h e o r i e s )  in  which i t  o c c u rs ,
th e y  r a th e r  ta k e  re a l ism  to  an extrem e whereby ’ what th e re  i s ’ depends
on what th e o ry  o r  paradigm  i s  in  u s e .  Thus M ello r has a p t ly  term ed
72t h e i r  p o s i t io n  ’’s u p e r - r e a lis m ” . '  O th e rs  see  i t  as e x p re s s in g  a  form 
o f  r e l a t iv i s m .
T his i s  ta k in g  th in g s  r a th e r  too  q u ic k ly  th o u g h . F eyerahend’ s 
su g g es ted  cou n te r-ex am p les  r a i s e  s e r io u s  doubts about N agel’ s c o n d i t io n s .  
The in c o m p a ra b i li ty  o f  m eanings f o r  te rm s in  d i f f e r e n t  th e o r ie s  does 
seem to  fo llo w  from th e  view  t h a t  th e  meaning o f  a  s c i e n t i f i c  term  
depends on th e  -th eo ry  in  w hich i t  o c c u rs .  But h i s to r y  shou ld  te a c h  
u s  som ething h e r e .  The p o s i t i v i s t s  n ev e r d id  g iv e  a  f u l l  account o f  
what th e  m eaning o f  a  term  i s ,  and n o t s u r p r is in g ly  th e y  found i t  
d i f f i c u l t  to  a r t i c u l a t e  th e  id e a  t h a t  th e  m eaning o f  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  term  
i s  p a r t i a l l y  s p e c i f ie d  by  t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s tu la te s .  T h is  shou ld  prompt 
u s  to  look  more c lo s e ly  a t  th e  r a th e r  g l ib  pronouncem ent ’ th e  m eaning
,46*
o f  a  s c i e n t i f i c  terra depends on th e  th e o ry  in  which i t  occurs* *
A problem  in  th e  p h ilo so p h y  o f  s c ie n c e  le a d s  to  an in q u iry  in to  th e  
n a tu re  o f  m eaning —  a  problem  in  th e  p h ilo so p h y  o f  lan g u ag e . I  s h a l l  
ta k e  t h i s  up a t  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  th e  n e x t c h a p te r .  To end t h i s  one , 
we sho u ld  n o te  one f u r th e r  im p o rtan t p o in t .
Suppose t h a t  Feyerahend i s  r i g h t  about th e  in c o m p a ra b ili ty  o f  
m eanings betw een te rras o f  d i f f e r e n t  t h e o r i e s .  T h is  f a i l s  to  show th a t  
we cannot d ec id e  th e  weaker t h e s i s  o f  w hether o r  n o t r i v a l  o r  su c c e s s iv e  
th e o r ie s  a re  about th e  same th in g s .  I t  m ight n o t be d e te rm in a te  e x a c t ly  
w hat, sa y , e a r l i e r  t h e o r i s t s  b e l ie v e d  about th o se  th in g s ,  b u t t h i s  i s  
a  d i f f e r e n t  m a t te r .  The r e a l i s t  accoun t o f  th e  grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  
knowledge r e l i e s ,  in  th e  f i r s t  in s ta n c e  a t  l e a s t ,  o n ly  on th e  weaker 
t h e s i s .
4 7 .
CHAPTER 2 A REALISTIC ACCOUNT OP THE GROWTH OP SCIENCE
S e c tio n  ( i ) i  M eaning and R eference
Let u s  b eg in  by  ta k in g  a  c lo s e r  lo o k  a t  th e  s ta tem en t ' t h e  m eaning 
o f  a  s c i e n t i f i c  term  depends on th e  th e o ry  in  which i t  occurs* • In  
t a lk in g  th u s  o f  *a s c i e n t i f i c  term* I  p resuppose no r i g i d  d i s t i n c t i o n  
betw een te rm s t h a t  a re  and te rras t h a t  a re  n o t in  some sen se  o b s e r v a t io n a l .  
As we have se e n , any d i s t i n c t i o n  o f  t h i s  k in d  i s  a t  b e s t  i l l - m o t iv a te d  
and a t  w orst u n te n a b le .  A lo o se  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een d i f f e r e n t  k in d s  o f  
s ta te m e n t w i l l ,  how ever, som etim es be assum ed. T his w i l l  enab le  u s  to  
d is t in g u is h  obv ious s ta te m e n ts  o f  th e o ry ,  l i k e  ' t h e  g r a v i t a t i o n a l  fo rc e  
betw een two b o d ie s  i s  d i r e c t l y  p ro p o r t io n a l  to  th e  p ro d u c t o f  t h e i r  
m asses and in v e r s e ly  p ro p o r t io n a l  to  th e  sq u are  o f  th e  d is ta n c e  betw een 
t h e m ' ,  from what a re  c l e a r ly  o b s e rv a tio n  r e p o r t s ,  l i k e  'o b je c t  x  r o ta te d  
in  a  c lockw ise  d i r e c t io n  around o b je c t  jy '.
An obv ious f i r s t  q u e s tio n  to  r a i s e  about th e  s ta tem en t u n d er 
c o n s id e ra t io n  i s  w hether a l l  o f  th e  p r in c ip le s  u se d  in  s t a t i n g  th e  th e o ry  
se rv e  to  s p e c ify  th e  m eanings o f  a l l  o f  th e  te rm s c o n ta in e d  in  i t ,  o r  
w hether th e  r e l a t i o n  i s  a  somewhat weaker one . To s t a r t  w ith , l e t  u s  
c o n c e n tra te  on th e  fo rm er, s t r o n g e r  a l t e r n a t i v e .  Some suppo rt f o r  such 
a view  m ight come from a  "network** p ic tu r e  o f  th e  m eanings o f  s c i e n t i f i c
te rm s ; *P  ^* and *P^' o ccu r in  t h e o r e t i c a l  p r in c ip le  *Th^ *, *P^* and *P^*
p 1in  *Th *, and so on; 'T h  ' does n o t c o n tr ib u te  d i r e c t l y  to  th e  meaning 
o f  ' P ^ * , b u t o n ly  i n d i r e c t l y  in  v i r t u e  o f  i t s  c o n t r ib u t in g  to  th e  m eaning
p po f  *P ' and th e  l e t t e r ' s  o c c u r r in g  in  *Th ' •
One consequence o f  t h i s  a l t e r n a t iv e  i s  th a t  a  change in  any o f  a
th e o r y 's  p r in c ip le s  le a d s  to  a  change in  th e  m eanings o f  a l l  o f  th e
.48.
te rra s  c o n ta in e d  in  th e  th e o ry .  Feyerahend , who a t  one tim e seems to
1have h e ld  th e  s tro n g  p o s i t i o n ,  f in d s  t h i s  consequence u n p a la ta b le .
As an extrem e exam ple, we m ight c o n s id e r  h i s  case  in v o lv in g  two th e o r ie s
o f  c l a s s i c a l  c e l e s t i a l  m echan ics, d i f f e r i n g  o n ly  in  t h a t  one g iv e s  a
s l i ^ t l y  d i f f e r e n t  v a lu e  f o r  th e  s t r e n g th  o f  th e  g r a v i t a t io n  p o t e n t i a l .
F eyerahend r i g h t l y  co n clu d es  t h a t  i t  would be ra s h  to  m a in ta in  t h a t  a
t r a n s i t i o n  from one th e o ry  to  th e  p th e r  would somehow in v o lv e  a  change
2o f  m eaning in  th e  te rra s .
There i s  a  l o t  o f  p la y  h e re  betw een change o f  th e o ry  on th e  one 
hand and change o f  m eaning on th e  o th e r .  W hilst i t  does seem c l e a r  
from th e  above example t h a t  m inor changes in  n u m erica l v a lu e s  f o r  c o n s ta n ts  
does n o t le a d  to  changes o f  m eaning, i t  m ight be r e p l i e d  t h a t  in  so f a r  
a s  t h i s  i s  th e  o n ly  d i f f e r e n c e  we have n o t changed from one th e o ry  to  
a n o th e r  b u t m ere ly  s l i g h t l y  a l t e r e d  th e  f i r s t .  A pparen tly  what i s  
r e q u ir e d  i s  a  b e t t e r  g r ip  on th e  n o tio n s  o f  change o f  th e o ry  and change 
o f  m eaning. B efo re  d is c u s s in g  them f u r th e r  th ough , we shou ld  n o te  some 
o th e r  problem s w ith  th e  s tro n g  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  ones t h a t  a lso  c a s t  doubt 
on th e  t e n a b i l i t y  o f  Feyerahend*s p o s i t io n  as  i t  was o u t l in e d  a t  th e  end 
o f  th e  p re v io u s  c h a p te r .
In  d is c u s s in g  th e  t h e s i s  o f  m eaning v a r ia n c e ,  Feyerahend h o ld s  
t h a t  a p p a re n tly  s u c c e s s iv e  o r  r i v a l  th e o r i e s  may c o n ta in  in c o m p a tib le  
s ta te m e n ts .  But by m a in ta in in g  th a t  a l l  th e  te rras  o f  such th e o r ie s  a re  
incom m ensurable, i . e . ,  t h a t  th e r e  i s  in  p r in c ip le  no way o f  showing 
th a t  th e y  mean th e  same, i t  becom es-obscure how c e r t a in  o f  th e  s ta te m e n ts  
c o n ta in e d  in  th e  th e o r ie s  co u ld  be shown to  be in c o m p a tib le .^  I f  th e re  
i s  no way o f  t e l l i n g  w hether by  'mass* a  New tonian means th e  same as  an 
E in s te in ia n ,  th e n  when th e  fo rm er a s s e n ts  to  th e  sen ten ce  'M ass i s  a
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c o n s ta n t p ro p e r ty  o f  an o b je c t*  and th e  l a t t e r  d is s e n ts  from i t  th e re  
i s  no way o f  t e l l i n g  w hether th e y  a re  even a s s e n t in g  to  and d is s e n t in g  
from th e  same s ta te m e n t;  th e y  a re  t a lk in g  p a s t  each  o th e r .  Showing 
th a t  s ta te m e n ts  from d i f f e r e n t  th e o r ie s  a re  in c o m p a tib le  ap p ears  to  
in v o lv e  a t  l e a s t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t r a n s l a t i n g  from one to  th e  o th e r .
The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  how ever, i s  p r e c i s e ly  what 
in co m m en su rab ility  d e n ie s ,
A f u r th e r  problem  i s  r e v e a le d  when we p re s s  th e  p o in t  about th e r e
b e in g  no th e o ry - n e u t r a l  o b s e rv a tio n  la n g u ag e . In  th e  l a s t  q u o ta tio n  o f
th e  p re v io u s  c h a p te r ,  F eyerahend t a l k s  about "changes o f  o u tlo o k  b o th
w ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e  o b se rv a b le  and w ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e  u n o b se rv ab le
f e a tu r e s  o f  th e  w o rld ."  But what co n te n t can be g iven  to  th e  id e a  o f
such  changes where a l l  o f  th e  te rm s o f  th e  th e o r i e s  a re  incom m ensurable?
A s im i la r  d i f f i c u l t y  a r i s e s  w ith  h i s  comments t h a t  G a li le o ’ s law s and
Newton’ s th e o ry  c o n f l i c t  in  a  common domain o f  v a l i d i t y , ^  and th a t  a
w id e r, more em bracing th e o ry  i s  cap a b le  o f  co v erin g  a l l  th e  phenomena
5co v ered  by  a  n arro w er th e o ry  w hich i t  su ccee d s . I f  Feyerahend’ s r a d ic a l  
co n c lu s io n s  s ta n d  and a l l  o f  th e  p r in c ip le s  o f  a  th e o ry  se rv e  to  s p e c ify  
th e  m eanings o f  a l l  th e  s c i e n t i f i c  te rm s , i t  makes no sense  to  t a l k  o f  
common domains o f  v a l i d i t y  o r  o f  th e  same s e t s  o f  phenomena form ing th e  
s u b je c t -m a t te r  o f  incom m ensurable t h e o r i e s .
As a  f i n a l  p o in t ,  l e t  u s  c o n s id e r  what accoun t o f  th e  t e s t i n g  o f  
th e o r i e s  i s  open, to  th e  h o ld e r  o f  th e  s tro n g  a l t e r n a t iv e  o f  th e  t h e s i s  
about m eaning. Suppose we have some th e o ry  T which p r e d ic ts  an 
o b s e rv a tio n  0 .  Could i t  be th e  ca se  th a t  when th e  o b s e rv a tio n  i s  c a r r i e d  
o u t th e  r e s u l t a n t  r e p o r t  e n t a i l s  n o t-0 ?  O rd in a r i ly  we sho u ld  c e r t a in l y  
th in k  so —  n o t even th e  most s u c c e s s fu l  th e o r i e s  a re  n e c e s s a r i ly  t r u e ,
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i . e . ,  a re  such t h a t  th e r e  co u ld  he no p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  an o b se rv a tio n  
c o n tra ry  to  t h a t  p r e d ic te d .  S ince  th e r e  i s  no language independen t 
o f  th e o ry  f o r  th e  r e p o r t in g  o f  th e  o b s e rv a tio n , how ever, term s employed 
in  d e s c r ib in g  p r e d ic t io n s  o f  T w i l l  be th e o ry - la d e n  and s ta te m e n ts  o f  
p r e d ic t io n s  w i l l  them se lv es  c o n t r ib u te  to  s p e c ify in g  th e  m eanings o f  
o th e r  te rm s in  T. I t  fo llo w s  t h a t  i f  n o t-0  were to  be a c c e p te d , th e  
m eanings o f  th e  te rm s u se d  in  i t s  r e p o r t in g  co u ld  n o t be assumed to  
have rem ained  th e  same a s  th o se  u se d  in  th e  o r ig i n a l  p r e d ic t io n  0 .  By 
way o f  exam ple, c o n s id e r  one th e o ry  o f  c e l e s t i a l  m echanics —  G a li le o ’ s 
f o r  in s ta n c e  —  w hich p r e d ic t s  t h a t  a  p la n e t ’ s  o r b i t  i s  c i r c u l a r .  
O b se rv a tio n  o f  ^the s o la r  system  su g g e s ts  r a th e r  t h a t  th e  o r b i t s  a re  n o t 
c i r c u l a r  b u t more n e a r ly  e l l i p t i c a l .  Yet i f  o b se rv a tio n  r e p o r ts  to  
t h i s  e f f e c t  were a c c e p te d , th e  m eaning o f  ’o r b i t  o f  a  p la n e t ’ , and 
s e v e ra l  o th e r  te rm s no d o u b t, co u ld  n o t be s a id  to  be th e  same f o r  b o th  
th e o ry  and o b s e rv a t io n .  Hence no o b se rv a tio n  r e p o r t  i s  p o s s ib le  which 
co u ld  d isco n firra  o r  f a l s i f y  th e  th e o ry .  That i s ,  th e  o n ly  o b se rv a tio n  
r e p o r ts  which a re  r e le v a n t  to  t e s t i n g  th e  th e o ry  w i l l  be th o se  which 
a re  c o n s is te n t  w ith  th e  th e o ry .  A ll t e s t i n g  o f  th e o r ie s  i s  th u s  c i r c u l a r .
E v id e n tly  th e re  a re  s e r io u s  problem s w ith  th e  view  th a t  a l l  o f  
th e  p r in c ip le s  u se d  in  s t a t i n g  a  th e o ry  se rv e  to  s p e c ify  th e  m eanings 
o f  a l l  o f  th e  te rm s c o n ta in e d  in  i t .  Pay ing  s t r i c t  a t t e n t io n  to  t h i s  
view  ro b s  i t  o f  th o se  c o n s id e ra t io n s  which o r ig i n a l l y  gave r i s e  to  i t .
L et u s  move on, th e n , to  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  how we m ight weaken i t  in  o rd e r  
to  av o id  th e s e  p a ra d o x ic a l consequences.
One a l t e r n a t iv e  would be to  h o ld  th a t  o n ly  some o f  th e  p r in c ip le s  
o f  a  th e o ry  se rv e  to  s p e c ify  m eanings. O ther a l t e r n a t iv e s  a re  su g g es ted  
i f  i t  i s  h e ld  t h a t  t h e o r e t i c a l  p r in c ip le s  o n ly  c o n t r ib u te  to  m eaning
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s p e c i f i c a t io n ,  i . e . ,  th e y  o n ly  p a r t i a l l y  s p e c ify  m eanings. In th e  
p re v io u s  c h a p te r , though, we saw th a t  each o f  th e s e  a l t e r n a t iv e s  engenders 
d i f f i c u l t i e s .  The f i r s t  r e s t s  on th e  id e a  th a t  we can d is t in g u is h  
betw een " t r u th s  grounded in  m eanings" and " t r u th s  grounded in  f a c t s " .
But t h i s  i s  p r e c i s e ly  one o f  th e  dogmas a t ta c k e d  by  Quine in  h i s  famous 
p a p e r .^  As f o r  th e  n o tio n  o f  p a r t i a l  s p e c i f i c a t io n  o f  m eaning, th e  
d i f f i c u l t y  rem ains o f  showing how t h i s  can be f r e e d  from th e  assum ption  
o f  a  f irm  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een o b se rv a tio n  and th e o r e t i c a l  te rm s , th e re b y
7d iv o rc in g  i t  from C arnap’ s  i l l - f a t e d  n o tio n  o f  " p a r t i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " .  
So w h ile  th e r e  does seem to  be som ething i n t u i t i v e l y  c o r r e c t  about th e  
id e a  t h a t  th e  m eaning o f  a  s c i e n t i f i c  terra depends on th e  th e o ry  in  
which i t  o c c u r s , i t  h as so f a r  r e s i s t e d  a l l  a tte m p ts  a t  c l a r i f i c a t i o n .
What we have h e re  i s  a  symptom o f  a much more w idespread  co m p la in t. 
F or th e r e  to  be a  th e o ry  o f  m eaning f o r  any g iven  c la s s  o f  te rm s , such 
a s  th o se  u se d  in  s t a t i n g  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s ,  i t  would seem t h a t  th e re  
would a lre a d y  have to  be a  g e n e ra l account o f  what meaning i s  —  th e re  
would have to  be a  th e o ry  o f  m eaning. U n fo r tu n a te ly  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f
o u r  e s ta b l i s h in g  such a  th e o ry  seems alm ost as  rem ote now as i t  e v e r  w as.
8Some go so f a r  as  to  c la im  th a t  ’m eaning’ i s  a d i s c r e d i te d  n o t io n ,  
w h ile  o th e r s ,  who seek  to  e x p la in  i t ,  d i f f e r  r a d i c a l l y  in  t h e i r  
p ro p o s a ls .^  What i s  f r e q u e n t ly  o v e rlo o k e d , how ever, i s  t h a t  sim ply 
r e f u s in g  to  t a l k  about m eaning does n o t c o n s t i tu te  an answer to  th e  
c h a lle n g e s  o f  F eyerahend , Kuhn, and th o se  who sh a re  t h e i r  v iew s, f o r  in  
do ing  so we g iv e  up th e  a ttem p t to  d ec id e  which te rm s from d i f f e r e n t  
th e o r ie s  mean th e  sam e .' Any s c e p tic ism  about m eanings must a lso  t e l l  
a g a in s t  e s ta b l i s h in g  co m m en su rab ility .
L a te r  in  th e  t h e s i s  I  s h a l l  have more to  say  about m eaning. At
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p re s e n t though w e  must keep in  mind th e  q u e s tio n  o f  what we want a  
th e o ry  o f  m eaning f o r .  In  t h i s  t h e s i s  I  have b een , and w i l l  be,, u rg in g  
t h a t  a  r e a l i s t  view  o f  th e  c o g n i t iv e  s t a t u s  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  i s  
n o t o n ly  i n t u i t i v e l y  a p p e a lin g  b u t a lso  su g g e s ts  a  p la u s ib le  account 
o f  th e  grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge. A ccording to  th e  r e a l i s t ,  th e  
s c i e n t i s t  aim s a t  f in d in g  b e t t e r  th e o r i e s  —  ones t h a t  le a d  to  g r e a te r  
p r e d ic t iv e  s u c c e s s ,  a re  s im p le r ,  and so on —  about th e  k in d s  o f  th in g s  
th e r e  a re  in  th e  w orld , and s c ie n c e  p ro g re s se s  because  t h i s  m ethodology 
w orks. The aim o f  th e  s c i e n t i s t  i s  to  f in d  a  t r u e  th e o ry  o r  d e s c r ip t io n  
o f  th e  r e g u l a r i t i e s  o f  th e  w o rld , and even though i t  m ight l a t e r  be 
d en ied  th a t  th e r e  i s  what a  th e o ry  say s  th e re  i s ,  a t  th e  tim e th e  th e o ry  
i s  propounded i t  i s  a t  l e a s t  c la im ed  th a t  i t  t r u l y  d e s c r ib e s  th e  r e a l  
w o rld . The i n i t i a l  p r o b l ^  i s  to  g iv e  enough sem an tic  th e o ry  to  g e t 
th e  r e a l i s t  view  g o in g . Let me e x p la in  t h i s  f u r th e r .
The r e a l i s t ' s  p rim ary  i n t e r e s t ,  a s  was n o te d  a t  th e  end o f  th e  
p re v io u s  c h a p te r ,  i s  n o t in  th e  concep t o f  m eaning b u t in  th e  concept 
o f  r e f e r e n c e . H is a c c o u n t, a s  we s h a l l  s e e , e x p l i c i t l y  m entions th e  
e x te n s io n s  t h a t  s c i e n t i f i c  p r e d ic a te s  h av e . The co re  o f  th e  r e a l i s t  
answ er to  problem s co n ce rn in g  th e  grow th o f  s c ie n c e  i s  t h a t  in  im p o rtan t 
c a se s  o f  th e o ry  change th e  th e o r ie s  in v o lv ed  a re  s t i l l  about th e  same 
th in g s .  By t h i s  i s  meant n o t ju s t  t h a t  th e y  in v o lv e  more o r  l e s s  th e  
same s o r t s  o f  th in g s ,  in  th e  sen se  in  which two th e o r ie s  about a c id s ,  
s a y , a re  b o th  th e o r ie s  about chem ica l compounds, b u t t h a t  in  many c a se s  
th e  p r o p e r t i e s  a re  th e  same and even th e  most th e o ry - la d e n  o f  te rras  
s t i l l  p ic k  o u t th e  same o b je c t s .  T h u s ,B o h r's  th e o ry  o f  th e  hydrogen 
atom m entions e le c t r o n s  —  so does c u r re n t  su b -a tom ic  p h y s ic s .
Newtonian p h y s ic s  t a l k s  about le n g th  (amongst o th e r  th in g s )  —  so does
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E in s te in ia n  p h y s ic s .  The American g e n e t i c i s t  H .J . M u lle r p o s tu la te d
th e o r ie s  about genes in  th e  1 9 2 0 's  and 1 930 's —  so do modem m o lecu la r
b i o l o g i s t s .  I t  does n o t ju s t  happen th a t  th e  same te rm s were ta k e n  o v e r
by  th e  l a t e r  th e o r i e s  —  th e r e  i s  a  d e f in i t e  sen se  in  which th e y  u se  th e
te rm s to  t a l k  about th e  same th in g s .  Or so th e  r e a l i s t  c la im s . We
s h a l l  have to  be a  good d e a l more e x p l i c i t  about what t h i s  sen se  i s ,
b u t l e t  u s  f i r s t  lo o k  a t  some h i s t o r i c a l  background .
There i s  a  firm  b a s i s  f o r  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een meaning and
re fe re n c e  in  th e  p h ilo so p h y  o f  la n g u ag e . I t  was f i r s t  e x p l i c i t l y
d is c u s s e d  in  F r e g e 's  j u s t l y  c e le b r a te d  p ap e r "Uber Sinn und B edeu tung ,"
10p u b lish e d  in  1892, a lth o u g h  he had m entioned  i t  in  a  p ap er o f  th e  
11p re c e d in g  y e a r .  He p re s e n te d  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  a s  a  means o f  r e s o lv in g  
c e r t a in  problem s a s s o c ia te d  w ith  p ro p e r  nam es. What he wanted to  e x p la in  
was how i t  i s  t h a t  two names which r e f e r  to  th e  same o b je c t  may y e t  be 
u se d  in  an i d e n t i t y  s ta te m e n t to  convey f a c tu a l  in fo rm a tio n , w hereas 
th e  u se  o f  th e  same name tw ic e  does n o t .  That i s ,  he w anted to  e x p la in
12why " ^ a  and a=b a re  o b v io u s ly  s ta te m e n ts  o f  d i f f e r i n g  c o g n itiv e  v a lu e ."  
H is answer r e l i e s  on d is t in g u is h in g  betw een th e  "S inn" o r  "se n se "  o f  a 
p ro p e r  name and i t s  "Bedeutung" o r  " r e fe re n c e " .  The " re fe re n c e "  i s  t h a t  
which we u se  th e  name to  t a l k  a b o u t. I t s  "sen se"  i s  r a th e r  more complex 
and i s  th e  means by w hich th e  re fe re n c e  o f  a  name can be d e te rm in ed . 
U n d erstan d in g  th e  sen se  o f  a  name i s  what i s  r e q u ire d  in  o rd e r  f o r  u s  
to  d ec id e  w h ich -o b je c t i t  r e f e r s  t o .  As an i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  c o n s id e r  th e  
two names 'H e sp e ru s ' and 'P h o s p h o ru s '. At one tim e th e s e  were u se d  to  
r e f e r  to  what were th o u g h t to  be d i s t i n c t  s t a r s  in  th e  sk y . I t  was 
l a t e r  d isc o v e re d  th a t  th e y  were b o th  names o f  th e  same o b je c t ,  th e  
p la n e t  Venus. The i d e n t i t y  s ta te m e n ts  ' H esperus^H esperus' and
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’ H esperas-Phosphorus* a re  b o th  t r u e  b u t c l e a r ly  d i f f e r  in  c o g n itiv e  
v a lu e  —  a f t e r  a l l ,  i t  was an a s tro n o m ic a l d isc o v e ry  t h a t  le d  p eo p le  to  
sa y  th e  l a t t e r  was t r u e .  On F r e g e 's  a cco u n t, th e  d if f e re n c e  in  
c o g n it iv e  v a lu e  r e s u l t s  from th e  f a c t  t h a t ,  w h ils t  hav ing  th e  same 
r e f e r e n c e ,  th e  two names d i f f e r  in  s e n s e . In  o rd e r  to  be ab le  to  d ec id e  
what each o f  th e  names r e f e r s  to ,  though,w e have to  g ra sp  t h e i r  s e n s e s .
I t  sh o u ld  n o t be th o u g h t t h a t  sen se  and re fe re n c e  a re  in  some way 
c o n s t i tu t i v e  o f  m eaning. For F re g e , re fe re n c e  s i g n i f i e s  th e  r e l a t i o n  
betw een a  word and an o b je c t  and so forms no p a r t  o f  what we m ight 
o r d in a r i ly  th in k  o f  as  m eaning. Sense i s  more c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d  to  
m eaning. Knowing th e  sen se  o f  a  word —  u n d e rs ta n d in g  i t  —  e n ab le s  
one to  d ec id e  w hich o b je c t ,  i f  any , th e  word a p p l ie s  to ;  b u t th e r e  b e in g  
a  r e l a t i o n  in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e  i s  som ething d i f f e r e n t .  F a i lu re  to  
a p p re c ia te  t h i s  p o in t  amounts to  f a i l u r e  to  u n d e rs ta n d  F re g e 's  s o lu t io n  
to  h i s  o r ig i n a l  p rob lem . F rege does n o t a c tu a l ly  t a l k  about sense  
b e in g  p a r t  o f  a  more g e n e ra l n o t io n .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  th a t  
w ith in  th e  i n t u i t i v e  n o tio n  o f  m eaning he though t th a t  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  
co u ld  be drawn betw een sen se  and two o th e r  in g re d ie n ts  —  " fo r c e " ,  as 
in  th e  d if f e r e n c e  betw een a s s e r t in g  som ething and a sk in g  w hether i t  i s  
t r u e ,  and " to n e " , a s  in  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  betw een 's w e a t ' and 'p e r s p i r a t i o n ' .  
As F rege rem arks, how ever, th e  l a t t e r  in g re d ie n ts  concern  " p o e tic  
e loquence . . .  and must be evoked by  each h e a re r  o r  re a d e r  a cc o rd in g  to  
th e  h in t s  o f  th e  p o e t o r  th e  s p e a k e r , P r e s u m a b l y  p o e t ic  e loquence 
w i l l  n o t be r e f l e c t e d  w ith in  th e  g e n e ra l a re a  o f  d is c o u rs e  w ith  which 
we s h a l l  be concerned , nam ely th a t  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s .  Our 
in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  m e a n in g ,th e n ,w ill  r a th e r  be an in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  s e n se , 
though we s h a l l  t r e a t  to p ic s  w hich F rege n ev e r co n s id e re d  and say  th in g s  
w ith  w hich he m ight w e ll have d is a g re e d .
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B efore s u g g e s tin g  how we m ight ex ten d  F re g e 's  o r ig in a l  i n s i g h t ,  
l e t  me say  a  few words about te rm in o lo g y . Many s c i e n t i f i c  te rm s a re  
p r e d ic a te s ,  i . e . ,  e x p re s s io n s  o f  th e  form . . .  i s  a  o r  ' . . .  i s  ^ ' , 
where th e  b la n k  i s  to  be  f i l l e d  by a  s in g u la r  term  such as a  name in  
o rd e r  to  y ie ld  a  com plete s e n te n c e . The t r u e  sen ten c e  'H esperus i s  a 
p l a n e t ' ,  f o r  exam ple, i s  made up o f  th e  s in g u la r  term  'H e sp e ru s ' and 
th e  p r e d ic a te  ' . . .  i s  a  p l a n e t ' .  O th er exam ples o f  s in g u la r  te rm s 
a re  d e m o n stra tiv e s  l i k e  ' t h i s  c lo u d  cham ber' and ' t h a t  pendulum’ , and 
d e f i n i t e  d e s c r ip t io n s  l i k e  ’ th e  2 0 c m .re f le c to r  te le s c o p e  in  th e  S t .  
Andrews U n iv e r s i ty  o b s e r v a to r y ', In  t a lk in g  o f  a  s in g u la r  term  I  s h a l l  
som etim es say  th a t  i t  d en o tes  an o b je c t ,  by which I  mean th a t  i t  r e f e r s  
to  th e  o b je c t ,  and sometimes t h a t  such  an o b je c t  i s  th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  
th e  te rm . O th er te rm s u se d  so f a r  which fu n c tio n  a s  p r e d ic a te s  a re  
'g e n e ' ,  'e l e c t r o n * ,  and ' a c i d ' .  I  s h a l l  a lso  in c lu d e  e v e n ts ,  l i k e  
'a n  e v o lu tio n  o f  g a s ' ,  and in s ta n c e s  o f  m a tte r ,  l i k e  ' t h e  e le c tro s c o p e  
l e a v e s ' ,  a s  p a r t i c u l a r s  o v e r which p r e d ic a te s  ra n g e . In t h i s  way 
'c h l o r i n e ' ,  'g o ld ’ , e t c . ,  can be coun ted  a s  p r e d ic a te s .  The n o tio n  o f  
r e fe re n c e  i s  to  be u n d e rs to o d  b ro a d ly  as s ig n ify in g  n o t o n ly  th e  
r e l a t i o n  betw een a. s in g u la r  term  and an o b je c t  b u t a lso  th e  r e l a t i o n  
betw een a  p r e d ic a te  and a  s e t  o f  o b je c t s ,  t h i s  s e t  b e in g  th e  ex te n s io n  
o f  th e  p r e d ic a te .  So when I  t a l k  about a  th e o ry  o f  re fe re n c e  f o r  
s c i e n t i f i c  te rm s t h i s  i s  som etim es to  be u n d e rs to o d  as m eaning a  th e o ry  
o f  th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  p r e d ic a te s .
R etu rn in g  to  th e  problem  o f  th e o ry  c o m p a ra b il i ty , suppose t h a t  
th e o ry  T^  has th e  fo llo w in g  e m p ir ic a l consequence;
( i )  (x )(P x o Q x ) 
Suppose a lso  th a '
( i i )  (3 x )(P x  & ~Qx)
2t  an ap p aren t r i v a l , T , has th e  e m p ir ic a l consequence;
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O rd in a r i ly  we sh o u ld  m a in ta in  t h a t ,  s in c e  ( i )  and ( i i )  a re  lo g ic a l  
1 2c o n t r a d ic to r ie s ,  T and T a re  in  c o n f l i c t .  In m a in ta in in g  t h i s  we 
a re  com m itted to  h o ld in g  n o t t h a t  b o th  *P' and have th e  same sense  
in  and b u t t h a t  th e y  have (more o r  le s s ^ ^ )  th e  same r e f e r e n c e .
The re a so n  i s  t h a t ,  in  e x te n s io n a l  lo g ic ,  to  say  t h a t  ( i )  and ( i i )  a re  
c o n t r a d ic to r ie s  i s  to  say  th a t  th e y  co u ld  n o t b o th  be t r u e  u n d er any 
un ifo rm  in t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  p r e d ic a te s ,  where by 'u n ifo rm  in t e r p r e t a t i o n  
o f  th e  p r e d ic a te s ' i s  m eant: g iven  a  non-em pty domain o f  o b je c ts  D, 
and an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  I  which a s s ig n s  s e t s  o f  o b je c ts  to  p r e d ic a te s  as  
t h e i r  e x te n s io n s ,  a l l  o c c u rre n c e s  o f  th e  same p re d ic a te  l e t t e r  u n d er 
an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  I  a re  to  be c o n s tru e d  a s  hav in g  th e  same e x te n s io n .
I f  i t  can be e s ta b l i s h e d  th a t  b o th  'P '  and *^' have th e  same ex te n s io n  
a s  th e y  o ccu r in  T^  and T^, th e n  th e y  can be re p re s e n te d ,  as in  ( i )  and 
( i i ) ,  by th e  same p re d ic a te  l e t t e r  in  lo g ic a l  form . F in a l ly ,  no 
u n ifo rm  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  p r e d ic a te s  co u ld  p o s s ib ly  make b o th  ( i )  
and ( i i )  t i u e .
A p p a re n tly ,th e n ,th e  r e a l i s t ' s  main ta s k  i s  to  e s t a b l i s h  what th e  
e x te n s io n s  o f  p r e d ic a te s  from d i f f e r e n t  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  a re  and to  
e x p re ss  t h i s  in  such a way a s  to  p e rm it com parison . The r e l a t i v i s t ,  
o r  s u p e r - r e a l i s t ,  d e n ie s  t h a t  such in t e r - t h e o r e t i c  com parison i s  
p o s s ib le .  We have seen  c e r t a in  problem s th a t  a r i s e  f o r  th e  r e l a t i v i s t ,  
b u t i t  does n o t th e re b y  fo llo w  th a t  re a lism  i s  v in d ic a te d .  As I  see  i t ,  
th e  r e l a t i v i s t ' s . d e n i a l  i s  a c h a lle n g e  to  th e  r e a l i s t  to  j u s t i f y  h i s  
c la im  th a t  th e r e  i s  a  f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  a s  to  w hether com peting o r  
su c c e s s iv e  th e o r ie s  a re  about th e  same th in g s .
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S e c tio n  ( i i ) :  ï b u r  Q uestions  f o r  R ealism
L et me now t r y  to  s p e l l  o u t re a l is m  in  more d e ta i l*  As I  s a id  
b e f o r e ,  my main aim i s  to  e x p l ic a te  th e  r e a l i s t  accoun t o f  th e  
developm ent o f  s c ie n c e ,  and th e  c e n t r a l  t h e s i s  o f  t h i s  account i s  
t h a t  th e re  a re  many c a se s  where com peting o r  su c c e s s iv e  th e o r ie s  a re  
abou t th e  same th in g s .  E v id e n tly  th e n  a  r e a l i s t  w i l l  have to  be 
a b le  to  answer th e  q u e s tio n :  how can we compare th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  
r e le v a n t  p r e d ic a te s  from d i f f e r e n t  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s ?  What we 
have to  have a  b e t t e r  id e a  o f  though  i s  which p r e d ic a te s  a re  th e  
r e le v a n t  o n e s . I f  we lo o k  a t  some o f  th e  t y p i c a l  p ro b le m a tic  c a se s  
o f  th e o ry  change, we some a c ro s s  q u e s tio n s  l i k e  'A re  th e  fo rm ativ e  
e lem en ts  p o s tu la te d  by Mendel th e  genes s tu d ie d  by  modem m o lecu la r 
b i o l o g i s t s ? ' ,  'W ere th e  atom ic th e o r ie s  o f  D alton  and Avogadro about 
th e  same t h i n g s ? ' , and 'When Newton u sed  th e  term  ' g r a v i t a t i o n a l  
f i e l d ' , d id  i t  ap p ly  to  a n y th in g  re c o g n iz e d  in  R e l a t i v i t y  p h y s ic s ? '. 
L ess p ro b le m a tic  c a s e s ,  i . e . ,  ones where sameness o f  ex te n s io n  i s  
more o b v io u s , a re  P to le m a ic  and C opernican  th e o r i e s  o f  th e  p la n e t s ,  
A r i s t o t l e 's  th e o ry  o f  th e  b r a in  and th a t  o f  contem porary  neuro ­
p h y s io lo g i s t s ,  and even th e  d isc o v e ry  th a t  w hales a re  mammals and 
n o t f i s h .  In  a l l  o f  th e s e  c a s e s ,  th e  re le v a n t  p r e d ic a te  —  'g e n e ' ,  
'a to m * , 'g r a v i t a t i o n a l  f i e l d * ,  'p l a n e t ' ,  ' b r a i n ' ,  and 'whale* —  i s  
a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te . Such p r e d ic a te s ,  which can be c o r r e c t ly  
a p p l ie d  to  o b je c ts  on th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  p h y s ic a l  p r o p e r t i e s ,  
occupy a  c e n t r a l  p la c e  in  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r iz in g .  At th e  b eg in n in g  
o f  C hap ter 5> 1 s h a l l  t a l k  about them in  more d e t a i l .  I  s h a l l  a lso  
m ention exam ples o f  th e o ry  change, to  be d isc u sse d  in  th e  f i n a l  
c h a p te r ,  which in v o lv e  p r e d ic a te s  n o t a s s o c ia te d  w ith  n a tu r a l  k in d s .
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F or th e  p re s e n t  though I  w ish  to  r e s t r i c t  my in v e s t ig a t io n s  to  th e  
c e n t r a l  c a se s  o f  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s .
The m ost g e n e ra l q u e s tio n  f o r  a  r e a l i s t  account o f  th e  grow th o f  
s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge th e n  i s ;
(1 ) How can we compare th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  r e le v a n t  n a tu r a l  k in d  
p r e d ic a te s  from d i f f e r e n t  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s ?
T his q u e s tio n  can he  ta k e n  in  a  fo rm al sense  o r  in  a m a te r ia l  o n e .
In  th e  form al sen se  i t  i s  a  q u e s tio n  about th e  lo g ic  o f  th e o ry  
com parison —  what language o r  th e o ry  shou ld  we u se  f o r  com paring th e  
e x te n s io n s  o f  n a t u r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  from two d i s t i n c t  th e o r ie s ?
The n ex t s e c t io n  w i l l  c o n ta in  my answ er to  t h i s  fo rm al q u e s tio n .
In  th e  m a te r ia l  s e n se , ( l )  i s  a  q u e s tio n  about th e  means t h a t  
a re  to  be employed in  a c tu a l ly  a s c e r ta in in g  what th e  r e le v a n t  p r e d ic a te s  
o f  d i f f e r e n t  th e o r ie s  have as  t h e i r  e x te n s io n s . In  c o n c e n tra t in g  on 
r e f e r e n c e ,  th e  r e a l i s t  has to  b e  a b le  to  meet th e  c h a lle n g e  posed  by 
a  p a r t i c u l a r  form o f  th e  in co m m en su rab ility  t h e s i s ,  v i z . ,  th a t  th e r e  i s  
no f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  as  to  w hether o r  n o t p r e d ic a te s  from d i f f e r e n t  
s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  have th e  same e x te n s io n s . How i s  he to  meet t l j i s ?
He has to  g iv e  a  g e n e ra l account o f  how th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  re le v a n t  
p r e d ic a te s  can be d is c o v e re d , i . e . ,  an account o f  how we a re  to  dec ide  
which th in g s  a  p a r t i c u l a r  p r e d ic a te  can b e , o r  was, c o r r e c t ly  a p p lie d  
t o .
In  p u rsu in g  an in v e s t ig a t io n  in to  th e  e p is te m o lo g ic a l q u e s tio n  
o f  what a  p a r t i c u l a r  s c i e n t i f i c  p re d ic a te  h a s ,  o r  had , as i t s  e x te n s io n , 
th e  r e a l i s t  w i l l  sometimes be le d  to  c o n s id e r  te rm s l i k e  'w h a le ',  
'p l a n e t '  and 'b r a i n '  which a re  u sed  o u ts id e  o f  s c ie n c e .  Many n a tu r a l  
k in d  p r e d ic a te s  a re  l i k e  t h i s .  O ften  t h i s  f e a tu r e  w i l l  be o f  some u se
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i n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  what th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  te rm s u sed  in  p a s t  s c i e n t i f i c  
th e o r i e s  w ere . The more w id e ly  a  term  i s  u se d  w ith in  a  l i n g u i s t i c  
community, th e  more in fo rm a tio n  one who w ishes to  u n d e rs ta n d  what i t  
means and what i t  r e f e r s  to  w i l l  have a v a i la b le ,  A s tu d y  o f  th e  u se  
o f  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te , th e n ,  i s  b e s t  c o n s tru e d  as a  s tu d y  o f  i t s  
u se  n o t ju s t  w ith in  a  p a r t i c u l a r  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry ,  b u t w ith in  a 
l i n g u i s t i c  community. I  s h a l l  d is c u s s  u se  and u n d e rs ta n d in g  more f u l l y  
in  subsequen t c h a p te r s .  F or th e  p r e s e n t ,  we a re  now in  a  p o s i t io n  to  
fo rm u la te  th e  second o f  th e  fo u r  q u e s tio n s  u n d e r ly in g  th e  r e a l i s t ' s  
accoun t o f  th e o ry  change;
( 2 ) How can we d is c o v e r  which o b je c ts  b e lo n g  to  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  
a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  as  t h a t  p r e d ic a te  i s  u se d  w ith in  a  
l i n g u i s t i c  community?
A com plete answ er to  q u e s tio n  ( I )  depends on th e r e  b e in g  an answ er to  
q u e s tio n  ( 2 ) ,  a s  w e ll as on th e  fo rm al problem  o f  d e c id in g  on a 
language f o r  th e o ry  com parison . O nly i f  answ ers to  b o th  o f  th e s e  a re  
ach iev ed  w i l l  th e  r e a l i s t  be  a b le  to  meet th e  c h a lle n g e  posed  by  th e  
t h e s i s  o f  in c o m m en su rab ility .
What s o r t s  o f  c o n s id e ra t io n s  w i l l  have to  be tak en  in to  account 
when i t  comes to  answ ering  (2 )?  I  have d is c u s se d  th e  Fregean d i s t i n c t i o n  
betw een th e  sen se  o f  a  terra and i t s  re fe re n c e  o r  e x te n s io n , and n o te d  
th a t  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  sen se  i s  a  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  d e te rm in in g  th e  
re fe re n c e  o r  e x te n s io n . I  a ls o  s a id  t h a t  sense  co u ld  be co n s id e re d  
a s  th e  p rim ary  n o tio n  c o n s t i tu t i v e  o f  m eaning. Thus we m ight expec t 
t h a t  th e  sen se  o f  a  s c i e n t i f i c  p r e d ic a te  w i l l  be g iv e n , a t  l e a s t  in  p a r t ,  
by  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  p r in c ip le s  u se d  in  s t a t i n g  th e  th e o ry , o r  t h e o r i e s ,  
in  which i t  o c c u rs .  But th e  r e a l i s t  has to  be ex trem ely  c a r e fu l  h e r e .
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As we have se e n , th e r e  a re  problem s in v o lv ed  in  making p r e c i s e  th e
n o tio n s  o f  'p a r t i a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n ' o r  'p a r t i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' .  More
fundam ental though  i s  th e  fo llo w in g  d i f f i c u l t y .  Suppose f o r  th e  moment
t h a t  th e  r e a l i s t  w ishes to  c o n s tru e  th e  s ta te m e n t . th a t  th e  sen se  o f  a
s c i e n t i f i c  p r e d ic a te  i s  g iven  in  p a r t  by t h e o r e t i c a l  p r in c ip le s  as
sa y in g  th a t  th e r e  i s ,  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  s e n se , a  c r i t e r i o n ,
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  which i s  a  n e c e s s a ry  c o n d itio n  f o r  an o b j e c t 's  b e lo n g in g
to  th e  e x te n s io n . Then in  n e a r ly  ev e ry  case  o f  th e o ry  change he w i l l
n o t be a b le  to  show th a t  su c c e s s iv e  th e o r ie s  a re  about th e  same th in g s !
Putnam has o f f e r e d  a  v iv id  exam ple;
Bohr assumed in  I 9 I I  t h a t  th e r e  a re  ( a t  ev e ry  tim e )  numbers £  and 2
such th a t  th e  (one d im en sio n a l)  p o s i t io n  o f  a  p a r t i c l e  i s  2  and th e
(one d im en s io n a l)  momentum i s  p ;  i f  t h i s  was p a r t  o f  th e  m eaning o f
'p a r t i c l e '  f o r  B ohr, and in  a d d i t io n ,  'p a r t  o f  th e  m eaning' means
'n e c e s s a ry  c o n d it io n  f o r  membership in  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  te rra* ,
th e n  e le c t r o n s  a re  n o t p a r t i c l e s  in  B o h r 's  s e n s e , and , in d e ed , th e re
a re  no p a r t i c l e s  ' i n  B o h r 's  s e n s e ' .  (And no 'e l e c t r o n s '  in  B o h r 's
sen se  o f  ' e l e c t r o n ' ,  e t c . )  None o f  th e  te rras  in  B o h r 's  I 9 I I  th e o ry
r e f e r r e d !  I t  fo llo w s  on t h i s  account th a t  we cannot say  th a t
p re s e n t  e le c t r o n  th e o ry  i s  a  b e t t e r  th e o ry  o f  th e  same p a r t i c l e s
15t h a t  Bohr was r e f e r r in g  t o .
From t h i s  th e  r e a l i s t  does n o t conclude th a t  th e  te rm s o f  B o h r 's  th e o ry  
were l i k e ,  e . g . ,  th e  terra 'p h l o g i s t o n ',  which we now say  cannot be 
c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d  to  a n y th in g  a t  a l l .  He p r e f e r s  to  say  t h a t  some o f  
B o h r 's  b e l i e f s  about e l e c t r o n s ,  e t c . ,  and hence some o f  h is  t h e o r e t i c a l  
p o s tu la te s  about them , were m is ta k e n . S im ila r  rem arks m ight be made 
c o n ce rn in g , s a y , P to le m y 's  b e l i e f s  about th e  p la n e ts  —  he th o u g h t th e y  
o r b i t e d  th e  e a r th  —  and M u lle r 's  b e l i e f s  about genes —  he though t 
th e y  were composed o f  p r o te in s .  But to  m a in ta in  t h i s ,  w h ils t  a t  th e  
same tim e h o ld in g  t h a t  modern r e s e a rc h e r s  a re  t a lk in g  about th e  same
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t h in g s ,  means t h a t  s a t i s f y i n g  th e  f u l l  sense  o f  a  term  cannot he 
th o u g h t n e c e s s a ry  f o r  an o b j e c t 's  b e in g  a  member o f  t h a t  te rm 's  
e x te n s io n , o r ,  in  th e  case  o f  a  s in g u la r  te rm , f o r  i t s  b e in g  r e f e r r e d  
to  by th a t  te rm .
Two p o in ts  fo llo w  from t h i s .  The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  we s h a l l  n o t be 
concerned  w ith  what M u lle r , B ohr, P to lem y , e t c . ,  " h a d  in  m ind" o r  
" in te n d e d  to  r e f e r  t o "  when th e y  u se d  te rm s l i k e  'g e n e ' ,  'e l e c t r o n '  
and 'p l a n e t ' .  What th e y  had in  mind may be r e v e a le d  by  more g e n e ra l 
c o n s id e ra t io n s  to  do w ith  what th e y  s a id ,  how th e y  a c te d ,  and what 
th e y  b e l ie v e d .  Our co n ce rn , on th e  o th e r  hand, i s  w ith  what th e y  
succeeded  in  r e f e r r in g  t o ,  where su c c e ss  i s  judged r e l a t i v e  to  o u r 
p re s e n t  u n d e rs ta n d in g . The most s t r i k i n g  c a se s  o f  t h i s  a re  ones l i k e  
th e o r ie s .c la im in g  to  be about c a l o r i c ,  p h lo g is to n ,  m agnetic  f lu x ,  and 
th e  lu m in ife ro u s  e th e r ,  where we now say  th a t  th e s e  te rm s f a i l  to  
r e f e r  o r  have an e x te n s io n .
The second p o in t  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  incumbent upon u s ,  in  so f a r  as
we want to  c o n tin u e  to  u se  th e  n o tio n  o f  's e n s e ' ,  to  r e j e c t  th e  view
t h a t  th e r e  i s  alw ays a  s in g le  c o re  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s  a s s o c ia te d  w i th  a
te rm , s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  which i s  a  n e c e ss a ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d itio n
f o r  an o b j e c t 's  b e in g  a  member o f  t h a t  te rm ’ s e x te n s io n , o r  f o r  i t s
b e in g  d eno ted  by th a t  te rm . - We have to  a llo w  f o r  e r r o r ,  f o r  m istak en
b e l i e f ,  n o t o n ly  on th e  p a r t  o f  o u r p re d e c e sso rs  b u t a lso  on th e  p a r t
o f  o u r s e lv e s .  -Putnam has a tte m p te d  to  avo id  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  by
abandoning th e  n o tio n  o f  's e n s e ' a l to g e th e r  and u s in g  what has come
16to  be known as  a c a u sa l accoun t o f  r e f e r e n c e .  In  C hap ter 5» 1 s h a l l  
c r i t i c i z e  t h i s  s t r a t e g y  and o f f e r  an a l t e r n a t iv e  b ased  on a c l u s t e r  
th e o ry  o f  r e f e r e n c e .
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The c a u s a l  account em phasises f e a tu r e s  o f  o u r u se  o f  p ro p e r  names 
and n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  which a re  re le v a n t  to  answ ering  th e  
e p is te m o lo g ic a l q u e s tio n  o f  how we can d isc o v e r  what a  term  r e f e r s  to  
o r  has as i t s  e x te n s io n . I f  we can d isc o v e r  c e r t a in  f a c t s  about th e  
c a u s a l o r ig in  o f  a  th e o ry  —  what a p p a ra tu s  and d a ta  a  s c i e n t i s t  o r  
group o f  s c i e n t i s t s  had  a v a i la b le  p r io r  to  advancing  a  th e o ry  —  t h i s  
m ight en ab le  u s  to  r u le  o u t some c o n je c tu re s  as  to  a  p r e d i c a t e 's  
e x te n s io n , o r  en ab le  u s  to  s e t t l e  more q u ic k ly  on o th e r s .  In t h i s  way 
th e  c a u sa l a c c o u n t, so I  s h a l l  a rg u e , i s  r e le v a n t  to  answ ering  q u e s tio n  
( 2 ) .  What i t  i s  n o t r e le v a n t  to  though i s  answ ering  th e  co n ce p tu a l 
q u e s tio n  o f  what i t  i s  f o r  a  p ro p e r  name to  r e f e r  o r  f o r  a  p re d ic a te  
to  have an e x te n s io n .  C le a r ly  t h i s  l a t t e r  q u e s tio n  has to  be answ ered 
b e fo re  th e  fo rm er can b e ; we have to  know what i t  i s  f o r  a  p r e d ic a te  
to  have an e x te n s io n  b e fo re  we can d ec id e  what th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  p r e d ic a te  i s .  Hence we have a  t h i r d  q u e s tio n  fo r  r e a l is m ;
( 3 ) What c o n d it io n s  have to  be  s a t i s f i e d  by a n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  
and an o b je c t  a  in  o rd e r  f o r  a s  i t  i s  u se d  w ith in  a 
l i n g u i s t i c  community G, to  be c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d  to  a?
I t  i s  im p o rtan t to  make a  c l e a r  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een q u e s tio n s  ( 2 ) 
and ( 3 ) .  ( 2 ) i s  an e p is te m o lo g ic a l q u e s tio n , (3 ) a  q u e s tio n  o f
co n ce p tu a l a n a ly s is *  By way o f  an a lo g y , c o n s id e r  th e  two q u e s tio n s
'How can we d is c o v e r  who th e  f a th e r  o f  a  g iven  perso n  i s ? '  and ' What i s
i t  to  be  a  f a t h e r ? ' .  The form er i s  e p is te m o lo g ic a l , th e  l a t t e r  
c o n c e p tu a l . There a re  v a r io u s  t e s t s  and c r i t e r i a  f o r  d isc o v e r in g  
p a t e r n i ty ,  b u t o b v io u s ly  t h e i r  v e ry  e x is te n c e  p resu p p o ses  t h a t  i t  i s
u n d e rs to o d  what i t  i s  to  be a  f a t h e r .
A lthough th e re  i s  an im p o rtan t d i s t i n c t i o n  h e re ,  we m ight expec t
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t h a t  once we have fo rm u la ted  an answ er to  th e  co n c e p tu a l q u e s tio n  t h i s  
w i l l  su g g es t c r i t e r i a  f o r  answ ering  th e  e p is te m o lo g ic a l o n e . An 
e x p la n a tio n  o f  what i t  i s  to  he a  f a th e r  c l a r i f i e s  th e  r e l a t i o n  o f  
p a t e r n i ty  and so en a b le s  u s  to  d e v ise  c r i t e r i a  f o r  d is c o v e r in g  who a  
p e r s o n 's  f a th e r  i s .  In  C h ap te r 5> I  s h a l l  argue th a t  a  p re d ic a te  
can be c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d  to  an o b je c t  i f  and o n ly  i f  t h a t  o b je c t  
s a t i s f i e s  a  s u i t a b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  th o s e  d e s c r ip t io n s  b e l ie v e d  to  be t r u e  
o f  s .  T h is  su g g e s ts  t h a t ,  in  o rd e r  to  d is c o v e r  what a  p a r t i c u l a r  
n a t u r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  h as  a s  i t s  e x te n s io n , we s h a l l  have to  d e term in e  
what i s  o r  was b e l ie v e d ,  by u s e r s  o f  th e  p r e d ic a te ,  to  b e  t r u e  o f  th in g s  
o f  t h a t  k in d .  But t h i s  i s  n o t to  say  th a t  'b e l i e f *  i s ,  a s  i t  w ere, th e  
o n ly  c a te g o ry  w ith  w hich th e  r e a l i s t  has to  work# For i t  i s  a t  t h i s  
s ta g e ,  i . e . ,  th e  s ta g e  o f  answ ering  a p a r t i c u l a r  in s ta n c e  o f  ( 2 ) ,  t h a t  
he can make good u s e  o f  th e  c a u s a l  accoun t o f  r e f e r e n c e .  In  C hap ter 6 ,
I  s h a l l  a lso  su g g es t o th e r  c r i t e r i a  t h a t  m ight a id  him in  d is c o v e r in g  
th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  p r e d ic a te s .
Q uestions o f  sam eness o r  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  e x te n s io n  r e l a t e  p r im a r i ly  
to  u n d e rs ta n d in g  p re v io u s  s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s .  The problem s o f  
understeuading  th e  language a s s o c ia te d  w ith  a  th e o ry  w i l l  a lso  be 
compounded in  th e s e  c a s e s .  The r e a l i s t  m ight even be fo rc e d  to  
reco g n ize  t h a t ,  d e s p i te  th e  c o n s t r a in t s  a l lu d e d  to  above, he cannot 
alw ays d é te rm in â te ly  t r a n s l a t e  from an o th e r language to  h is  own. He. 
would th e n  have, to  d ec id e  i f  such  in d e te rm in acy  a f f e c t s  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  
what re fe re n c e  o r  e x te n s io n  a  te rm  h a s ,  o r  w hether i t  m erely  a f f e c t s  
th e  s e n s e . I  s h a l l  have a  l o t  more to  say  about th e s e  is s u e s  l a t e r ,  
b u t f i r s t  we need  to  pose a  f i n a l  q u e s t io n .
R etu rn in g  to  th e  l e v e l  o f  q u e s tio n  ( 3 ) ,  l e t  u s  c o n s id e r  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  p r e d ic a te  'P '  which i s  p a r t  o f  some language u sed  by
i 64#
members o f  a  g iv en  l i n g u i s t i c  community. To say  th a t  ’P* can be 
c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d  to  some o b je c t  a.^  i s  to  say  t h a t  'Pa.^* i s  a  t r u e  
s e n te n c e  o f  • T h is concep t o f  t r u t h  w i l l  be d is c u s s e d  a t  le n g th  in  
C h ap te r 4* I  in tro d u c e  i t  now so a s  to  g iv e  some id e a  o f  th e  c lo se  
r e l a t i o n  betw een th e  th e o ry  o f  r e fe re n c e  and th e  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h .
T h is  r e l a t i o n  su g g e s ts  t h a t  we m ight p a ra p h ra se  q u e s tio n  (3 ) as  'What 
c o n d it io n s  have to  be s a t i s f i e d  by  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p re d ic a te  o f  
language L and an o b je c t  a  in  o rd e r  f o r  to  be  a  t r u e  sen ten c e  o f
L?*. In t h i s  way we see  t h a t  in  coming to  u n d e rs ta n d  what i t  i s  f o r  
a  p r e d ic a te  to  have an e x te n s io n  we come to  u n d e rs ta n d  what i t  i s  f o r  
a  s ta tem en t to  be  t r u e .
A c e n t r a l  t e n e t  o f  th e  r e a l i s t ' s  p o s i t io n  i s  a  co rrespondence 
th e o ry  o f  t r u t h , i . e . ,  a  th e o ry  whereby what i t  i s  f o r  a  s ta te m e n t to  
be  t r u e  i s  e x p la in e d  in  te rm s o f  a  r e l a t i o n ,  a  co rrespondence r e l a t i o n ,  
betw een th a t  s ta te m e n t and som ething e l s e .  In  C hap ter 4 , i t  w i l l  be 
shown t h a t  such  a th e o ry  can be tu rn e d  in to  a  r e c u r s iv e  d e f in i t i o n  o f  
t r u t h .  But t h i s  r a i s e s  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  what i t  i s  f o r  th e re  to  be such 
a  r e c u r s iv e  d e f i n i t i o n ,  what makes th e  d e f in i t i o n  p o s s ib le ?  In 
d is c u s s in g  th e s e  problem s I  s h a l l  fo cu s  ray a t t e n t i o n  on th e  q u e s tio n :
(4 ) What c o n d i t io n s  have to  be met in  o rd e r  f o r  t r u t h  to  be 
r e c u r s iv e ly  d e f in e d ?
" My answ er to  t h i s  most fundam ental o f  th e  fo u r  q u e s tio n s  w i l l  be 
t h a t ,  where we a re  concerned  w ith  some n a tu r a l  la n g u ag e , t r u t h  can o n ly  
be  r e c u r s iv e ly  d e f in e d  i f  th e r e  i s  a  d e te rm in a te  r e l a t i o n  o f  re fe re n c e  
betw een s in g u la r  te rm s o f  th e  language and o b je c ts  in  th e  w orld , and 
betw een p r e d ic a te s  o f  th e  language and s e t s  o f  o b je c ts  in  th e  w o rld . 
R efe re n ce , I  s h a l l  s a y , in  t h i s  way u n d e rw rite s  t r u t h .  Here we have
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reac h ed  th e  fo u n d a tio n  o f  r e a l i s m .  An e x p la n a tio n  o f  th e  concept c f  
t r u t h ,  o f  what i t  i s  f o r  a  s in g u la r  term  to  deno te  o r  f o r  a  p r e d ic a te  
to  have an e x te n s io n , o f  how we can d isc o v e r  which o b je c ts  a  g iv en  
p r e d ic a te  can be c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d  t o ,  and hence w hether o r  n o t 
p r e d ic a te s  from d i f f e r e n t  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  have th e  same e x te n s io n s , 
a l l  depends on th e re  b e in g  a  p r im i t iv e  r e l a t i o n  o f  re fe re n c e  betw een 
language and th e  w o rld .
That th e r e  i s  such  a  d e te rm in a te  r e l a t i o n  m ight seem o b v io u s . 
C e r ta in ly  we have seen  no cause  to  doubt t h a t  th e r e  i s  so f a r ;  even th e  
r e l a t i v i s t  o r  s u p e r - r e a l i s t  p o s i t io n s  o f  F eyerahend and Kuhn assume t i ia t  
th e r e  i s .  The r e a l i s t  r e p r e s e n ts  th e  s c i e n t i s t  a s  one who p o s tu la te s  
t h e o r ie s  d e s c r ib in g  th e  r e a l  w o rld . M oreover, th e  s c i e n t i s t  i s  n o t 
u s u a l ly  th o u g h t to  be p r iv i le g e d  in  th u s  making c o n ta c t w ith  " e x te r n a l  
r e a l i t y "  —  most o f  u s ,  most o f  th e  tim e , th in k ,  a c t  and t a l k  a s  though 
we d o . But how d e te rm in a te  i s  th e  r e l a t i o n  betw een language and th e  
w orld? In . th e  n e x t c h a p te r ,  I  s h a l l  c o n s id e r  a  forcefV il argument 
p re s e n te d  by  Quine f o r  th e  view  t h a t  even though th e re  i s  some r e l a t i o n  
betw een language and th e  w orld  i t  i s  n o t th a t  which p h ilo so p h e rs  s in c e  
F rege have c a l le d  r e f e r e n c e .  In  a  sen se  I  s h a l l  be d e a l in g  w ith  a 
f i f t h  q u e s tio n  f o r  r e a l is m . I f  we f in d  grounds f o r  d o u b tin g  t h a t  th e re  
i s  a  d e te rm in a te  r e l a t i o n ,  th e n  th e  o th e r  q u e s tio n s  la p s e .
Having posed  fo u r  q u e s tio n s  and sk e tch e d  t h e i r  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s ,  
l e t  me now o u t l in e  th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  rem ainder o f  th e  t h e s i s .  To 
g iv e  some in d ic a t io n  o f  th e  s t r a t e g y  we need  to  a d o p t, th e  n ex t s e c t io n  
c o n ta in s  an answ er to  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  th e  "m echanics" o f  th e o ry  
com parison , o f  th e  language th a t  i s  to  be u s e d . My rem arks w i l l  be 
b ased  on c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  an a c tu a l  example from th e  h i s to r y  o f  th e
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atom ic  th e o ry .  In  th e  fo llo w in g  c h a p te r ,  I  s h a l l  d is c u s s  Q u in e 's  
argument t h a t  r e fe re n c e  i s  in s c r u t a b le .  R eply ing  to  t h i s ,  I  s h a l l  
a tte m p t to  show th a t  i t  i s  n o t s o , e i t h e r  in  o u r  own home language o r  
when i t  comes to  t r a n s l a t i n g  an a l i e n  lan g u ag e . S ta r t in g  in  C hap ter 4»
I  s h a l l  work s y s te m a t ic a l ly  th ro u g h  th e  fo u r  q u e s tio n s  in  r e v e rs e  o r d e r ,  
b e g in n in g  w ith  th e  r e l a t i o n s  betw een t r u t h  and r e f e r e n c e .  C hap ter 5 , as 
I  s a id  b e f o r e ,  w i l l  c o n ta in  a  c l u s t e r  th e o ry  o f  re fe re n c e  fo r  n a tu r a l  
k in d  p r e d ic a te s .  B efo re  t h i s  i s  p ro p o sed , how ever, I  s h a l l  draw a 
s t ro n g  ana logy  betw een n a t u r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  and p ro p e r  nam es, and 
d efend  a  c l u s t e r  th e o ry  o f  r e fe re n c e  f o r  p ro p e r  nam es. Much o f  th e  
su p p o rt f o r  th e  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  th e o ry  w i l l  d e r iv e  from argum ents 
in  defence  o f  th e  p ro p e r  name th e o ry .  The p e n u ltim a te  c h a p te r  w i l l  
in v e s t ig a te  more c lo s e ly  how we can u n d e rs ta n d  what e a r l i e r  s c i e n t i f i c  
th e o r ie s 'w e r e  a b o u t. I  s h a l l  a lso  lo o k  a t  how t h i s  t a s k  i s  a f f e c te d  by  
Q u in e 's  argum ents f o r  th e " in d e te rm in a c y  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  s e n te n c e s ."  
F in a l ly ,  in  C h ap te r 7» I  s h a l l  d is c u s s  some more exam ples and c o n s id e r  
th e  c o n t r a s t  betw een sa y in g  t h a t  e a r l i e r  s c i e n t i s t s  had some in c o r r e c t  
b e l i e f s  about th in g s  we now co u n ten an ce , and sa y in g  t h a t  th e y  f a i l e d  to  
r e f e r  to  a n y th in g  a t  a l l .  T h is  sh o u ld  g iv e  u s  a firm  g rasp  o f  what i s  
r e q u ire d  to  answ er q u e s tio n  ( l ) .
The f i r s t  p e rso n  to  e x p l i c i t l y  su g g est u s in g  th e  th e o ry  o f  
re fe re n c e  in  an a ttem p t to  re b u t in co m m en su rab ility  was I .  S c h e f f le r ,  
in  h is  book S cience  and S u b je c t iv i ty , which app ea red  in  I 9 6 7 . To th e  
b e s t  o f  my know ledge, how ever, n e i th e r  S c h e f f le r  n o r anyone e l s e  has 
drawn a t t e n t io n  t o ,  l e t  a lo n e  f u l l y  d is c u s s e d , th e  s e t  o f  p o in ts  ju s t  
made. They a r e ,  n e v e r th e le s s ,  c r u c i a l  to  a  th o ro u g h  exam ination  o f  
th e  fo u n d a tio n s  o f  re a lism  in  th e  p h ilo so p h y  o f  s c ie n c e .  Im portan t
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argum ents which b e a r  on some o f  th e s e  p o in ts  have been  r a i s e d  by  Q uine, 
E vans, Putnam , F ie ld ,  and o th e r s  —  we s h a l l  c o n s id e r  them in  due 
co u rse  —  b u t nowhere do th e y  g iv e  a  u n i f i e d  account o f  th e  s o r t  I
s h a l l  be p r e s e n t in g  h e re .  The more f a m i l i a r  p a t te r n  o f  d is c u s s io n
seCTis to  have been  s e t  by  S c h e f f le r  h im s e lf ,  who a rg u es  a t  le n g th  in
h i s  book t h a t  sam eness o f  r e f e r e n c e  i s  what i s  r e q u ir e d  f o r  com paring
th e o r i e s ,  y e t le a v e s  i t  t o t a l l y  u n c le a r  how th e  r e fe re n c e  o f  an 
e x p re s s io n  i s  to  be d isc o v e re d !  R ece n tly  an a ttem p t has been made by 
K. P a rso n s  to  f i l l  t h i s  la c u n a  and hence to  answ er q u e s tio n s  l i k e  (1 ) 
and ( 2 ) .^ ^  I  s h a l l  c o n s id e r  i t  c lo s e ly  in  th e  rem ainder o f  t h i s  
c h a p te r .  P a rso n s  goes beyond o th e r  fo llo w e rs  o f  S c h e f f le r  in  t h a t  she 
re c o g n iz e s  t h a t  d is c o v e r in g  what th e  ex te n s io n  i s  o f  a  s c i e n t i f i c  
p r e d ic a te  a s  u se d  in  a  th e o ry  r e q u ir e s  u s  to  say  som ething about how 
th e  p r e d ic a te  comes to  be  u n d e rs to o d . However, r a th e r  th a n  a d d re s s in g  
h e r s e l f  d i r e c t l y  to  q u e s tio n  ( 3 ) and th e  co n c e p tu a l problem  o f  what i t  
i s  f o r  an o b je c t  to  b e lo n g  to  th e  ex te n s io n  o f  a  p r e d ic a te ,  she o n ly  
o f f e r s  some vague su g g e s tio n s  f o r  d e c id in g  th e  e p is te m o lo g ic a l 
(question o f  how to  d is c o v e r  what a  p a r t i c u l a r  p r e d i c a t e 's  e x te n s io n  i s .  
The inadequacy  o f  th e s e  s u g g e s tio n s  w i l l  be made ap p aren t when we look  
a t  h e r  r e p ly  to  one argum ent f o r  in c o m m en su rab ility .
S e c tio n  ( i i i ) :  Saying  What th e  E x ten sio n  o f  a P re d ic a te  i s
To g e t a  b e t t e r  f e e l  f o r  th e  problem s c o n fro n tin g  a  r e a l i s t
accoun t o f  th e  grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge, l e t  u s  tu rn  im m ediate ly
to  q u e s tio n  ( I )  o f  th e  l a s t  s e c t io n .  Suppose we have two s c i e n t i f i c  
1 2t h e o r i e s  T and T , and we a re  i n t e r e s t e d  in  com paring th e  e x te n s io n s
1o f  p r e d ic a te  'P '  — a  p r e d ic a te  u se d  in  T —  and p re d ic a te  —  a
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p r e d ic a te  u sed  in  • Sometimes *P* and w i l l  be th e  same te rra , as
w ith  th e  th e o r ie s  about genes and e le c tro n s  m entioned  above. T h is i s
n o t so fo r  th e  example I  s h a l l  be c o n c e n tra t in g  on in  t h i s  s e c t io n .
In  c a se s  where T^  and a re  r i v a l  o r  su c c e s s iv e  th e o r i e s ,  th e  r e a l i s t
w i l l  aim to  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  w hatever i s  a  P a c c o rd in g  to  T  ^ i s  a  ^
2ac c o rd in g  to  T . But how sh o u ld  we ex p ress  t h i s  in  lo g ic a l  form? At 
f i r s t  i t  seems c o r r e c t  to  say  t h a t  in  such c a se s  he w ants to  e s t a b l i s h  
th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  p ro p o s it io n  
(x )(P x = Q x )
When we th in k  about i t ,  though , t h i s  p ro p o s it io n  must s t r i k e  u s  a s  an 
u n h o ly  m ix tu re . S ince ’P* and a re  te rm s b e lo n g in g  to  d i f f e r e n t  
th e o r i e s ,  how can th e y  be  u sed  in  th e  same p r o p o s i t io n ,  bound by  th e  
same q u a n t i f i e r ?  The c r u c i a l  term  in  t h i s  q u e s tio n  i s  'u s e d ' . To see  
why, l e t  u s  descend  from th e  realm  o f  lo g ic a l  form and make a  ca se  s tu d y . 
To b eg in  w ith , I  t r u s t  th a t  I  s h a l l  be fo rg iv e n  i f  I  beg  some q u e s tio n s  
and make some assum ptions abou t th e o ry  c o m p a ra b ility  in  o rd e r  to  d e sc r ib e  
th e  c a s e .
In  1808 , John D alton p u b lish e d  P a r t  I  o f  h is  New System o f  Chem ical 
P h ilo so p h y  in  w hich he propounded a  th e o ry  o f  ch e m is try  b ased  on a 
m o lecu la r  th e o ry  o f  m a t te r .  The p o s tu la te s  which formed th e  b a s i s  o f  
h i s  m o lecu la r th e o ry  were e s s e n t i a l l y  s a t i s f a c to r y  and c o r r e c t .  
U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  how ever, th e y  were n o t in  th em selves s u f f i c i e n t  to  make 
p o s s ib le  a  c a l c u la t io n  o f  a tom ic w e ig h ts , which was n e c e ssa ry  in  o rd e r  
to  show in  what way atoms o f  d i f f e r e n t  gases  were d i f f e r e n t .  To f i l l  
t h i s  la c u n a , D alton  b o ld ly  assumed an a r b i t r a r y  s e t  o f  maxims which 
amounted to  a  r u le  o f  g r e a te s t  s im p l ic i ty  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e  r a t i o s  in  
which e lem en ts  combined to  form compound m o lecu le s ,
I f  th e r e  a re  two b o d ie s , A and B, which a re  d isp o sed  to  com bine, th e
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fo llo w in g  i s  th e  o rd e r  in  which th e  com binations may ta k e  p la c e ,  
b e g in n in g  w ith  th e  most s im p le , nam ely:
1 atom o f  A + 1 atom o f  B = 1 atom o f  C, b in a ry .
1 atom o f  A + 2 atoms o f  B = 1 atom o f  D, te r n a r y .  • • •
The fo llo w in g  g e n e ra l r u le s  may be adop ted  a s  g u id e s  in  a l l  o u r 
in v e s t ig a t io n s  r e s p e c t in g  chem ica l s y n th e s is .
1 s t .  When o n ly  one com bination  o f  two b o d ie s  can be  o b ta in e d , i t
m ust be presum ed to  be  a  b in a ry  on e , u n le s s  some cause  appear to  th e
. 18 co n tra ry *  . . .
The t r o u b le  w ith  th e s e  maxims i s  t h a t  th e y  b ro u g h t D a lto n ’ s th e o ry  
in to  c o n f l i c t  w ith  some c a r e f h l ly  de term ined  ex p e rim en ta l r e s u l t s  o f  th e  
F rench  chem ist G ay-Lussac. These were e n c a p su la te d  in  h i s  Law o f  
Combining Volumes: when g ases  r e a c t  ch e m ic a lly , th e  p ro p o r tio n s  by  volume 
m easured a t  th e  same te m p e ra tu re  and p re s s u re  b e a r  sim ple  whole number 
r e l a t i o n s  to  each o th e r ,  and th e  volum es o f  th e  p ro d u c ts  ( i f  gaseo u s) 
m easured u n d er th e  same c o n d it io n s  a lso  b e a r  s im p le  whole number r e l a t i o n s  
to  th e  volum es o f  th e  r e a c t in g  g a s e s .  When oxygen and hydrogen r e a c t  
to  form w a te r , f o r  exam ple, one volume o f  oxygen and two volum es o f  
hydrogen y ie ld  two volum es o f  w ate r v ap o u r.
I f  D alton  had a c c e p te d  t h a t  th e r e  i s  some sim ple  r e l a t i o n  betw een 
volum es o f  d i f f e r e n t  g ases  and th e  number o f  "atom s" th e y  c o n ta in ,  he 
m ight have been  a b le  to  e x p la in  th e s e  r e s u l t s .  But he had a t  l e a s t  
th r e e  re a so n s  f o r  n o t do ing  s o .  In th e  f i r s t  p la c e  he thou g h t t h a t  
"atom s" o f  d i f f e r e n t  e lem en ts  have d i f f e r e n t  s i z e s ,  and so b e l ie v e d  
t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  numbers o f  them would occupy th e  same volum e. S econdly , 
th e re  would have been c a se s  w here, in  o rd e r  to  r e c o n c i le  h i s  maxims w ith  
G ay-Lussac’ s law , he would have to  have a c c ep ted  th a t  c e r t a in  o f  what 
he re g a rd e d  as  atoms —  oxygen m o lecu le s , f o r  example —  were composed 
o f  two l i k e  p a r t s .  From th e  b e g in n in g , though , D alton  had been im pressed  
by  Newton’ s work on e l e c t r i c i t y  and m agnetism , and he adopted  Newton’ s
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model o f  a i r  a s  an e l a s t i c  f l u i d  c o n s t i tu te d  o f  l i k e  atoms which r e p e l
each  o th e r  by  a  fo rc e  in c re a s in g  as  t h e i r  d is ta n c e  d im in ish e s . ’ Like
r e p e l s  lik e*  w as, f o r  D a lto n , a  u n iv e r s a l  t r u t h .  F in a l ly ,  D alton c la im ed
to  have d k p erim en ta l ev idence  o f  h i s  own t h a t  c o n f l i c te d  w ith  G ay-Lussac’ s
19law . *nius, D alton  rem ained  s t e a d f a s t l y  opposed to  th e  law .
In 1811 , M adeo Avogadro, an I t a l i a n  p h y s i c i s t ,  p u b lish e d  an
o b scu re  p ap e r e n t i t l e d  "E ssay  on a  Manner o f  D eterm in ing  th e  R e la tiv e
M asses o f  th e  E lem entary  M olecules o f  B od ies, and th e  P ro p o r tio n s  in
20Which They E n te r  in to  These Compounds." He p o in te d  ou t th a t  to  deny 
t h a t  th e  number o f  m o lecu les  c o n ta in e d  in  a  g iven  volume a t  a  g iven  
te m p e ra tu re  and p re s s u re  were th e  same fo r  d i f f e r e n t  g ases  would have 
made i t  v i r t u a l l y  im p o ss ib le  to  account f o r  th e  o b serv ed  r e g u l a r i t i e s  
o f  r e a c t io n s .  Avogadro went on to  propound a  h y p o th e s is ,  now r e f e r r e d  
to  as  h i s  law , th a t  eq u a l volum es o f  a l l  g a se s , u n d er th e  same c o n d i t io n s ,  
c o n ta in  equal numbers o f  m o le c u le s . He added, as a  c o r o l l a r y  to  t h i s ,  
what we sh o u ld  now ex p re ss  by  sa y in g  th a t  th e  m o lecu les  o f  e lem en ta ry  
g ases  were u s u a l ly  composed o f  more th an  one atom . On th e  b a s is  o f  th e  
h y p o th e s is  i t  was p o s s ib le  n o t o n ly  to  e x p la in  G ay -L ussac 's  r e s u l t s  b u t 
a lso  to  p ro v id e  a  method o f  f in d in g  t r u e  m o lecu la r form ulae w ith o u t 
a r b i t r a r y  maxims o f  s im p l ic i ty .  The advances made in  th e  c h em is try  o f  
th e  l a t e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  were th e  r e s u l t .
How does a l l  t h i s  i l l u s t r a t e  o u r problem ? W ell, we have two
th e o r ie s  about th e  m o lecu la r com position  o f  g ases  —  D alto n ’ s and
1 2 A vogadro’ s .  L et u s  deno te  th e  form er as  T and th e  l a t t e r  as  T . From
th e  p o in t o f  view  o f  o u r own s c ie n c e ,  i t  seems n a tu r a l  to  say  t h a t  one
1 2  2 s a l i e n t  d i f f e r e n c e  betw een T and T i s  th a t  T d is t in g u is h e s  atoms from
m olecu les w hereas T  ^ does n o t .  Of c o u rse , i t  i s  n o t q u i te  as  sim ple  as
t h i s .  A lthough D alton  u s e s  ’ atom ' and 'm o le c u le ' more o r  l e s s  i n t e r -
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ohangeab ly , he a lso  u s e s  th e  te rm s ’u l t im a te  p a r t i c le *  and 's im p le
21e lem en ta ry  p a r t i c l e ’ to  deno te  atoms o r  m o lecu les  o f  compounds.
Avogadro a ls o  employs a  wide range  o f  te rm in o lo g y , d is t in g u is h in g  atoms
22o f  elem en ts from m olecu les  o f  e lem en ts  and m o lecu les  o f  compounds.
And t h i s  i s  o n ly  how we would c h a r a c te r iz e  t h e i r  v o cab u la ry  dj; we had 
some way o f  com paring te rm s from d i f f e r e n t  t h e o r i e s .
F or th e  sake o f  s im p l ic i ty ,  I  s h a l l  c o n c e n tra te  on D a lto n ’ s term  
’ atom ’ , which he u s e s  in  p r e s e n t in g  h i s  maxims o f  s im p l ic i ty ,  and 
A vogadro’ s term  ’m o lecu le* , w hich o ccu rs  in  h i s  h y p o th e s is .  Were th e y ,  
in  u s in g  th e s e  te rm s , t a lk in g  about th e  same th in g s  o r  n o t?  How a re  
we to  d ec id e?  I t  seems p la in  t h a t  when D alton u se s  th e  term  ’ atom ’ to  
t a l k  about th e  e lem en ta ry  p a r t i c l e s  o f  g a s e s , he i s  r e f e r r in g  to  what 
Avogadro and modem ch em is ts  would term  'm o le c u le s ’ . Because o f  t h i s  
i t  seems p la in  a lso  th a t  th e  c la im  D alton  would make u s in g  th e  s ta te m e n t 
’No atoms o f  g ases  a re  composed o f  two l i k e  p a r t i c l e s ’ i s  d i r e c t l y  
c o n t ra d ic te d  by th e  c la im  Avogadro and modem ch em ists  would make u s in g  
th e  s ta te m e n t ’ Some m o lecu les  o f  g ases  a re  composed o f  two l i k e  p a r t i c l e s ’ . 
And i t  i s  t h i s  w hich in c l in e s  u s  to  say  th a t  D a lto n ’ s th e o ry  was 
f a c tu a l ly  in c o r r e c t ,  i . e . ,  t h a t  i t  le d  to  f a l s e  s ta te m e n ts  about how 
th e  w orld i s .
The r e a l i s t ’ s  s t r a t e g y  h e re  i s  to  t r y  to  e s t a b l i s h  th a t  ’ atom o f
a  g a s ’ f o r  D alton  had th e  same e x te n s io n  as ’m olecu le  o f  a  g a s ’ f o r
A vogadro. S u b s t i tu t in g  th e  l e t t e r s  ’P* and ’^ ’ r e s p e c t iv e ly  f o r  th e s e
p r e d ic a te s ,  we may say  th a t  what he t r i e s  to  e s t a b l i s h  i s  th e  t r u t h  o f
th e  s ta te m e n t
( l )  ’P ' and *^’ a re  c o -e x te n s io n a l .
I f  t h i s  can be e s ta b l i s h e d ,  th e n  th e  two c la im s may be w r i t te n  in  lo g ic a l
2form u s in g  th e  language o f  T —  th e  language in  which ’£ ’ i s  u se d  —  as
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( 2 )  ( x ) (Q x  D-'Itac)
(3) (3x)(Qx&Dx)
2where 'D* i s  th e  p r e d ic a te  o f  T ' i s  composed o f  two l i k e  p a r t i c l e s ' ,  
and where i t  i s  assumed th a t  th e r e  a re  some th in g s  o f  which i s  t r u e .  
From t h i s  th e  r e a l i s t  can conclude t h a t  th e  two th e o r ie s  were r i v a l s  in  
t h a t  th e y  o f f e r e d  c o n t ra d ic to ry  acco u n ts  o f  th e  same o b je c ts  — what 
Avogadro*s th e o ry  id e n t i f i e d  a s  m o lecu les o f  gases*  S ince we now accep t 
m ost o f  th e  th in g s  Avogadro s a id ,  t h i s  p ro v id e s  th e  b a s is  fo r  a  c r i t i c i s m  
o f  D a lto n 's  th e o ry ; (3 )  i s  t r u e  and hence (2 ) i s  f a l s e ,  D a lto n 's  maxims 
a lso  were m is ta k e n . So some o f  D a lto n 's  b e l i e f s  about m o lecu les were 
in c o r r e c t .
How i s  th e  r e a l i s t  to  go about e s ta b l i s h in g  th e  t r u t h  o f  (1 )?
There a re  two problem s a t  i s s u e  h e re ,  one c o rre sp o n d in g  to  what I  c a l le d
th e  fo rm al sen se  o f  q u e s tio n  (1 ) from th e  p re v io u s  s e c t io n ,  and one
co rre sp o n d in g  to  what I  c a l le d  i t s  m a te r ia l  s e n s e . For th e  tim e b e in g
I  s h a l l  c o n c e n tra te  on th e  f i r s t  o f  th e s e  p rob lem s.
E v id e n tly  th e  r e a l i s t  w ants to  be a b le  to  a s s e r t  b o th  "The ex te n s io n
o f  'P '  i s  . . . "  and "The e x te n s io n  o f  i s  . . . "  in  th e  same lan g u ag e ,
s in c e  th e n  th e  q u a n t i f i e r s  w i l l  range  ov er th e  same o n to lo g y , th u s
p e rm it t in g  com parison . I t  would seem th a t  th e  obv ious way to  do t h i s
i s  to  c o n s tru c t  a  m etalanguage in  which one can make s ta te m e n ts  about
th e  r e f e r e n t s  o f  th e  s in g u la r  te rras  and th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  th e  p r e d ic a te s
o f  an o b je c t  la n g u ag e . T h is  concep t o f  form al sem an tic s  was f i r s t
23a r t i c u l a t e d  by  T a r s k i .  As re g a rd s  i t s  a p p l ic a t io n  in  th e  lo g ic  o f
th e o ry  com parison , Putnam has rem arked , " i f  one has a  s c i e n t i f i c  language
L c o n ta in in g  th e  term  'e l e c t r o n ' ,  th e n  one can c e r t a in l y  c o n s tru c t  a
m etalanguage ML ov er i t  à  l a  T a r s k i ,  and d e f in e  'r e f e r e n c e ' in  such a
24.way th a t  " 'e l e c t r o n '  r e f e r s  to  e le c tro n s "  i s  a  t r i v i a l  th eo rem ,"
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While t h i s  p ro v id e s  a  way o f  sa y in g  what th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a 
p r e d ic a te  i s ,  i t  does n o t im m ed ia te ly  so lv e  th e  problem  o f  com paring 
th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  p r e d ic a te s  from d i f f e r e n t  s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s .  I f  we 
have two such  th e o r i e s ,  T’ and T", we cannot assume th a t  th e y  a re  to  be 
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  same fo rm al la n g u ag e . I f  we a s s o c ia te  them w ith  
d i f f e r e n t  languages L* and L" r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  th ough , th e y  w i l l  a ls o  be 
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  d i f f e r e n t  m eta languages ML' and ML". U sing  P u tn am 's  
exam ple, we can say  in  ML' " 'e le c t ro n *  r e f e r s  to  e l e c t r o n s " ,  in te n d in g  
th a t  'e l e c t r o n '  in  th e  sense  o f  T' r e f e r s  to  what a re  id e n t i f i e d  as 
e le c t r o n s  in  th e  th e o ry  T ' , and in  ML" we can sa y  " 'e l e c t r o n '  r e f e r s  to. 
e le c t ro n s "  in te n d in g  t h a t  'e l e c t r o n '  in  th e  sen se  o f  T" r e f e r s  to  what 
a re  i d e n t i f i e d  as  e le c t r o n s  in  th e  th e o ry  T ". But as Putnam c o n c lu d e s , 
" th e re  i s  no ML in  which we can even ex p re ss  th e  s ta te m e n t th a t  'e l e c t r o n '  
r e f e r s  to  th e  same e n t i t i e s  in  T' and
The r e a l i s t  w i l l  need  to  go a  l i t t l e  f u r th e r  h e re  and j u s t i f y  th e  
u s e  o f  th e  same m etalanguage f o r  t a lk in g  about b o th  t h e o r i e s .  F o llow ing  
t h i s  l i n e  o f  argum ent, P a rso n s  has su g g es ted  an answ er which r e l i e s  on
a  g e n e ra l c r i t e r i o n  o f  what i t  i s  f o r  a  p r e d ic a te  to  be t r u e  o f  an o b je c t .
She ex p re sse s  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  a s ,
f o r  any p r e d ic a te  e x p re ss io n  ' ? ' ;
For any a ,  'P ' i s  t r u e  o f  a  in  L i f  and o n ly  i f  a  i s  an F ( f o r  
some F)^^
By way o f  example she s u g g e s ts ,  " f o r  any in d iv id u a l  a ,  ' l i t h o l o g i s t ' i s
27t r u e  o f  a  in  E n g lish  i f  and o n ly  i f  a  s tu d ie s  ro c k s ."  These le a d  h e r  
• to  p re s e n t th e  fo llo w in g  s ta te m e n ts  fo r  com paring p r e d ic a te s ,
( 4 ) (x ) ( 'P *  i s  t r u e  o f  x  in  T^= F x ),
( 5 ) i s  t r u e  o f  x  in  T^= F x ) ,
from which she i n f e r s
1 ? ?8(6 )  (% ) ( '? ' i s  t r u e  o f  x  .in  T =  '_g' i s  t r u e  o f  x  in  T ) .
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1 2 U n d ers tan d in g  T as D a lto n 's  th e o ry ,  T as A vog ad ro 's , and *P* and *^'
a s  b e f o r e ,  th e s e  th r e e  s ta te m e n ts  would seem to  be ju s t  what th e  r e a l i s t
i s  a f t e r ,  f o r  (6 ) i s  th e n  sim ply  a n o th e r  way o f  c a p tu r in g  th e  im port o f
( 1 ) .  Both (4 ) and ( 5 ) a re  s ta te m e n ts  b e lo n g in g  to  th e  same m etalanguage
and so th e  in fe re n c e  i s  j u s t i f i e d .  The rem ain in g  problem  i s  th e n
w hether th e r e  i s  a  s u i t a b le  p r e d ic a te  to  s u b s t i t u t e  fo r  .
What i s  im p o rtan t about P a rs o n s ' su g g e s tio n  and h e r  c r i t e r i o n  i s  
t h a t  th e y  show how u s e f u l  i t  can be to  conce ive o f  t r u t h  as  a  t h r e e -  
p la c e  r e l a t i o n  h o ld in g  betw een a  p r e d ic a te ,  a  s e t  o f  o b je c ts  and a 
la n g u ag e . In  th e  p re v io u s  s e c t io n  I  m entioned  th e  con cep tio n  o f  t r u t h  
a s  a  tw o -p lace  r e l a t i o n  h o ld in g  betw een a  s ta te m e n t and a  la n g u ag e .
S ee in g  i t  as a  th r e e - p la c e  r e l a t i o n  i s  an obv ious e x te n s io n . T h is , I  
th in k ,  makes i t  c l e a r  how th e  r e a l i s t  shou ld  answ er q u e s tio n  ( I )  when 
u n d e rs to o d  in  th e  fo rm al mode. In o rd e r  to  re s o lv e  problems* o f  c o -  
e x te n s io n a l i ty  betw een p r e d ic a te s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  th e o r i e s ,  we need  to  be 
a b le  to  s p e c ify  t h e i r  e x te n s io n s  u s in g  th e  same m eta language . In t h i s  
way th e  v a r ia b le s  a l l  range  o v e r th e  same o n to lo g y . The q u e s tio n  which 
rem ains i s  ( I )  u n d e rs to o d  in  th e  m a te r ia l  mode. How e x a c t ly  can we 
e s ta b l i s h  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  l i k e s  o f  (4 ) and ( 5 )?
One o f  th e  main d i f f i c u l t i e s  i s  to  d ec id e  on a  p re d ic a te  'P * .
I  have a lre a d y  p o in te d  o u t t h a t ,  where we now th in k  a  th e o ry  i s  m istaken  
on some p o in t s ,  we canno t in  g e n e ra l h o ld  t h a t  a  n e c e s sa ry  c o n d itio n  
f o r  an o b j e c t 's  b e lo n g in g  to  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a p r e d ic a te  o f  th e  th e o ry  
i s  th a t  i t  f u l l y  s a t i s f y  th e  sen se  o f  th e  p r e d ic a te  as  s p e c i f ie d  w ith in  
th e  th e o ry .  -In  th e  p re s e n t  c a s e ,  f o r  exam ple, th e  r e a l i s t ' s  v iew  o f  
how sc ie n c e  p ro g re s s e s  co u ld  n o t be made o u t i f  p a r t  o f  th e  sen se  o f  'P '  
were assumed to  be ' i s  n o t d i v i s i b l e  by chem ical m e an s ', f o r  a lth o u g h  
D alton ap p ea rs  to  have b e l ie v e d  t h i s  to  be t r u e  o f  what he c a l l e d  "a tom s",
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i t  i s  n o t t r u e  o f  what Avogadro and p re s e n t-d a y  ch em ists  c a l l  "m o lecu les" ,
I t  would he more p la u s ib le  i f  *P' were in t e r p r e te d  as  ' i s  a  s m a lle s t
p a r t i c l e  o f  a  g as  to  have a l l  th e  chem ica l p r o p e r t i e s  o f  th e  g a s ' , b u t
r a th e r  th a n  compare such  s p e c i f i c  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  th e  q u e s tio n  I  want to
p re s s  i s  how we co u ld  know any one o f  them to  be c o r re c t*  No doubt
th e r e  a re  c a se s  o f  th e o ry  change where no s u i ta b le  p re d ic a te  can be
f ix e d  on; a f t e r  a l l ,  th e  r e a l i s t  i s  o n ly  c la im in g  th a t  h i s  accoun t i s
one o f  what t y p i c a l l y  happens* But what c o n d it io n s  have to  be f u l f i l l e d
in  o rd e r  f o r  a  p r e d ic a te  to  be s u i t a b l e ,  and how can we, in  p r a c t i c e ,
i n t e r p r e t  one th e o ry  u s in g  th e  language o f  a n o th e r?
P a rso n s , in  h e r  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  D alton/A vogadro c a s e , does n o t
a d d re s s  h e r s e l f  d i r e c t l y  to  th e s e  q u e s t io n s ,  a lth o u g h  she does make
s e v e ra l  p o in t s  which r e l a t e  to  them . Her b a s ic  approach  to  problem s
o f  change o f  e x te n s io n  i s  to  advance e m p ir ic a l "m eaning h y p o th eses"
29co n ce rn in g  th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  th e  r e le v a n t  p r e d ic a te s .  These h y p o th eses
a re  th e n  t e s t e d  a g a in s t  th e  " in fo rm a tio n a l backgrounds" o f  th e  th e o r ie s
co n ce rn ed . I f  judged c o r r e c t  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  th e s e  t e s t s  th e y  a re
defended , where n e c e s s a ry , a g a in s t  th e  a c tu a l  argum ents g iven  by  th e
30ad h e re n ts  o f  th e  th e o r ie s  f o r  c o n tra ry  ass ignm en ts  o f  e x te n s io n s . 
E x p re ss in g  th e  l a s t  s te p  in  th e  te rm s I  have u sed  in  t h i s  c h a p te r ,  what 
i t  amounts to  i s  d e c id in g  w hich o f  th e  b e l i e f s  th e  a d h e re n ts  o f  th e  
th e o r i e s  had a b o u t, s a y , m o lecu les  were f a l s e .
The id e a  o f  advancing  e m p ir ic a l hypo th eses  about e x te n s io n s  o f  
p r e d ic a te s  seems to  me to  be a  good one* As I  have a lre a d y  em phasised , 
th e  r e a l i s t ' s  case  sh o u ld  be b ased  on c o n tin g e n t f a c t s ;  s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
th e  t r u t h  o f  h i s  c la im s about th e  grow th o f  s c ie n c e  depend on what 
in fo rm a tio n  we now have a v a i la b le  about p a s t  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s .  He 
m ust, t h e r e f o r e ,  be p re p a re d  to  r e v is e  an assignm ent o f  e x te n s io n  to  a
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p r e d ic a te  o f  a  p a s t  th e o ry  in  th e  l i g h t  o f  f u r th e r  e v id e n c e . There i s  
a ls o  som ething to  he  s a id  f o r  a  n o tio n  l i k e  t h a t  o f  an in fo rm a tio n a l 
background . In C hap ter 6 , I  s h a l l  t a l k  about i t  m ore. I t  becomes 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  im p o rtan t when we a sk  q u e s tio n s  l i k e  how D alton was a b le  
to  e x p la in ,  in  h i s  own day , what he was ta lk in g  abou t when he u se d  a  
te rm , such as  'a to m ',  to  w hich he gave a  p a r t i c u l a r  sen se  w ith in  h is  
th eo ry *  How d id  o th e r  s c i e n t i s t s  come to  u n d e rs ta n d  D alton? In  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  how co u ld  Avogadro have come to  u n d e rs ta n d  him? The answ er, 
I  s h a l l  a rg u e , i s  t h a t  th e r e  a re  c e r t a in  c o n d itio n s  t h a t  have to  be 
s a t i s f i e d  in  o rd e r  f o r  a  p r e d ic a te  o r  s in g u la r  term  to  be s u c c e s s fu l ly  
in tro d u c e d  i n t o ,  and u se d  w ith in ,  a  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry .  Here I  s h a l l  
ap p ea l to  a  c a u s a l accoun t o f  r e f e r e n c e .  We a lso  have to  remember th a t  
D a lto n 's  th e o ry  d id  n o t sudd en ly  a p p e a r , p h rased  in  i t s  own s c i e n t i f i c  
lan g u ag e , com plete u n to  i t s e l f *  Most o f  th e  te rm s he u sed  had been 
u se d  in  o th e r  th e o r ie s  b e f o r e .  I t  i s  r a th e r  th a t  th e re  a lre a d y  was a  
s c i e n t i f i c  language w hich was l in k e d  to  a  w ider n a tu r a l  language and 
w hich D alton augm ented by  in t ro d u c in g  term s w ith  p a r t i c u l a r  in te n d e d  
senses*
T his i s  g e t t in g  away from th e  su b stan ce  o f  P a rso n s ' a r t i c l e
th o u g h . There th e  o n ly  c h a r a c te r i z a t io n  g iven  o f  th e  n o tio n  o f  an
in fo rm a tio n a l background i s  t h a t  i t  " c o n ta in s  th e  b e s t  s u b s ta n t ia te d
31• th e o r ie s  o f  th e  d a y ."  The te rm  'b e s t  s u b s ta n t i a te d ' i s  most u n c le a r ,  
b u t le a v in g  t h i s  a s id e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  seem to  a r i s e  in  case s  o f  th e o ry  
c o n f l i c t  when n e i th e r  th e o ry  i s  o b v io u s ly  b e t t e r  s u b s ta n t ia te d  th a n  th e  
o th e r*  A ccording  to  P a rs o n s ' c h a r a c te r i z a t io n ,  n e i th e r  th e o ry  would 
th e n  appear in  th e  in fo rm a tio n a l background , so in  p r in c ip le  th e r e  would 
be no way o f  a s c e r t a in in g  w hether such r i v a l  th e o r ie s  a re  about th e  same 
th in g s*  And t h i s  i s  one o f  th e  main problem s Psirsons s e t s  ou t to  s o lv e l
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What i s  m ore, th e  v e ry  example o f  th e  D alton  and Avogadro th e o r ie s  
would seem to  be a  ca se  in  p o in t ,  f o r  in  th e  f i f t y  y e a rs  betw een I8 I I  
and 1861 , b o th  were known to  many c h e m is ts , y e t n e i th e r  en joyed  more 
th a n  l im i te d  a c c e p ta n c e .
A more g e n e ra l c r i t i c i s m  o f  Parsons* a r t i c l e  i s  t h a t  she ta k e s
too  much f o r  g ra n te d . For exam ple, she  sa y s .
In  p r a c t i c e ,  a  m eaning h y p o th e s is  w i l l  be e x p l i c i t l y  made o n ly  f o r  
a  f a i r l y  sm a ll number o f  key te rm s —* th o se  abou t which th e r e  i s  
some q u e s tio n  —  w hile  o th e rs  a re  assumed to  have th e  same m eaning 
in  rae ta - and o b je c t  la n g u ag e . T h is assum ption , o f  c o u rse , 
c o n s t i tu te s  an im p l ic i t  m eaning h y p o t h e s i s . ^
What P a rso n s  say s  m ight b e  q u i te  t r u e  o f  what w i l l  happen in  p r a c t ic e
u s in g  h e r  ap p ro ach . But what i s  i t  t h a t  j u s t i f i e s  th e  im p l ic i t
h y p o th e s is?  What e n t i t l e s  u s  to  assume th a t  th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  th e  many
p r e d ic a te s  f o r  which no h y p o th e s is  i s  made rem ain  th e  same? I t  seems
t h a t  what i s  la c k in g  i s  a  th e o ry  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  a  th e o ry  o f  how we
can i n t e r p r e t  one s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry ,  l i k e  D a l to n 's ,  u s in g  th e  language
o f  a n o th e r , l i k e  th a t  u se d  to  t a l k  about A v o g ad ro 's . F in a l ly ,  th e r e  i s
a lso  th e  p re s u p p o s it io n  th a t  th e r e  i s  a  w e ll-d e f in e d  r e l a t i o n  betw een
p r e d ic a te s  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  and o b je c ts  in  th e  w o rld . P a rso n s
makes u se  o f  t h i s  in  p ro p o s in g  h e r  g e n e ra l c r i t e r i o n  o f  what i t  i s  f o r
a  p r e d ic a te  to  be t r u e  o f  an o b je c t .  As I  s a id ,  I  th in k  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n
i s  b o th  c o r r e c t  and u s e f u l  in  th e  log i'c  o f  th e o ry  com parison . I  argued
in  s e c t io n  ( i i ) ,  how ever, th a t  a  tho rough  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  re a l is m
has to  r e f u te  any c la im s t h a t  th e r e  i s  no such d e te rm in a te  r e l a t i o n  to
be made th e  s u b je c t  o f  a  c r i t e r i o n .  In  th e  n e x t c h a p te r  I  s h a l l  lo o k
in  d e t a i l  a t  one such c la im .
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CHAPTER 3 THE * SGRUTABILITT' OP REFERENCE
Section- ( i ) ;  Quine on T ra n s la t io n  and Meaning
We u se  a  m etalanguage in  o rd e r  to  s p e c ify  th e  r e l a t i o n s  betw een 
s in g u la r  te rm s o f  an o b je c t  language and t h e i r  r e f e r e n t s  and betw een 
p r e d ic a te s  o f  an o b je c t  language and t h e i r  e x te n s io n s . The m etalanguage 
en a b le s  u s  to  m ention th e  e x p re s s io n s  o f  th e  o b je c t  lan g u ag e . Those 
c a se s  in  which we a re  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in t e r e s te d  a re  where th e  o b je c t  
language c o n ta in s  a  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry ,  i . e . ,  a l l  o f  th e  te rm s u s e d  in  
s t a t i n g  th e  th e o ry  a re  assumed to  b e lo n g  to  th e  langusige. When we w ish 
to  t a l k  about th e  te rm s o f  th e  th e o ry ,  any m etalanguage c o n s tru c te d  
o v e r th e  o b je c t  language in  th e  T arsk ia n  manner w i l l  s u f f i c e .  O fte n , 
how ever, we w ish to  know what r e l a t i o n s  h o ld  betw een e x p re s s io n s  o f  
one th e o ry  and th o se  o f  a n o th e r ;  r e l a t i o n s  such  as  c o r e f e r e n t i a l i t y  
and o o e x te n s io n a l i ty .  T his o th e r  th e o ry  m ight be a  more com prehensive 
th e o ry  in  th e  sen se  t h a t  i t s  domain in c lu d e s  t h a t  o f  th e  f i r s t .  On th e  
o th e r  hand, i t  m ight ju s t  be a n o th e r  th e o ry  r e l a t e d  more lo o s e ly ;  th e  
domains o v e r la p .  A nother a l t e r n a t iv e  s t i l l  would be t h a t  th e re  i s  no 
o v e r la p  w h a tso ev er, in  which ca se  th e  th e o r ie s  have d i f f e r e n t  dom ains.
In o rd e r  to  p e rm it com parison , th o u g h , we must in  a l l  oases be a b le  to  
t a l k  about th e  te rm s o f  b o th  th e o r ie s  u s in g  th e  same m eta language . 
O therw ise we s h a l l  be u n a b le  to  say  an y th in g  a t  a l l  about th e  r e l a t i o n s  
t h a t  i n t e r e s t  u s ,  n o t even , e . g . ,  t h a t  th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  c e r t a in  
p r e d ic a te s  a re  d i f f e r e n t .
The id e a  t h a t  we must u se  a  background language f o r  t a lk in g  
about co n n ec tio n s  betw een words and th e  w orld has su g g es ted  to  some 
peop le  —  n o ta b ly  Quine —  th a t  th e  o n ly  r e l a t i o n s  which r e a l l y  make
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sen se  a re  th o se  betw een one language and a n o th e r ,  n o t th o se  betw een
language and th e .w o r ld .  P e rh ap s  th e  key p o in ts  in  h i s  argument f o r
t h i s  v iew  a re  t h a t ,  from th e  s ta n d p o in t o f  a d i f f e r e n t  background
lan g u ag e , th e  c o n n ec tio n s  m ight be d i f f e r e n t ,  and th a t  we have no
t e l l i n g  rea so n  f o r  p r e f e r r in g  one background language to  a n o th e r .
U sing  a  f a v o u r i te  exam ple, Quine p u ts  th e  p o in ts  l i k e  t h i s .
When we a sk , "Does ' r a b b i t ' r e a l l y  r e f e r  to  r a b b i t s ? ” someone can 
c o u n te r  w ith  th e  q u e s tio n :  "R efe r to  r a b b i t s  in  what sense  o f  . 
’ r a b b i t s '? "  th u s  la u n c h in g  a  r e g r e s s ;  and we need  th e  background 
language to  r e g re s s  i n t o .  The background language g iv e s  th e  query  
se n se , i f  o n ly  r e l a t i v e  s e n se ; sen se  r e l a t i v e  in  tu r n  to  i t ,  t h i s  
background la n g u ag e . ^
From t h i s  he draws a  r a d i c a l  c o n c lu s io n , "what makes sense  i s  to  say
n o t what th e  o b je c ts  o f  a th e o ry  a r e ,  a b s o lu te ly  sp eak in g , b u t how
2one th e o ry  o f  o b je c ts  i s  in t e r p r e ta b le  o r  r e in t e r p r e t a b l e  in  a n o th e r ."
Quine i s  u rg in g  h e re  t h a t  se v e re  r e s t r i c t i o n s  ap p ly  to  what can 
be s a id  about r e l a t i o n s  betw een words and th e  w o rld . There i s  no f a c t  
o f  th e  m a tte r  about r e f e r e n c e ,  o n ly  " r e la t iv e  f a c t s " ,  f a c t s  r e l a t i v e  
to  a  background lan g u ag e . T h is m ight even be c o n s tru e d  as  a  r a d ic a l  
form o f  th e  in co m m en su rab ility  t h e s i s ,  f o r  i t  q u e s tio n s  th e  whole 
n o tio n  o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  o f  w hether o r  n o t th e re  i s  such  a  d e te rm in a te  
r e l a t i o n  betw een language and th e  w orld . Q uine’ s argum ent, th e n ,  i s  
d i r e c te d  a t  th e  v e ry  fo u n d a tio n s  o f  re a lism  as  I  have e x p la in e d  i t .
Quine has a rgued  a t  le n g th  and o f te n  t h a t  language i s  in d e te r ­
m inate  in  v a r io u s  ways. As he has r e c e n t ly  em phasised , how ever, 
th e re  a re  two main s tr a n d s  o f  argum ent f o r  t h i s  co n c lu s io n  which need  
to  be d is t in g u is h e d .^  The f i r s t  tu r n s  on th e  u n d e rd e te rm in a tio n  o f  
p h y s ic a l  th e o ry  by  a l l  p o s s ib le  e v id e n c e . A ccording  to  Q uine, " th e o ry  
can s t i l l  v a ry  though  a l l  p o s s ib le  o b s e rv a tio n s  be f ix e d .  P h y s ic a l
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th e o r i e s  can be a t  odds w ith  each  o th e r  and y e t com p atib le  w ith  a l l  
p o s s ib le  d a ta  even in  th e  b ro a d e s t s e n s e . In a  w ord, th e y  can be 
l o g i c a l l y  in c o m p a tib le  and e m p ir ic a l ly  e q u iv a le n t ." ^  From t h i s  p o in t ,  
on which Quine e x p e c ts  wide ag reem en t, he c la im s to  i n f e r  th a t  o u r 
t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  a  f o r e ig n e r 's  th e o ry  w i l l  p e rm it a t  l e a s t  as  much 
v a r i a t i o n ,  in  t h a t  i t  w i l l  be in d e te rm in a te  which th e o ry  sh o u ld  be 
a t t r i b u t e d  to  him g iven  a  d e te rm in a te  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  h is  o b s e rv a tio n  
s e n te n c e s .  When a  * f o r e ig n e r ' i s  ta k en  to  be an e a r l i e r  t h e o r i s t ,  
t h i s  argum ent o b v io u s ly  has c o n s id e ra b le  re le v a n c e  to  o u r a ttem p t to  
u n d e rs ta n d  p re v io u s  s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s .  I  s h a l l  c o n s id e r  i t  in  d e t a i l  
in  C hap ter 6 .  In  r e p ly  i t  w i l l  b e  m a in ta in ed  t h a t ,  g iven  th e  u n d e r­
d e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e o ry  by  a l l  p o s s ib le  e v id e n c e , i f  t h i s  r e s u l t s  in  
th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  p re v io u s  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  n o t b e in g  d e te rm in a te , 
such  la c k  o f  d e te m in a c y  h as  n o t been shown by  Quine to  a f f e c t  th e  
e x te n s io n s  th e  p r e d ic a te s  o f  th o s e  th e o r ie s  a re  s a id  to  have. In  t h i s  
c h a p te r  I  s h a l l  c o n fin e  m y se lf  to  th e  second main s tr a n d  o f  argum ent 
Quine adduces f o r  in d e te rm in acy  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  s e n te n c e s ,  t h a t  
c o n ce rn in g  what he c a l l s  " th e  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  r e fe re n c e  o f  te rm s ."
To b e g in  w ith ,  Quine a rg u es  f o r  th e  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  r e fe re n c e
in  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  p r e d ic a te s ,  o r ,  a s  he u s u a l ly  c a l l s  them , g e n e ra l
te rm s , from a  fo re ig n  language f o r  which we have no p re v io u s ly
e s ta b l i s h e d  d ic t io n a r y .  Thus, to  ta k e  Quine’ s n o to r io u s  exam ple,
suppose th a t  a  f i e l d  l i n g u i s t  i s  w ondering how to  t r a n s l a t e  th e  fo re ig n
term  ' g a v a g a i' in to  E n g lis h . He i s  a b le  to  e s t a b l i s h  in d u c t iv e ly ,
beyond re a so n a b le  d o u b t, t h a t  a  f o r e ig n e r  can be  prom pted to  a s s e n t
to  th e  o cca s io n  sen ten c e  ’ G avagai’ by th e  p re sen ce  o f  a  r a b b i t , o r
' 5re a so n a b le  f a c s im i le ,  and n o t o th e rw is e .^  The obv ious t r a n s l a t i o n  f o r  
th e  te rm  would seem to  be ’r a b b i t ' .  B u t, Quine n o te s ,  "a  whole r a b b i t
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i s  p re s e n t when and o n ly  when an undetaohed  p a r t  o f  a  r a b b i t  i s  p r e s e n t ;  
a lso  when and o n ly  when a  tem p o ra l s ta g e  o f  a  r a b b i t  i s  p r e s e n t ." ^
There i s  no way o f  t e l l i n g ,  s im ply  by  o s te n s io n ,  w hich o f  ’ r a b b i t ' ,  
’u n d e tach ed  r a b b i t  p a r t '  o r  'r a b b i t  s ta g e ' i s  th e  c o r r e c t  t r a n s l a t i o n .  
U sin g  Q uine’ s te rm in o lo g y , ' G avagai' in  th e  fo re ig n  tongue can be 
e s ta b l i s h e d  as  h av ing  th e  same " s tim u lu s  m eaning" a s ,  i . e . ,  as b e in g  
" s tim u lu s  synonymous" w ith , th e  E n g lish  'R a b b i t ' .  T h is means, ro u g h ly , 
t h a t  each  o c c a s io n  sen ten c e  would be a s se n te d  t o ,  o r  d is s e n te d  from , 
by  a  sp eak e r o f  th e  r e le v a n t  language i f  asked  u n d er th e  same c o n d itio n s  
o f  sen so ry  s t im u la t io n .  'R a b b i t ' , how ever, i s  in  tu r n  s tim u lu s  
synonymous w ith  th e  o th e r  E n g lish  o cca s io n  se n te n c e s  ’U ndetached r a b b i t  
p a r t '  and 'R a b b it s t a g e ’ . As Quine se e s  i t ,  t r y i n g  to  s e t t l e  behav­
io u r a l  ly  th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  th e  v a r io u s  te rm s c o n s t i tu t i n g  th e se  
b e h a v io u ra lly  in d is t in g u is h a b le  se n te n c e s  i s  an in s o lu b le ,  and th e r e f o r e  
u n r e a l ,  p rob lem . Though i t  i s  obv ious th a t  th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  th e  
v a r io u s  E n g lish  te rm s must be d i s t i n c t ,  th e r e  seems no a sp e c t o f  a c tu a l  
o r  p o s s ib le  p h y s ic a l  b e h a v io u r w hich t e l l s  u s  to  which o f  them th e  
l i n g u i s t  sh o u ld  map ' g a v a g a i’ •
How i s  th e  l i n g u i s t  to  d ec id e  betw een th e  a l t e r n a t iv e s ?  W ell, 
say s  Q uine, he has to  tu r n  from o s te n s io n  and o b se rv ed  b eh av io u r to  
v e rb a l  s t im u l i  and v e rb a l  b e h a v io u r . In E n g lis h , o u r re c o g n i t io n  o f  
s o r t a l  te rm s —  te rm s w hich d iv id e  t h e i r  e x te n s io n s  —  depends on 
gram m atical p a r t i c l e s  and c o n s tru c t io n s  l i k e  p lu r a l  en d in g s, p ronouns, 
n u m era ls , th e  ' i s '  o f  i d e n t i t y ,  and i t s  r e l a t e d  te rm s 'som e' and 
’o th e r* .  The l i n g u i s t  p ro ceed s  by  a b s t r a c t in g  what he ta k e s  to  be 
s im i la r  p a r t i c l e s  and c o n s tru c t io n s  from th e  fo re ig n  language and 
h y p o th e s is in g  how th e y  a re  to  be a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  E n g lish  o n e s .
7Such h y p o theses o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  Quine c a l l s  " a n a ly t ic a l  h y p o th e se s" .
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The l i n g u i s t  may now a sk  th e  fo re ig n e r s  what he supposes amounts 
to  th e  q u e s tio n s  'Same g av ag a i?* o r  'How many g a v a g a is? ' T h e ir  answ ers 
would seem to  s e t t l e  m a t te r s .  Quine ag re e s  th a t  to  s e l e c t  a  fo re ig n  
word, say  ' h l e g ' , a s  th e  i d e n t i t y  p a r t i c l e  v i r t u a l l y  f ix e s  th e  t r a n s ­
l a t i o n ;  hence some a n a l y t i c a l  h y p o th eses  a re  o f  c ru c ia l . im p o r ta n c e .
But th e y  a re  a f t e r  a l l  o n ly  h y p o th e se s , th em se lv es  u n d erd e te rm in ed  by  
b e h a v io u r . Im agine t h a t  a  f o r e ig n e r  s e e s ,  p ro tru d in g  from b eh in d  a 
sm a ll ro c k , a  r a b b i t  head and a  t a i l .  He i s  prom pted to  u t t e r  th e  
s e n te n c e : ' Ip gavaga i b le g  op g a v a g a i ' .  The l i n g u i s t  m ight e q u a l ly  
w e ll t r a n s l a t e  i t  as  'T h is  r a b b i t  i s  th e  same as  t h a t  one ' o r  as  ' T his 
u n d e tach ed  r a b b i t  p a r t  b e lo n g s  w ith  t h a t  one ' •
The p o s s i b i l i t y  th u s  em erges t h a t  th e re  a re  in c o m p a tib le  m anuals 
o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  f o r  p r e d ic a te s  from a  fo re ig n  language to  o u r home 
language which would p re s e rv e  in v a r i a n t  a l l  th e  d is p o s i t io n s  to  
p h y s ic a l  and v e rb a l  b eh av io u r on th e  p a r t  o f  sp eak e rs  o f  th e  fo re ig n  
la n g u ag e . The m anuals a re  in c o m p a tib le  in  th e  sen se  t h a t  th e y  would 
c a r ry  a  s in g le  p r e d ic a te  from th e  fo re ig n  language in to  v a r io u s  
p r e d ic a te s  o f  th e  home language which a re  n o t c o e x te n s io n a l .  So 
f a i l u r e  o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  n o t m ere ly  f a i l u r e  o f  sen se  —  which I  s h a l l  
l a t e r  argue to  be  th e  im port f o r  sen ten c e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  th e  u n d e r­
d e te rm in a tio n  o f  p h y s ic a l  th e o ry  by ev idence —  i s  what i s  a t  i s s u e .
Two f e a tu r e s  o f  t h i s  argum ent r e q u ir e  f u r th e r  comment. The 
f i r s t  i s  t h a t  Quine pays e x c lu s iv e  a t t e n t io n  to  th e  b e h a v io u ra l f a c t s  
—  o s te n s io n ,  v e rb a l  b eh av io u r and th e  l i k e  —  when c o n s id e r in g  how 
th e  l i n g u i s t  m ight f i x  on a  p a r t i c u l a r  t r a n s l a t i o n  m anual. The s tu d y  
o f  language and th e  m eanings i t  c o n ta in s  i s ,  f o r  Q uine, p r im a r i ly  a 
s tu d y  o f  b e h a v io u r , " language i s  a  s o c ia l  a r t  which we a l l  a c q u ire  on 
th e  ev idence s o le ly  o f  o th e r  p e o p le 's  o v e r t  b eh av io u r u n d er p u b l ic ly
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8re c o g n iz a b le  c irc u m s ta n c e s ."  Viewed c o r r e c t ly  th e n , "know ledge, 
m ind, and m eaning a re  p a r t  o f  th e  same w orld  t h a t  th e y  have to  do 
w ith ,  and • • •  a re  to  be s tu d ie d  in  th e  same e m p ir ic a l s p i r i t  t h a t
Qan im ates n a tu r a l  s c ie n c e .  There i s  no p la c e  fo r  a  p r i o r  philosophy."*^ 
C onsequen tly  th e r e  i s  n o th in g  more to  guide u s  in  t r a n s l a t i n g  th e
language o f  a n o th e r  p e rso n  th a n  t h a t  p e r s o n 's  d is p o s i t io n s  to  o v e r t
^  ^  . 10 b e h a v io u r .
The second  f e a tu r e  i s  t h a t  Quine th in k s  i t  i s  obv ious t h a t  th e re  
a re  no b e h a v io u ra l f a c t s  u n d e r ly in g  th e  u se  o f  a  term  l i k e  ' g a v a g a i' 
w hich co u ld  a llo w  u s  to  say  th a t  i t  i s  a  p r e d ic a te  s ig n if y in g  one s e t  
u n d e r t r a n s l a t i o n  r a th e r  th a n  a n o th e r .  That i s ,  no b e h a v io u ra l f a c t s
g iv e  u s  a  re a so n  f o r  p r e f e r r in g  one t r a n s l a t i o n  to  a n o th e r .  As we
“h.saw, ap p ea l to  th e  f o r e ig n e r 's  d is p o s i t io n s  to  a sse n t^ a n d  d is s e n t
v e rb a l  s t im u l i  f a i l s  to  r e s o lv e  th e  in d e te rm in a c y , s in c e  we th e n  have
to  a llo w  f o r  th e  in d e te rm in acy  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  i d e n t i t y  and o th e r
in d iv id u a t iv e  a p p a ra tu s .  For someone to  now say  th a t  th e re  i s  some
f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  a s  re g a rd s  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  even though i t  canno t
be d ec id ed  by  ap p ea l to  b e h a v io u ra l f a c t s ,  i s  fo r  him to  f a l l  v ic t im
to  what Quine d e r id e s  as  " th e  myth o f  a  museum in  w hich th e  e x h ib i t s
11a re  m eanings and th e  words a re  l a b e l s . "
Having n o te d  th e s e  two f e a tu r e s  o f  th e  argum ent, l e t  u s  see  how 
Q uine develops i t .  In  p la c e  o f  th e  fo re ig n e r  and t r a n s l a t i o n  from a  
rem ote la n g u ag e , l e t  u s  p u t a  n e ig h b o u r o f  o u rs  and o u r own home 
la n g u ag e . We become l i n g u i s t s  o u r s e lv e s ,  w ondering how to  ' t r a n s l a t e '  
o u r  n e ig h b o u r 's  E n g lish  d is c o u r s e .  O rd in a r i ly  we a re  gu ided  by one 
com pendious, a n a l y t i c a l  h y p o th e s is ,  v i z . ,  th e  r u l e  o f  homophonie 
t r a n s l a t i o n :  we eq u a te  e x p re s s io n s  in  ou r n e ig h b o u r 's  mouth w ith  th e  
same s t r i n g s  o f  phonemes in  o u r own. Sometimes th e re  i s  a  p r in c ip le
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o f  c h a r i ty  a t  work w hereby we a v o id  a t t r i b u t i n g  a b s u rd i ty  to  ou r
ne ig h b o u r in  c e r t a in  un tow ard  s i t u a t i o n s ,  b u t by  and la rg e  homophony
s u f f i c e s .  Yet th e r e  i s  n o th in g  in  e i t h e r  th e  n e ig h b o u r 's  b e h a v io u r ,
o r  d is p o s i t io n s  to  b ehave , w hich o b lig e s  u s  to  adop t t h i s  r u l e .  There
a re  no b e h a v io u ra l f a c t s ,  so th e  argument g o es , to  p re v e n t u s  ad o p tin g
h é té ro p h o n ie  t r a n s l a t i o n s  whereby h i s  ' i s  th e  same a s '  c a r r i e s  o v e r
in to  o u r 'b e lo n g s  w ith ' and h i s  ' r a b b i t ' in to  o u r 'u n d e ta c h e d  r a b b i t
p a r t ' , and so on a c ro s s  th e  la n g u ag e .
We can r e c o n c i le  a l l  t h i s  w ith  o u r n e ig h b o u r 's  v e rb a l  b e h a v io u r , 
by c u n n in g ly  r e a d ju s t in g  o u r t r a n s l a t i o n s  o f  h i s  v a r io u s  co n n e c tin g , 
p r e d ic a te s  so a s  to  com pensate f o r  th e  sw itc h  o f  o n to lo g y . In
12s h o r t ,  we can rep ro d u ce  th e  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  r e fe re n c e  a t  home.
The f i n a l  s ta g e  o f  th e  argum ent comes when we wonder about o u r 
own d is c o u rs e  and o u r own d i s p o s i t i o n s .  The same p o in ts  t h a t  were 
made co n ce rn in g  o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  o u r n e ig h b o u r 's  speech  may be 
made m u ta tis  m utand is  when i t  comes to  i n t e r p r e t i n g  o u r own. As Quine 
s a y s ,  " i f  th e r e  i s  r e a l l y  no f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r ,  th e n  th e  i n s c r u t ­
a b i l i t y  o f  r e f e r e n c e  can be b ro u g h t even c lo s e r  to  home th an  th e  
n e ig h b o u r 's  c a s e ; we can ap p ly  i t  to  o u r s e lv e s .
The u p sh o t i s  t h a t  th e r e  w i l l  be n o n - id e n t ic a l  mappings on to
i t s e l f  o f  th e  i n f i n i t e  s e t  o f  s e n te n c e s  o f  some one s p e a k e r 's  language
which p re s e rv e  in v a r i a n t  a l l  h i s  d is p o s i t io n s  to  a s s e n t  to  o r  d is s e n t  
14from s e n te n c e s .  As was th e  ca se  in  t r a n s l a t i n g  from a  fo re ig n  
la n g u ag e , th o s e  se n te n c e s  on to  which some one se n te n c e  i s  mapped w i l l  
b e  d i f f e r e n t ,  though s tim u lu s  synonymous, becau se  a  s in g le  p r e d ic a te  
w i l l  be mapped onto  p r e d ic a te s  t h a t  a re  ( i n t u i t i v e l y )  n o t coextensiem W  
What i s  d i f f e r e n t ,  th o u g h , i s  t h a t  a l l  o f  th e  p r e d ic a te s  in v o lv ed  w i l l  
be p r e d ic a te s  o f  th e  same la n g u ag e . The th e o ry  o f  re fe re n c e  i s  a t  
i s s u e  h e re ,  n o t ju s t  th e  th e o ry  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n .
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T his developm ent by  Quine o f  h i s  argument from t r a n s l a t i o n
c h a lle n g e s  th e  v e ry  fo u n d a tio n s  o f  th e  r e a l i s t  p o s i t io n  as  I  have
e x p la in e d  i t .  I f  th e r e  i s  no d e te rm in a te  r e l a t i o n  o f  re fe re n c e  betw een
e x p re s s io n s  o f  a  language and p a r t s  o f  th e  w o rld , th e n  i t  m ight be
doub ted  w hether any o f  th e  fo u r  q u e s tio n s  posed  in  th e  p re v io u s  c h a p te r
can  be answ ered . In  consequence, one m ight be le d  to  s p e c u la te  on how
much i s  l e f t  o f  re a l is m  when b a se d  on a  weaker w ords/w orld  r e l a t i o n
such  a s  m ight be d i s t i l l e d  from Q u in e 's  n o tio n  o f  s tim u lu s  m eaning.
Such s p e c u la t io n ,  how ever, must s u r e ly  s ig n a l  a  d e p a r tu re  from th e
Fregean  t r a d i t i o n .  We can o n ly  make sense  o f  s a y in g  what th e  o b je c ts
o f  a  th e o ry  a re  r e l a t i v e  to  some background la n g u ag e . Bui^ i f  Quine
i s  r i g h t ,  th e r e  a re  no b e h a v io u ra l f a c t s  which j u s t i f y  th e  p re fe re n c e
o f  one assignm ent w ith in  a  background language to  o th e r s ,  and hence
no f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  a s  to  w hich assignm ent i s  c o r r e c t .
As Quine h im s e lf  has o b se rv e d , th e  example o f  r a b b i t s  and t h e i r
p a r t s  and s ta g e s  " i s  a  c o n tr iv e d  example and a  p e rv e rs e  one, w ith
15w hich . . .  th e  p r a c t i s in g  l i n g u i s t  would have no p a t ie n c e ."  He goes
on to  p re s e n t  l e s s  b iz a r r e  o ases  th a t  a r i s e  in  p r a c t i c e .  The c l e a r e s t
in v o lv e s  a  c la im  about in c o m p a tib le  b u t e q u a lly  a c c e p ta b le  t r a n s l a t i o n s
o f  c e r t a in  Japanese  c l a s s i f i e r s . ^ ^  Moving to  th e  home lan g u ag e ,
o th e r s  a re  s a id  to  a r i s e  when we u se  d e fe r re d  o s te n s io n  to  e s t a b l i s h
17some co rresp o n d en ce , "as  in  th e  case  o f  a  g a s o lin e  g au g e ."  T h is 
su g g e s ts  th e r e  m ight be an i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  in  th e  ch o ice  betw een 
e x p re s s io n s  and , s a y , t h e i r  Godel numbers as  r e f e r e n t s  fo r  quo ted  
e x p re s s io n s . F in a l ly ,  Quine has e lsew here  e x p re sse d  a  guarded  a c c e p t­
ance o f  H arm an's example o f  th e  v a r io u s  r e f e r e n t s  o f  n u m erica l 
e x p re s s io n s  g iven  by  com peting s e t  th e o r e t i c  r e d u c t io n s  o f  num ber.
N e v e r th e le s s ,  p e r v e r s i t y  i s  o f te n  th e  o rd e r  o f  th e  day when i t
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comes to  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  d i s p u ta t io n .  What i s  so im p o rtan t abou t th e
gav ag a i example and i t s  developm ent to  in c lu d e  te rm s o f  ou r own
language i s  t h a t  i t  opens up th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  ev e ry  p re d ic a te  th a t
d iv id e s  i t s  r e fe re n c e  does so in s c r u ta b ly .  The Japanese  c l a s s i f i e r s
example in v o lv e s  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o n ly  in  t r a n s l a t i o n .  As f o r  th e
in d e c is io n  about e x p re s s io n s  and t h e i r  Godel numbers (a ls o  s a id  to  be 
19\a  p e rv e rs e  example th e  ground i s . p r e c i s e l y  th e  same a s  f o r  in s c r u t ­
a b i l i t y  a t  home; we need  to  be a b le  to  r e a d ju s t  o u r t r a n s l a t i o n s  o f  
c o n n e c tin g  p r e d ic a te s .  One comes to  r e a l i z e  t h a t  th e  v i t a l  s te p  in  
each  o f  th e s e  exam ples i s  th e  one summed up by  Quine in  t h i s  p a s sa g e ,
The whole n o tio n  o f  te rra s  and t h e i r  d e n o ta tio n  i s  bound up w ith
o u r own gram m atical a n a ly s is  o f  th e  se n te n c e s  o f  o u r own la n g u ag e .
I t  can be p r o je c te d  on th e  n a t iv e  language o n ly  a s  we s e t t l e  what
to  coun t in  th e  n a t iv e  language a s  analogues o f  o u r p ronouns,
20i d e n t i t y ,  p l u r a l s ,  and r e l a t e d  a p p a ra tu s .
Quine f in d s  t h i s  s te p  p la u s ib le  b e c a u se , "o f  th e  b ro a d ly  s t r u c t u r a l  and
c o n te x tu a l  c h a r a c te r  o f  any c o n s id e ra t io n s  th a t  co u ld  gu ide u s  to
n a t iv e  t r a n s l a t i o n s  o f  th e  E n g lish  c l u s t e r  o f  i n t e r r e l a t e d  dev ices , o f  
21in d iv id u a t io n ."  C onseq u en tly , " th e re  seem bound to  be s y s te m a t ic a l ly
v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  c h o ic e s ,  a l l  o f  which do ju s t i c e  to  a l l  d is p o s i t io n s
22to  v e rb a l  b e h a v io u r on th e  p a r t  o f  a l l  c o n ce rn ed ."
In  s e c t io n  ( i i i )  I  s h a l l  a rgue  th a t  th e r e  a re  n o t th e  system ­
a t i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  c h o ic e s  Quine th in k s  th e re  seem bound to  b e ,  I  
s h a l l 'c o n c e n t r a te  .on r a th e r  s im p le , b u t o b v io u s ly  c e n t r a l ,  c a se s  o f  
th e  gavagai k in d .  My aim i s  n o t to  deny t h a t  th e re  a re  no in s ta n c e s  
o f  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  e x te n s io n  f o r  th e  p r e d ic a te s  o f  a  lan g u ag e , 
in c lu d in g  p r e d ic a te s  o f  o u r own language^ E n g lis h . I t  i s  r a th e r  to  
deny th a t  th e r e  i s  th e  g ro s s  deg ree  o f  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  which Quine 
c la im s to  have e s ta b l i s h e d ,  and w hich many p h ilo so p h e rs  ta k e  him to
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have e s ta b l i s h e d ,  by r e f l e c t i n g  on th e  r e l a t i o n s  betw een p re d ic a te s  
and th e  gram m atical m achinery  u se d  in  in d iv id u a t io n .  The co n c lu s io n  
I  s h a l l  draw i s  th a t  Quine has f a i l e d  to  show th a t  th e r e  i s  n o t th e  
d e te rm in a te  r e l a t i o n  o f  r e f e r e n c e  assumed by th e  r e a l i s t .  There m ight 
be  no f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  a s  re g a rd s  th e  r e l a t i o n  f o r  some p a r t i c u l a r  
te rm , b u t to  e s t a b l i s h  t h i s  one n eeds to  make an e m p ir ic a l in v e s t ig ­
a t io n  o f  th e  s o r t  u se d  by  Quine in  h i s  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  Japanese  
c l a s s i f i e r s  and th e  r e f e r e n t s  o f  n u m erica l e x p re s s io n s .
In a rg u in g  th u s  I  s h a l l  a c c e p t Q u in e 's  s t r i c t u r e  t h a t  th e r e  i s  
n o th in g  more to  gu ide  u s  in> t r a n s l a t i n g  o r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  a  p e r s o n 's  
language th a n  th e  f a c t s  abou t h i s  b eh av io u r and d i s p o s i t io n s  to  b eh av e . 
In  C hap ter 6 ,  I  s h a l l  argue th a t  % iine o v e r lo o k s , in  h i s  purv iew  o f  
t r a n s l a t i o n ,  n o n -b e h a v io u ra l p h y s ic a l  f a c t s  w hich m ight g ive  u s  re a so n  
f o r  p r e f e r r in g  one t r a n s l a t i o n  to  a n o th e r .  For th e  p r e s e n t ,  th o u g h ,
I  s h a l l  c o n fin e  my d is c u s s io n  to  th e  b e h a v io u ra l .  I  s h a l l  a lso  fo llo w  
Quine in  r e j e c t i n g  th e  myth o f  a  museum* That i s ,  I  s h a l l  ag ree  t h a t  
f o r  u s  to  a c c e p t one t r a n s l a t i o n  o r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  r a th e r  th a n  a n o th e r ,  
th e re  has to  be a  b e h a v io u ra l f a c t  o f  th e  m a t te r .  The whole problem  
i s  to  be p r e c i s e  about what th e s e  f a c t s  a r e .
The argum ents I  s h a l l  p u t fo rw ard  d e r iv e  su p p o rt from some
23rem arks made by G areth  Evans in  a  re c e n t  p a p e r . What Evans draws 
a t t e n t i o n  to  i s  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i d e n t i t y ,  and th e  whole n o tio n  o f  
in d iv id u a t io n ,  a re  in  a  s tro n g  sen se  secondary  to  p re d ic a t io n  from th e  
p o in t  o f  view  o f  a  c o n c e p tu a l u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  la n g u ag e . T his su g g e s ts  
th e re  i s  much more f a c tu a l  in fo rm a tio n  th a n  i s  c o n s id e re d  by Q uine.
He i s  th u s  le d  to  conclude t h a t  a t  l e a s t  th e  p r e d ic a te s  o f  o u r own 
language a re  n o t in s c r u ta b le  —  th e y  do b e a r  a  d e te rm in a te  r e l a t i o n  
to  th e  w orld . In  th e  n e x t s e c t io n  we s h a l l  see  in  what sense  Evans 
th in k s  p r e d ic a t io n  i s  a  p r i o r  n o t io n .
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S e c tio n  ( i i ) :  Evans on I d e n t i t y  and P r é d ic a t io n
Evans* s p rim ary  concern  i s  w ith  w hether o r  n o t Quine has 
succeeded  in  show ing, v i a  th e  gav ag a i and r a b b i t  exam ples, th a t  th e r e  
i s  " in d e te rm in a c y  in  th e  th e o ry  o f  m eaning ."  That i s ,  he i s  concerned  
w ith  Qiine* s c la im  to  have shown, by  d ev e lo p in g  h i s  argument from 
r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  t h a t  in  any la n g u ag e , ev ery  p r e d ic a te  th a t  d iv id e s  
i t s  e x te n s io n  does so in s c r u t a b ly .  To t h i s  end he c o n c e n tra te s  on 
c e r t a in  p r im it iv e  languages w hich may be s a id  to  c o n s t i tu te  fragm en ts 
o f  E n g lis h .
" I t  i s  a  q u arre lsom e m an," say s  Evans, "who would b ic k e r  w ith
Quine o v e r th e  in d e te rm in a c y  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  —  th e  c o n s t r a in t s  upon
24th a t  e n te r p r i s e  b e in g  so s l i g h t . "  ^  I t  i s  f a r  from c l e a r ,  how ever, 
t h a t  th e  c o n s t r a in t s  on t r a n s l a t i o n  a re  so s l i g h t .  In  p a s s in g  I  
m entioned  Q u in e 's  a v a i l in g  h im s e lf  o f  W ilso n 's  " p r in c ip le  o f  c h a r i ty "  
in  o rd e r  to  a v o id  a t t r i b u t i n g  a b s u rd i ty  to  a n o th e r 's  b e h a v io u r . I t  
amounts to  assum ing th a t  th e  b e l i e f s  o f  o th e r s ,  in c lu d in g  f o r e ig n e r s ,  
a r e  much th e  same as  o u r own in  many commonplace m a t te r s .  But b e l i e f  
i s  p erhaps too  sh a llo w  a  c a te g o ry  on i t s  own. I f  o u r aim i s  to  
u n d e rs ta n d  th e  b e h a v io u r , b o th  v e rb a l  and p h y s ic a l ,  o f  a member o f  
some language community, th e n  i t  seems th a t  what i s  r e q u ire d  i s  n o t 
ju s t  a  th e o ry  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  b u t a  th e o ry  o f  i n t  e r p r e t  a t  io n . We need  
to  in t e r p r e t  a c t io n s  —  g e s tu r e s ,  b eh av io u r when prom pted, e t c .  —  
b e fo re  we can t r a n s l a t e  s e n te n c e s .  Both D avidson and Lewis have
25su g g es ted  t h a t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  in  t h i s  way u n d e r l i e s  t r a n s l a t i o n .  
C le a r ly  enough, a  th e o ry  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  a  th e o ry  o f  a c t io n .  
Now in  o rd e r  to  e x p la in  why a  p e rso n  a c te d  in  th e  way he d id ,  i t  i s  
n o t s u f f i c i e n t  to  s im ply  a t t r i b u t e  c e r t a in  b e l i e f s  to  him , e . g . ,  about 
th e  outcome o f  h i s  a c t io n ,  we a ls o  need  to  i d e n t i f y  th e  d e s i r e s  he
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h as —  why he w anted t h a t  outcome in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e .  Thus R ichard
Grandy u rg e s  more th a n  c h a r i ty ,
I f  a  t r a n s l a t i o n  t e l l s  u s  t h a t  th e  o th e r  p e r s o n 's  b e l i e f s  and 
d e s i r e s  a re  co n n ec ted  in  a  way t h a t  i s  too  b iz a r r e  f o r  u s  to  make 
sen se  o f ,  th e n  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  u s e le s s  f o r  o u r p u rp o se s . So we 
have , a s  a  p rag m a tic  c o n s t r a in t  on t r a n s l a t i o n ,  th e  c o n d itio n  th a t  
th e  im puted p a t t e r n  o f  r e l a t i o n s  among b e l i e f s ,  d e s i r e s  and th e  
w orld  be a s  s im i la r  to  o u r own a s  p o s s ib le .  T h is  p r in c ip le  I  s h a l l
26c a l l  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  hum an ity .
Lewis goes f h r th e r  s t i l l  and su g g e s ts  an a d d i t io n a l  f iv e  p r in c i p l e s .
I  s h a l l  d is c u s s  th e  m a tte r  f u r th e r  in  C hap ter 6 .
R e tu rn in g  to  E v a n s 's  a r t i c l e ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  when he t a l k s  o f  
in d e te rm in a c y  he means t h a t  which m ight r e s u l t  from th e  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  
o f  fo re ig n  te rra s . As in d ic a te d  a t  th e  end o f  th e  l a s t  s e c t io n ,  on 
t h i s  p o in t I  am one o f  th o s e  who would b ic k e r  w ith  Q uine, By draw ing 
a t t e n t i o n  to  c e r t a in  f e a tu r e s  o f  th e  s t r u c tu r e  and fu n c tio n  o f  o u r own 
lan g u ag e , Evans p r e s e n ts  s t ro n g  re a so n s  fo r  r e j e c t i n g  Q u in e 's  c la im  to  
have shown indeterm inacy ,.,in  th e  concep t o f  r e f e r e n c e .  In th e  n e x t 
s e c t io n  I  s h a l l  b u i ld  on E vans’ s  in s ig h t  and o f f e r  a  g e n e ra l argum ent 
a g a in s t  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  b o th  a t  home and as i t  a f f e c t s  o u r t r a n s l a t i o n  
o f  a  fo re ig n  language o f  th e  s o r t  Quine c o n s id e r s .  Not o n ly  i s  
r e fe re n c e  a  d e te rm in a te  r e l a t i o n  a t  home, i t  a ls o  makes sense  to  see  
i t  as  d e te rm in a te  f o r  a  fo re ig n  la n g u ag e .
To b eg in  w ith , Evans p o in t s  o u t th a t  Q u in e 's  argum ent f o r  
i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  r e s t s  upon th e  b e l i e f  t h a t ,  " th e  s o le  rea so n  a  sera an­
t i c i s t  can have fo r  t r e a t i n g  an e x p re ss io n  as a  p r e d ic a te  w ith  a
p a r t i c u l a r  d iv id e d  re fe re n c e  i s  to  account f o r  th a t  e x p re s s io n 's
28in t e r a c t io n  w ith  th e  ( p u ta t iv e )  a p p a ra tu s  o f  in d iv id u a t io n ."  We 
en co u n te red  t h i s  re a so n  most r e c e n t ly  in  th e  p assag e  quo ted  tow ards
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th e  end o f  th e  l a s t  s e c t io n  w hich, I  s a id ,  c o n s t i tu te s  th e  v i t a l  s te p  
in  Q u in e 's  exam ples. I t  o r i g i n a l l y  a ro se  in  th e  c o n te x t o f  Q u in e 's  
e x p la n a tio n  o f  " a n a ly t ic a l  h y p o th e se s " . Evans m a in ta in s  t h a t  t h i s  
re a so n  i s  m istak en  on two c o u n ts .  To b eg in  w ith , th e  " e m p ir ic a l 
lo c a t io n  o f  th e  scheme o f  p r e d ic a t io n "  i s  r e a l l y  to  be id e n t i f i e d  by 
q u i te  d i f f e r e n t  means to  i t s  in t e r a c t io n  w ith  th e  a p p a ra tu s  o f  
in d iv id u a t io n .  F u rth e rm o re , t h i s  a p p a ra tu s  i t s e l f  o n ly  succeeds in  
lo c a t in g  th e  scheme because  i t  i s  f ix e d  in  tu rn  by  th e s e  o th e r  m eans. 
Let u s  look  a t  th e  f i r s t  count in  d e t a i l .
29In  a  way re m in is c e n t o f  some o f  Eum m ett's rem arks on t r u t h ,
Evans a rg u es  t h a t  b e fo re  we t a l k  about r e fe re n c e  we f i r s t  have to  be
c l e a r  about th e  p o in t  o f  c o n s tru in g  an e x p re s s io n , 'G ' , a s  a  p r e d ic a te
which d iv id e s  i t s  r e fe re n c e  o v e r ,  s a y , r a b b i t s  and n o t r a b b i t  p a r t s
o r  th e  l i k e .  The p o in t  i s ,
To e x p la in  how th e  t r u t h  c o n d it io n s  o f  c e r t a in  e lem en ta ry , b u t  
compound, s e n te n c e s  in to  which i t  e n te r s  a re  de te rm in ed  by t h e i r  
p a r t s  . . .  To see  th e  n o tio n  'w ha t G i s  a  p r e d ic a te  o f  in  t h i s  way 
i s  to  see  i t  as  c o n s tr a in e d  by a  th e o ry  o f  se n te n c e  com position  
in to  which i t  f i t s  and which a lo n e  g iv e s  i t  s e n s e .
O nly in  t h i s  way, he s a y s , can th e  sem an tic  t h e o r i s t  do j u s t i c e  to
D av id so n 's  in s ig h t  t h a t  a le a rn a b le  language ' must have a  f i n i t e  th e o ry  
31o f  m eaning. Given t h i s  v iew  abou t th e  p o in t  o f  i n t e r p r e t i n g  a  
p r e d ic a te  in  a  p a r t i c u l a r  way, th e  a p p a ra tu s  o f  in d iv id u a t io n  i s  
ind eed  seco n d a ry . As an extrem e ca se  —  d is c u s se d  f u r th e r  in  th e  
n e x t p a rag rap h  —  we can im agine i t  b e in g  ab sen t from a  s e t  o f  elem ­
e n ta ry  se n te n c e s  o f  th e  form ' ^ '  , where 'F '  i s  some p re d ic a te  and 'x* 
i s  a  f r e e  v a r i a b l e .  I t  w i l l  a ls o  no lo n g e r seem s u r p r is in g  th a t  th e  
n o tio n  'w hat G i s  a  p r e d ic a te  o f  sh o u ld  th en  be  u n d erd e te rm in ed  by 
d a ta  e x c lu s iv e ly  d e r iv e d  from th e  a s s e n t  c o n d it io n s  o f  la c o n ic  one-w ord
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u t t e r a n c e s ,  l i k e  ' G avagai' ,  and o f  se n te n c e s  p u ta t iv e ly  in v o lv in g
in t e r a c t io n  -with th e  a p p a ra tu s  o f  in d iv id u a t io n ,  l i k e  * Ip gavaga i b le g
op g a v a g a i' , " f o r  by c o n c e n tra t in g  upon such d a ta  we th e re b y  d is r e g a rd
32p r e c i s e ly  th o se  compound se n te n c e s  w hich g iv e  th e  n o tio n  i t s  p o in t . "
What a re  th e  compound s e n te n c e s  th a t  g iv e  th e  n o tio n  i t s  p o in t?
By way o f  exam ple, Evans a sk s  u s  to  c o n s id e r  a  s im ple  language in  
w hich th e  a p p a ra tu s  o f  in d iv id u a t io n  —  p l u r a l s ,  p ronouns, n u m era ls , 
th e  i d e n t i t y  p r e d ic a te ,  th e  d e f i n i t e  a r t i c l e  —  p la y s  no p a r t T h i s  
language c o n ta in s  e x p re s s io n s  G^, Gg, . . . ,  G  ^ w hich, a s  one-w ord 
o c c a s io n  s e n te n c e s ,  we can e s t a b l i s h  as  s tim u lu s  synonymous w ith  ou r 
'A  r a b b i t  I ' (and  hence w ith  o u r 'A  r a b b i t  p a r t i '  and 'A r a b b i t  s t a g e l* ) ,  
'A man I ' , and so on . I t  a ls o  c o n ta in s  e x p re s s io n s  P ,j, w hich,
when q u e r ie d , a re  a s s e n te d  to  when th e  environm ent m a n ife s ts  th e  
p re se n c e  o f  c e r t a in  g e n e ra l f e a tu r e s  t h a t  do n o t r e q u ir e  th e  p re sen ce  
o f  a  s p e c i f i c  k in d  o f  o b je c t .  They a re  s tim u lu s  synonymous w ith  ou r 
'W h ite l* , 'P u r r y i ' ,  'Warml* , 'B lo o d s ta in e d l ' , and so on . These 
e x p re s s io n s  s ta n d  a lo n e  a s  o cca s io n  sen ten c es  and a lso  w ith  a  s e n t e n t i a l  
n e g a tio n  o p e r a to r .  (Quine a c c e p ts  t h a t  we can d e te rm in a te ly  t r a n s l a t e  
th e  n e g a tio n  o p e r a t o r . I t  i s  a lso  o b served  th a t  complex se n te n c e s  
a re  formed by com bining one o f  th e  P term s w ith  one o f  th e  G te rm s , 
a lth o u g h  two G te rm s a re  n ev e r coup led  to g e th e r .  F u rth e rm o re , th e  
n e g a tio n  o p e ra to r  i s  a ls o  found to  o ccu r w ith  th e  P term s to  y i e l d  an 
in t e r n a l  n e g a t io n ,  (n o t-P  G), which i s  s y n ta c t i c a l l y  and b e h a v io u ra lly  
d is t in g u is h a b le  from th e  e x te r n a l  n e g a tio n  N o t-(P  G).
Evans th en  a rg u es  t h a t  th e  a s s e n t  c o n d it io n s  f o r  (P G ), e . g . ,  
f o r  'W hite r a b b i t* ,  may w e ll tu r n  o u t to  be such th a t  th e  P f e a tu r e  
has to  be d i s t r i b u t e d  " in  a  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  way in  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  
b o u n d a rie s  o f  a  s in g le  o b je c t  whose p re sen ce  prom pts a s s e n t to  th e
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35q u e r ie d  G te rm s ."  N e ith e r  a s s e n t  to  b o th  P and G n o r  an o v e r la p  
betw een th e  f e a tu r e s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  P and G i s  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  a s s e n t  
to  (P  G) « A lso , in  th o se  c a se s  where o v e rla p  i s  s u f f i c i e n t , a s  in  
'B lo o d s ta in e d  r a b b i t ' ,  th e  a s s e n t  c o n d itio n s  o f  th e  i n t e r n a l l y  n e g a te d  
sen ten c e  (n o t-P  g) ,  "ag a in  show a  s e n s i t i v i t y  to  th e  b o u n d a rie s  o f  an 
o b je c t ,  f o r  a s s e n t  r e q u ir e s  th e  absence o f  th e  a s s o c ia te d  f e a tu r e  from 
th e  e n t i r e  exposed s u r fa c e  o f  t h a t  o b je c t .
Hdw a re  we to  g iv e  a  sy s te m a tic  account o f  th e  t r u t h  c o n d it io n s  
o f  th e s e  and s im i la r  compound s e n te n c e s?  A ccord ing  to  E vans, we f i r s t  
have to  a t t r i b u t e  to  th e  p a r t s  o f  th o se  se n te n c e s  p r o p e r t i e s  c o n s is te n t  
w ith  t h e i r  o c c u rre n c e s  in  a l l  o th e r  c o n te x ts ,  and th e n  c h a r a c te r iz e  
th e  c o n s tru c t io n  o f  th o se  se n te n c e s  in  such  a  way th a t  th e  t r u t h  
c o n d itio n s  can be deduced . In s e c t io n  I I  o f  h i s  p a p e r , Evans e x p la in s  
in  some d e t a i l  what an a c c e p ta b le  accoun t would lo o k  l i k e .  As i s  to  
be e x p ec ted , i t  e n t a i l s  t h a t  ' r a b b i t '  i s  to  be  in t e r p r e te d  as a  
p r e d ic a te  w hich d iv id e s  i t s  e x te n s io n  o v er r a b b i t s .  In s e c t io n  I I I ,  
he a rg u es  t h a t  none o f  Q u in e 's  a l t e r n a t iv e  sem an tic  p ro p o sa ls  a re  
a c c e p ta b le .  Let me b r i e f l y  summarize E v an s 's  own acc o u n t.
In  so f a r  a s  we a re  i n t e r e s t e d  in  c o n s tru c t in g  a  th e o ry  o f  
m eaning fo r  th e  s im ple  language en v isag e d , we a re  o b lig e d  to  s t a t e ,  
amongst o th e r  th in g s ,  how ' W hite ' o ccu rs  in  'n o t- W h i te ';  th e  two 
e x p re s s io n s  a re  c l e a r l y  n o t a s s o c ia te d  w ith  indep en d en t c o n d i t io n s .  
Suppose th a t  th e  b e h a v io u ra l ev id en ce  w arran ts  t h i s  g e n e ra l p r in c ip le  
f o r  g e n e ra tin g  th e  se m a n tic a l c o n t r ib u t io n  o f  'n o t '  n  /  from th a t  o f  
an o b je c t  s a t i s f i e s  'n o t '  i f  and o n ly  i f  th e  o b je c t  does n o t 
s a t i s f y  (Evans n o te s  t h a t  T a rsk i showed t h i s  accoun t u n i f i e s  b o th  
i n t e r n a l  and e x te r n a l  u s e s  o f  ' n o t ' . )  Then i t  fo llo w s  th a t  c o n tra d ­
i c t i o n  w i l l  r e s u l t  i f  b o th  p r e d ic a te s  a re  a p p l ie d  to  th e  same o b je c t .
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So th e  d i s t r i h u t io n  o f  w h ite n e ss  th ro u g h o u t a  ra h b it - s h a p e d  a re a  eind 
n o t some o th e r  i s  r e le v a n t  to  th e  judgm ents 'W hite  r a b b i t ' and 
'n o t-W h ite  r a b b i t * , " p r e c i s e ly  b ecau se  e i t h e r  judgment a ff irm e d  upon 
an i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  ex tended  su rv ey  i s  l i a b l e  to  be c o n tra d ic te d  by th e  
o th e r  judgm ent, w a rran ted  by th e  c o n d itio n  o f ,  and made w ith  r e s p e c t  
t o ,  th e  same r a b b i t . "
Here we to u c h  upon what Evans c a l l s  " th e  deep co n n ec tio n "  betw een 
p r e d ic a t io n  and i d e n t i t y ,  and th u s  upon th e  r e s t  o f  th e  a p p a ra tu s  o f  
in d iv id u a t io n . At t h i s  p o in t ,  t o o ,  Evans makes c l e a r  th e  second count 
on w hich he th in k s  Q u in e 's  " s o le  re a so n "  i s  m is ta k e n . A n e c e s s a ry  
c o n d itio n  fo r  a  p r e d ic a te  to  be th e  i d e n t i t y  p r e d ic a te  i s  t h a t  th e  way 
sp e a k e rs  u s e  s e n te n c e s  c o n ta in in g  i t  r e v e a ls  a  d i s p o s i t io n  to  w ith h o ld  
c o n t ra d ic to r y  p r e d ic a te s  from th e  th in g s  i d e n t i f i e d .  Now th e re  m ight 
w e ll be c a s e s  w here, because  o f  th e  s t r u c tu r e  o f  th e  se n te n c e s  o f  a 
lan g u ag e , we a re  fo rc e d , in  g iv in g  a  th e o ry  o f  m eaning f o r  th e  lan g u ag e , 
to  re c o g n iz e  p re d ic a t io n  w ith o u t a lso  id e n t i f y in g  an id e n t i t y  p r e d ic a te .  
But f o r  any language a t  a l l ,  we c o u ld  n ev er re c o g n iz e  an i d e n t i t y  
se n te n c e  save by  i t s  i n f e r e n t i a l  co n n e c tio n s  to  such  p r e d ic a t iv e  
se n te n c e s ; in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t s  u s e  in  co n fo rm ity  w ith  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  
th e  n o n id e n t i ty  o f  d i s c e m ib l e s .  Of co u rse  th e n ,  Quine was r i g h t  to  
f in d  th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  i d e n t i t y  p r e d ic a te  u n d erd e te rm in ed  by 
th e  d a ta  he c o n s id e re d , " f o r  upon such a b a s i s  one co u ld  n o t  show t h a t  
an e x p re s s io n  behaves in  th e  r e q u ir e d  way in  r e l a t i o n  to  c o n t ra d ic to ry
•JQp r e d ic a te s . "  But t h i s  u n d e rd e te rm in a tio n  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  u n im p o rtan t 
once we a p p re c ia te  t h a t  i d e n t i t y  has to  be t i e d  to  th e  r e s t  o f  th e  
la n g u ag e . As Evans c o n c lu d e s , "we may suppose t h a t  what o b je c ts  a  
language d i s t in g u is h e s  and t a l k s  about i s  a  m a tte r  embedded much 
d eep e r th a n  Q u in e 's  t a l k  o f  j i g g l in g  w ith  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  th e
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39in d iv id u a t iv e  a p p a ra tu s  would le a d  u s  to  b e l i e v e ."
T his i s  a s  f a r  a s  I  w ish to  ta k e  th e  d is c u s s io n  o f  E v a n s 's  
a r t i c l e .  The l i n e  o f  h is  c e n t r a l  argum ent sh o u ld  now be c l e a r .  The 
p o in t  o f  c o n s tru in g  a  p r e d ic a te  o f  a  language a s  h av in g  a  p a r t i c u l a r
e x te n s io n  i s  to  e x p la in  how th e  t r u t h  c o n d itio n s  o f  whole se n te n c e s
o f  th e  language come to  be d e te rm in ed  by  th e  r e fe re n c e s  o f  t h e i r  p a r t s .  
We need  to  be a b le  to  e x p la in  t h i s  in  o rd e r  to  s a t i s f y  th e  req u irem en t 
th a t  a  le a m a b le  language h as  a  f i n i t e  th e o ry  o f  m eaning. How to
c o n s tru e  a  p r e d ic a te  i s  what we focus on when we lo o k  a t  th e  i n t e r ­
r e l a t i o n s  betw een , sa y , th e  n e g a tio n  o p e ra to r^ a n d  c e r t a in  c a te g o r ie s  
o f  e x p re s s io n s  in  th e  la n g u ag e . We a re  th en  s e e k in g  a  s y s te m a tic  
accoun t o f  how th e  t r u t h  c o n d it io n s  o f  th o se  s e n te n c e s  depend on t h e i r  
s t r u c t u r e .  T h is  account r e q u i r e s  co n fo rm ity  w ith  c e r t a in  p r in c ip le s  
o f  i d e n t i t y ,  b u t th e s e  a re  o n ly  rec o g n iz e d  from th e  way in  which th e  
p r e d ic a te s  o f  th e  language a re  th em se lv es  u s e d . So e x p la in in g  th e  
scheme o f  p r e d ic a t io n  o f  a  language by c o n s id e r in g  th e  a v a i la b le  
b e h a v io u ra l ev idence  i s  e p is te m o lo g ic a l ly  p r io r  to  in v e s t ig a t in g  how 
p r e d ic a te s  i n t e r a c t  w ith  th e  in d iv id u a t iv e  a p p a ra tu s .  Thus, we can 
e x p la in  th e  t r u t h  c o n d it io n s  o f  compound se n te n c e s  o f ,  sa y , th e  form 
(P  G) and (n o t-P  G), g iven  o u r r e c o g n i t io n  o f  t h e i r  s e n s i t i v i t y  to  th e  
id e n t i t y  c o n d i t io n s  o f  r a b b i t s ,  by  su g g e s tin g  th a t  th e  se n te n c e s  
in v o lv e  p r e d ic a te s  o f  r a b b i t s .
How s u c c e s s fu l  i s  Evans in  r e p ly in g  to  Q u in e 's  c la im s to  have 
shown th a t  th e r e  i s  in d e te rm in acy  in  th e  th e o ry  o f  re fe re n c e ?  By 
draw ing a t t e n t i o n  to  c e r t a in  f e a tu r e s  o f  th e  s t r u c tu r e  o f  o u r language 
and th e  way i t  fu n c t io n s ,  Evans i s  a b le  to  p o in t  to  a  mass o f  d e t a i l  
which has to  be acco u n ted  fo r  when we co n tem p la te  c o n s tru c t in g  a  
th e o ry  o f  m eaning f o r  o u r la n g u ag e . The onus i s  s u r e ly  on Quine to
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e x p la in  how h is  a l t e r n a t i v e  p ro p o s a ls  accoun t f o r  i t  in  an e q u a l ly  
s a t i s f a c t o r y  way. True enough, we have n o t looked  a t  E v a n s 's  argum ents 
a g a in s t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  such  a  Quinean r e t o r t .  There a re  two 
re a so n s  fo r  t h i s .  The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  my main pu rpose  in  r e l a t i n g  
E v a n s 's  p ro p o sa ls  i s  to  be a b le  to  draw upon them in  th e  n ex t s e c t io n  
when I  p re s e n t  my own argum ents a g a in s t  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y .  The second i s  
t h a t ,  by  r e p ly in g  to  Q u in e 's  a l t e r n a t i v e  p ro p o sa ls  m y se lf  in  th e  n e x t 
s e c t io n ,  th e  need  f o r  e x p la in in g  E v a n s 's  r e p l i e s  i s  o b v ia te d .
As was n o te d  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  t h i s  s e c t io n ,  Evans se e s  l i t t l e  
p o in t  in  r e p ly in g  to  th e  argum ent fo r  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  a s  i t  a r i s e s  in  
t r a n s l a t i o n  from a  fo re ig n  la n g u ag e . Thus he c o n f in e s  h i s  a t t e n t io n  
to  fragm en ts  o f  E n g lis h ,  whose se n te n c e s  have s t r u c tu r e s  and a s s e n t 
c o n d i tio n s  f a m i l i a r  to  u s .  The "sim p le  language" we c o n s id e re d  was 
o n ly  a  sm a ll frag m e n t. In  a t te m p tin g  to  d is p la y  shortcom ings in  
Q u in e 's  sem an tic  p ro p o s a ls ,  th e  fragm en ts  a re  c o n s id e ra b ly  l a r g e r .  
O b v io u sly , th e  l a r g e r  th e  f ra g n e n t th e  l e s s  th e  argum ents can be 
ex p ec ted  to  c a r r y  o v e r to  th e  a r e a  o f  r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t i o n .
In  th e  n e x t s e c t io n  I  s h a l l  be c o n c e n tra t in g  n o t on fragm en ts  
o f  E n g lish , b u t on th e  domain o f  language Quine ta k e s  as th e  back ­
ground fo r  r a d i c a l  t r a n s l a t i o n .  I  s h a l l  b eg in  by  making some f u r th e r  
rem arks about th e  s t r u c tu r e  o f  se n te n c e s  c o n ta in in g  th e  n e g a tio n  
o p e r a to r .  The way in  which th e  n e g a tio n  o p e ra to r  i n t e r a c t s  w ith  
p r e d ic a te s  w i l l  be c o n t r a s te d  w ith  th e  way in  w hich i t  i n t e r a c t s  w ith  
s in g u la r  te rm s . I  s h a l l  th e n  a rgue  th a t  th e  s t r u c t u r a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  
r e v e a le d  in  t h i s  way, to g e th e r  w ith  o th e r  c r i t e r i a  i f  n e c e ss a ry , 
su g g e s t a  g e n e ra l way in  w hich a  l i n g u i s t  m ight i d e n t i f y  a  c a te g o ry  
o f  te rm s in  a  fo re ig n  language as  c o rre sp o n d in g  to  th e  c a te g o ry  o f  
s in g u la r  te rm s in  th e  home lan g u ag e , and th u s  r e f u te  an argument o f
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Q u in e 's  a g a in s t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  such an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  H aving 
id e n t i f i e d  t h i s  c a te g o ry , th e  l i n g u i s t  w i l l  th e n  be a b le  to  re c o g n iz e  
th e  fo re ig n  q u a n t i f i e r  c o n s t r u c t io n ,  w hich in  tu r n  w i l l  enab le  him to  
re c o g n iz e  lo g i c a l  s i m i l a r i t i e s  betw een th e  two la n g u a g e s . Given what 
Evans has s a id  abou t th e  r e l a t i o n s  betw een i d e n t i t y  and p r e d ic a t io n ,  
to g e th e r  w ith  one o r  two f u r th e r  rem a rk s , i t  w i l l  be argued  t h a t  no 
re a so n  so f a r  g iven  by  Quine shows th a t  th e  l i n g u i s t  w i l l  n o t be in  
a  p o s i t io n  t o u n iq u e ly ^ t r a n s la te  th e  p r e d ic a te  which he a t  f i r s t  
n a iv e ly  ta k e s  to  be t h a t  o f  i d e n t i t y .  As we have seen  b o th  in  t h i s  
s e c t io n  and th e  l a s t ,  once t h i s  i s  f ix e d  so a re  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n s  o f  
th e  p r e d ic a te s .
I t  must be em phasised th a t  I  am n o t go ing  to  g iv e  some k in d  o f  
g e n e r a l iz a t io n  o f  E v a n s 's  argum ent, Evans p la c e s  no w eight on th e  
re a so n s  w hich a  p e rso n  c o n s tr u c t in g  a  th e o ry  o f  m eaning m ight have 
f o r  id e n t i f y in g  c e r t a in  e x p re s s io n s  as s in g u la r  te rm s . As I  have 
rem arked th o u g h , my argum ents w i l l  have ju s t  as  much b e a r in g  on th e  
ca se  where a  l i n g u i s t  i s  t r y i n g  to  c o n s tru c t  a  t r a n s l a t i o n  manual f o r  
an a l i e n  la n g u ag e . Thus i t  sh o u ld  n o t be s u r p r i s in g  th a t  I  w i l l  have 
to  ta k e  in to  accoun t ev id en ce  r e l a t i n g  to  o th e r  c a te g o r ie s  o f  e x p re s s ­
io n s .  M oreover, I  w i l l  seek  to  show t h a t ,  g iven  th e  c lo se  co n n ec tio n  
betw een s in g u la r  te rm s and q u a n t i f i e r s ,  i t  i s  to  be  exp ec ted  th a t  th e  
c a te g o ry  o f  e x p re s s io n  w hich i s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  s ig n if ic a n c e  i s  t h a t  o f  
s in g u la r  te rm s .
S e c tio n  ( i i i ) î  C a tch in g  gavaga i
Quine has c o n t r a s te d  how we can t r a n s l a t e  fo re ig n  p r e d ic a te s  
and q u a n t i f i e r s  w ith  how we t r a n s l a t e  th e  t r u t h  f u n c t i o n s T h e  
l a t t e r  i s  f a c i l i t a t e d  by  th e  f a c t  t h a t  we can s t a t e  " s u b s t a n t ia l
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b e h a v io u ra l c o n d it io n s "  f o r  i n t e r p r e t i n g  fo re ig n  o p e ra to r s  l i k e  n e g a tio n  
and a l t e r n a t io n .^ ^  When i t  comes to  q u a n t i f ie d  s e n te n c e s , how ever, 
m a tte r s  s ta n d  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  f o r  th e y  "depend fo r  t h e i r  t r u t h  on th e  
o b je c ts  . . .  o f  which th e  component te rm s a re  t r u e ;  and what th o se  
o b je c ts  a re  i s  n o t u n iq u e ly  d e te rm in ed  by s tim u lu s  m eaning. Indeed  . . .  
l i k e  p lu r a l  end ings and i d e n t i t y  [ t h e y ]  a re  p a r t  o f  o u r own s p e c ia l  
a p p a ra tu s  o f  o b je c t iv e  r e f e r e n c e . M o r e o v e r ,  we w i l l  f i r s t  need  to  
d ec id e  w hich fo re ig n  te rm s c o rre sp o n d  to  o u r p r e d ic a te s  and which to  
o u r  s in g u la r  te rm s . (Of c o u rse , i f  th e re  a re  no such  c la s s e s  o f  te rm s 
in^ th e  fo re ig n  language th e n  th e r e  i s  no co rresp o n d en ce , b u t th e n  n o r  
w i l l  th e re  be i n s c r u t a b i l i t y . )  A ccording  to  Q uine, though , even th e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een p r e d ic a te s  and s in g u la r  te rm s i s  independen t o f  
s tim u lu s  m e a n in g .^  I  w ish  to  c h a lle n g e  t h i s  l a s t  c la im .
■ In  p u rs u in g  an in d u c tiv e  d e f in i t i o n  o f  th e  c l a s s  o f  fo re ig n  
s e n te n c e s ,  a  l i n g u i s t  w i l l  have re c o g n iz e d  c e r t a in  la rg e  c la s s e s  o f  
e x p re s s io n s  w hich m ight be term ed ' g ram m atical c a t e g o r ie s ’ . W ill he 
have any re a so n  to  c o r r e l a t e  one o f  th e se  c a te g o r ie s  w ith  o u r E n g lish  
c a te g o ry  o f  s in g u la r  te rm s?  The problem  he f a c e s ,  say s  Q uine, i s  
s im i la r  to  t h a t  in v o lv ed  in  d e c id in g  on th e  e x te n s io n  o f  an e x p re ss io n  
l i k e  ’ g a v a g a i’ . Thus, th e  s in g u la r  term  'B e rn a rd  J .  O r tc u t t '  " d i f f e r s  
none in  s tim u lu s  m eaning from a  g e n e ra l term  t r u e  o f  each o f  th e  good 
d e a n 's  tem p o ra l segm ents, and none from a  g e n e ra l term  t r u e  o f  each  
o f  h i s  s p a t i a l  p a r t s . T h e  o n ly  way to  d ec id e  i s  by ap p ea l to  th e  
a p p a ra tu s  o f  in d iv id u a t io n .  But i s  t h i s  in  f a c t  th e  case?  What Quine 
i s  sa y in g  i s  t h a t  f o r  a u n iq u e  t r a n s l a t i o n  to  be  made th e  l i n g u i s t  has 
to  accep t one o r  more a n a l y t i c a l  h y p o th e se s , f o r  no ap p ea l to  th e  
b e h a v io u ra l f a c t s  i s  in  i t s e l f  s u f f i c i e n t .  Let u s  c o n s id e r  more 
c lo s e ly ,  th e n ,  what some o f  th e s e  f a c t s  a r e .
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To b eg in  w ith , th e  l i n g u i s t  w i l l  be a b le  to  g le an  q u i te  a  l o t  
o f  in fo rm a tio n  by  r e f l e c t i n g  on th e  d i f f e r e n t  ways in  which s in g u la r  
te rm s and p r e d ic a te s  i n t e r a c t  w ith  th e  n e g a tio n  o p e ra to r .  The 
d if f e r e n c e  i s  e n c a p su la te d  in  A r i s t o t l e 's  dictum  th a t  a  q u a l i ty  has 
a  c o n tra ry  b u t a  su b s tan ce  does n o t .  T his may be in t e r p r e te d  in  th e  
fo llo w in g  way. To say  th a t  a  q u a l i ty  has a  c o n tra ry  i s  to  say  t h a t ,  
fo r  any p re d ic a te  ' P ' , th e r e  i s  p o t h e r  p re d ic a te  'n o t - P ' which i s  
t r u e  o f  ju s t  th o s e  o b je c ts  o f  which th e  o r ig in a l  p r e d ic a te  i s  f a l s e ,  
and f a l s e  o f  ju s t  th o se  o b je c ts  o f  which th e  o r ig i n a l  p r e d ic a te  i s  
t r u e .  To say  t h a t  a  su b s tan ce  does n o t have a  c o n tra ry  i s  to  say  t h a t  
we cannot in  g e n e ra l assume t h a t ,  f o r  any given  o b je c t  a ,  th e re  i s  
some o b je c t  b ,  d i s t i n c t  from a ,  o f  which ju s t  th o se  p r e d ic a te s  which 
a re  f a l s e  o f  a  a re  t r u e  o f  b ,  and ju s t  th o se  which a re  f a l s e  o f  b 
a re  t r u e  o f  a .
The f a c t  t h a t  o b je c ts  la c k  c o n t r a r ie s  i s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  im portance 
to  th e  l i n g u i s t .  I t  i s  re v e a le d  in  n a tu r a l  language by th e  r e f u s a l  
o f  a  sp eak er to  re c o g n iz e  th e  u se  o f  e x p re s s io n s  o f  th e  form 'n o t - a ' .  
P er a  sp eak er who u s e s  'B e rn a rd  J .  O r tc u t t '  as a  name, and hence as  
a s in g u la r  te rm , th e  e x p re s s io n  'n o t-B e m a rd  J .  O r tc u t t '  i s  non­
s e n s ic a l .  C onsequen tly , th e  r e p e a te d  u se  by an in q u i s i t iv e  l i n g u i s t  
o f  'n o t-B e m a rd  J .  O r tc u t t '  in  a t te m p tin g  to  p roduce a  s ta tem en t i s  
alw ays l i k e l y  to  r e s u l t  n o t so much in  r e f u s a l  to  a s s e n t o r  d is s e n t  
on th e  p a r t  o f  a  n a t iv e  sp e a k e r , b u t in  h i s  e x p re s s in g  b ew ilderm en t.
I t  i s  a n o th e r  m a tte r  when n e g a tio n  o f  a  p r e d ic a te  i s  th e  p u ta t iv e  
i s s u e .  I f  th e  l i n g u i s t  th in k s  he can id e n t i f y  a  fo re ig n  p re d ic a te  
' P^ '  and a  fo re ig n  name ' a^? , th e n  h i s  re p e a te d  p rom pting  o f  th e  
n a t iv e  sp eak er w ith  ( ' n o t ' n  p^ a^ ) shou ld  som etim es e l i c i t  e i th e r .  
a s s e n t  o r  d i s s e n t .  N o tic e  to o  th a t  in  ta lk in g  o f  th e  ex p re ss io n  o f
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bew ilderm ent —  an amazed lo o k , a  boggle —  and th e  r e f u s a l  to  a s s e n t  
o r  d is s e n t  —  a  sh ru g , a  g e s tu re  —  we a re  d e a l in g  w ith  f e a tu r e s  th a t  
a re  b e h a v io u ra lly  d e te c ta b le .  A lso , f a c tu a l  s u r p r is e  o r  mere 
in d i f f e r e n c e  in  re sp o n se  to  a  w ell-fo rm ed  sen ten c e  w i l l  n o t alw ays 
o c c u r; s y n ta c t ic  bew ilderm ent in  re sp o n se  to  a  d e v ia n t sen ten c e  alw ays 
w i l l .
The above rem arks su g g e s t th e  fo llo w in g  g u id e lin e  which m ight 
be u se d  by a  b e h a v io u ra lly  co n sc io u s  l i n g u i s t  in  t r a n s l a t i n g  a  fo re ig n  
language :
(a ) For any ( p u ta t iv e )  s in g u la r  term  ' a '  and p re d ic a te  'F '  o f  a  
fo re ig n  lan g u ag e , i f  a  u s e r  o f  th a t  language e i t h e r  a s s e n ts  to  
o r  d i s s e n ts  from th e  se n te n c e  , th en  he w i l l  u s u a l ly  ex p re ss  
bew ilderm ent when c o n fro n te d  by sequences o f  phonemes c o n ta in in g  
th e  e x p re s s io n  ' n o t ' n  a ,  and w i l l  ( th u s )  in v a r ia b ly  r e fu s e  to  
a s s e n t  to  o r  d is s e n t  from them , though he w i l l  in v a r ia b ly  e i t h e r  
a s s e n t to  o r  d is s e n t  from th e  sen ten ce  ( ' n o t ' n F a ) .
Given h i s  r e c o g n i t io n  th a t  th e re  a re  fo re ig n  gram m atical c a te g o r ie s ,
I  subm it t h a t , on th e  b a s i s  o f  a  s u f f i c i e n t l y  wide su rv ey  o f  th e  
b e h a v io u ra l e v id en ce , th e  l i n g u i s t  w i l l  be a b le  to  u se  (a ) a lone  in  
o rd e r  to  s e t t l e  on th e  fo re ig n  c a te g o ry  most s im i la r  to  o u r c a te g o ry  
o f  s in g u la r  te rm s . I t  c e r t a in l y  d e c id e s  th e  is s u e  f o r  th e  'B e rn a rd  J .  
O rtc u tt*  exam ple, and s in c e  t h i s  i s  Q u in e 's  o n ly  d i r e c t  argument 
a g a in s t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  d e c id in g  on th e  c l a s s  o f  s in g u la r  te rm s ,
I  conclude th a t  he has f a i l e d  to  p rove th a t  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een 
p r e d ic a te s  and s in g u la r  te rm s i s  independen t o f  s tim u lu s  m eaning.
We sh o u ld  f u r th e r  n o te  th a t  (a ) i s  n o t th e  o n ly  g u id e lin e  a 
l i n g u i s t  can u se  in  a t te m p tin g  to  d e te c t  s in g u la r  te rm s . Leaving 
a s id e  th e  f o r e ig n e r 's  r e a c t io n  to  c e r t a in  sequences o f  phonemes
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c o n ta in in g  th e  n e g a tio n  o p e r a to r ,  suppose we look  a t  th o se  c a se s  where 
he r e fu s e s  to  e i t h e r  a s s e n t  to  o r  d is s e n t  from an u t te r a n c e  which th e  
l i n g u i s t  has good rea so n  to  b e l ie v e  i s  a  member o f  th e  c l a s s  o f  
fo re ig n  s e n te n c e s .  I t  has been c la im ed  by S t r a w s o n , a n d  a c c e p te d  , 
by  Q u i n e , t h a t  t h i s  r e f l e c t s  a  t r u th - v a lu e  gap , i . e . ,  a  sen ten c e  
w hich i s  n e i th e r  t r u e  n o r f a l s e .  T h is m ight n o t alw ays be th e  c a s e .
I t  m ight b e , e . g . ,  t h a t  a s s e n t  o r  d is s e n t  would amount to  a  f l a g r a n t  
d is r e g a rd  f o r  some s o c ia l  co n v en tio n  on th e  p a r t  o f  a  sp e a k e r . L et 
u s  suppose , th o u g h , t h a t  such d i f f i c u l t i e s  co u ld  be r e s o lv e d  by 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  v a ry in g  th e  c irc u m stan c es  o f  th e  q u e s tio n in g .
Straw son goes on to  p o in t  o u t t h a t ,  "w hether th e  sen ten ce  i s  
t r u e  o r  f a l s e  depends on th e  su c c e ss  o r  f a i l u r e  o f  th e  g e n e ra l te rm ; 
b u t th e  f a i l u r e  o f  th e  s in g u la r  term  appea rs  to  d e p riv e  th e  g e n e ra l 
term  o f  th e  chance o f  e i t h e r  su c c e ss  o r  f a i l u r e . T h i s  would seem 
to  su g g e s t,  and Straw son c e r t a i n l y  w r ite s  as though i t  s u g g e s ts , th a t  
t r u th - v a lu e  gaps w i l l  be seen  to  depend s y s te m a t ic a l ly  on members o f  
one g ram m atical c a te g o ry . R ep ly in g  to  S traw son, Quine c la im s t h a t ,  
" th e re  w i l l  o f  co u rse  be th e  problem  o f  d e c id in g  which word o f  th e  
t r u th - v a lu e l e s s  sen ten c e  to  blame th e  t r u th - v a lu e  gap on , and th e re
AQw i l l  be o th e r  te c h n ic a l  p ro b lem s."  U n fo r tu n a te ly  Quine does n o t 
e la b o ra te  on what th e s e  " te c h n ic a l  problem s" m ight b e .  The problem  
o f  "which word" seems to  have more su b stan ce  to  i t .  T ru th -v a lu e  gaps 
a r i s e  in  o u r own language f o r  a  v a r i e t y  o f  re a so n s  o th e r  th an  f a i l u r e  
o f  re fe re n c e  on th e  p a r t  o f  a  s in g u la r  term  —  c a te g o ry  m is ta k e s , 
p re s u p p o s i t io n s ,  am b ig u ity , v ag u en ess , and th e  l i k e .  Can th e se  be 
overcome by c a s t in g  th e  n e t  in  s e a rc h  o f  ev idence  s u f f i c i e n t l y  w ide? 
S u re ly  we need  to  em phasise th e  e m p ir ic a l s p i r i t  h e r e .  And what i s  
m ore, th e  l i n g u i s t  sh o u ld  be a b le ,  w ith  th e  h e lp  o f  ( a ) ,  to  check any
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h y p o th e s is  he may he le d  to  form .
A nother g u id e lin e  i s  su g g es ted  by th e  ev idence th a t  can be 
deduced from r e f l e c t i n g  on how s in g u la r  te rm s in t e r a c t  w ith  th e  
ca te g o ry  o f  p r e d ic a te s .  In  o u r own lan g u ag e , we n ev e r f in d  a  p e rso n  
a s s e n t in g  t o ,  s a y , O rtc u tt*  and *Pg O rtc u tt*  w ith o u t b e in g  
p re p a re d  to  a s s e n t  to  th e  compound 'F^P^ O r tc u t t* . Gould th e  l i n g u i s t  
u se  t h i s  as  a  f u r th e r  a id  in  t r a n s l a t i o n ?  I t  would be a  b iz a r r e  
language ind eed  where a sp eak er a s s e n te d  to  some o b je c t  hav ing  
p ro p e r ty  and to  th e  same o b je c t  hav in g  p ro p e r ty  F^, w h ils t  r e f u s in g  
to  a s s e n t to  th a t  o b je c t  hav ing  b o th  F.^  and P^l As f o r  th e  problem  
o f  id e n t i f y in g  th e  fo re ig n  c a te g o ry  o f  p r e d ic a te s ,  g u id e lin e  ( a ) w i l l  
be o f  h e lp  h e r e .  N o tice  a lso  th a t  such  an a id  c a s ts  f u r th e r  doubt on 
Q u in e 's  o r ig i n a l  argument a g a in s t  id e n t i f y in g  fo re ig n  s in g u la r  te rm s . 
I f  'O r tc u tt*  were t r e a te d  as  a  p r e d ic a te  t r u e  o f  s e v e ra l  th in g s ,  th e n  
th e  a id  co u ld  be p re se rv e d  upon one assum ption  o n ly ; th a t  w hatever i s  
t r u e  o f  one O r tc u t t  i s  t r u e  o f  a l l .  That i s ,  i f  th e  p r in c ip le  i s  to  
h o ld , then  th e  l i n g u i s t  can o n ly  re g a rd  what a re  p u ta t iv e ly  s in g u la r  
term s as p r e d ic a te s  on th e  assum ption  th a t  th e  s e v e ra l  th in g s  o f  
which th e  term  i s  t r u e  a re  in d i s c e r n ib le  by  th e  p r e d ic a te s  w ith  which 
i t  i n t e r a c t s .  T his seems im p la u s ib le .
As a f i n a l  g u id e lin e  to  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f  some fo re ig n  
c a te g o ry  as th e  c a te g o ry  o f  s in g u la r  te rm s , l e t  u s  once more lo o k  a t  
how th e  n e g a tio n  o p e ra to r  fu n c tio n s  in  e lem en ta ry  s e n te n c e s . Suppose 
t h a t  a  sp eak e r o f  th e  fo re ig n  language ou r l i n g u i s t  i s  t r y in g  to  
t r a n s l a t e  a s s e n ts  to  a  sen ten ce  th e  l i n g u i s t  ta k e s  to  be o f  th e  form 
'Not* n  (F a ) , where 'a ' i s  a  name. He can check w hether t h i s  i s  th e  
form by s e e in g  i f  th e  sp eak er a lso  a s s e n ts  to  ( ' no t *  a ) .  For i f  
a  person  i s  d isp o sed  to  a s s e n t to  i t s  n o t b e in g  th e  case  th a t  a ' i s  P,
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i t  would seem t h a t  he sh o u ld  he e q u a l ly  d isp o sed  to  a s s e n t  to  i t s  b e in g  
th e  ca se  t h a t  a  i s  n o t-P  (and  v ic e - v e r s a ) .  Or a t  any r a t e ,  i f  someone 
m a in ta in s  t h a t  a  p e rso n  m ight n o t b e  e q u a lly  d isp o se d , i t  i s  s u r e ly  
incum bent upon them to  e x p la in  how th e  d if f e r e n c e  co u ld  be m a n ife s te d  
v i a  a  s p e a k e r 's  d is p o s i t io n s  to  a s s e n t  end d i s s e n t .  The same p o in ts  
may be made m u ta tis  m utand is f o r  th e  case  where th e  sp eak er d is s e n ts  
from 'N o t ' (P a ) .  T h is su g g e s ts  th e  fo llo w in g  g u id e l in e  f o r  
t r a n s l a t i o n ;
( b ) For any ( p u ta t iv e )  s in g u la r  term  ' a '  and p r e d ic a te  'P '  o f  a  
fo re ig n  la n g u ag e , a  s p e a k e r 's  d is p o s i t io n s  to  a s s e n t  to  o r  
d is s e n t  from 'N o t ' n ( P a )  a re  th e  same as  h i s  d is p o s i t io n s  to  
a s s e n t  to  o r  d is s e n t  from ( ' n o t ' n P  a ) .
T his com pletes th e  f i r s t  s ta g e  o f  my argum ent a g a in s t  th e  
i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  r e f e r e n c e .  I  have p u t fo rw ard  s e v e ra l  g u id e lin e s  
f o r  h e lp in g  th e  l i n g u i s t  d ec id e  which fo re ig n  gram m atical c a te g o ry  
i s  most s im i la r  to  o u r own c a te g o ry  o f  s in g u la r  te rm s . Each o f  them 
sought to  e x p lo i t  c e r t a in  f a c t s  about th e  s t r u c tu r e  o f  n a tu r a l  
lan g u ag e . The f i r s t  en ab led  u s  to  re b u t Q u in e 's  c o n tra ry  argument 
and I  su g g es ted  th a t  i t  o f f e r e d  s u f f i c i e n t  ev idence in  i t s e l f  f o r  a 
d e c is io n  to  be made. I  th e n  su g g e s te d  th r e e  o th e r  g u id e l in e s ,  o f  
v a ry in g  s t r e n g th s ,  to  which th e  l i n g u i s t  m ight a lso  a p p e a l. The 
second o f  th e s e  p ro v id ed  a  f u r th e r  argum ent a g a in s t  Q u in e 's  c la im .
At no p o in t  in  th e  d is c u s s io n  d id  I  assume th a t  th e  l i n g u i s t  r e q u ir e s  
more th a n  th e  b e h a v io u ra l ev id en ce  fo r  p u t t in g  th e s e  g u id e lin e s  in to  
p r a c t i c e .  There was no need  t o ,  th e  b e h a v io u ra l ev idence i t s e l f  i s  
overw helm ing.
The second s ta g e  o f  th e  argument concerns how th e  l i n g u i s t  i s  
to  re c o g n iz e  th e  fo re ig n  q u a n t i f i e r  c o n s t r u c t io n .  T h is i s  n o t th e
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same th in g  a s  t r a n s l a t i n g  se n te n c e s  o f  th e  fo re ig n  language c o n ta in in g  
q u a n t i f i e r s .  F or t h a t  we have to  know, as  Quine s a y s ,  what th in g s  
coun t as o b je c ts  in  th e  fo re ig n  la n g u ag e . How th e n  does th e  l i n g u i s t  
re c o g n iz e  q u a n t i f ic a t io n ?
One answ er emerges when Quine r e f l e c t s  on s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  
q u a n t i f i c a t io n .
B eh av io u ra l c o n d i t io n s  f o r  i n t e r p r e t i n g  a  n a t iv e  c o n s tru c t io n  as
e x i s t e n t i a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  q u a n t i f i c a t io n ,  th e n ,  a re  r e a d i ly
fo rm u la te d . We f i x  on p a r t s  o f  th e  c o n s tru c t io n  as c a n d id a te s  f o r
th e  r o le s  o f  q u a n t i f i e r  and v a r ia b le ;  th e n  a  c o n d itio n  o f  t h e i r
f i t n e s s  i s  t h a t  th e  n a t iv e s  be d isp o se d  to  d is s e n t  from a whole
q u a n t i f ie d  se n te n c e  when and o n ly  when d isp o se d  to  d is s e n t  from
each o f  th e  s e n te n c e s  o b ta in a b le  by  d ropp ing  th e  q u a n t i f i e r  and
s u b s t i t u t i n g  f o r  th e  v a r i a b l e .  A second c o n d it io n  i s  th a t  th e
n a t iv e s  be d isp o se d  to  a s s e n t  to  one o f  th e  s e n te n c e s  o b ta in a b le
50by d rop p in g  th e  q u a n t i f i e r  and s u b s t i t u t i n g  f o r  th e  v a r i a b l e . - ^
T h is  m ight seem to  be a  r a th e r  haphazard  p ro ced u re  s in c e  " f o r  any one
ch o ice  o f  n a t iv e  lo c u t io n s  as  c a n d id a te s  f o r  th e  r o le  o f  q u a n t i f i e r
and v a r i a b le ,  an i n f i n i t e  l o t  o f  q u a n t i f ie d  s e n te n c e s  and s u b s t i tu t io n
in s ta n c e s  would have to  be t e s t e d . B u t  Q u in e 's  f a i t h  in  th e
e m p ir ic a l method i s  g r e a t ,  " e m p ir ic a l  in d u c tio n  i s  a l l  we have to  go
52o n , and a l l  we would ask.""^
There a re  a s  many k in d s  o f  s u b s t i tu t io n a l  q u a n t i f i c a t io n  f o r  a
language as  th e r e  a re  a d m iss ib le  s u b s t i tu t io n  c l a s s e s .  S ince th e
l i n g u i s t  i s  now a b le  to  re c o g n iz e  th e  fo re ig n  c a te g o ry  o f  s in g u la r
te rm s , though , l e t  u s  focus  on i t  as  th e  s u b s t i tu t io n  c l a s s .  As
53C h ris to p h e r  H i l l  has p o in te d  o u t , ^  th e  experim en ts  d e sc r ib e d  by Quine 
w i l l  som etim es in d ic a te  t h a t  th e  fo re ig n e r s  a re  u s in g  o b je o tu a l ,  o r  
r e f e r e n t i a l ,  q u a n t i f i e r s .  For i f  th e r e  i s  a t  l e a s t  one e x i s t e n t i a l l y  
q u a n t i f ie d  se n te n c e  which commands a s s e n t ,  w h ile  each  o f  i t s
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s u b s t i tu t io n  in s ta n c e s  te n d s  to  provoke d i s s e n t ,  th e  fo re ig n e r s  w i l l
be coun ted  r e f e r e n t i a l i s t s ,  b e l ie v e r s  in  nam eless o b je c t s .  H i l l  goes on .
On th e  o th e r  hand , when in fo rm a n ts  a re  found a s s e n t in g  and 
d is s e n t in g  as  Quine d e s c r ib e s ,  t h e i r  q u a n t i f i e r s  can be view ed 
e i t h e r  way. C e r ta in ly  th e y  co u ld  be s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  q u a n t i f i e r s .
I t  i s  p o s s ib le ,  th o u g h , t h a t  th e  n a t iv e s  have an o n to lo g y  w hich i s  
b ig g e r  th a n  t h e i r  s to c k  o f  nam es, b u t th a t  no p r e d ic a te  o f  t h e i r  
th e o ry  i s  s a t i s f i e d  by  ju s t  th e  nam eless o b je c t s .  S ince b o th  
hypo th eses  acc o rd  e q u a l ly  w e ll w ith  p a t te r n s  o f  a s s e n t  and d i s s e n t ,  
Quine says t h a t  th e y  come to  th e  same th in g s  in  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  he 
i s  u n a b le  " to  d i s t in g u is h  o b je c t iv e ly  betw een r e f e r e n t i a l  q u a n t­
i f i c a t i o n  and a  s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  c o u n te r f e i t "  (O n to lo g ic a l R e l . ,  p . 6 7 ) .^ ^
More r e c e n t ly ,  Quine has e x p re s se d  some doubt abou t th e  cla im ed
55i n a b i l i t y  to  d i s t in g u is h ,^ ^  b u t th e  i n t r i c a c i e s  o f  th e  argument need
n o t concern  u s  h e r e .  What i s  im p o rtan t to  u s  i s  Q u in e 's  acknowledgement
th a t  th e re  i s  a  p o in t  to  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  w hether a  g iv en  fo re ig n
e x p re ss io n  c o u n ts  as  an e x i s t e n t i a l  q u a n t i f i e r .  The l i n g u i s t  can now
add to  h i s  p re v io u s  knowledge o f  th e  fo re ig n  t r u t h - f u n c t io n s . He w i l l
be a b le  to  map fo re ig n  s e n te n c e s  on to  th o se  c l a s s e s  o f  E n g lish
se n te n c e s  w hich have th e  same lo g i c a l  form up to  th e  le v e l  where
s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  and r e f e r e n t i a l  q u a n t i f ic a t io n  d iv e rg e .  To u se  a  p h ra se  
56o f  H i l l ' s ,  th e  l i n g u i s t  w i l l  be  in  a  p o s i t io n  to  reco g n ize  " lo g ic a l  
s i m i l a r i t i e s "  betw een th e  two la n g u a g e s .
We now come to  th e  c r u c i a l  t h i r d  s ta g e  o f  th e  argum ent, where 
we need  to  b e a r  in  mind what Evans c a l l s  " th e  deep co n n ec tio n "  betw een 
i d e n t i t y  and p r e d ic a t io n .  The l i n g u i s t  would l i k e  to  be  a b le  to  
d ec id e  w hether a  p a r t i c u l a r  fo re ig n  tw o -p lace  p r e d ic a te ,  say  ' b l e g ' , 
can be t r a n s l a t e d  by  o u r i d e n t i t y  s ig n .  What E v a n s 's  rem arks su g g es t 
i s  t h a t  th e r e  i s  a t  l e a s t  one c r i t e r i o n  fo r  d e c id in g . T his c r i t e r i o n  
i s  t h a t  th e  way sp eak e rs  o f  th e  language u se  s e n te n c e s  c o n ta in in g
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' b l e g ' must r e v e a l  a  d is p o s i t io n  to  w ith h o ld  c o n t ra d ic to ry  p r e d ic a te s  
from th e  th in g s  i d e n t i f i e d ;  th e y  m ust u se  i t  in  co n fo rm ity  w ith  th e  
p r in c ip le  o f  th e  n o n id e n t i ty  o f  d i s c e m ib l e s .  We may fo rm u la te  t h i s  
p r in c ip le  a s ;
(ND) (ïbc& '~Fy)o ~ ( x=  y)
I t  i s  e a s i l y  p roved  th a t  (NB) i s  in te r - d e r iv a b le  in  f i r s t - o r d e r  lo g ic  
w ith  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  th e  i n d i s c e m i b i l i t y  o f  i d e n t i c a l s ;
( l l )  (x  = y & Fx) d BV 
Now in  o rd e r  to  g e n e ra te  a l l  th e  v a l i d  schem ata o f  th e  lo g ic  o f  
i d e n t i t y ,  g iv en  f i r s t - o r d e r  l o g i c ,  th e  axiom-schema ( l l )  needs to  be 
supplem ented  by  th e  axiom-schema
( l )  x =  X
T h is  su g g e s ts  a  f u r th e r  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  d e c id in g  w hether a fo re ig n  
p r e d ic a te  co rresp o n d s  to  o u r i d e n t i t y  p r e d ic a te ;  sp eak e rs  o f  th e  
fo re ig n  language must show a  d is p o s i t io n  to  a s s e n t  to  s ta te m e n ts  o f  
s e l f - i d e n t i t y .
To check w hether th e  fo re ig n  tw o -p lace  p r e d ic a te  ' b le g ' i s  in  
f a c t  th e  same a s  o u r i d e n t i t y  p r e d ic a te ,  th e  l i n g u i s t  can o b ta in  what 
would in  t h a t  ca se  be in s ta n c e s  o f  th e  axioms by u s in g  what he has 
e s ta b l i s h e d  to  be fo re ig n  s in g u la r  te rm s . IVhen a  fo re ig n e r  i s  found 
a s s e n t in g  to  a  s e n te n c e  c o n ta in in g  ' b le g ' and two s in g u la r  term s *a ^ ' 
and ' a ^ ' , and to  a  se n te n c e  c o n ta in in g  ' a ^ ' ( o r  ' a ^ ' ) in  one o r  more 
o f  i t s  argum ent p la c e s ,  th e n  he must be d isp o sed  to  a s s e n t to  a  t h i r d  
s e n te n c e  o f  e x a c t ly  th e  same form as  th e  second b u t which has ' a^ '
( o r  ' a ^ ' )  s u b s t i tu t e d  one o r  more tim es  f o r  ' '  ( o r  ' a ^ ' ) .  
F u rth erm o re , f o r  any fo re ig n  s in g u la r  term  ' a ' , a  sp eak er must be 
d isp o se d  to  a s s e n t  to  th e  s e n te n c e  formed by s u b s t i t u t i n g  ' a '  in  b o th  
argum ent p la c e s  o f  a  se n te n c e  c o n ta in in g  ' b l e g ' . I t  would seem, th e n ,
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t h a t  even w ith in  th e  Quinean s t r i c t u r e s  on t r a n s l a t i o n ,  a  l i n g u i s t  
w i l l  he a b le  to  d e term in e  w hether a  fo re ig n  p eo p le  sh a re  o u r concep t 
o f  i d e n t i t y .
We now come to  th e  f o u r th  and f i n a l  s ta g e  o f  th e  argum ent, where 
th e  l i n g u i s t  a tte m p ts  to  r e s o lv e  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  ' g a v a g a i' .  In  
s e c t io n  ( i )  we saw t h a t  when th e  l i n g u i s t  u s e s  a fo re ig n  e x p re ss io n  
l i k e  ' b le g * in  an a tte m p t to  d ec id e  w hether t h i s  gavaga i i s  th e  same 
as  t h a t  one , i t  seems t h a t  he has no way o f  t e l l i n g ,  w ith o u t re c o u rse  
to  v o lu n t a r i l y  added maxims, i f  he i s  th e re b y  a sk in g  about w holes, 
p a r t s  o r  s ta g e s .  But h av in g  e s ta b l i s h e d  .(a) what to  count as fo re ig n  
s in g u la r  te rm s , (b ) lo g i c a l  s i m i l a r i t i e s  betw een th e  two lan g u ag es , 
and (o ) c r i t e r i a  f o r  when to  t r a n s l a t e  a  fo re ig n  p r e d ic a te  as an 
i d e n t i t y  p r e d ic a te ,  i t  now seems th a t  th e  problem  w i l l  y i e ld  to  
r e s e a r c h .  Thus, suppose he i s  w o rried  about w hether he has asked  i f  
t h i s  u n d e tach ed  r a b b i t  p a r t  i s  i d e n t i c a l  w ith  t h a t  u n d e tach ed  r a b b i t  
p a r t ,  r a th e r  th a n  w hether t h i s  r a b b i t  i s  i d e n t i c a l  w ith  th a t  o n e .
Then he w i l l  p ro ceed  as  fo l lo w s . To b eg in  w ith  he o b ta in s  a  v a r ie g ­
a te d  an im al, e . g . ,  one w ith  a  w h ite  le g  and th e  r e s t  brown, o r  one 
to  which he adds some dye on an a p p ro p r ia te  p a r t .  Let u s  suppose he 
i s  lu ck y  and f in d s  a  r a b b i t  w ith  a  w h ite  le g .  In  th e  u s u a l  way he 
e s ta b l i s h e s  w hich fo re ig n  word i s  s tim u lu s  synonymous w ith  ou r ' w h i t e ' ; 
im agine th e  word i s  ' f i s p ' • On th e  b a s is  o f  h i s  knowledge o f  th e  
lo g i c a l  s i m i l a r i t i e s ,  th e  l i n g u i s t  th e n  produces th e  fo re ig n  se n te n c e  
m ost s im i la r  to
(1 )  C 3 x ) (  3 y ) ( g a v a g a i(x )  & g a v a g a i(y ) & f i s p (x ) & ^ f i s p (y ) &b l e g ( x , y ) ) .
Now ( l )  has th e  same lo g i c a l  form as b o th  o f  th e  fo llo w in g ;
(2 )  ( 3  x ) (  3  y  ) ( r a b b i t  (x ) & r a b b i t  (y ) & w h ite (x ) & ^ w h ite (y ) & x= y)
( 3 ) ( 3  x ) ( 3  y  ) (u n d e tach ed  r a b b i t  p a r t  (x ) & u n d e tach ed  r a b b i t  p a r t ( y )  &
w h ite (x )  &--white (y ) & (x ) b e lo n g s  w ith  ( y ) ) .
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The im p o rtan t d i f f e r e n c e ,  how ever, l i e s  in  th e  a s s e n t  c o n d itio n s  u n d e r 
s t im u la t io n  in  th e  p re se n c e  o f  th e  v a r ie g a te d  ra b b it*  I f  th e  f o r e ig n e r  
does a s s e n t to  ( l )  th e n ,  g iven  th e  t r u t h  o f  (ND), (2)  would c l e a r ly  
be an in c o r r e c t  t r a n s la t io n *  (3 ) i s  th e  obv ious c h o ic e . In  such a  
c a s e ,  i t  fo llo w s  n o t o n ly  t h a t  ' b le g * i s  to  be t r a n s l a t e d  as
' . . .  b e lo n g s w i t h  ' ,  b u t a lso  t h a t  ' g a v a g a i' i s  a  p re d ic a te  t r u e
o f  u n d e tach ed  p a r t s  o f  r a b b i t s .  I f ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, th e  fo r e ig n e r  
d i s s e n ts  from ( l )  th e n , o f  c o u rs e , (3 ) i s  r u le d  o u t as  th e  c o r r e c t  
t r a n s l a t i o n .  'R a b b it ' m ight be th e  c o r r e c t  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  ' g a v a g a i' , 
b u t so m ight ' r a b b i t  s ta g e * ; we s h a l l  r e s o lv e  t h i s  quandary s h o r t ly .
One p o s s ib le  r e p ly  to  t h i s  l i n e  o f  argum ent would be t h a t  ' f i s p * 
i s  n o t a  sim ple  p r e d ic a te  l i k e  ' w h i t e ' ,  b u t i s  a  complex p r e d ic a te  
m eaning som ething  l i k e  'w h i te  in  some p la c e * . When i t  ap p ea rs  tw ice  
in  one s e n te n c e , th e  p la c e  in  q u e s tio n  i s  assumed to  have changed.
The c o r r e c t  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  ( l ) ,  i t  m ight th e n  be u rg e d , would be 
(2*)  ( 3  x ) (  3 y ) ( r a b b i t  (x ) & r a b b i t  (y ) & w hite  in  some p la c e  (x )
& ^ w h ite  in  a n o th e r  p la c e  (y ) & x = y ) .
But even such  a  p e rv e rs e  h y p o th e s is  as  t h i s  can be t e s t e d .  I f  ' f i s p ' 
i s  r e a l l y  s tim u lu s  synonymous w ith  'w h ite  in  some p l a c e ' ,  th en  f o r  
a n y th in g  to  be f i s p  th e re  has to  be some p la c e  in  w hich i t  i s  w h ite .  
That i s ,  ' f i s p ' has to  be u n d e rs to o d  as a  tw o -p lac e  p r e d ic a te .  So 
w henever a f o r e ig n e r  a s s e n ts  to  i t s  b e in g  th e  ca se  t h a t  th e re  i s  some 
one th in g  t h a t  i s  f i s p , he w i l l  a lso  a s s e n t to  a  double i n s t a n t i a t i o n  
o f  th e  form
(4 )  (3  x ) ( 3  y ) ( f i s p  ( x , y ) ) .
Having r e s o lv e d  th e  problem  about un d e tach ed  r a b b i t  p a r t s ,  l e t  
u s  now see  how th e  l i n g u i s t  copes w ith  r a b b i t  s ta g e s .  The su g g e s tio n  
t h a t  th e  fo re ig n  p eo p le  a re  more p a r t i a l  to  s ta g e s  o f  r a b b i t s  th a n  to
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p e r s i s t i n g  r a b b i t s  im p lie s  t h a t  no s ta te m e n t a s s e r t in g  th e  i d e n t i t y  
o f  g av ag a is  o v e r tim e w i l l  be t r u e .  In  o rd e r  to  e x p lo i t  t h i s  f a c t ,  
o u r  l i n g u i s t  w i l l  need  to  have some way o f  f ix in g  th e  tim es  o f  c e r t a in  
ev e n ts  —  c e r t a in  " o c u la r  i r r a d i a t i o n  p a t te r n s "  as  Quine c a l l s  them —  
in  a  way a c c e p ta b le  to  th e  f o r e ig n e r .  He sh o u ld  en co u n te r l i t t l e  
d i f f i c u l t y  in  t h i s .  I f  th e  fo r e ig n e r  i s  in d eed  p a r t i a l  to  s ta g e s  and 
t a l k s  about them in  c o n fo rm ity  w ith  a concep t o f  i d e n t i t y ,  he m ust be 
a c u te ly  aware o f  th e  p assag e  o f  t im e . P erhaps th e  Quinean d ev ice  o f  
" p ro p e r ly  tim ed  b l in d f o ld in g s "  w i l l  a llo w  him to  s e t t l e  on some 
tem p o ra l p r e d ic a t io n s  f o r  s ig h t in g s  o f  g a v a g a is . Maybe he w i l l  need  
to  a v a i l  h im s e lf  o f  o th e r  e v e n ts ,  l i k e  a  f l a s h  o f  l ig h tn in g ,  o r  th e  
s e t t i n g  o f  th e  su n , which he can u se  to  e s t a b l i s h  a t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  
' b e f o r e ' .  At any r a t e ,  th e r e  would appear to  be numerous a l t e r n a t i v e s .
L et u s  suppose t h a t  he d e c id e s  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  o u r complex p r e d ic a te  
' seen  b e fo re  th e  l ig h tn in g  f la sh *  i s  ' ky Ian  w o rra t ' .  B lend ing  t h i s  
w ith  ' g av ag a i' , ' b le g ' , e x i s t e n t i a l  q u a n t i f i e r  c o n s tru c t io n s  and a  few 
o th e r  lo g ic a l  te rm s , th e  l i n g u i s t  p roduces a  s e n te n c e  w hich lo o k s l i k e
(5 )  C 3 x ) (  3 y ) (g av ag a i (x ) & gav ag a i (y ) & ky  Ian  w o rra t (x ) &
^ k y  Ian  w o rra t (y )  & b le g  ( x , y ) ) .
Now (5 ) has th e  same lo g i c a l  foiro as b o th  o f  th e  fo llo w in g :
(6 ) ( 3 x ) (  3 y ) ( r a b b i t  (x ) & r a b b i t  (y ) & seen  b e fo re  th e  l ig h tn in g
f la s h  (x )  & /^seen b e fo re  th e  l ig h tn in g  f la s h  (y ) & x =  y)
(7 ) ( 3  x ) ( 3  y ) ( r a b b i t  s ta g e  (x ) & r a b b i t  s ta g e  (y ) & seen  b e fo re
th e  l ig h tn in g  f l a s h  (x ) & ^ s e e n  b e fo re  th e  l ig h tn in g
f l a s h  (y )  & (x ) i s  a  s ta g e  o f  th e  same anim al as  ( y ) ) .
But th e  d i f f e r e n c e  betw een (6 ) and (7 ) i s  r e v e a le d  in  th e  same way as  
th e  d i f f e r e n c e  betw een (2 ) and (3 ) —  by lo o k in g  a t  th e  a s s e n t
c o n d i t io n s .  In  t h i s  c a s e ,  th o u g h , th e  fo re ig n e r  i s  n o t s t im u la te d  by
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th e  p re sen ce  o f  a  v a r ie g a te d  r a b b i t , b u t by th e  appearance o f  any one 
r a b b i t  a t  d i f f e r e n t  t im e s .  I f  he a s s e n ts  to  ( 5 ) th e n , g iven  th e  t r u t h  
o f  (ND), ( 7 ) must be th e  c o r r e c t  t r a n s l a t i o n .  C onsequen tly , th e  
l i n g u i s t  would know to  t r a n s l a t e  ' b le g * as  ' . . .  i s  a  s ta g e  o f  th e  same
anim al a s  ' ,  and * gavagai ' a s  ' r a b b i t  s t a g e ' .  D isse n t from ( 5 ) on
th e  p a r t  o f  th e  fo re ig n e r  r u le s  o u t ( 7 ) as a  t r a n s l a t i o n .
Over th e  l a s t  few pages I  have been c o n s id e r in g  how to  d is t in g u is h  
a  fo re ig n  p r e d ic a te  t r u e  o f  r a b b i t s  from two p e rv e rs e  a l t e r n a t iv e s  —  
one t r u e  o f  u n d e tach ed  r a b b i t  p a r t s  and one t r u e  o f  tem poral s ta g e s  o f  
r a b b i t s  —  and how to  d i s t in g u is h  th e  p e rv e rse  a l t e r n a t iv e s  from each 
o th e r .  I  have shown how a  cunning  l i n g u i s t  can accom plish  t h i s  by  
exam ining th e  ways in  which th e  fo re ig n  p r e d ic a te  i n t e r a c t s  w ith  th e  
fo re ig n  i d e n t i t y  p r e d ic a te .  Where th e  fo re ig n e r s  a re  p a r t i a l  to  p a r t s  
and n o t to  w holes o r  s ta g e s ,  th e y  w i l l  a s s e n t to  a  s ta te m e n t, such  as 
( 1 ) ,  to  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  b e lo n g  to  one and th e  same 
o b je c t)  where th e y  a re  n o t p a r t i a l  in  t h i s  way th e y  would ta k e  th e  
s ta te m e n t as  n o t b e in g  about p a r t s  a t  a l l ,  o r  as b e in g  about d i f f e r e n t  
o b je c t s .  Where th e y  a re  p a r t i a l  to  s ta g e s  and n o t to  wholes o r  p a r t s ,  
th e  fo re ig n e r s  w i l l  in v a r ia b ly  a s s e n t to  a  s ta te m e n t ,  such as ( 5 ) i  
a c c o rd in g  to  w hich th e  o b je c t  id e n t i f i e d  changes w ith  tim e ; o th e rw ise  
th e y  would sometimes see  th e  same o b je c t  o v e r tim e .
The problem  does n o t q u i te  end here* Throughout t h i s  c h a p te r
I  have s im p l i f ie d  th e  d is c u s s io n  by c o n s id e r in g  as  p o s s ib le  t r a n s l a t i o n s
o f  ' g a v a g a i' o n ly  th o se  e x p re s s io n s  which d iv id e  t h e i r  r e f e r e n c e .
When p re s e n t in g  th e  argument f o r  r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t i o n  in  Word and O b je c t ,
how ever, Q iine  a lso  su g g e s ts  as two o th e r  p o s s ib le  t r a n s l a t io n s
' ra b b ith o o d ' —  th e  u n iv e r s a l  term  —  and ' t h e  r a b b i t  fu s io n ' —  th e
57f u s io n ,  in  Goodman's s e n se , o f  a l l  r a b b i t s .  The o cca sio n  sen ten c e
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' G avagai' would th e n  he  s tim u lu s  synonymous w ith  'R ab b ith o o d  i s  
m a n ife s te d  h e re ' o r  'T he r a b b i t  fu s io n  i s  m a n ife s te d  h e r e ' .  What i s  
d i f f e r e n t  abou t th e s e  a l t e r n a t iv e  t r a n s l a t i o n s  i s  th a t  th e y  a re  s in g u la r  
te rm s and so do n o t d iv id e  t h e i r  r e fe re n c e  a t  a l l .  Evans c o n s id e rs  
th e s e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  in  th e  a r t i c l e  I  d is c u s se d ; we must now do th e  same.
The obv ious r e p ly  fo r  u s  to  make i s  th a t  th e  g u id e lin e s  p re s e n te d  
a t  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  t h i s  s e q tio n  f o r  d is t in g u is h in g  th e  c a te g o ry  o f  
fo re ig n  s in g u la r  te rm s w i l l  a llo w  th e  l i n g u i s t  to  s e t t l e  th e  m a t te r .  
Thus, th e re  i s  no c o n tra ry  o f  ' ra b b ith o o d ' o r  ' t h e  r a b b i t  f u s i o n ' .
I f  a d d i t io n a l ,  independen t ev idence  were r e q u ire d ,  th e  l i n g u i s t  co u ld  
o b ta in  i t  in  th e  fo llo w in g  way. Where th e re  i s  in d e c is io n  about 
' r a b b i t '  and 'r a b b i th o o d ',  he w a its  u n t i l  th e  o b je c t  which prom pts 
' G avagai' moves. A p re d ic a te  i s  found which a p p l ie s  to  i t s  f i r s t  
p o s i t io n  b u t n o t to  i t s  second , and an a p p ro p r ia te  v a r ia n t  o f  ( l )  i s  
u t t e r e d  to  th e  f o r e ig n e r .  A ssent in d ic a te s  'r a b b i th o o d ',  s in c e  any 
m a n ife s ta t io n  o f  i t  i s  a  m a n ife s ta t io n  o f  th e  same th in g ,  th e  u n iv e r s a l  
' r a b b i th o o d '. A s im i la r  p ro ced u re  d is t in g u is h e s  ' r a b b i t '  from ' t h e  
r a b b i t  f u s i o n ' .  D if f e re n t  r a b b i t s  have d i f f e r e n t  p r e d ic a te s  t r u e  o f  
them , b u t a  p r e d ic a te  t r u e  o f  " th a t  s in g le  though d isc o n tin u o u s  p o r t io n
58o f  th e  sp a tio te m p o ra l w orld  t h a t  c o n s is ts  o f  r a b b i t s "  w i l l  n o t ,  
ind eed  ca n n o t, v a ry  from r a b b i t  to  r a b b i t . L a s t ly ,  i f  th e  l i n g u i s t  
i s  n o t su re  w hether 'r a b b i th o o d ' o r  ' t h e  r a b b i t  f u s io n ' i s  in te n d e d , 
he can make u se  o f  th e  f a c t  th a t  a  d e tach ed  p a r t  o f  a r a b b i t  i s  a  p a r t  
o f  th e  d isc o n tin u o u s  p o r t io n  o f  th e  sp a t io  tem pora l w orld  t h a t  c o n s is t s  
o f  r a b b i t s .  Such a  p a r t  i s  th u s  an i n s t a n t i a t i o n  o f  t h e 'r a b b i t  fu s io n  
b u t o b v io u s ly  n o t o f  ra b b ith o o d .
In  s e c t io n  ( i )  I  r e p o r te d  an argument o f  Q u in e 's  which p u rp o r te d  
to  show t h a t ,  b ecause  o f  th e  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  th e re  co u ld
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b e  n o t o n ly  l o g i c a l l y  in c o m p a tib le  t r a n s l a t i o n  m anuals from a  fo re ig n  
language to  o u r s ,  b u t a lso  l o g i c a l l y  in co m p a tib le  ass ignm en ts  o f  
r e fe re n c e s  o r  e x te n s io n s  to  many e x p re s s io n s  o f  ou r own lan g u ag e . The 
le a d in g  id e a s  b eh in d  Q uine’ s argum ent a re  th a t  th e  th e o ry  o f  r e fe re n c e  
fo r .  a  language —  what th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  th e  p r e d ic a te s  a re  and what 
th e  s in g u la r  te rm s den o te  —  can o n ly  be s e t t l e d  by exam ining th e  
in d iv id u a t iv e  a p p a ra tu s  o f  t h a t  la n g u ag e , and th a t  t h i s  i s  u n d e rd e te r ­
m ined by  a l l  th e  b e h a v io u ra l ev idence  th a t  co u ld  be c o l le c te d  b ecau se  
o f  th e  e v id e n c e ’ s "b ro a d ly  s t r u c t u r a l  and c o n te x tu a l c h a r a c te r ."  In  
s e c t io n  ( i i )  I  c lo s e ly  exam ined what Evans th o u g h t was wrong w ith  th e  
f i r s t  id e a .  P r e d ic a t io n ,  n o t in d iv id u a t io n ,  i s  th e  key n o tio n  
in t im a te ly  bound w ith  r e f e r e n c e .  In d iv id u a tio n  i s  a  secondary  n o tio n  
and can o n ly  be e x p la in e d  by  c o n s id e r in g  how p r e d ic a te s  fu n c tio n  in  
la n g u ag e . E vans’ s own c o n c lu s io n  i s  th a t  th e re  a re  n o t going  to  be 
th e  lo g i c a l l y  in c o m p a tib le  ass ig n m en ts  o f  e x te n s io n s  to  th e  p r e d ic a te s  
o f  ou r own language t h a t  Quine th in k s  th e re  w i l l  b e .
In t h i s  s e c t io n  I  have ta k e n  th e  key p o in ts  Evans made about 
i d e n t i t y  and p r e d ic a t io n  and shown th a t  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  does n o t a r i s e  
in  t r a n s l a t i o n  from a  fo re ig n  language in  th e  way p re d ic te d  by  Q uine. 
C le a r ly ,  i f  th e re  i s  n o t th e  p r e d ic te d  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  h e re  th en  th e  
argum ent by  an a logy  f o r  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  a t  home c o l la p s e s .  Throughout 
th e  d is c u s s io n  we have n o t exceeded th e  bounds Quine h im se lf  im poses 
on t r a n s l a t i o n .  On th e  b a s i s  o f  th e  p r e d ic te d  b e h a v io u ra l ev idence 
we were a b le  to  r e f u te  h is  c la im s  about th e  in d e te rm in acy  o f  
t r a n s l a t i n g  from one gram m atical c a te g o ry  to  a n o th e r ,  and even w ith in  
th e  gram m atical c a te g o r ie s  o f  s in g u la r  terra and p r e d ic a te  we were a b le  
to  re s o lv e  in d e c is io n s  abou t how to  t r a n s l a t e  th e  ex p re ss io n  ’g a v a g a i’ .
A ll o f  t h i s  s a id ,  I  do n o t p re te n d  to  have shown th a t  a l l  te rm s ,
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even w ith in  ou r own la n g u ag e , have a  's c r u t a h l e '  r e f e r e n c e .  Thus, I  
have s a id  n o th in g  th a t  c a s t s  doubt on case s  o f  d e fe r r e d  o s te n s io n  o r  
on th e  example o f  th e  Japanese  c l a s s i f i e r s .  I  have c o n fin e d  my 
a t t e n t io n  to  a t ta c k in g  one argum ent which Quine hopes w i l l  e s t a b l i s h  
i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  on a  g rand  s c a le .  I t  m ight tu rn  o u t t h a t  an in g e n io u s  
r e p ly  w i l l  save th e  p u rp o r te d  exam ple. The assum ptions I  have made 
abou t t r a n s l a t i o n  in  t h i s  s e c t io n ,  many o f  which a re  ta k en  ov er from 
Quine to  be u se d  ad hominem, m ight be  q u e s tio n e d , a lth o u g h  th e y  seem 
p e r f e c t ly  a c c e p ta b le  when c o n s tru e d  as  s ta te m e n ts  about how we i n t e r ­
p r e t  o u r own la n g u ag e . In  th e  end , th e n , th e  charge  s ta n d s  th a t  
Q uine’ s argum ent from r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t i o n  pays f a r  too  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  
to  th e  f in e -g ra in e d  s t r u c tu r e  o f  language , to  th e  ways in  which 
s in g u la r  te rm s and p r e d ic a te s  i n t e r a c t  w ith  t r u th - f u n c t io n s  and 
q u a n t i f i e r s  in  o rd e r  to  g iv e  complex se n te n c e s  whose t r u th - v a lu e s  
depend on th e  r e fe re n c e s  o f  t h e i r  p a r t s .
At th e  b e g in n in g  o f  t h i s  c h a p te r  we n o te d  th a t  any s ta te m e n ts  
about th e  e x te n s io n s  o r  r e f e r e n t s  o f  th e  e x p re s s io n s  o f  a  language a re  
c o n ta in e d  in  a  m e ta -  o r  background lan g u ag e . Q uine’ s argument p u rp o r ts  
to  show t h a t ,  f o r  a  v e ry  wide range  o f  e x p re s s io n s , th e re  w i l l  be 
l o g i c a l l y  in c o m p a tib le  ass ig n m en ts  w ith in  th e  one m etalanguage, and th a t  
th e re  a re  no b e h a v io u ra l f a c t s  which would en ab le  u s  to  dec ide  between 
them . I  have argued  t h a t ,  on th e  c o n tra ry ,  th e r e  a re  b e h a v io u ra l f a c t s  
which s e t t l e  th e  m a tte r  f o r  Q uine’ s main exam ple. So in  t h i s  ca se  th e re
i s  a  f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  abou t which assignm ent i s  th e  c o r r e c t  o n e . My
c o n c lu s io n , th e r e f o r e ,  i s  t h a t  Q uine’ s argument f a i l s  to  show th a t  th e re  
i s  no d e te rm in a te  r e l a t i o n  o f  r e fe re n c e  between e x p re s s io n s  o f  a 
language and p a r t s  o f  th e  w o rld . In  th e  n e x t two c h a p te rs  I  s h a l l
e x p la in  what th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  i s  f o r  th e  r e a l i s t .
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CHAPTER 4 THE FOUNDATIONS OF TRUTH
S e c tio n  ( i ) ;  T a r s k i’ s  Theory a s  a  C orrespondence Theory
"Throughout t h i s  work I  s h a l l  he  concerned  e x c lu s iv e ly  w ith  g ra sp in g  
th e  in te n t io n s  which a re  c o n ta in e d  in  th e  s o - c a l l e d  c l a s s i c a l  
co n cep tio n  o f  t r u t h  ( ’ t r u e  —  co rre sp o n d in g  w ith  r e a l i t y ’ ) . "
—  A. T a rs k i ,  "The Concept o f  T ru th  in  F o rm alized  Languages"
At th e  v e ry  s t a r t  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  I  d is t in g u is h e d  two problem s —  
th e  problem  o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  o f  to  what e x te n t s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  may be 
s a id  to  d e s c r ib e  th in g s  th a t  e x i s t  in  th e  w orld , and th e  problem  o f  
p r e d ic a t io n ,  o f  w hether s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  may be s a id  to  be t r u e .
The r e a l i s t ,  I  s a id ,  co n ce iv es  o f  th e  th e o r ie s  o f  a  m ature s c ie n c e  as 
g iv in g  ap p ro x im ate ly  t r u e  acc o u n ts  o f  how th e  w orld  i s .  The in s tru m en ­
t a l i s t ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, was s a id  to  commonly deny t h a t  t h i s  i s  s o .' *
For v a r io u s  re a so n s  I  have ad v o ca ted  a c c e p tin g  th e  r e a l i s t ' s  c o n ce p tio n  
r a th e r  th a n  th e  in s t r u m e n ta l i s t ’ s .
When I  f i r s t  posed  th e s e  p rob lem s, I  drew a t t e n t io n  to  th e  f a c t  
t h a t  th e y  were c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d  to  each o th e r  in  th e  sense  th a t  one way 
o f  e x p la in in g  what i t  i s  f o r  any s ta tem en t to  be t r u e  i s  by showing 
how th in g s  in  th e  w orld  can be a s  i t  says th e y  a r e .  We m ight p u t t h i s  
more s tro n g ly  by  sa y in g  th a t  a  s ta te m e n t i s  t r u e  p r e c i s e ly  b ecau se  th e  
w orld  i s  as  th e  s ta te m e n t says  i t  i s .  Here we have an ex p re ss io n  o f  
th e  co rrespondence  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h .  Whether o r  n o t i t  i s  in  f a c t  a 
th e o ry  i s  a  moot p o in t ;  p e rh ap s ’ d e f in i t i o n ’ would be  b e t t e r .  My main 
concern  in  t h i s  c h a p te r ,  th o u g h , w i l l  be w ith  th e  term  'c o r re s p o n d e n c e '.  
No c a p i t a l  w i l l  be made o u t o f  th e  ch o ice  to  t a l k  in  th e  modem idiom  
o f  a  th e o ry .
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The fundam ental id e a  b eh in d  th e  co rrespondence  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h
i s  t h a t  th e  p ro p e r ty  o f  b e in g  t r u e  i s  to  be e x p la in e d  by a  r e l a t i o n
betw een a  s ta te m e n t ,  o r  sen ten c e  o f  some in t e r p r e te d  lan g u ag e , and
som ething  e l s e .  T h is  id e a  was e x p l i c i t l y  re c o g n iz e d  by  P la to  in  h is
d ia lo g u e  th e  S o p h is t .  ^ I t  was l a t e r  g iven  i t s  c l a s s i c a l  fo rm u la tio n
by  A r is to t l e  in  th e  M etaphysics ; "To say  o f  what i s  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t ,
o r  o f  what i s  n o t th a t  i t  i s ,  i s  f a l s e ,  w h ile  to  say  o f  what i s  t h a t
2i t  i s ,  and o f  what i s  n o t t h a t  i t  i s  n o t ,  i s  t r u e . "  In  v a r io u s  forms 
such a  d e f in i t i o n  was d is c u s s e d  by  Aquinas and B uridan  in  th e  l a t e r  
M iddle Ages, and by  Moore, R u s s e l l ,  Ramsey, and W ittg e n s te in  in  t h i s  
c e n tu ry . My concern  in  t h i s  c h a p te r  w i l l  be  w ith  a  p a r t i c u l a r  v a r ia n t  
o f  th e  th e o ry  due to  A lfre d  T a r s k i .^
I t  i s  n a tu r a l  th a t  a  r e a l i s t  shou ld  accep t some form o f  th e  
co rrespondence  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h .  S ince  he a c c e p ts  t h a t  we a re  a b le  to  
make t r u e  s ta te m e n ts  about th in g s  in  th e  w orld , and th a t  th e se  th in g s  
e x i s t  in d e p e n d e n tly  o f  b o th  o u r sen se  ex p erien ce  and th e  th e o r ie s  we 
p o s tu la te  to  d e s c r ib e  th e  w o rld , what cou ld  be more n a tu r a l  th a n  to  
sa y  t h a t  th e  s ta te m e n ts  a re  t r u e  because  o f  how th e s e  th in g s  a re ?
The r e a l i s t ,  m oreover, does n o t see  t h i s  a b i l i t y  to  make t r u e  s t a t e ­
m ents as  som eth ing  p e c u l ia r  to  u s  now; our f o r e f a th e r s  were a b le  to  
make t r u e  s ta te m e n ts ,  t r u e  because  th e y  c o r r e c t ly  d e sc r ib e d  th e  w o rld . 
T h is  r e c a l l s  th e  r e a l i s t ' s  c o n ce p tio n  o f  th e  grow th o f  knowledge —  
o u r th e o r ie s  a re  s im p le r , have g r e a te r  p r e d ic t iv e  su c c e s s , and so on , 
th a n  o u r a n c e s t o r s ' , b u t in  many c a se s  th e y  a re  th e o r ie s  o f  th e  same 
th in g s  .
Here th e  r e l a t i v i s t  d is a g r e e s .  He does n o t deny th a t  s ta te m e n ts  
o f  a  th e o ry  a re  t r u e ,  and he m ight w e ll n o t deny th a t  t h e i r  t r u t h  
c o n s is ts  in  sa y in g  how th e  w orld  i s .  What he does deny, how ever, i s
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t h a t  th e re  i s  a  s in g le  e x te r n a l  r e a l i t y  which i s  th e  m easure o f  t r u t h .
We saw in  C h ap te r 1 how P eyerahend t a lk s  about th e  o n to lo g ie s  o f  
e a r l i e r  th e o r ie s  b e in g  co m p le te ly  re p la c e d  by th o se  o f  l a t e r  o n es , and 
o f  th e r e  b e in g  changes in  w orld  o u tlo o k . We a ls o  n o te d  th a t  Kuhn t a lk s  
abou t th e  s e n se s  in  which p o s t—re v o lu t io n a ry  s c i e n t i s t s  may be s a id  
to  work in  a  d i f f e r e n t  w orld  from t h e i r  p re d e c e s s o rs .  At th e  b eg in n in g  
o f  C hap ter 2 i t  was p o in te d  o u t t h a t  in  o rd e r  to  say  th a t  two th e o r ie s  
d i f f e r  in  p o in t  o f  w orld  o u tlo o k , e t c . ,  i t  has to  be assumed th a t  th e y  
a re  com parab le . T his le d  u s  to  i n t e r p r e t  r e la t iv i s m  a s  denying  th a t  
we can e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  com peting o r  su c c e s s iv e  th e o r i e s  a re  about th e  
same th in g s .  I t  fo llo w s  from t h i s  t h a t  th e re  i s  no grow th o r  
convergence o f  knowledge in  th e  r e a l i s t ' s  s e n s e . I t  w i l l  in  p r in c ip le  
n o t be d e c id a b le  i f  D a lto n 's  "atom s" were A vogadro 's  "m o lecu les" ; when 
p re s e n t-d a y  p h y s ic i s t s  t a l k  abou t e le c t r o n s ,  th e r e  i s  no f a c t  o f  th e  
m a tte r  as  to  w hether th e y  a re  t a lk in g  about what Bohr was r e f e r r i n g  to  
when he u sed  th e  term  'e l e c t r o n ' ;  M endel's  term  ' b i ld u n g s fa h ig  E lem ent' , 
which we t r a n s l a t e  as  ' fo rm a tiv e  e le m e n t ',  canno t be shown to  have th e  
same e x te n s io n  a s  o u r term  'g e n e ';  and so on .
Some c r i t i c s  have gone f u r th e r  th a n  t h i s  and have a ttem p ted  to  
s e t t l e  th e  r e a l i s m /r e la t iv is m  d eb a te  on a  p r i o r i  grounds in  th e  
r e a l i s t ' s  fa v o u r . The r e l a t i v i s t ,  th e y  sa y , cannot even s t a t e  h is  
p o s i t io n  w ith o u t m aking u s e  o f  co n ce p ts  which a re  c o h e re n t o n ly  i f  
r e a l is m  i s  t r u e .  For th e  r e l a t i v i s t ,  th e  t r u th - v a lu e s  o f  s ta te m e n ts  
a re  r e l a t i v e  to  some s o r t  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  framework o r  to  a  s e t  o f  co re  
s ta te m e n ts .  Ih e  p ro p e r ty  o f  b e in g  t r u e  te n d s  to  be view ed as  a  t h r e e -  
p la c e  r e l a t i o n  o f  a  r a th e r  d i f f e r e n t  s o r t  to  th e  tw o -p lace  r e l a t i o n  
u n d e r ly in g  th e  co rrespondence  th e o ry .  But what about th e  t r u th - v a lu e  
o f  th e  s ta te m e n t th a t  th e  t r u th - v a lu e  o f  a  s ta te m e n t i s  r e l a t i v e ?
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I s  i t  a lso  o n ly  r e l a t i v e l y  t r u e ,  i . e . ,  t r u e  r e l a t i v e  to  some f u r th e r  
s e t  o f  co re  s ta te m e n ts?  I f  t h i s  l i n e  o f  argument i s  fo llow ed  th ro u g h , 
i t  ap p ea rs  t h a t  th e  r e l a t i v i s t  i s  face d  w ith  an i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s ,  to  
he s to p p ed  o n ly  by t a c i t l y  a c c e p tin g  th e  r e a l i s t ' s  'n o n - r e l a t i v e ' 
n o tio n  o f  t r u t h .  I  s h a l l  n o t ,  how ever, pu rsue  t h i s  argument f u r th e r .^  
My whole approach  in  t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  n o t to  a ttem p t a  r e f u ta t io n  o f  
r e la t iv i s m ,  b u t to .  respond  to  th e  c h a lle n g e  i t  p o ses  to  th e  r e a l i s t  
to  e x p la in  h i s  view  o f  th e  n a tu re  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  and th e  
grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge. The r e a l i s t ' s  v iew  makes e s s e n t i a l  
u s e  o f  th e  n o tio n s  o f  r e fe re n c e  and t r u t h ,  and one aim o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  
i s  to  f irm ly .b a s e  th e s e  n o t io n s .
In  sa y in g  th a t  a  s ta te m e n t i s  t r u e  because  i t  c o r r e c t ly  
d e s c r ib e s  th e  w orld , th e  r e a l i s t  sh o u ld  n o t be ta k en  as  say in g  t h a t  
t r u t h  must be e x p la in e d  in  te rm s o f  a  r e l a t i o n  betw een a  s ta te m e n t 
a s  a  whole and some e n t i t y ,  p erhaps a  f a c t ,  o r  a  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s .
T h is commonly r e s u l t s  from in t e r p r e t i n g  th e  q u e s tio n  'What i s  i t  f o r  
a  s ta te m e n t to  be t r u e ? ' as a sk in g  ' What makes a  s ta tem en t tru e?*
Thus suppose we o f f e r ,  as an answ er to  th e  form er q u e s tio n , ' I t  i s  
f o r  th e  s ta te m e n t to  co rresp o n d  w ith  th e  f a c t s . '  T h is im m ediately  
g iv e s  r i s e  to  two w ell-know n o b je c t io n s .  The f i r s t  i s  th a t  in  o rd e r  
to  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  answ er we must know what k in d  o f  co rrespondence i s  
in te n d e d , and a  concep t such a s  t h a t  o f  a f a c t ,  o r  th e  f a c t s ,  seems 
to  s ta n d  in  as  much need  o f  e x p la n a tio n  as th e  concep t o f  t r u t h .  
In d eed , i t  ap p ea rs  t h a t  th e  o n ly  way in  which we can e x p la in  what 
a  f a c t  i s ,  -is by sa y in g  th a t  i t  i s  what a  t r u e  s ta te m e n t s t a t e s .
The second o b je c tio n  i s  t h a t  i f  anybody w ants to  a s s e r t  th a t  
th e  r e l a t i o n  betw een th e  s ta te m e n t and th e  f a c t  does h o ld , he r i s k s
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s l i d i n g  in to  a  r e g r e s s .  F or m aking th e  a s s e r t io n  would in tro d u c e  a
se c o n d -o rd e r  co rre sp o n d en ce . The f i r s t - o r d e r  co rrespondence  w i l l
e i t h e r  h o ld  o r  n o t h o ld .  Any q u e s tio n  o f  i t s  h o ld in g , i f  answ ered in
th e  a f f i r m a t iv e ,  amounts to  th e  s ta te m e n t ' "The co rrespondence  h o ld s"
i s  t r u e ' .  Now i f  t r u t h  i s  co rresp o n d en ce , t h i s  w i l l  in tro d u c e  a
seco n d -o rd e r  co rre sp o n d en ce , and so on i n d e f i n i t e l y .  Dummett d is c u s s e s
t h i s  o b je c t io n  in  h i s  book on F re g e .^  He a rg u es  t h a t  what i t  shows
i s  n o t t h a t  t r u t h  i s  " a b s o lu te ly  in d e f in a b le " ,  b u t  t h a t  any le g i t im a te
d e f in i t i o n  has to  meet a  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n d i t io n ,
The c o n d itio n  i s  t h a t  th e  d e f in i t i o n  sho u ld  y i e ld  th e  r e s u l t  t h a t ,  
e . g . ,  to  e n q u ire  w hether th e  s ta te m e n t 'F re g e  d ie d  in  1925* i s  t r u e  
i s  to  e n q u ire  w hether F rege d ie d  in  1925, and l ik e w is e  fo r  ev ery  
o th e r  s ta te m e n t .  That i s ,  th e  i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s  can be n e u t r a l iz e d  
p ro v id ed  t h a t  th e  r e s u l t  o f  ap p ly in g  th e  d e f in i t i o n  o f  ' . . . i s  t r u e '  
to  th e  s p e c i f i c  in s ta n c e  ' "F rege d ie d  in  1925" i s  t r u e '  i s  t h a t  
t h i s  s e n te n c e  i s  reduced  to  th e  sen ten c e  ' F rege d ie d  in  1925*, andg
lik e w is e  fo r  a l l  o th e r  s p e c i f i c  in s ta n c e s .
N o tic e  t h a t  t r u t h  i s  u n d e rs to o d  h e re  as  a  p r e d ic a te  o f  s e n te n c e s .  
Dummett goes on to  s t a t e  th e  c o n d itio n  in  i t s  g e n e ra l form , "where A 
i s  any s e n te n c e , and S i t s  c a n o n ic a l name, i t  sh o u ld  be p o s s ib le  to  
d e r iv e ,  from th e  d e f in i t i o n  o f  ' J  i s  t r u e ' , th e  e q u iv a len c e  '"S i s
7t r u e  i f  and o n ly  i f  A? ."
Assuming th a t  Dummett's argum ent i s  c o r r e c t ,  o u r rem arks o v e r 
th e  l a s t  few pages su g g e s t t h a t ,  i f  any form o f  th e  co rrespondence  
th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  i s  to  p rove ad e q u a te , i t  must s a t i s f y  th e  fo llo w in g  
c o n s t r a in t s :
( i )  i t  must e x p la in  th e  p ro p e r ty  o f  b e in g  t r u e  in  term s o f  a  
r e l a t i o n  betw een a  s ta te m e n t and som ething e l s e ,
( i i )  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  i s  n o t one h o ld in g  betw een th e  s ta te m e n t a s  a
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whole and some o th e r  k in d  o f  e n t i t y  such a s  a  f a c t ,  and
( i i i )  th e  c o n d it io n  s t a t e d  by Dummett.
L et u s  now see  how T a rs k i’ s th e o ry  s a t i s f i e s  th e s e  th r e e  c o n s t r a i n t s .
I  have a lre a d y  in tro d u c e d , in  C hap ter 2 , s e v e ra l  o f  th e  id e a s  
b e h in d  th e  th e o ry .  To b eg in  w ith ,  we ta lk e d  about t r u e  s e n te n c e s .
In  T a r s k i’ s th e o ry ,  ’ tru e*  i s  t r e a t e d  as  a  p re d ic a te  o f  s e n te n c e s .
The th e o ry  answ ers th e  q u e s tio n  'Vfliat i s  t r u t h ? ’ ju s t  in  so f a r  a s  th e  
n o tio n  o f  t r u t h  c o in c id e s  w ith  t h a t  o f  ’ t r u e  s e n te n c e ’ . T his s u i t s  u s  
w e ll ,  fo r  in  a sk in g  w hether o r  n o t s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s  a re  t r u e ,  we 
a re  a sk in g  w hether o r  n o t t h e i r  component se n te n c e s  —  th e  b a s ic  law s, 
and so on —  a re  t r u e .
In C h ap te r 2 a lso  i t  was em phasised th a t  a  sen ten ce  i s  t r u e  o n ly  
a s  p a r t  o f  some p a r t i c u l a r  lan g u ag e ; th e  same goes f o r  a sen ten ce
gb e in g  f a l s e .  T h is  p o in t  has been  made by  numerous com m entators s in c e
th e  M iddle Ages, and T a rsk i makes i t  to o .  He a c tu a l ly  goes on to
prove th a t  a  s e n te n c e  a s s e r t in g  th a t  some sen ten c e  S i s  a  t r u e  sen ten c e
o f  some c l a s s i c a l  language L canno t i t s e l f  be a  sen ten c e  o f  L, b u t
must b e lo n g  to  a  m etalanguage in  which th e  se n te n c e s  o f  L a re  n o t u se d
b u t can be m entioned  o r  d is c u s s e d . The A r i s to te l i a n  c r i t e r i o n  ta k e s
no account o f  t h i s  and so le a d s  to  c o n t r a d ic t io n .
I t  i s  im p o rtan t to  n o t ic e  th e  q u a l i f i c a t io n  ’ c la s s ic a l*  u se d  to
d e s c r ib e  th e  languages T a rsk i i s  concerned  w ith , K ripke has r e c e n t ly
o u t l in e d  a  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  fo r  c e r t a in  n o n - c la s s ic a l  la n g u ag es , in
p a r t i c u l a r  th o se  w ith  t r u th - v a lu e  g ap s , which c o n ta in  t h e i r  own t r u t h  
9p r e d ic a te s .  In  t h i s  t h e s i s  I  s h a l l  c o n fin e  m y se lf  to  c l a s s i c a l  
languages and th e  s ta n d a rd . T a rsk ia n  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h .
In  sk e tc h in g  T a r s k i’ s th e o ry ,  I  w i l l  focus my a t te n t io n  on an 
o b je c t  language L and a  m etalanguage ML, which a x e  b o th  b u i l t  on th e
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p a t te r n  o f  f i r s t - o r d e r  q u a n t i f i c a t io n  th e o ry . L w i l l  he assumed to
have a  p a ra p h ra se  in  some n a t u r a l  lan g u ag e , and ML a  p a rap h ra se  in  th e
n a t u r a l  language E n g lis h . As w e ll as  b e in g  a  quan t i f i c a t i o n a l
la n g u ag e , L c o n ta in s  a  f i n i t e  number o f  names ( a^ , a g , . . . )  and o n e -
p la c e  p r e d ic a te s  I t s  sy n tax  may be d e f in e d  by g iv in g
r e c u r s iv e  d e f in i t i o n s  o f  ’ s i n ^ l a r  term* and * fo rm u la* , on th e  b a s is
10o f  which th e  ’c lo se d  s e n te n c e s ’ a re  s in g le d  o u t .  C losed  se n te n c e s  
o f  th e  o b je c t  language a re  th e  th in g s  th a t  a re  t r u e  o r  f a l s e .
The most im p o rtan t f e a tu r e  o f  T a r s k i 's  approach  i s  h i s  adequacy 
c o n d i t io n ,  C onvention T. ML must have s t r u c t u r a l - d e s c r ip t i v e  names 
o f ,  and t r a n s l a t i o n s  f o r ,  a l l  c lo se d  sen ten c es  o f  L . C onvention T 
r e q u ir e s  o f  a  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  t h a t ,  f o r  each c lo se d  sen ten ce  o f  L, 
i t  have as  a  lo g i c a l  consequence in  ML an in s ta n c e  o f  th e  schema
(T) X i s  t r u e  i f  and o n ly  i f  p
where *X* i s  r e p la c e d  by  a  s t r u c t u r a l - d e s c r ip t i v e  name o f  th e  c lo se d  
s e n te n c e  o f  L, and ’p ’ i s  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  in to  ML o f  t h i s  same 
s e n te n c e . C le a r ly ,  C onvention T i s  p r e c i s e ly  th e  c o n d itio n  s t a t e d  by 
Dummett as  b e in g  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  any le g i t im a te  d e f in i t i o n  o f  t r u t h .  
Thus, where L i s  a  fragm ent o f  E n g lis h , and th e  s t r u c t u r a l - d e s c r ip t i v e  
name o f  th e  se n te n c e  ’F rege d ie d  in  1925' i s  ta k e n  to  be formed by
p u t t in g  th a t  v e ry  sen ten c e  in  q u o ta tio n  m arks, (T) y ie ld s  a s  an
in s ta n c e
(T ^) ’F rege d ie d  in  1925* i s  t r u e  i f  and o n ly  i f  F rege d ie d  in
1925.
We s h a l l  see  s h o r t ly  how T a r s k i’ s  th e o ry  m eets h i s  adequacy c o n d i t io n ,  
b u t f i r s t  a  rem ark needs to  be made th a t  w i l l  be  ta k en  up l a t e r .
In (T^ ) we have an in s ta n c e  o f  what has come to  be known a s  th e  
*d is q u o ta t io n ’ p r in c i p l e :  where L and ML a re  b o th  fragm ents o f  th e
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same lan g u ag e , th e  name o f  th e  c lo s e d  sen ten c e  o f  L i s  d e r iv e d , a s  was
s a id ,  by  p u t t in g  th e  sen ten c e  w ith in  q u o ta tio n  m arks, and th e
t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  t h a t  sen ten c e  i s  ta k en  to  be th e  sen ten c e  i t s e l f ,  i . e . ,
th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  th e  name ’ d isq u o te d * . Some p eo p le  have c la im ed ,
on th e  b a s is  o f  t h i s ,  t h a t  T a r s k i’ s th e o ry  i s  n e u t r a l  w ith  r e s p e c t  to
e p is te m o lo g ic a l q u e s t io n s .  Putnam , f o r  exam ple, s a y s , "On t h i s  v iew ,
’ t r u e ’ i s ,  am azing ly , a  p h i lo s o p h ic a l ly  n e u t r a l  n o t io n .  ’ T rue’ i s
ju s t  a  d ev ice  f o r  ’ sem an tic  a s c e n t ’ —  fo r  ’ r a i s i n g ’ a s s e r t io n s  from
th e  ’o b je c t  la n g u ag e’ to  th e  ’m e ta -lan g u ag e’ , and th e  d ev ice  does n o t
11commit one epistem o lo g i c a l l y  o r  m e ta p h y s ic a lly . ’’ In  th e  n e x t 
s e c t io n  I  s h a l l  c o n te s t  t h i s  c la im . A lthough in s ta n c e s  o f  (T) may in  
t h i s  way ap p ea r n e u t r a l ,  t h i s  i s  q u i te  d i f f e r e n t  from say in g  th a t  th e  
th e o ry  i s  i t s e l f  n e u t r a l .  But f i r s t  we must lo o k  fU r th e r ,  a t  how th e  
th e o ry  i s  e s ta b l i s h e d  and a t  how, in  g e n e ra l ,  in s ta n c e s  o f  (T) a re  
o b ta in e d .
The b a s i s  o f  T a r s k i’ s th e o ry  i s  th e  concep t o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n .
The id e a  o f  th e  th e o ry  i s  to  g iv e  a  r e c u r s iv e  d e f in i t i o n  o f  t h i s  
co n c e p t, and th e n  to  connect i t  a p p ro p r ia te ly  w ith  th e  concept o f  
t r u t h .  S a t i s f a c t io n  was co n ce iv ed  by T a rsk i as a  tw o -p lace  r e l a t i o n  
betw een an i n f i n i t e  numbered sequence o f  in d iv id u a ls  and a s e n te n c e , 
open o r  c lo s e d ,  o f  th e  o b je c t  la n g u ag e . I  s h a l l  n o t g ive  th e  d e t a i l s  
o f  th e  r e c u r s iv e  d e f in i t i o n  h e re ,  b u t r a th e r  i l l u s t r a t e  i t  f o r  a  p a r t  
o f  L.
Suppose t h a t ,  in  L (ag a in  assumed to  be a  fragm ent o f  E n g l is h ) ,  
’P^’ i s  th e  p re d ic a te  ’ d ie d  in  1^25’ . C onsider now th e  open sen ten c e  
o f  L, ’P^x’ . T h is w i l l  be s a t i s f i e d  by  a  sequence s i f  and o n ly  i f  
th e  f i r s t  member o f  _s d ie d  in  1925* The c lo se d  sen ten c e  ’ ( 3 x )P ^x ' 
w i l l  be  s a t i s f i e d  by s i f  and o n ly  i f  ’P^x’. i s  s a t i s f i e d  by s o r  by
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some o th e r  sequence l i k e  ^  excep t in  h av ing  a  d i f f e r e n t  f i r s t  te rm . 
W hether o r  n o t a  p a r t i c u l a r  sequence s a t i s f i e s  a  sen ten c e  depends 
e n t i r e l y  on what in d iv id u a ls  i t  a s s ig n s  to  th e  f r e e  v a r ia b le s  o f  th e  
s e n te n c e . So i f  th e  se n ten c e  has no f r e e  v a r i a b le s ,  i . e . ,  i f  i t  i s  
a  c lo se d  s e n te n c e , th e n  i t  must be s a t i s f i e d  by ev ery  sequence o r  by 
n o n e . Thus, where i t  i s  assumed th a t  Frege i s  one o f  th e  in d iv id u a ls  
in  th e  domain o f  q u a n t i f ic a t io n  o f  L, and t h a t  F rege d ie d  in  1925» 
* (3 3 :)F ^ x ' i s  s a t i s f i e d  by ev ery  sequence _s, b ecau se  even i f  i t  i s  
n o t th e  case  th a t  th e  f i r s t  terra o f  a  g iven  _s d en o tes  an in d iv id u a l  
who d ie d  in  1925» th e r e  i s  a  sequence e x a c tly  l i k e  3  excep t t h a t  i t s  
f i r s t  term  does deno te  F re g e . F in a l ly ,  i t  sh o u ld  be c l e a r  from th e s e  
i l l u s t r a t i o n s  o f  th e  re c u rs io n  th a t  th o se  c lo se d  se n te n c e s  th a t  a re  
s a t i s f i e d  by a l l  sequences a re  t r u e ,  w h ile  th o se  which a re  s a t i s f i e d  
by  none a re  f a l s e .  T his i s  how th e  s e n te n t i a l  p r e d ic a te  ’ i s  t r u e ’ i s  
d e f in e d  —  s a t i s f a c t i o n  by a l l  seq u en ces .
We now b eg in  to  see  why T a r s k i’ s th e o ry  d ese rv es  to  be c a l le d  
a  co rrespondence th e o ry  o f  t r u t h .  What i t  i s  f o r  a  sen ten ce  o f  an 
in t e r p r e te d  language to  be t r u e  i s  e x p la in e d , n o n - t r i v i a l l y ,  in  term s 
o f  a  r e l a t i o n  betw een th e  se n te n c e  and som ething e l s e .  T h is r e l a t i o n  
i s  c a p tu re d  in  th e  concept o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  M oreover, th e  r e l a t i o n  
h o ld s  n o t betw een se n te n c e s  and some o th e r  k in d  o f  e n t i t y ,  b u t betw een 
sequences o f  in d iv id u a ls  and se n te n c e s  o f  th e  o b je c t  lan g u ag e . The 
f i r s t  two c o n s t r a in t s  a l lu d e d  to  e a r l i e r  a re  th e r e f o r e  m et.
B efore we tu r n  to  th e  t h i r d  c o n s t r a in t ,  l e t  u s  c o n c e n tra te  on 
th e  e x p la n a tio n  o f  what i s  meant by say in g  o f  any p re d ic a te  in  th e  
o b je c t  language th a t  i t  i s  s a t i s f i e d  by a  g iven  sequence o f  o b je c t s .
I t  was s a id  t h a t  ’F^x* i s  s a t i s f i e d  by  a  sequence s i f  and o n ly  i f  
th e  f i r s t  member o f  s  d ie d  in  1925. A p paren tly  t h i s  i s  o n ly  an
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e x p la n a tio n  in  so f a r  as th e  p r e d ic a te  i s  i t  s e l f  u n d e rs to o d .
A s im i la r  p o in t  may be  made w ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  c o n d itio n
f o r  th e  c lo se d  se n te n c e  * (3 x )P ^ x * , which r e q u ir e s  t h a t  be
s a t i s f i e d  by s  o r  by some o th e r  sequence l i k e  s  excep t in  hav ing  a
d i f f e r e n t  f i r s t  te rm . To suppose t h a t  t h i s  c o n d itio n  e x p la in s  th e
n o tio n  o f  e x i s t e n t i a l  q u a n t i f i c a t io n  would th e r e f o r e  in v o lv e  a  v ic io u s
12c i r c l e .  T a rs k i ,  as Q iine  has n o te d , saw th e  pu rpose  o f  th e  c o n d itio n  
th e  o th e r  way round; n o t as  e x p la in in g  e x i s t e n t i a l  q u a n t i f i c a t io n ,  
b u t a s  c o n t r ib u t in g  to  a  d e f in i t i o n  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  and s o , 
d e r iv a t iv e ly ,  o f  t r u t h .
In  th e  ca se  o f  th e  p r e d ic a te ,  though , i t  ap p ea rs  t h a t  a  n a tu r a l  
way o f  a t te m p tin g  to  avo id  t h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  i s  by  r e p la c in g  th e  above 
e x p la n a tio n  b y , sa y , " ’P^x* i s  s a t i s f i e d  by a  sequence _s i f  and o n ly  
i f  c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie s  to  th e  f i r s t  member o f  T h is , how ever,
assumes th a t  th e  m etalanguage a lre a d y  c o n ta in s  th e  sem an tic  e x p re s s io n  
’ c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie s  t o ’ .
Now i t  was T a r s k i’ s in te n t io n  to  e l im in a te  as many sem an tic  
co n cep ts  as p o s s ib le  from h is  in v e s t ig a t io n s  in to  th e  concept o f  
t r u t h .  He s a y s ,  " In  t h i s  c o n s tru c t io n  I  s h a l l  n o t make u se  o f  any 
sem a n tic a l concep t i f  I  am n o t a b le  p re v io u s ly  to  reduce i t  to  o th e r  
c o n c e p t s . H o w  he a ttem p ted  to  f u l f i l  t h i s  in t e n t io n  i s  b e s t  seen  
fo r  c a se s  where names a re  in v o lv e d . Suppose we w ish to  e x p la in  what 
i s  meant by sa y in g  th a t  th e  c lo se d  sen ten c e  ’ a ^ ’ i s  t r u e ,  where ’ a ^ ’ 
i s  th e  name ’ F reg e ’ . The q u e s tio n  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  h e re  tu rn s  on th e  
q u e s tio n  o f  what th e  name ’ a^ ’ d e n o te s . C onsequen tly , a  n a tu r a l  
su g g e s tio n  fo r  e x p la in in g  what i t  i s  fo r  th e  sen ten c e  to  be t r u e  
would appear to  be " ’F ^a^’ i s  t r u e  i f  and o n ly  i f  ’ F  ^’ c o r r e c t ly  
a p p l ie s  to  th e  in d iv id u a l  which ’ a ^ ’ d e n o te s" . T h is tim e , though .
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th e  ’ exp lan a tio n *  assumes n o t o n ly  t h a t  th e  m etalanguage c o n ta in s  th e  
sem an tic  e x p re ss io n  ’ c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie s  t o ’ , b u t a lso  th e  sem an tic  
e x p re ss io n  ’ d e n o te s* .
T a rsk i a ttem p ted  to  p ro v id e  a  s o lu t io n  to  th e s e  p rob lem s. I t
was to  t r a n s l a t e  ev ery  name and p r e d ic a te  o f  th e  o b je c t  language in to
E n g lis h , and th e n  u t i l i z e  th e s e  c la u s e s  in  th e  t r u t h  d e f in i t i o n .
T h is  s t r a t e g y  he s t a t e s  e x p l i c i t l y  fo r  ’d e n o te s ’ :
To say  t h a t  th e  name x d en o tes  a  g iven  o b je c t  a  i s  th e  same as  to  
s t i p u l a t e  t h a t  th e  o b je c t  a  (o r  ev e ry  sequence o f  which a  i s  th e  
c o rre sp o n d in g  te rm ) s a t i s f i e s  a  s e n t e n t i a l  fu n c tio n  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
ty p e .  In  c o l lo q u ia l  language i t  would be a  fu n c tio n  which c o n s is ts  
o f  th re e  p a r t s  in  th e  fo llo w in g  o rd e r :  a  v a r i a b le ,  th e  word ’ i s ’ 
and th e  g iv en  name x .^ ^
Hence to  say  th a t  ’F re g e ’ d en o tes  F rege i s  to  s t i p u l a t e  th a t  any
sequence whose f i r s t  member i s  F rege s a t i s f i e s  th e  open sen ten ce
( s e n t e n t i a l  fu n c tio n )  ’x  i s  F reg e* . Given th e  way in  which th e
s a t i s f a c t i o n  r e l a t i o n  was d e f in e d , however, t h i s  s t r a t e g y  would appear
to  be c i r c u l a r ,  f o r  what i t  means to  say  th a t  th e  f i r s t  member o f  a
sequence s a t i s f i e s  th e  open sen ten c e  ’x  i s  Frege* i s  t h a t  th e  f i r s t
member i s  F re g e . The a s s ig n in g  o f  o b je c ts  to  v a r ia b le s  a lre a d y
p resu p p o ses  th e  concep t o f  d e n o ta t io n .  An analogous rem ark h o ld s  f o r
th e  su g g e s tio n  th a t  to  say  ’ d ie d  in  1925* c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie s  to  an
in d iv id u a l  a^ i s  to  s t i p u l a t e  t h a t  any sequence whose f i r s t  member
a . s a t i s f i es  th e  open sen ten c e  ’x d ie d  in  1925*. For what i t  means
to  say  t h a t  th e  f i r s t  member o f  a  sequence s a t i s f i e s  th e  open sen ten c e
*x d ie d  in  1925* i s  t h a t  th e  f i r s t  member d ie d  in  1925. A n o tio n  o f
c o r r e c t ly  ap p ly in g  to  i s  a lre a d y  p resu p p o sed . I t  seems as  though in
t h i s  case  T a rsk i f a i l e d  to  see  th e  pu rpose o f  assum ing a  p r io r
f a m i l i a r i t y  w ith  th e  n o tio n s  o f  d e n o tin g  and c o r r e c t ly  a p p ly in g  t o .
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They too  c o n t r ib u te  to  a  d e f in i t i o n  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  and so , 
d e r iv a t iv e ly ,  o f  t r u t h .
In  th e  n e x t s e c t io n  I  s h a l l  c o n s id e r  an a l t e r n a t iv e  way o f  
d isp e n s in g  w ith  such an assum ption , one which does n o t r e in tro d u c e  
th e  n o tio n  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  I t  w i l l  be argued  th a t  o n ly  i f  th e  
assum ption  can be d isp en sed  w ith  w i l l  i t  be  c o r r e c t  to  say , w ith  
Putnam , t h a t  ’ t r u e ’ i s  ju s t  a  d ev ice  f o r  ’’sem an tic  a s c e n t” . M eanwhile, 
l e t  u s  le av e  T a r s k i’ s p u rp o r te d  s o lu t io n  and acc ep t t h a t  p r im it iv e  
n o tio n s  o f  d e n o tin g  and c o r r e c t ly  ap p ly in g  to  a re  p resupposed  in  
d e f in in g  ’ t r u e  in  L’ .
I  s a id  e a r l i e r  th a t  I  would n o t p re s e n t th e  whole th e o ry  f o r  L
and ML, b u t r a th e r  i l l u s t r a t e  i t  f o r  a  p a r t  o f  some L. L was th en
assumed to  be a  fragm ent o f  E n g lish  c o n ta in in g  th e  sen ten c e  Dummett 
u s e s ,  ’ F rege d ie d  in  1925’ . We have seen  how th e  th e o ry  s a t i s f i e s  
Dummett’ 8 c o n d itio n  f o r  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  s e n te n c e . O bviously  a  f u l l  
p ro o f  th a t  th e  th e o ry  m eets th e  c o n d itio n  f o r  ev e ry  c lo se d  sen ten c e  
o f  L i s  o u t o f  th e  q u e s tio n  w ith o u t a  f u l l  p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  th e  th e o ry .  
N e v e r th e le s s ,  as  T a rsk i showed, when t h i s  i s  p re s e n te d  i t  m eets h i s  
own adequacy c o n d itio n  w hich, a s  was n o te d , i s  e q u iv a le n t to  th e  one 
s t a t e d  by Dummett. T h is i s  th e  t h i r d  c o n s t r a in t  we s a id  had to  be 
met by any form o f  th e  co rrespondence  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  which was to  
prove a d e q u a te . F u rth erm o re , we have a lso  seen  how i t  m eets th e  f i r s t  
two c o n s t r a i n t s .  In  so f a r ,  th e n ,  a s  th e se  c o n s t r a in t s  a re  d e f in i t i v e  
o f  a  co rrespondence  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h ,  T a rs k i’ s th e o ry  i s  such a  th e o ry .
From th e  r e a l i s t ’ s p o in t  o f  v iew , we may say  th a t  T a rs k i’ s
th e o ry  i s  f a r  more s a t i s f a c t o r y  th a n  any th e o ry  which p o s i t s  a 
r e l a t i o n  betw een s ta te m e n ts  and f a c t s  cou ld  b e . The q u e s tio n  ’ lihat 
i s  i t  fo r  a  s ta te m e n t ,  o r  s e n te n c e  o f  an in t e r p r e te d  lang u ag e , to  be
.125.
t r u e ? ’ i s  answ ered in  a  way th a t  makes e s s e n t i a l  re fe re n c e  to  how th e  
w orld  i s .  T h is.w as seen  most c l e a r ly  when we looked  a t  how th e  th e o ry  
e x p la in s  what i t  i s  f o r  th e  s ta te m e n t ’F rege d ie d  in  1925’ to  be t r u e .  
Any d e to u r  from e x p la in in g  t r u t h  in  t h i s  way, e . g . ,  by  f i r s t  p o s i t in g  
f a c t s  which co rresp o n d  to  a  s ta te m e n t ,  must s u r e ly  weaken th e  v e ry  
n o tio n  o f  co rrespondence  i t  i s  in te n d e d  to  s u p p o r t.
S e c tio n  ( i i ) :  T ru th  and R eference
In t h i s  s e c t io n  I  s h a l l  ag a in  c o n s id e r  t h a t  c r u c ia l  p a r t  o f  
T a r s k i’ s th e o ry  where a  r e l a t i o n  i s  e s ta b l is h e d  betw een names o f  t h e '  
o b je c t  language and in d iv id u a l s ,  and p r e d ic a te s  o f  th e  o b je c t  language 
and s e t s  o f  in d iv id u a l s .  What I  want to  do i s  to  ex p lo re  th e  
co n n ec tio n  betw een t h i s  and q u e s tio n s  (2 ) and (3 ) o f  C hap ter 2 . These 
concern  th e  e p is te m o lo g ic a l and co n ce p tu a l a s p e c ts  o f  th e  th e o ry  o f  
r e f e r e n c e .  But f i r s t  I  want to  p ropose  an answ er to  what I  c h a r a c te r ­
iz e d  as th e  most b a s ic  q u e s tio n  o f  a l l ,  th e  q u e s tio n
(4 ) What c o n d it io n s  have to  be met in  o rd e r  f o r  t r u t h  to  be 
r e c u r s iv e ly  d e f in e d ?
In c o n s id e r in g  t h i s  q u e s tio n  we need  to  remember th a t  o u r 
a t t e n t io n  i s  b e in g  co n fin e d  to  se n te n c e s  o f  a  c l a s s i c a l  f i r s t - o r d e r  
lan g u ag e , i . e . ,  to  a  language s u i ta b le  fo r  th e  p ro o f  o f  a l l  theorem s 
o f  c l a s s i c a l  p r e d ic a te  lo g i c ,  where th e  p r e d ic a te s  range  o v er 
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  in d iv id u a ls  and in d iv id u a l  v a r ia b le s  ran g e  o v e r 
in d iv id u a l s .  As we saw in  th e  l a s t  s e c t io n ,  T a rsk i showed how to  
d e f in e  th e  concep t o f  t r u t h  as  i t  r e l a t e s  to  th e  se n te n c e s  o f  such  
a  lan g u ag e . The q u e s tio n  i s ,  need  th e  d e f in i t i o n  make u se  o f  any 
u n d e fin e d  r e l a t i o n s ?
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The b a s ic  concep t u se d  by T a rsk i i s  th a t  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  which 
he d e f in e s  r e c u r s iv e ly .  The s a t i s f a c t i o n  r e l a t i o n  c a r r i e s  th e  burden  
o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  s in c e  o n ly  i f  th e r e  a re  in d iv id u a ls ,  and hence sequences 
o f  them , can we t a l k  about th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  se n te n c e s  by such 
seq u en ces . There has to  be a  d e te rm in a te  r e l a t i o n  o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  th e n , 
in  o rd e r  f o r  T a r s k i’ s d e f in i t i o n  to  e x p la in  what th e  t r u t h  o f  a  
s ta te m e n t c o n s i s t s  i n .  R eference  in  t h i s  sense  u n d e rw rite s  t r u t h ,  fo r  
th e  d e f in i t i o n  makes e s s e n t i a l  u se  o f  a  r e l a t i o n  betw een se n te n c e s  o f  
a  language (w ords) and sequences o f  in d iv id u a ls  ( th e  w o rld ) .
- T a rsk i th o u g h t t h a t  h i s  n o tio n  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  co u ld  be u se d  to  
d e f in e  ’ d e n o te s ’ and ’ c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie s  t o ’ —  th e  v e ry  n o tio n s  t h a t  
a  th e o ry  o f  re fe re n c e  d e a ls  w ith . I t  seem s, though , th a t  do ing  so 
in v o lv e s  a v ic io u s  c i r c l e .  But p e rh ap s th e re  i s  an a l t e r n a t iv e  method 
o f  r e d u c t io n ,  and i f  so t h i s  would c a s t  doubt on th e  id e a  th a t  a  
th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  p resu p p o ses  a  th e o ry  o f  r e f e r e n c e .  Suppose we say  
th a t  names o f  th e  o b je c t  language L p r im i t iv e ly  r e f e r  to  t h e i r  
r e f e r e n t s ,  and th a t  p r e d ic a te s  o f  L p r im i t iv e ly  r e f e r  to  t h e i r  
e x te n s io n s . Then i t  would seem th a t  th e  r e l a t i o n  o f  p r im it iv e  
r e fe re n c e  co u ld  be d e f in e d  by  means o f  a  l i s t . Assume once more th a t  
L c o n ta in s  th e  one name ’F re g e ’ and th e  one p re d ic a te  ’ d ie d  in  1925’ » 
th e n  such a  d e f in i t i o n  o f  p r im it iv e  re fe re n c e  in  L would b e :
( l )  (E )(x )(E  p r im i t iv e ly  r e f e r s  to  x  =  E i s  ’F re g e ’ and x  i s  F reg e , 
o r  E i s  ’ d ie d  in  1925’ and x d ie d  in  1925), 
where ’E’ ran g es  o y er th e  names and p r e d ic a te s  o f  L, and *x’ o v e r th e  
domain o f  L.
I t  sho u ld  be n o te d  t h a t  th e  r e l a t i o n  o f  p r im it iv e  re fe re n c e  i s  
n o t in tro d u c e d  by  T a r s k i .  I  am sim ply  fo llo w in g  H a r try  F ie ld  in  u s in g  
a  new term  to  focus on th o se  se m a n tic a l co n cep ts  o f  p a r t i c u l a r
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16i n t e r e s t  to  u s .  The q u e s tio n  I  now want to  r a i s e  i s  w hether t h i s  
c o n s t i tu te s  an adequa te  d e f in i t i o n  o f  p r im it iv e  r e f e r e n c e .
One p e rso n  who has d e n ie d  th a t  i t  does i s  F ie ld  h im s e lf .  He does
concede th a t  T a rsk i accom plished  som ething o f  g re a t  p h ilo s o p h ic a l
im portance in  showing how to  d e f in e  t r u t h ,  h u t he th in k s  th a t  th e
d e f in i t i o n  o n ly  succeeds in  e x p la in in g  t r u t h  in  te rm s o f ,  o r  re d u c in g
t r u t h  t o ,  a  r e l a t i o n  l i k e  t h a t  o f  p r im it iv e  r e f e r e n c e ,  and th a t  a  l i s t
ta k e s  u s  no f u r th e r  in  u n d e rs ta n d in g  t h i s  b a s ic  n o t io n .  Here i s  th e
c r u c i a l  p a rag rap h  from F ie ld ’ s p a p e r .
Now, i t  would have been easy  f o r  a  ch em is t, l a t e  in  th e  l a s t  
c e n tu ry , to  have g iven  a  ’v a le n c e  d e f in i t io n *  o f  th e  fo llo w in g  form ; 
( 3 ) (V E )(V n ) (B  has v a le n c e  n =  E i s  p o tassium  and n i s  +1, o r  . . .
B i s  su lp h u r  and n i s  -2 )  
where in  th e  b la n k s  go a  l i s t  o f  s im i la r  c la u s e s ,  one f o r  each 
e lem en t. B u t, t h o u ^  t h i s  i s  an e x te n s io n a l ly  c o r r e c t  d e f in i t i o n  
o f  v a le n c e , i t  would n o t have been an a c c e p ta b le  re d u c t io n ;  and had 
i t  tu rn e d  o u t t h a t  n o th in g  e l s e  was p o s s ib le  —  had a l l  e f f o r t s  to  
e x p la in  v a le n c e  in  term s o f  th e  s t r u c t u r a l  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  atoms 
proved  f u t i l e  —  s c i e n t i s t s  would have e v e n tu a lly  had to  d ec id e  
e i t h e r  (a )  to  g iv e  up v a le n c e  th e o ry ,  o r  e l s e  (b ) to  re p la c e  th e  
h y p o th e s is  o f  p h y s ic a lism  by a n o th e r  h y p o th e s is  (chem ica lism ?)^
I t  i s  p a r t  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  m ethodology to  r e s i s t  d o ing  (b ) ;  and I  
a lso  th in k  i t  i s  p a r t  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  m ethodology to  r e s i s t  d o ing  (a )  
as  lo n g  a s  th e  n o tio n  o f  v a le n c e  i s  s e rv in g  th e  pu rp o ses  f o r  which 
i t  was d es ig n ed  ( i . e . ,  a s  lo n g  a s  i t  i s  p ro v in g  u s e f u l  in  h e lp in g  
u s  c h a ra c te r iz e  chem ica l compounds in  te rm s o f  t h e i r  v a le n c e s ) .
But th e  m ethodology i s  n o t to  r e s i s t  (a )  and (b ) by g iv in g  l i s t s  
l i k e  ( 3 ) ;  th e  m ethodology i s  to  lo o k  fo r  a  r e a l  r e d u c t io n .  T h is  i s  
a  m ethodology th a t  has  p roved  ex trem ely  f r u i t f u l  in  s c ie n c e , and I  
th in k  we’ d be  c ra z y  to  g iv e  i t  up in  l i n g u i s t i c s .  And I  th in k  we 
a re  g iv in g  up t h i s  f r u i t f u l  m ethodology, u n le s s  we r e a l i z e  t h a t  we 
need  to  add th e o r ie s  o f  p r im it iv e  re fe re n c e  to  [ t h e  sem antic  
d e f in i t i o n s  o f  th e  t r u t h  th e o ry ]  i f  we a re  to  e s t a b l i s h  th e  n o tio n
17o f  t r u t h  as  a  p h y s i o a l i s t i c a l l y  a c c e p ta b le  n o t io n .  •
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N o tic e  th a t  ( l ) ,  th e  d e f in i t i o n  o f  p r im it iv e  r e fe re n c e  fo r  L by means 
o f  a  l i s t ,  i s  th e  l i n g u i s t i c  c o u n te rp a r t  o f  F ie ld ’ s "v a len ce  d e f in i t i o n "  
(3).« What F ie ld  i s  sa y in g  i s  t h a t ,  s in c e  language i s  a  n a tu r a l  
phenomenon, we sh o u ld  a p p ly , in  o u r s tu d y  o f  i t ,  th e  same s ta n d a rd s  
t h a t  we ap p ly  in  o th e r  n a tu r a l  s c ie n c e s ;  and t h i s  means we sho u ld  n o t 
s e t t l e  fo r  ( l ) .  The r e l a t i o n  o f  p r im it iv e  r e fe re n c e  i s  ju s t  a s  much 
p a r t  o f  th e  n a t u r a l ,  p h y s ic a l  o rd e r  as  th e  r e l a t i o n  ’ i s  ch em ica lly  
bonded t o ’ , and i s  to  be s tu d ie d  in  th e  same way. Both ( l )  and (3 ) 
a r e  " e x te n s io n a l ly  c o r r e c t"  d e f in i t i o n s  —  th e y  c o r r e c t ly  p a i r  
e x p re s s io n s  w ith  in d iv id u a l s ,  and elem ents w ith  v a le n c e s  —  b u t in  . 
o rd e r  to  be " p h y s i o a l i s t i c a l l y  a c c e p ta b le "  th e y  would have to  g iv e  
re d u c t io n s  o f  t h e i r  d é f i n i enda.
What s o r t  o f  a  d e f in i t i o n  does F ie ld  th in k  i s  r e q u ire d  b e fo re  
an a c c e p ta b le  re d u c t io n  can be s a id  to  have been g iven? E v id e n tly  i t  
has to  be a  c a u s a l-e x p la n a to ry  d e f in i t i o n  in  which c e r t a in  p r o p e r t i e s  
a re  e x p la in e d  in  p h y s ic a l  te rm s . In  th e  case  o f  v a le n c e , t h i s  would 
c o n s is t  in  r e l a t i n g  th e  s t r u c t u r a l  p r o p e r t ie s  o f  atoms to  th e  s o r t s  
o f  chem ical com binations t h a t  th e  atom s, and t h e i r  s ta b le  c o n f ig u r ­
a t io n s  (e le m e n ts , r a d i c a l s ,  e t c . ) ,  e n te r  i n t o .  T h is su g g es ts  t h a t  a  
’ r e c u r s iv e ’ d e f in i t i o n  o f  v a le n c e  i s  in  th e  o f f in g ,  f o r  " i t  i s  an 
im p o rtan t f a c t  about v a le n c e  t h a t  th e  v a len ce  o f  a  c o n f ig u ra tio n  o f
elem en ts i s  d e te rm in ed  from th e  v a le n c e s  o f  th e  e lem en ts  t h a t  make i t
18u p , and from th e  way th e y ’ r e  p u t to g e th e r ."
F ie ld  i s  l e s s  fo rth co m in g  about p r im it iv e  r e f e r e n c e ,  lihat would 
c o n s t i tu te  a  " r e a l  re d u c t io n "  h e re ?  P erh ap s an e x p la n a tio n  in  p h y s ic a l  
te rm s o f  why names and p r e d ic a te s  have th e  r e fe re n c e s  o r  e x te n s io n s  
th e y  do . T h is would p ro v id e  an answ er to  my q u e s tio n  ( 2 ) o f  C h ap te r 2 . 
F ie ld ’ s o n ly  rem arks on th e  m a tte r  r e l a t e  to  " p r im it iv e  d e n o ta tio n " .
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He c r i t i c i z e s  th e  " c l a s s i c a l "  v iew , a t t r i b u t e d  by  him to  R u s s e l l ,  th a t
a  name i s  " a n a ly t i c a l l y  lin k e d "  to  a  c e r t a in  d e s c r ip t io n ,  and
c o n je c tu re s  t h a t ,  when T a rsk i w ro te , th e  o n ly  a l t e r n a t iv e  seemed to
be th e  t r i v i a l  one e n c a p su la te d  in  th e  n o tio n  o f  a  l i s t .  Then, in
ju s t  h a l f  a  p a ra g ra p h , he o u t l in e s  why he th in k s  a  c o r r e c t  answ er w i l l
have to  ta k e  co g n isan ce  o f  th e  c a u s a l account o f  d e n o ta t io n . He does
n o t th in k  th a t  K ripke o r  anyone e l s e  ho ld s  t h a t  p u re ly  c a u sa l acco u n ts
can be d eveloped , even f o r  p ro p e r  names o r  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s ,
b u t he does th in k  t h a t  what th e y  su g g es t i s  " a  k in d  o f  f a c to r  in v o lv ed
in  d e n o ta tio n  th a t  g iv e s  new hope to  th e  id e a  o f  e x p la in in g  th e
19co n n ec tio n  betw een language and th e  th in g s  i t  i s  a b o u t,"
B r ie f  though F ie ld ’ s re n a rk s  a r e ,  I  th in k  he i s  r ig h t  to  draw 
a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  c a u s a l accoun t and to  em phasise th e  need  f o r  a  th e o ry  
o f  p r im it iv e  r e f e r e n c e .  Yet what he f a i l s  to  do i s  to  d is t in g u is h  
betw een th e  e p is te m o lo g ic a l q u e s tio n  o f  how we can d isc o v e r  what a  
name d en o tes  o r  what th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a  p r e d ic a te  i s ,  and th e  concep­
t u a l  q u e s tio n  o f  what i t  i s  f o r  a  name to  r e f e r  o r  f o r  a  p r e d ic a te  to  
have an e x te n s io n . That i s ,  he g lo s s e s  o v e r th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
q u e s tio n s  (2 ) and (3 )  o f  C hap ter 2 . F ie ld ’ s an a lo g y , and th e  im p lie d  
req u irem en t o f  a  c a u s a l-e x p la n a to ry  n o tio n  o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  ob scu re  how 
an answer to  (2 )  p resu p p o ses  an answ er to  ( 3 ) ,  Let me e x p la in  t h i s  
f u r th e r ,
- F ie ld  n e v e r  say s  how an accoun t o f  p r im it iv e  re fe re n c e  i s  to  
be  b ased  on p h y s ic a l  f a c t s .  What he does say  i s  th a t  " i t  seems l i k e l y  
t h a t  such th in g s  as  p s y c h o lo g ic a l m odels o f  human b e in g s  and
in v e s t ig a t io n s  o f  n eu ro p h y sio lo g y  w i l l  be v e ry  r e le v a n t  to  d is c o v e r in g
20th e  mechanisms in v o lv ed  in  r e f e r e n c e ."  But s u r e ly  th e  mechanisms 
in v o lv ed  w i l l  r e l a t e  to  why a  te rm  has th e  re fe re n c e  o r  e x te n s io n  i t
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d o es , and n o t some o th e r ,  r a th e r  th a n  to  what i t  i s  to  have a  re fe re n c e  
o r  e x te n s io n . I t  m ight w e ll he conceded th a t  psycho logy  and n eu ro ­
p h y sio lo g y  w i l l  p ro v id e  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t, e . g . ,  th e  ways in  which we 
group o b je c ts  to g e th e r  u s in g  a  s in g le  p r e d ic a te ,  o r  how we go about 
in d iv id u a t in g  o b je c t s ,  b u t th e s e  a re  d i f f e r e n t  m a t te r s .
I t  would seem th a t  an e x p la n a tio n  o f  what F ie ld  c a l l s  th e  concep t 
o f  " p r im itiv e  d e n o ta tio n "  sh o u ld  e x p la in  such th in g s  as  what c o n d it io n s  
have to  be s a t i s f i e d  by  th e  name ’ F reg e ' and th e  o b je c t  F rege in  o rd e r  
f o r  o u r u se  o f  th e  name to  deno te  th e  o b je c t .  The f a c t  th a t  th e r e  
a re  c a u sa l c h a in s  l in k in g  th e  o b je c t  to  u s e s  o f  th e  name i s  o f  some 
im p o rtan ce . But how do we e s t a b l i s h  th a t  th e re  a re  th e s e  c h a in s?
And what i s  i t  t h a t  makes them c a u s a l?  I f  we can t r a c e  them back  th e n  
we m ight hope to  d is c o v e r  which o b je c t  i s  d en o ted . F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  
th ough , we need  a  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  u n co v e rin g  and t r a c in g  them . At t h e i r  
b a se  we im agine a  more d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n  betw een th e  name, o r  p a r t i c u l a r  
e v e n ts  o f  i t s  u s e ,  and th e  o b je c t .  In fo rm atio n  about th e  psycho logy  
and n eu ro p h y sio lo g y  o f  th e  o r ig i n a l  u s e r s  m ight t e l l  u s  why th e  name 
d en o tes  Frege and n o t som ething e l s e .  Yet i t  would seem to  be an 
e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  o f  any e x p la n a tio n  o f  how re fe re n c e  succeeds th a t  th e  
u s e r s  in te n d e d  to  r e f e r  to  F reg e , and b e l ie v e d  th e y  were do ing  s o . 
C ausal r e l a t i o n s  a re  n o t b a s ic ;  th e y  too  p resuppose  a  th e o ry  o f  
r e f e r e n c e .  These p o in ts  w i l l  be d is c u s se d  a t  le n g th  in  th e  n e x t 
c h a p te r .
More r e c e n t ly ,  Putnam , on th e  b a s is  o f  an id e a  o f  Leeds’ s ,  has 
argued  th a t  th e r e  a re  good re a so n s  f o r  n o t a t te m p tin g  to  g iv e  a  th e o ry  
o f  p r im it iv e  r e f e r e n c e .  He s a y s , "we can g iv e  a  ’ tr a n s c e n d e n ta l  
argument* f o r  T a r s k i’ s p ro ced u re  by a p p e a lin g  to  a  purpose fo r  hav ing  
n o tio n s  l i k e  t r u t h  and r e fe re n c e  which i s  n o t a t  a l l  p a r a l l e l  to  th e
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21purpose  fo r  w hich we have n o tio n s  l i k e  v a le n c e ."  Putnam e a r l i e r  
rem arks th a t  one purpose  fo r  h av in g  th e  n o tio n  o f  t r u t h  i s  so t h a t  we 
can s t a t e  c e r t a in  f a c t s  about d e d u c tiv e  lo g ic ;  a n o th e r  i s  s a id  to  be 
f o r  e x p re s s in g  agreem ent when we do n o t know e x a c t ly  what was s a id .  
P resum ably  he would want to  say  th a t  one im p o rtan t purpose f o r  hav ing  
th e  n o tio n  o f  r e fe re n c e  i s  so t h a t  we can d e f in e  t r u t h  in  te im s o f  
s a t i s f a c t i o n .  A ccording to  Putnam , i t  does n o t m a tte r  how th e s e  
n o tio n s  a re  d e f in e d , ju s t  so lo n g  a s  th e y  do s a t i s f y  th e  p u rp o ses  f o r  
which th e y  a re  need ed . I f  th e  l i s t  (1 )  can be shown to  s a t i s f y  th e  
pu rp o ses  o f  hav in g  a  d e f in i t i o n  o f  p r im it iv e  r e f e r e n c e ,  th e n  i t  i s  
a c c e p ta b le .  The c r u c ia l  q u e s tio n  now becom es, how can we be su re  th a t  
i t  does s a t i s f y  th o se  p u rp o ses?
When I  sk e tch e d  p a r t s  o f  T a r s k i’ s th e o ry  in  s e c t io n  ( i ) ,  I  
assum ed, in  o rd e r  to  f a c i l i t a t e  th e  p r e s e n ta t io n ,  th a t  th e  m eta­
language ML was p a r t  o f  E n g lis h . In  c o n t r a s t ,  th e  o b je c t  language L 
was o n ly  assumed to  be a  p a r t  o f  some n a tu r a l  la n g u ag e . T his i s  in  
acco rd  w ith  T a r s k i’ s p ro c e d u re . T ru th  i s  d e f in e d  fo r  a  g iven  language 
w hich, in  g e n e ra l ,  cannot be assumed to  be t h a t  o f  th e  m etalanguage 
in  which th e  d e f in i t i o n  i s  s t a t e d .  When i t  came to  d is c u s s in g  
exam ples, L was ta k en  to  be a f ra g n e n t o f  E n g lis h , a lth o u g h  i t  was 
p o in te d  o u t th a t  t h i s  too  was o n ly  done f o r  s im p l i f ic a t io n  and t h a t ,  
in  g e n e ra l ,  i t  has to  be assum ed, in  d e r iv in g  in s ta n c e s  o f  C onvention 
T, t h a t  th e re  i s  some way o f  t r a n s l a t i n g  c lo se d  se n te n c e s  o f  L in to  
ML. F ie ld  e x p re sse s  t h i s  p o in t  a s  fo llo w s ,
. On T a r s k i’ s  v iew  we need  to  a d e q u a te ly  t r a n s l a t e  th e  o b je c t  language
in to  th e  m etalanguage in  o rd e r  to  g iv e  an ad equa te  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h
fo r  th e  o b je c t  lang u ag e ; t h i s  means th a t  th e  n o tio n  o f  an ad equa te
t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  employed in  th e  m ethodology o f  g iv in g  t r u t h  t h e o r i e s ,
22b u t i t  i s  n o t employed in  th e  t r u t h  th e o r ie s  th e m se lv e s .
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With t h i s  in  m ind, suppose th a t  L i s  a  q u a n t i f ic a t io n a l  fragm ent 
o f  German c o n ta in in g  th e  name ’ D eu tsch lan d ’,, w h ile  ML i s  s t i l l  p a r t  
o f  E n g lish . S ince th e  ’ d is q u o ta t io n ’ p r in c ip le  w i l l  n o t ap p ly  h e re ,  
we need  to  f in d  some a l t e r n a t iv e  t r a n s l a t i o n  on which to  h ase  ou r 
d e f in i t i o n  o f  p r im it iv e  r e f e r e n c e .  Not ju s t  any t r a n s l a t i o n  w i l l  do . 
I f ,  f o r  exam ple, ’ D eu tsch lan d ’ were t r a n s l a t e d  as ’ F reg e ’ , a  t r u t h  
d e f in i t i o n  b ased  on t h i s  would g ro s s ly  m is re p re se n t L, in  which ca se  
th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  would n o t s a t i s f y  th e  purpose f o r  which i t  was 
r e q u ir e d .
On th e  b a s i s  o f  such a  c o n s id e r a t io n , F ie ld  im poses, as an
adequacy c o n d itio n  on th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  names and p r e d ic a te s  from
o b je c t  language to  m eta language , th e  c o n d itio n  o f  " c o r e f e r e n t i a l i t y " ;
"two s in g u la r  te rm s a re  c o r e f e r e n t i a l  i f  th e y  deno te  th e  same th in g ;
two p re d ic a te  e x p re s s io n s  a re  c o r e f e r e n t i a l  i f  th e y  have th e  same
23e x te n s io n , i . e . ,  i f  th e y  a p p ly  to  th e  same th in g s . "  Putnam , how ever,
se e s  th e  m a tte r  d i f f e r e n t l y .  He su g g e s ts  t h a t  i t  i s  n a tu r a l  to  say
th a t  th e  n o tio n  o f  re fe re n c e  o n ly  makes sense  where th e  n o tio n  o f
t r a n s l a t i o n  makes s e n s e , and hence th a t  we sh o u ld  " th in k  o f  re fe re n c e
as  d e f in e d  f i r s t  f o r  th e  home language à  l a  T a r s k i ,  and th en  ex tended
24to  o th e r  languages v i a  t r a n s l a t i o n . "  But how can we be su re  th a t  
d is q u o ta t io n ,  which i s  th e  way Putnam th in k s  T a rsk i d e f in e d  re fe re n c e  
f o r  th e  home lan g u ag e , does s a t i s f y  th e  purpose f o r  which i t  i s  
re q u ire d ?  Why i s  i t  t h a t  we a re  p re p a re d  to  say  th a t  d is q u o ta t io n  
works fo r  th e  home language? As f a r  as I  can s e e , Putnam has no 
answ er to  t h i s  q u e s t io n .  I f  i t  i s  m a in ta in ed  th a t  re fe re n c e  fo r  th e  
home language i s  d e f in e d  u s in g  d is q u o ta t io n ,  i . e . ,  t h a t  we do n o t need 
a  th e o ry  o f  p r im it iv e  r e f e r e n c e ,  th en  th e re  i s  n o th in g  f u r th e r  to  be 
s a id  about how we know th a t  th e  d e f in i t i o n  i s  adequa te  —  e i th e r  i t  i s
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o r  i t  i s  n o t ,  and th a t  i s  th e  end o f  th e  m a t te r .  There a re  no 
e p is te m o lo g ic a l q u e s tio n s  t h a t  rem ain  to  he answ ered, and a th e o ry  o f  
t r u t h  b ased  on such  a d e f in i t i o n  would b e , in  t h i s  s e n s e , n o n -ep is tem io#  
A ll th a t  th e r e  i s  to  r e f e r e n c e ,  on t h i s  v iew , i s  c o n ta in e d  in  th e  
p a i r in g  o f  a  term  and an in d iv id u a l  o r  a  s e t  o f  in d iv id u a ls ,  a s  in  a  
l i s t .
Of c o u rs e , i t  s t i l l  rem ains to  be shown t h a t  d is q u o ta t io n  i s
adequa te  as a  means o f  e s ta b l i s h in g  re fe re n c e  f o r  th e  home la n g u ag e .
In  h is  p a p e r . F ie ld  a rg u es  t h a t  i t  w i l l  n o t be when th e  language
c o n ta in s  ambiguous nam es, c o u n te r f  a c tu a l s ,  se n te n c e s  in  which ’ d e n o te '
i s  a p p lie d  to  te rm s a s  th e y  o ccu r in  more th a n  one o th e r  lan g u ag e , o r
i s  such th a t  i t  re c o g n iz e s  o b je c ts  t h a t  cannot be named in  th e  m e ta - 
25la n g u ag e . A ll o f  th e s e  f e a tu r e s  a re  p re s e n t in  E n g lish . I  s h a l l  
n o t pu rsu e  t h i s  o b je c t io n  h e re  th o u g h .
I f  i t  i s  n o t p o s s ib le  to  e x p la in  how we know th a t  d is q u o ta t io n  
works fo r  th e  home la n g u ag e , t h e n  i s  i t  p o s s ib le  to  e x p la in  how 
re fe re n c e  w orks. As I  have a rg u ed , we co u ld  n o t th en  even pose th e  
q u e s tio n  o f  how we can be su re  t h a t  we do succeed  in  r e f e r r i n g .  T his 
m arks a  s e r io u s  d e fe c t  w ith  Putnam ’ s p ro p o s a l.  But what i f  we were 
p re p a re d  to  re c o g n iz e  th e  le g it im a c y  o f  such a  q u e s tio n ?  We sh o u ld  
s t i l l  have to  e x p la in  th e  su c c e ss  o f  th e  d is q u o ta t io n  p r in c i p le ,  even 
though we d id  n o t accep t i t  a s  a  d e f in i t i o n .
This can be done i f  we re c o g n iz e  th e  i n t u i t i o n  u n d e r ly in g  th e  
c a u s a l th e o ry  o f  r e f e r e n c e .  For we can th en  h o ld  th a t  th e  p r in c ip le  
works ( to  th e  e x te n t  i t  does) in  v i r t u e  o f  a  r e l a t i o n  hav ing  been 
e s ta b l is h e d  betw een a  word, o r  th e  even t o f  i t s  hav ing  been u t t e r e d  
in  an a p p ro p r ia te  c irc u m s ta n c e , and an in d iv id u a l  o r  a s e t  o f  
in d iv id u a l s .  Our su c c e ss  in  r e f e r r i n g  i s  grounded in  th e  f a c t  th a t
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we s ta n d  in  c e r t a in  p h y s ic a l  r e l a t i o n s  to  what i s  b e in g  r e f e r r e d  t o .
As was p o in te d  o u t b e f o r e ,  th o u g h , t h i s  s t i l l  le a v e s  unansw ered th e  
c o n c e p tu a l q u e s tio n s  co n ce rn in g  th e  c o n d itio n s  which have to  be 
s a t i s f i e d  by  p ro p e r  names and p r e d ic a te s  in  o rd e r  f o r  them to  deno te  
o r  c o r r e c t ly  a p p ly  to  o b je c t s .
There i s  a ls o  t h i s  p o in t  to  be made a g a in s t  th e  d is q u o ta tio n  
p r in c ip le  a s  a  d e f i n i t i o n .  T a rsk i c la im ed  th a t  h i s  d e f in i t i o n  o f  th e  
concep t o f  d e n o ta tio n  u s in g  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  r e l a t i o n  a c tu a l ly  d e f in e d  
th e  m eaning o f  th e  c o n c e p t . N o w  even i f  th e  d is q u o ta t io n  p r in c ip le  
were p roved  to  be " e x te n s io n a l ly  a d e q u a te " , in  F ie ld ’ s s e n se , f o r  even 
a  p a r t  o f  th e  home la n g u ag e , t h i s  would s t i l l  p ro v id e  i n s u f f i c i e n t  
ground fo r  c la im in g  th a t  th e  m eaning o f  th e  concep t o f  d e n o ta tio n  was 
th e re b y  d e f in e d . A l i s t  does n o t d e f in e  th e  c o n c e p t, o r  e x p la in  th e  
m eaning, o f  t h a t  o f  which i t  i s  a  l i s t ,  A l i s t  o f  v a le n c e s  does n o t 
e x p la in  what i t  i s  f o r  an elem ent to  have a  v a le n c e , and a  l i s t  o f  
in d iv id u a ls  r e f e r r e d  to  does n o t e x p la in  what i t  i s  f o r  a term to  
r e f e r  o r  to  have an e x te n s io n .
The main argum ent o f  t h i s  c h a p te r  has been th a t  th e re  has to  be 
a  p r im it iv e  r e l a t i o n  o f  re fe re n c e  betw een e x p re s s io n s  o f  a  language 
and p a r t s  o f  th e  w orld  in  o rd e r  f o r  u s  to  e x p la in ,  in  th e  T arsk ian  
m anner, what th e  t r u t h  o f  a  s ta te m e n t c o n s is t s  i n .  T h is su g g e s ts  th e  
fo llo w in g  answ er to  q u e s tio n  (4 ) :
(4A) There has to  be a  p r im it iv e  r e l a t i o n  o f  r e fe re n c e  betw een 
s in g u la r  te rm s o f  a  language and o b je c ts  in  th e  w o rld , and 
betw een p re d ic a te s  o f  th e  language and s e t s  o f  o b je c ts  in  th e  
w o rld ,
T a r s k i’ s th e o ry  i s  a  co rrespondence  th e o ry  and i s  w e ll s u i te d  to  th e  
r e a l i s t .  But i t  le a v e s  u n e x p la in e d  what s o r t  o f  a  r e l a t i o n  r e fe re n c e
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i s .  How i s  i t  to  be  d e f in e d ?  What i s  needed i s  a  th e o ry  o f  p r im it iv e  
r e f e r e n c e ,  a  th e o ry  o f  what i t  i s  f o r  an in d iv id u a l  to  be th e  r e f e r e n t  
o f  a  name, o r  to  b e lo n g  to  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a  p r e d ic a te ,  as  th o se  
e x p re s s io n s  a re  u se d  w ith in  a  community o f  sp e a k e rs .  T his in  tu rn  
sh o u ld  su g g es t how we can d is c o v e r  what th e  re fe re n c e  o r  e x te n s io n  
o f  a  p a r t i c u  1 e r  term  i s .
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CHAPTER 5 CLUSTER THEORIES OP REFERENCE
S e c tio n  ( i ) :  N a tu ra l Kind P r e d ic a te s  and P ro p e r  Names
One c e n t r a l  problem  th a t  I  have f r e q u e n t ly  a l lu d e d  to  i s  t h a t  
o f  e x p la in in g  th e  grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge. I  have argued  th a t  
th e  r e a l i s t ’ s  accoun t o f  t h i s  i s  i n t u i t i v e l y  p la u s ib le  b u t r e q u ir e s  
a  fiiTO p h i lo s o p h ic a l  fo u n d a tio n ; hence th e  fo u r  q u e s t io n s .  A ccording 
to  th e  r e a l i s t ,  many subsequen t s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  g iv e  b e t t e r  
acco u n ts  o f  ju s t  th o se  th in g s  which e a r l i e r  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  
d e s c r ib e d . I  have m entioned  s e v e ra l  exam ples w hich m ight p la u s ib ly  
be  in t e r p r e te d  in  t h i s  way: D a lto n ’ s  atom ic th e o ry  was su p ersed ed  by  
Avogadro’ s ;  th e  B o h r-R u th e rfo rd  th e o ry  o f  th e  e le c t r o n  by p re s e n t-d a y  
th e o r i e s ;  M u lle r’ s th e o ry  o f  genes by  th e  th e o r ie s  o f  modem 
m o lecu la r  b i o l o g i s t s .  The r e a l i s t  does no t c la im  t h a t  ev ery  change 
o f  th e o ry  i s  o f  t h i s  k in d , f o r  som etim es, a s  in  th e  c a se s  o f  
’ p h lo g i s to n ',  ’ lu m in ife ro u s  e t h e r ’ , and 'm ag n e tic  f lu x ’ , we say  th a t  
th e r e  i s  no one p r e d ic a te  now u se d  which has th e  same e x te n s io n  as 
an e a r l i e r  t h e o r e t i c a l  p r e d ic a te .  (One q u e s tio n  we have y e t to  
t a c k le  i s  what makes th e s e  c a se s  d i f f e r e n t . )  A ll he i s  sa y in g  i s  
t h a t ,  by and l a r g e ,  s c i e n t i s t s  do , as a  m a tte r  o f  f a c t ,  seeurch f o r  
b e t t e r  th e o r ie s  about th e  k in d s  o f  th in g s  th e re  a r e ,  and th a t  s c ie n c e  
p ro g re s s e s  b ecau se  t h i s  m ethodology w orks.
The s o r t s  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  p r e d ic a te s  we a re  d e a l in g  w ith  a re  
o f te n  o f  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  k in d .  As we saw in  C hap ter 1, th e re  i s  no 
r i g i d  d i s t i n c t i o n  to  be  drawn betw een t h e o r e t i c a l  and o b se rv a tio n  
te rm s . We may s t i l l  u se  th e s e  e x p re s s io n s , how ever, fo r  approxim ate 
d e s c r ip t io n .  Thus we m ight c h a r a c te r iz e  ’ atom’ , ’m o lecu le ’ , ’ g en e’ .
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and ’ e l e c t r o n ’ a s  t h e o r e t i c a l .  By c o n t r a s t ,  some f a m i l ia r  p r e d ic a te s  
o c c u r r in g - in  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  m ight he c h a ra c te r iz e d  as  o h s e r -  ■ 
v a t io n a l ,  e . g . ,  ’ g o ld ’ , ’w a te r ’ , ’q u a r tz ’ , and ’mammal’ . These 
p r e d ic a te s  can he c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d  to  o b je c ts  o f  common e x p e r ie n c e . 
C o rrec t a p p l ic a t io n  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  p r e d ic a te s ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, 
depends on th e r e  b e in g  a  c e r t a in  amount o f  s o p h is t ic a te d  a p p a ra tu s .  
W ater and g o ld  a re  en co u n te red  in  d a i ly  l i f e  in  a  sen se  in  which 
genes and e le c t r o n s  a re  n o t .  A lso , c o r r e c t  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  p r e d ic a te s  
o f  an o b s e rv a t io n a l  k in d  f r e q u e n t ly  r e q u ire s  l i t t l e , o r  no u n d e r­
s ta n d in g  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry .
There a re  o th e r  p r e d ic a te s ,  to o ,  which a re  l i k e  o b s e rv a tio n a l  
s c i e n t i f i c  ones b u t w hich o ccu r l e s s  f re q u e n t ly  in  s c i e n t i f i c  
th e o r ie s  — p r e d ic a te s  l i k e  ’ lem on’ , ’ t i g e r ’ , ’oak t r e e ’ , and so o n . 
What th e s e  p r e d ic a te s  have in  common w ith  p r e d ic a te s  o f  th e  f i r s t  two 
k in d s ,  though , i s  th a t  th e y  a re  g e n e ra l nam es, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  n a t u r a l  k in d s . I t  i s  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  t h a t  
we a re  p r im a r i ly  concerned  w ith .
There i s  no need  f o r  u s  to  a ttem p t to  g iv e  a  p r e c is e  d e f in i t i o n  
o f  what a  n a t u r a l  k in d  i s ,  b u t i t  i s  w orth m en tio n in g  some f e a tu r e s  
o f  them and o f  th e  p r e d ic a te s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  them . To beg in  w ith , 
n a t u r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  do n o t u s u a l ly  adm it o f  s im p le , p re c is e  
d e f in i t i o n s ;  as  Putnam has s a id ,  th e y  a re  " c lu s t e r  term s'* . ’Oak 
t r e e ’ m ight be d e f in e d  a s  ’ a  member o f  th e  beech  fam ily  w ith  h a rd  
wood, jagged le a v e s ,  and w hich b e a rs  a c o rn s ’ , 'go ld*  a s  ’ a  y e llo w , 
n o n - ru s t in g ,  m a lle a b le ,  d u c t i l e  m e ta l w ith  atom ic number 79*. These 
may be c o n tra s te d  w ith  ’b a c h e lo r ’ , a  g e n e ra l name n o t a s s o c ia te d  w ith  
a  n a tu r a l  k in d , which i s  commonly d e f in e d  as  ’ a  man who has n ev e r 
been m a rr ie d ’ . One i n t e r e s t i n g  p o in t  which fo llo w s from t h i s
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d if f e r e n c e  i s  t h a t  w hereas ’b ache lo r*  cannot be c o r r e c t ly  a p p lie d  to
an o b je c t  t h a t  i s  e i t h e r  n o t a  man o r  has been m a rr ie d , ’oak t r e e ’
and ’g o ld ’ can be a p p lie d  to  th in g s  t h a t  do n o t p o sse ss  a l l  th e
p r o p e r t i e s  m entioned  in  t h e i r  d e f in in g  c l u s t e r s ;  th u s ,  many oak t r e e s
have le a v e s  w ith  smooth ed g es , and some g o ld  i s  w h ite . Putnam n o te s
t h i s  p o in t  in  s a y in g  th a t  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  a re  n o t synonymous
2w ith  t h e i r  d e f i n i t i o n s .  We m ight i d e n t i f y  som ething  as b e lo n g in g  
to  a  k in d  even though i t  does n o t p o sse ss  a l l  th e  p r o p e r t i e s  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  members o f  th e  k in d .  T his id e a  
o f  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  b e in g  c l u s t e r  te rm s w i l l  be o f  g re a t  
im portance when we come to  g iv e  a  th e o ry  o f  re fe re n c e  fo r  them .
A common f e a tu r e  o f  n a t u r a l  k in d s  i s  t h a t  th e  p r o p e r t ie s  u se d  
to  d e f in e  them a re  p r im a r i ly  p h y s ic a l .  Oak t r e e s  and go ld  a re  
re c o g n iz e d  by  th e  p h y s ic a l  p r o p e r t i e s  th e y  e x h i b i t .  B a c h e lo rs , on 
th e  o th e r  hand , a re  n o t to  be d is t in g u is h e d  from o th e r  men by  p h y s ic a l  
p r o p e r t i e s  b u t by  a  ’ l e g a l ’ p r o p e r ty ,  v i z . ,  w hether o r  n o t th e y  have 
been m a rr ie d . N a tu ra l k in d s  a re  a lso  commonly though t to  be o f  
e x p la n a to ry  im portance and so become s u i ta b le  s u b je c ts  f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  
in v e s t ig a t io n .  C onsequen tly , many o f  th e  s c i e n t i f i c  p r e d ic a te s  o f  
i n t e r e s t  to  th e  r e a l i s t ,  when he t a lk s  about s c i e n t i f i c  p ro g re s s ,  a re  
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  n a tu r a l  k in d s .
Having m entioned  n a tu r a l  k in d s ,  l e t  me now d is s o c ia te  m y se lf  
from s e v e ra l  o f  th e  th in g s  commonly s a id  about them . In  th e  f i r s t  
p la c e ,  I  do n o t w ish  to  ta k e  th e  analogy  betw een g e n e ra l names and 
p ro p e r  names to  th e  e x te n t th a t  a  g e n e ra l name i s  h e ld  to  r e f e r  to  
a  k in d  o f  th in g ,  i . e . ,  to  a  supposed a b s t r a c t  e n t i t y ,  ju s t  as  most 
p ro p e r  names r e f e r  to  p a r t i c u l a r  th in g s .  There a re  e le c t ro n s  and s e t s  
o f  e le c t r o n s ,  b u t n o t ,  in  a d d i t io n ,  a  k in d  o f  th in g  ’ e l e c t r o n ’ .
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'I n  th e  second p la c e ,  I  do n o t w ish to  commit m y se lf  to  th e  m odish view  
o f  K ripke and Putnam t h a t  n a tu r a l  k in d s  have e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t i e s ,  
i . e . ,  p r o p e r t i e s  which n o th in g  can la c k  and s t i l l  he o f  th e  k in d .^
More re c e n t work has su g g es ted  t h a t  th e re  a re  s e r io u s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
in v o lv ed  in  t r y in g  to  make sen se  o f  such a  n o tio n  o f  e s se n c e .^
Towards th e  end o f  t h i s  c h a p te r  I  s h a l l  su g g es t t h a t  we can make sense  
o f  a  more r e s t r i c t e d  n o tio n  —  th a t  o f  " r e la t iv e "  o r  " e p is te m ic "  
e s s e n t ia l is m  —  h u t t h i s ,  a s  K ripke em phasises, i s  n o t th e  s o r t  o f  
e s s e n t ia l is m  to  which he i s  com m itted .
One l a s t  rem ark th a t  needs to  he made i s  t h a t  th e re  i s  a  s e t  
o f  te rm s whose members a re  f r e q u e n t ly  c i te d  in  d is c u s s io n s  o f  th e  
grow th o f  s c ie n c e ,  b u t which a re  n o t a s s o c ia te d  w ith  n a tu r a l  k in d s  —  
te rm s l i k e  ’ te m p e ra tu re * , ’m ass* , ’ le n g th ’ , ’ t im e ’ , ’ energ y ’ , and 
’ e l e c t r i c  c h a rg e ’ . In  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  th e y  ty p i c a l l y  ex p ress  
m easurem ents, i . e . ,  r e l a t i o n s  betw een o b je c ts ,  o r  e v e n ts , and num bers, 
and so m ight be re g a rd e d  as  tw o -p lace  p r e d ic a te s  o r  r e l a t i o n a l  te rra s . 
In  th e  f i n a l  c h a p te r  I  s h a l l  c o n s id e r  how f a r  th e  th e o ry  o f  r e fe re n c e  
developed  in  t h i s  c h a p te r  f o r  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  can be ex tended  
to  in c lu d e  th e s e  te rm s .
Our p rim ary  concern  in  t h i s  c h a p te r  w i l l  be w ith  answ ering  th e  
q u e s tio n ;
( 3 ) What c o n d itio n s  have to  be s a t i s f i e d  by a  n a tu r a l  k in d
p re d ic a te  ’^ ’ and an o b je c t  a  in  o rd e r  f o r  as i t  i s  u se d
w ith in  a  l i n g u i s t i c  community G, to  be c o r r e c t ly  a p p lie d  to  a? 
An a l t e r n a t iv e  way o f  p u t t in g  t h i s  q u e s tio n  would b e , what i s  i t  f o r  
an o b je c t  to  b e lo n g  to  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  as 
t h a t  p r e d ic a te  i s  u sed  w ith in  a  l i n g u i s t i c  community? One im p o rtan t 
p o in t  to  n o t ic e  about th e  q u e s tio n  i s  th a t  p r e d ic a te  e x te n s io n  i s
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r e l a t i v i z e d  to  u se  o f  th e  p r e d ic a te  w ith in  a  l i n g u i s t i c  community.
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  some r e s t r i c t i o n  in v o lv in g  u se  has to  he p la c e d  on 
an in q u iry  in to  what i t  i s  f o r  a  c e r t a in  p r e d ic a te  to  have an 
e x te n s io n . Even though one l i n g u i s t i c  community may u se  many o f  th e  
p r e d ic a te s  t h a t  a n o th e r  community u s e s ,  i t  does n o t fo llo w  th a t  th e y  
a re  th e re b y  ta lk in g  about th e  same th in g s .  A mundane example a r i s e s  
when we. r e f l e c t  on th e  f a c t  t h a t  w hales were once though t to  b e lo n g  
n o t to  th e  n a tu r a l  k in d  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  term  ’mammal’ b u t to  th a t  
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  te im  ’ f i s h ’ . A f te r  r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  sp eak ers  
s t i l l  u se d  th e  same te rm s , a lth o u g h  t h e i r  e x te n s io n s  had changed. 
A nother example i s  su g g es ted  by th e  fo llo w in g  p a ssag e , "The name 
’ e le c t r o n ’ was in tro d u c e d  by G. Johnstone Stoney ( I 826 - I 9 I I ) ,  in  I8 9 I ,  
n o t o f  co u rse  a s  th e  name o f  th e  p a r t i c l e s ,  b u t as th e  name o f  th e  
fundam ental u n i t  o f  e l e c t r i c i t y ,  nam ely, th e  e l e c t r i c  charge on a 
hydrogen ion  in  e l e c t r o l y s i s . " ^
Given th a t  th e  in q u iry  i s  to  be made r e l a t i v e  to  u s e ,  th e  
q u e s tio n  i s ,  whose u se ?  The obv ious ch o ic e s  a re  (a )  u se  w ith in  a  
l i n g u i s t i c  community, and (b ) u se  by  an in d iv id u a l  sp e a k e r. I  haye 
chosen (a )  b ecause  i t  i s  more germane to  th e  e n te r p r i s e  o f  e x p la in in g  
how i t  i s  t h a t  subsequen t th e o r ie s  can be about th e  same th in g s .  A 
s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry  i s  som ething sh a re d  by  a  community, u s u a l ly  a  
community o f  s c i e n t i s t s .  Of c o u rse , t h i s  community i s  composed o f  
in d iv id u a ls ,  many o f  whom know th e  th e o ry .  But o f te n  a speaker, u s e s  
a  s c i e n t i f i c  p r e d ic a te ,  o r  even a  r e l a t i v e l y  n o n - s c ie n t i f i c  n a tu r a l  
k in d  te rra , w ith o u t f u l l y  u n d e rs ta n d in g  i t .  T h is  r a i s e s  numerous 
problem s fo r  q u e s tio n s  l i k e  (3 ) i f  u se  i s  ta k en  as  r e l a t i v e  to  an 
in d iv id u a l  sp eak e r; I  w i l l  draw a t t e n t i o n  to  some o f  them l a t e r .  By 
choosing  ( a ) ,  I hope to  avo id  them .
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In  a t te m p tin g  to  answ er q u e s tio n  ( 3 ) I  s h a l l  make u se  o f  some 
o f  th e  id e a s  p u t fo rw ard  in  r e c e n t  work on p ro p e r  nam es. That t h i s  
shou ld  be p o s s ib le  becomes ap p are n t when i t  i s  re c o g n iz e d  th a t  th e re  
i s  a  p a r a l l e l  q u e s tio n  fo r  p ro p e r  names:
(3*) What c o n d itio n s  have to  be s a t i s f i e d  by  a p ro p e r  name and 
an o b je c t  a  in  o rd e r  f o r  , as i t  i s  u se d  w ith in  a 
l i n g u i s t i c  community G, to  deno te  a?
Or a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  what i s  i t  f o r  an o b je c t  to  be th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  
p ro p e r  name as i t  i s  u sed  w ith in  a  l i n g u i s t i c  community? I  s h a l l  
b eg in  my in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  ( 3 ) by  c o n s id e r in g  how we m ight answ er (3 ’ ) .
The th e o ry  o f  F re g e 's  th a t  I  b r i e f l y  o u t l in e d ^ in  C hap ter 2
su g g e s ts  one approach  to  answ ering  (3 ’ ) .  I t  was p o in te d  o u t t h a t ,
in  o rd e r  to  e x p la in  how c e r t a in  i d e n t i t y  s ta te m e n ts  cou ld  be
in fo iro a tiv e , F rege was le d  to  d is t in g u is h  betw een th e  sense  and th e
re fe re n c e  o f  a  p ro p e r  name. 'S e n s e ' he to o k  to  be a  c o g n it iv e  n o t io n ,
som ething which i s  known by  u s e r s  o f  th e  name and which can be p assed
on to  o th e r s .  In  th e  case  o f  p ro p e r  names which o ccu r in  n a tu r a l
lan g u ag e , a s  opposed to  p ro p e r  names o c c u rin g  in  a  p e r f e c t  lang u ag e ,
he th o u g h t th a t  th e  sense  may be d i f f e r e n t  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  s p e a k e rs ,^
b u t f o r  b o th  th e s e  ty p e s  o f  case  th e  sense  o f  a  p ro p e r  name would
s t i l l  be t h a t  by which th e  r e f e r e n t  i s  d e te rm in ed . Dummett p u ts  t h i s
p o in t  a s  fo llo w s .
What i s  im p o rtan t about F re g e 's  th e o ry  i s  t h a t  a  p ro p e r name, i f
i t  i s  to  be c o n s id e re d  a s  h av in g  a  d e te rm in a te  s e n s e , must have
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  i t  a  s p e c i f i c  c r i t e r i o n  fo r  re c o g n iz in g  a g iv en
o b je c t  a s  th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  th e  name; th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  th e  name, i f7any, i s  w hatever o b je c t  s a t i s f i e s  th a t  c r i t e r i o n .
B efore we can fram e an answ er to  (3 ’ ) on th e  b a s is  o f  t h i s  
th e o ry ,  we need  to  d ec id e  what th e  sense  o f  a  p ro p e r  name i s  a s  th a t
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name i s  u se d  w ith in  a  l i n g u i s t i c  community. Ought we to  i n t e r p r e t  
i t  a s  th e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  th e  se n se s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  name by  th e  
members o f  th e  community, as th e  u n io n  o f  th o se  s e n s e s ,  o r  as 
som ething more com plex? Of c o u rs e , th e  answ er to  (3 ’ ) would be 
s t r a ig h tfo rw a rd  i f  we had p h ra se d  i t  in  term s o f  an in d iv id u a l  
s p e a k e r 's  u se  o f  a  name: would deno te  a  i f  and o n ly  i f  a  were t h a t
o b je c t  which u n iq u e ly  s a t i s f i e d  th e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  r e c o g n it io n  
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  sen se  a t ta c h e d  to  '«(' by th e  sp e a k e r .
One p o in t  t h a t  has to  be ta k en  in to  accoun t h e re  i s  c a p tu re d
by Putnam in  h is  " p r in c ip le  o f  th e  d iv is io n  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  la b o u r" ,
i . e . ,  th e  p r in c ip le  t h a t .
Every l i n g u i s t i c  community . . .  p o s se sse s  a t  l e a s t  some term s whose
a s s o c ia te d  ' c r i t e r i a '  a re  known o n ly  to  a  su b se t o f  th e  sp eak e rs
who a c q u ire  th e  te rm s , and whose u se  by th e  o th e r  sp eak e rs  depends
upon a  s t r u c tu r e d  c o o p e ra tio n  betw een them and th e  sp eak ers  in  th e  0
r e le v a n t  s u b s e ts .
As re g a rd s  p ro p e r  nam es, an example where P u tn am 's  p o in t  i s  made c l e a r  
i s  in  ou r u se  o f  th e  name 'E i n s t e i n ' , where we in te n d  to  r e f e r  to  th e  
famous s c i e n t i s t  who f i r s t  fo rm u la ted  th e  S p e c ia l Theory o f  R e l a t i v i t y ,  
and so o n . Many o f  th o se  who u se  th e  name w ith  t h i s  in te n t io n  may 
n o t a s s o c ia te  w ith  i t  a  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  re c o g n iz in g  th e  man; a t  b e s t  
th e y  o n ly  have a  p a r t i a l  g rasp  o f  th e  s e n se . N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e r e  a re  
d i c t i o n a r i e s ,  e n c y c lo p e d ia s , and more know ledgeable peo p le  who co u ld  
p ro v id e  th e  r e q u i s i t e  in fo rm a tio n , and th e  r e a l i z a t i o n  th a t  such  
so u rces  may be ap p ea led  to  grounds th e  u se  o f  th e  name w ith in  th é  
community. Thus i t  would b e  a  m istak e  to  id e n t i f y  's e n s e  w ith in  a  
community' w ith  ' i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  sen se s  fo r  members o f  th e  com m unity '.
Pu tnam 's p r in c ip le  m ight be f u r th e r  ex tended  i f  i t  i s  th o u g h t 
t h a t  th e  c r i t e r i a  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  a  name m ight n o t even be f u l l y  known
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to  any o f  th e  sp e a k e rs .  I t  m ight he th a t  c e r t a in  b e l i e f s  and item s 
o f  knowledge re g a rd in g  th e  h e a re r  o f  a  name a re  p re se rv e d  in  
m a n u sc rip ts  and h i s t o r i c a l  documents such as  h i r t h  r e g i s t e r s  w ith o u t 
anyone h e in g  aware o f  t h e i r  e x is te n c e ,  and i t  co u ld  he s a id  th a t  th e s e  
were c o n s t i tu t i v e  o f  th e  sen se  o f  th e  e x p re ss io n  a s  i t  i s  u se d  w ith in  
a  community whose members had a c c e ss  to  th e  m a n u sc rip ts  and docum ents. 
In  such c a se s  we would have to  say  th a t  * sen se  w ith in  a  community* 
was som ething more th a n  * u n io n  o f  sen ses  fo r  members o f  th e  community*. 
To a llo w  f o r  such  a  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  I  s h a l l  h e n c e fo r th  u n d e rs ta n d  *the 
sen se  o f  a  p ro p e r  name a s  t h a t  name i s  u sed  w ith in  a  l i n g u i s t i c  
community G* as  h e in g  g iven  by  a  complex s e t  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s  which 
may he a r r iv e d  a t  on th e  b a s i s  o f  what i s  b e l ie v e d  w ith in  C. * What 
i s  b e l ie v e d  w ith in  G* i s ,  in  tu r n ,  to  he u n d e rs to o d  as  in c lu d in g  * what 
i s  known w ith in  G*. Seen in  t h i s  l i g h t ,  sen se  i s  a  fu n c tio n  o f  b e l i e f ,  
and what i s  b e l ie v e d  w ith in  a  community may exceed what i s  b e l ie v e d  
by  i t s  members.
T his s t i p u l a t i o n  means th a t  some allow ance w i l l  have to  be made 
f o r  in c o n s is te n c ie s  w ith in  a  community. I f  in c o n s i s te n t  d e s c r ip t io n s  
a re  a t t r i b u t e d  to  th e  b e a re r  o f  a  name, then  c l e a r ly  o n ly  one a t  most 
can be t r u e  o f  th e  b e a r e r .  C onsequen tly , i f  th e  sense  i s  to  p ro v id e  
a  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  d e te rm in in g  th e  r e f e r e n c e ,  o n ly  one o f  th e  d e s c r ip t io n s  
can be reckoned  p a r t  o f  th e  s e n s e .
T his th e o ry  which we have developed m ight seem somewhat removed 
from F rege*s p r i s t i n e  v iew . Sense i s  to  be th o u g h t o f  as  a  complex 
n o tio n  which canno t be assumed to  be g iven  by a  sim ple d e f in i t e  
d e s c r ip t io n  and m ight change o v er tim e . We h av e , how ever, p re se rv e d  
what was c r u c i a l  to  F re g e ’ s view  —  sense  i s  a  c o g n it iv e  n o tio n  w hich, 
in  th e  case  o f  a  p ro p e r  name, p ro v id e s  a  c r i t e r i o n  fo r  d e te rm in in g  th e  
r e f e r e n t .
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We a re  now in  a  p o s i t io n  to  g iv e  a f i r s t  answ er to  q u e s tio n  (3 * ) . 
I t  m ight he lo o s e ly  term ed ’F regean* ;
(3*F) a p ro p e r  name as  i t  i s  u se d  w ith in  a  l i n g u i s t i c  community
C, d en o tes  an o b je c t  a  i f  and o n ly  i f  a  i s  t h a t  o b je c t  which 
u n iq u e ly  s a t i s f i e s  a l l  o f  th e  d e s c r ip t io n s  which co u ld  be 
c o n s i s te n t ly  a t t r i b u t e d  to  th e  b e a re r  o f  *«* on th e  b a s i s  o f  
what i s  b e l ie v e d  w ith in  C,
Both th e  th e o ry  o f  re fe re n c e  e n c a p su la te d  in  (3*F) and F reg e ’ s 
o r ig i n a l  th e o ry  a re  exam ples o f  what have come to  be known as 
d e s c r ip t iv e  th e o r ie s  o f  re fe re n c e  f o r  p ro p e r nam es. They appea l o n ly  
to  b e l i e f s  and item s o f  knowledge in  o rd e r  to  d e term in e  what a  name 
r e f e r s  t o .  O th er d e s c r ip t iv e  th e o r ie s  have been proposed  by 
W ittg e n s te in ,^  S e a r le ,^ ^  and S t r a w s o n . L i k e  (3 ’P) th e y  ta k e  th e  
sen se  o f  a  p ro p e r  name to  be  g iv en  by a  c l u s t e r  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s ;  
u n l ik e  (3 ’F) th e y  do n o t m a in ta in  th a t  th e  r e f e r e n t  has to  s a t i s f y  
a l l  o f  th e  c l u s t e r .  R a th e r , th e  o b je c t  named i s  th a t  which s a t i s f i e s  
a  s u i ta b le  number o f  them . A s u i t a b le  number need  n o t be a  
m a jo r i ty  —  allow ance can be made f o r  a t ta c h in g  more im portance to  
some th a n  to  o th e r s .  C o n sid e r, f o r  exam ple, o u r u se  o f  th e  name 
’ A rchim edes’ . We b e l ie v e  a  number o f  th in g s  to  be t r u e  o f  
Archimedes —- t h a t  he d isc o v e re d  th e  p r in c ip le  named a f t e r  him , th a t  
he l iv e d  most o f  h i s  l i f e  in  S y racu se , t h a t  he once le a p t  from h is  
b a th  and ra n  naked th ro u g h  th e  s t r e e t s  sh o u tin g  'E u re k a l’ , t h a t  he 
in v e n te d  a  m echan ica l screw  u se d  fo r  i r r i g a t i o n ,  and so o n . Not a l l  
o f  th e s e  b e l i e f s  need  be assumed to  c a r ry  equ a l w eigh t in  d e te rm in in g  
who ’A rchim edes’ r e f e r s  t o .  We m ight w e ll c o n s id e r  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f ,  
s a y , th e  f i r s t  and second b e l i e f s  to  be o f  p rim ary  im portance .
There i s  good reaso n  to  r e v is e  (3*F) in  o rd e r  to  account f o r
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t h i s  v iew . I f  h i s t o r i c a l  r e s e a r c h  shou ld  su g g e s t,  e . g . ,  t h a t  one 
Anaximedes r e a l l y  in v e n te d  what we c a l l  th e  'A rchim edean s c re w ',  then  
we would n o rm ally  conclude th a t  t h i s  i s  som ething Archimedes d id  n o t 
do . S tic k in g  to  th e  l e t t e r  o f  (3 * F ), though , we would be fo rc e d  to  
co n c lu d e , on th e  b a s i s  Of t h i s  one p ie c e  o f  in fo rm a tio n , t h a t  th e re  
was no such p e rso n  as  A rchim edes, and t h i s  seems most im p la u s ib le .
More g e n e ra l ly ,  th e r e  seems to  be no reaso n  f o r  h o ld in g  th a t  a  p e rso n  
has to  have done e v e ry th in g  we a t t r i b u t e  to  them b e fo re  th e y  can be 
s a id  to  be r e f e r r e d  to  when we u se  t h e i r  name. A f te r  a l l ,  we o f te n  
concede th a t  we have made a  m is tak e  in  o u r d e s c r ip t io n  o f  a  p e rso n , 
even when th a t  d e s c r ip t io n  em bodies th e  b e s t  knowledge a v a i la b le  to  
u s .  T his id e a  o f  a  w eigh ted  c l u s t e r  a lso  marks a  f u r th e r  analogy  
betw een p ro p e r  names and n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s .  Let u s  re fo rm u la te  
(3 'F )  so as  to  ta k e  accoun t o f  i t ;
(3 ’C) A p ro p e r  name , a s  i t  i s  u sed  w ith in  a  l i n g u i s t i c
community G, d en o tes  an o b je c t  a i f  and o n ly  i f  a  i s  t h a t  
o b je c t  which u n iq u e ly  s a t i s f i e s  a  s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  
d e s c r ip t io n s  which c o u ld  be  c o n s is te n t ly  a t t r i b u t e d  to  th e  
b e a r e r  o f  on th e  b a s i s  o f  what i s  b e l ie v e d  w ith in  0 .
One o f  th e  im p o rtan t f e a tu r e s  o f  d e s c r ip t iv e  th e o r ie s  i s  t h a t  
th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  p ro p e r  name i s  f ix e d  by c e r t a in  b e l i e f s .  In th e  
ca se  o f  'A rc h im e d e s ', th e  r e f e r e n t ,  f o r  a  l i n g u i s t i c  community G, i s  
t h a t  person  ( i f  any) who s a t i s f i e s  a  s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  th o se  
d e s c r ip t io n s  which co u ld  be a t t r i b u t e d  to  him on th e  b a s is  o f  what 
i s  b e l ie v e d  w ith in  C. I f  i t  sh o u ld  tu rn  ou t t h a t  one Anaximedes i s  
so i d e n t i f i e d  th e n  ' A rch im e d es ', as u sed  w ith in  th e  community, den o tes  
Anaximedes, d e s p i te  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e re  may have been some o th e r  
p e rso n , contem poraneous w ith  Anaximedes, who was named 'A rc h im e d e s '.
.146.
An i l l u s t r a t i o n  in v o lv in g  a  case  l i k e  t h i s  i s  a f fo rd e d  by th e  
G ilb e r t  and S u lliv a n  o p e r e t ta  H.M.S. P in a fo re . Towards th e  end, 
B u tte rc u p , a  n u rse  and c h ild -m in d e r , c o n fe sse s  t h a t  some y e a rs  
p re v io u s ly  she mixed up two b a b ie s .  One, R alph , grew up to  be an 
o rd in a ry  seaman, w h ile  th e  o th e r ,  C orcoran , became c a p ta in  o f  th e  
P in a f o r e .  A ccording to  a  d e s c r ip t iv e  th e o ry , i t  co u ld  be s a id  a f t e r  
th e  c o n fe s s io n  t h a t ,  in  u s in g  th e  name ’C o rc o ra n ',  p eo p le  p r io r  to  
th e  c o n fe s s io n  th e re b y  succeeded  in  r e f e r r in g  to  R alph .
A nother im p o rtan t f e a tu r e  o f  d e s c r ip t iv e  th e o r i e s ,  a t  l e a s t  as 
I  have p re s e n te d  them , i s  t h a t ,  s in c e  th e  sen se  o r  m eaning o f  a  
p ro p e r  name i s  g iven  by  th e  same s e t  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s  u sed  to  f i x  th e  
r e f e r e n t ,  i t  would be m ean in g less  to  deny th a t  th e  r e f e r e n t  s a t i s f i e d  
th o se  d e s c r ip t io n s .  I f  th e  sen se  o f  th e  name 'A rch im edes' i s  g iven  
by  th e  fo u r  d e s c r ip t iv e  p h ra se s  m entioned  above, th en  th e  s ta tem en t 
'A rchim edes d id  n o t d is c o v e r  th e  p r in c ip le  named a f t e r  him , n o r l i v e  
most o f  h i s  l i f e  in  S y racu se , n o r run  naked th ro u g h  th e  s t r e e t s  
sh o u tin g  'E u r e k a . ' ,  n o r in v e n t a  m echanical w a te r-sc re w ’ would be 
c o n t r a d ic to r y .  C o n v erse ly , we can say  th a t  th e  s ta te m e n t t h a t  he d id  
do a  s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  th e s e  th in g s  i s  n e c e s s a r i ly  t r u e .
These and o th e r  consequences o f  d e s c r ip t iv e  th e o r ie s  have been
s u b je c t  to  s t r in g e n t  c r i t i c i s m  by K ripke in  h i s  p ap e r "Naming and 
1PN e c e s s ity ” . A ccording to  K rip k e , i t  i s  a  m istak e  to  th in k  th a t  
such  th e o r ie s  e i t h e r  f i x  th e  re fe re n c e  o f  a  p ro p e r  name o r  g iv e  i t s  
m eaning. He a rg u es  t h a t  what one must d o , in  o rd e r  to  u n d e rs ta n d  
w hich o b je c t  i s  r e f e r r e d  to  by  a  name, i s  to  lo o k  a t  how th a t  name 
came to  be u se d  in  th e  l i n g u i s t i c  community. In  th e  n ex t s e c t io n  we 
s h a l l  c o n s id e r  h i s  c r i t i c i s m s  in  d e t a i l .  My main argument w i l l  be 
th a t  what he succeeds in  draw ing a t te n t io n  to  i s  a  f e a tu r e  o f  th e  u se
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o f  p ro p e r  names w hich i s  r e le v a n t  to  th e  e p is te m o lo g ic a l q u e s tio n  
'How can we d is c o v e r  what th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  p ro p e r  name i s  as t h a t  
name i s  u se d  w ith in  a  l i n g u i s t i c  com m unity? ', h u t n o t to  th e  
co n ce p tu a l q u e s tio n  o f  what r e fe re n c e  c o n s is ts  i n .  That i s ,  he draws 
a t t e n t io n  to  a  f e a tu r e  r e le v a n t  to  answ ering  th e  p ro p e r  name v e rs io n  
o f  q u e s tio n  ( 2 ) .  K ripke has no th e o ry  o f  r e fe re n c e  to  o f f e r ,  d e s p i te  
what o th e rs  mdght claim # A ll he g iv e s  i s  an accoun t o f  how we m ight 
d e c id e , in  c e r t a in  o ases  where (3 'C )  p roves in a d e q u a te , what i s  b e in g  
r e f e r r e d  t o .
S e c tio n  ( i i ) :  K rip k e ' s  Remarks on Naming
To be f a i r  to  K ripke , he does n o t e x p l i c i t l y  m ention th e
d e s c r ip t iv e  th e o ry  embodied in  ( 3 'C ) .  H is c r i t i c i s m s  r e l a t e
p r im a r i ly  to  th o s e  th e o r i e s  in  w hich th e  r e fe re n c e  o f  a  p ro p e r  name
i s  made r e l a t i v e  to  a  s p e a k e r 's  u se  o f  th e  name. A gainst th e se  he
employs s e v e ra l  exam ples, l i k e  th e  'E in s t e in ' one g iven  above, which
13app ear to  be c o n c lu s iv e . Some o f  h is  c r i t i c i s m s ,  though , a re  more
g e n e ra l ,  and i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  he th in k s  th e y  a re  t e l l i n g  a g a in s t  any
th e o ry  which im p lie s  t h a t  th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  p ro p e r  name i s  whoever
o r  w hatever s a t i s f i e s  a  c e r t a in  s e t  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s .
One p o in t  w hich K ripke makes much o f  i s  t h a t  a  p ro p e r name may
be in tro d u c e d  v i a  a  d e f i n i t e  d e s c r ip t io n  w ith o u t i t s  th e re b y  coming
14to  be h e ld  as  synonymous w ith  i t .  There i s  no rea so n  why t h i s  
p o in t  cannot be accommodated by one who h o ld s  a  c l u s t e r  v e rs io n  o f  
th e  d e s c r ip t iv e  th e o ry , such as  ( 3 'C ) .  In  f a c t ,  r e c a l l i n g  P u tnam 's 
p o in t  about c l u s t e r  c o n c e p ts , he would seem to  be com m itted to  i t .
The name 'M ars ' may have been in tro d u c e d  v i a  th e  d e f in i t e  d e s c r ip t io n  
' t h e  re d  s t a r ' , b u t as  we le a rn  more and more about th e  p la n e t  so
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th e  sen se  o f  th e  name changes.
K ripke th e n  goes on to  o f f e r  a  g e n e ra l argum ent fo r  why th e
sen se  o f  a  p ro p e r  name c o u ld  n e v e r  c o in c id e  w ith  th a t  o f  a  d e f in i t e
d e s c r ip t io n ;  names behave d i f f e r e n t l y  from d e f in i t e  d e s c r ip t io n s  in
modal c o n te x ts .  An e x te n s iv e  r e p ly  to  t h i s  argument has been g iven  
15by Dummett. S ince  p ro p e r  names a re  b e in g  d is c u s s e d  in  t h i s  c h a p te r
a s  som ething o f  a  means to  an end , i t  i s  n o t a p p ro p r ia te  to  in v o lv e
o u rs e lv e s  in  th e  d e t a i l s  o f  what Dummett s a y s .  H is main c o n c lu s io n
i s ,  "For modal c o n te x ts  in  g e n e ra l ,  th e re  i s  no r e le v a n t  d if f e r e n c e
betw een p ro p e r  names and d e f i n i t e  d e s c r ip t io n s ." ^ ^  The one
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  he adds i s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t so "when th e  name o r  th e
17d e s c r ip t io n  i s  p reced ed  by th e  v e rb  ' t o  b e ' o r  ' t o  b e c o m e '.” But 
th e  reaso n  f o r  t h i s  " i s  n o t a  g e n e ra l f e a tu r e  o f  th e  b eh av io u r o f  
p ro p e r  names in  modal c o n te x ts " ; i t  r a th e r  has to  do w ith  th e  f a c t  
t h a t  a  p ro p e r ty  l i k e  th a t  o f  'b e in g  Archimedes* i s  n o t a  p ro p e r ty  
t h a t  can be a c q u ire d . Thus, th e  p e rso n  who d id  most o f  th o se  th in g s  
a t t r i b u t e d  to  Archimedes d id  n o t become Archimedes when he d id  them ; 
he had alw ays been A rchim edes, becau se  he had alw ays been th e  one 
who in  f a c t  was to  do most o f  th o se  t h i n g s . O n e  m ight q u e s tio n  
h e re  th e  p r o p r ie ty  o f  sp eak in g  o f  Archimedes a s  ' t h e  one who was to  
do most o f  what i s  a t t r i b u t e d  to  A rchim edes*. I s  i t  n o t p o s s ib le  
th a t  Archimedes m ight n o t have done any o f  th o s e  th in g s  a t t r i b u t e d  
to  him? T his i s  in  f a c t  a n o th e r  argument which K ripke u se s  to  c a s t  
doubt on d e s c r ip t iv e  th e o r ie s ;  we s h a l l  examine i t  s h o r t ly .
What i s  more r e le v a n t  from th e  p o in t  o f  view  o f  th e  analogy  we 
have drawn betw een p ro p e r  names and n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s ,  and o u r 
a tte m p t to  throw  some l i g h t  on what i t  i s  f o r  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  
to  have an e x te n s io n , i s  what K ripke says about how th e  re fe re n c e
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o f  a  p ro p e r  name i s  f ix e d .  A gainst th e  d e s c r ip t iv e  t h e o r i s t ' s  accoun t
o f  t h i s ,  K ripke p r e s e n ts  th e  fo llo w in g  p u rp o rte d  co u n te r-ex am p le ,
hnagine th e  fo llo w in g  b l a t a n t l y  f i c t i o n a l  s i t u a t io n  • • •  Suppose
th a t  Godel was n o t in  f a c t  th e  a u th o r  o f  [ t h e  in co m p le te n e s s ]
theorem , A man named 'S c h m id t ',  whose body was found in  V ienna
u n d er m y s te rio u s  c irc u m stan c es  many y e a rs  ago , a c tu a l ly  d id  th e
work in  q u e s t io n .  H is f r ie n d  Godel somehow g o t h o ld  o f  th e
m an u scrip t and i t  was t h e r e a f t e r  a t t r i b u t e d  to  G odel, On th e
view  in  q u e s tio n ,  th e n , • • •  we, when we t a l k  about 'G o d e l ',  a re
19in  f a c t  alw ays r e f e r r i n g  to  Schm idt,
K ripke th in k s  t h a t  such  a  c o n c lu s io n  i s  q u i te  wrong, and he i s  r i g h t
to  th in k  s o .  But he i s  m istak en  i f  he th in k s  t h a t  a  d e s c r ip t iv e
th e o r i s t  m ust be com m itted to  i t .  # i a t  makes a  count e r f  a c tu a l
s i tu a t io n  l i k e  th e  one g iv en  i n t e l l i g i b l e  i s  t h a t  th e  sense  o f  th e
name ' G odel' i s  g iven  by  a  c l u s t e r  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s  which to g e th e r
p ro v id e  a  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  d e te rm in in g  th e  r e f e r e n t ,  Schmidt would have
had to  have done more th an  to  have f i r s t  p roved  th e  in co m p le ten ess
theorem  in  o rd e r  fo r  him to  be th e  one to  whom we r e f e r  when we u se
th e  name 'G o d e l* . One m ight o f  co u rse  c o n s id e r  th e  case  where th e
o n ly  th in g  th a t  i s  b e l ie v e d  abou t Godel i s  th a t  he was th e  f i r s t ,  to
prove th e  in co m p le ten ess  theorem . Then a  q u e s tio n  would a r i s e ,  g iven
K ripke*s f i c t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  a s  to  w hether u s e r s  o f  th e  name had a
f a l s e  b e l i e f  about Godel o r  a  t r u e  b e l i e f  about Schm idt. P resum ably
20K ripke would ta k e  th e  fo rm er to  be  th e  c a s e . The problem  w ith  t h i s  
v iew , how ever, i s  th a t  i t  re n d e rs  unansw erab le  th e  q u e s tio n  'Who, 
th e n ,  i s  t h i s  Godel about whom th e  u s e r s  o f  th e  name had a  f a l s e  
b e l i e f ? ' .  For o b v io u s ly  any answ er, even 'The man who was named 
'G o d e l '* ,  would p ro v id e  a  c r i t e r i o n  o th e r  th a n  th a t  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  
th e  o r ig in a l  b e l i e f  f o r  re c o g n iz in g  th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  th e  name 'G o d e l ',  
In  sum, K rip k e ' s  example i s  o n ly  t e l l i n g  a g a in s t  one who h o ld s
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s t r i c t l y  to  a  F regean  th e o ry  l i k e  ( 3 'P ) î  i t  has no fo rc e  a g a in s t  one 
who h o ld s  a  c l u s t e r  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s  th e o ry  l i k e  ( 3 'C ) .
P e rh ap s th e  m ost im p o rta n t example which K ripke g iv e s  concerns 
th e  name 'A r i s t o t l e * .  I t  i s  s im i la r  to  th e  Godel one in  th a t  K ripke 
c o n s id e rs  i t  to  he t e l l i n g  a g a in s t  th e  d e s c r ip t iv e  t h e o r i s t ' s  accoun t 
o f  how th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  p ro p e r  name i s  f ix e d .  But i t  goes beyond 
th e  Godel one in  a t te m p tin g  to  c a s t  doubt on what th e  d e s c r ip t iv e  
t h e o r i s t  th in k s  th e  sen se  o f  a  p ro p e r  name i s .  Here i s  th e  key 
p assa g e ;
Not o n ly  i s  i t  t r u e  o f  th e  man A r i s to t l e  th a t  he m ight n o t have
gone in to  pedagogy; i t  i s  a ls o  t r u e  th a t  we u se  th e  term
'A r i s to t le *  in  such  a  way t h a t ,  in  th in k in g  o f  a  o o u n te r fa c tu a l
s i tu a t io n  in  which A r i s to t l e  d i d n 't  go in to  any o f  th e  f i e l d s  and
do any o f  th e  ach ievem ents we commonly a t t r i b u t e  to  him, s t i l l  we
would say  th a t  was a s i t u a t io n  in  which A r i s to t l e  d id  n o t do 21th e s e  th in g s .
D esp ite  K ripke*s c la im s to  th e  c o n tra ry , i t  would be wrong to  
c o n s tru e  t h i s  argum ent as  t e l l i n g  a g a in s t  th e  d e s c r ip t iv e  t h e o r i s t ' s  
view  th a t  th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  p ro p e r  name i s  f ix e d  by c e r t a in  b e l i e f s .  
I f  we ta k e  th e  name 'A r i s to t le *  and s u c c e s s iv e ly  deny th e  t r u t h  o f  
th e  u s u a l  d e s c r ip t io n s  g iven  o f  him , th e re  soon comes a  p o in t where 
th e  n a tu r a l  r e a c t io n  i s  to  say  'Who a re  you now ta lk in g  a b o u t? '.
Thus, i f  someone says  'A r i s t o t l e  d id  n o t s tu d y  w ith  P l a t o ,  n o r te a c h  
A lexander th e  G re a t, n o r w r ite  th e  M etap h y sics , n o r . . . ' ,  one soon 
wonders whom i s  b e in g  r e f e r r e d  t o .  In  r e p ly  to  t h i s ,  i t  m ight be 
s a id  th a t  what K ripke r e a l l y  meant to  draw a t t e n t io n  t o ,  r e g a rd le s s  
o f  what he a c tu a l ly  s a id ,  i s  th e  modal s ta tem en t 'A r i s t o t l e  m ight 
n o t have s tu d ie d  w ith  P la to ,  n o r ta u g h t A lexander th e  G rea t, n o r 
w r i t t e n  th e  M e tap h y sics , n o r  However, i f  t h i s  i s  u n d e rs to o d
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as  'A r i s t o t l e  m ight n o t have s tu d ie d  w ith  P la to ,  and A r i s to t l e  m ight 
n o t have ta u g h t A lexander th e  G re a t, and th e n ,  a lth o u g h  q u i te
i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  i t  does n o t su p p o rt th e  th e s i s  t h a t  th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  
'A r i s t o t l e '  i s  n o t f ix e d  by  a t  l e a s t  some s e t  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s .  I f ,  
on th e  o th e r  hand, i t  i s  u n d e rs to o d  as ' I t  m ight have been th e  case  
t h a t  ( A r i s to t l e  d id  n o t s tu d y  w ith  P la to ,  n o r  te a c h  A lexander th e  
G rea t, n o r th e  embedded se n ten c e  i s  sim ply  th e  one o r i g i n a l l y
found to  be p u z z l in g .
K r ip k e 's  argum ent i s  more p la u s ib ly  c o n s tru e d  as an argument 
a g a in s t  th e  v iew  th a t  th e  m eaning o f  a  name i s  g iven  by  a  c e r t a in  
s e t  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s .  We n o te d  in  th e  l a s t  s e c t io n  t h a t ,  g iven  (3 ’C ), 
i t  i s  n e c e s s a r i ly  t r u e  t h a t  th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  p ro p e r  name s a t i s f i e s  
a  s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  d e s c r ip t io n s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  name.
From t h i s  i t  fo llo w s  t h a t  th e re  sh o u ld  come a  p o in t  where a  
c o n ju n c tiv e  a s s e r t io n  l i k e  'A r i s t o t l e  d id  n o t s tu d y  w ith  P la to ,  n o r 
te a c h  A lexander th e  G rea t, n o r  . . . '  n o t o n ly  i n v i t e s  a  query  b u t 
a c tu a l ly  r e s u l t s  in  c o n t r a d ic t io n .
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  n o te  h e re  th a t  K ripke h im se lf  p ro v id e s  an
argument t h a t  c o u ld , in  some in s ta n c e s ,  be u sed  to  b o l s t e r  th e
d e s c r ip t iv e  t h e o r i s t ' s  c a s e .  For K ripke , as was n o te d  in  s e c t io n  ( i ) ,
a lso  wants to  h o ld  th a t  o b je c ts  have e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t i e s ,  where an
e s s e n t i a l  p ro p e r ty  o f  an o b je c t  i s  one which i t  co u ld  n o t have f a i l e d  
22to  h ave . The exam ples he g iv e s  o f  such p r o p e r t i e s  in v o lv e  t h e i r
23o r ig in  and su b s ta n c e . He a rg u e s , f o r  exam ple, t h a t  i t  i s  
n e c e s s a r i ly  t r u e  t h a t  a  p e rso n  has th e  p a re n ts  th e y  do . Hence, i f  
i t  were known t h a t ,  sa y , A r i s t o t l e 's  p a re n ts  were X and Y, i t  would 
be c o n t ra d ic to ry  to  a s s e r t  o f  A r i s to t l e  th a t  h is  p a re n ts  m ight n o t 
have been X and Y.
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I t  does n o t fo llo w  from t h i s  o f  co u rse  t h a t  one who su p p o rts  
a  d e s c r ip t iv e  th e o ry  need  a cc ep t such p r o p e r t ie s  as  e s s e n t i a l ,  o r ,  
in d e e d , t h a t  th e y  need  he com m itted to  any form o f  K ripkean 
e s s e n t ia l i s m .  What does seem to  he in e sc a p a b le  though i s  t h a t  some 
more o r  l e s s  complex d e s c r ip t io n  i s  n e c e s s a r i ly  t r u e  o f  whoever o r  
w hatever i s  th e  b e a re r  o f  a  p ro p e r  name. Or a t  any r a t e  t h i s  w i l l  
be so u n le s s  i t  i s  m a in ta in e d  t h a t  a  c l u s t e r  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s  
d e te rm in es  th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  name b u t does n o t g iv e  i t s  m eaning.
One who h o ld s  t h i s  l a s t  p o s i t io n  would seem in  tu rn  to  be com m itted 
to  denying  th a t  names have m eaning. For i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  see  th a t  
an y th in g  co u ld  be made o f  th e  v iew  th a t  names do have m eaning, t h a t  
what f ix e s  th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  name i s  a  c r i t e r i o n  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  what 
i s  b e l ie v e d  about th e  b e a r e r ,  b u t th a t  th e  m eaning o f  a name i s  n o t 
g iven  by  what i s  b e l ie v e d  about th e  b e a r e r .
I  s h a l l  n o t d is c u s s  in  d e t a i l  th a t  p o s i t io n  which does n o t 
acco rd  names m eaning, f o r  i t  m arks a  r a d ic a l  d e p a r tu re  from th e  
F regean  t r a d i t i o n .  The m eaning o f  a  word, a c c o rd in g  to  F reg e , i s  
j u s t  what a  p erso n  knows when th e y  know how to  u se  th e  word, and^ so 
to  deny th a t  names have m eaning seems to  re n d e r  u n i n t e l l i g i b l e  what 
a  p e r s o n 's  g rasp  o f  th e  u se  o f  a  name c o n s is ts  i n .  I f  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  
h o ld s  good, th en  one who w ants to  adopt a  b ro a d ly  Fregean view  w i l l  
have to  h o ld  th a t  a  c l u s t e r  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s  n o t o n ly  f ix e s  th e  
r e f e r e n t  o f  a  name b u t a lso  g iv e s  i t s  m eaning.
R e tu rn in g  to  ( 3 'C ) ,  we can say  th a t  one who w ished to  acc ep t 
t h i s  account o f  how th e  sen se  o r  m eaning o f  a  p ro p e r name i s  to  be 
s p e c i f ie d  would be com m itted to  h o ld in g  th a t  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r i ly  t r u e  
t h a t  th e  o b je c t  which u n iq u e ly  s a t i s f i e s  a  s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  
d e s c r ip t io n s  which co u ld  be c o n s i s te n t ly  a t t r i b u t e d  to  th e  b e a r e r
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o f  a  name on th e  b a s i s  o f  what i s  b e l ie v e d  w ith in  a  l i n g u i s t i c
community G, does s a t i s f y  some su b se t o f  th o se  d e s c r ip t io n s .  Such
a  consequence o f  h o ld in g  a  d e s c r ip t iv e  th e o ry  m ight a t  f i r s t  seem
u n p a la ta b le .  What needs to  be bo rne in  m ind, th o u g h , i s  th a t  th e
complex d e s c r ip t io n  which i s  s a id  to  be n e c e s s a r i ly  t r u e  o f  th e
b e a re r  o f  th e  name i s  dependent on what i s  known and b e l ie v e d  w ith in
th e  l i n g u i s t i c  community in  which th e  name i s  u s e d . There i s  no
im p u ta tio n  o f  n e c e ss a ry  p r o p e r t i e s  in  th e  sen se  which K ripke c a l l s
24m e tap h y s ica l and which u n d e r l i e s  h is  form o f  e s s e n t ia l is m ;  ^  th e  
k in d  o f  n e c e s s i ty  i s  p u re ly  ep istem o l o g i c a l .  The d e s c r ip t iv e  
t h e o r i s t  i s  n o t in  th e  p o s i t io n  o f  h o ld in g  th a t  c e r t a in  th in g s  w i l l  
be  t r u e  o f  th e  b e a r e r  o f  a  name come what may, b u t o n ly  t h a t  th e y  
a re  t r u e  r e l a t i v e  to  what i s  known and b e l ie v e d  w ith in  some
l i n g u i s t i c  community in  w hich th e  name i s  u s e d . In  o u r own c a s e ,
g iven  th o se  d e s c r ip t io n s  which we now b e l ie v e  to  be t r u e  o f  
A r i s t o t l e ,  i t  i s  n o t p o s s ib le  t h a t  a  s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  them sh o u ld  
tu r n  o u t n o t to  be t r u e  o f  A r i s t o t l e . The su g g e s tio n  th a t  t h i s  m ight 
be so i s  tan tam ount to  s u g g e s tin g  th a t  th e  name 'A r i s to t l e *  i s  b e in g  
an a ly zed  a s  i t  i s  u se d  w ith in  a  d i f f e r e n t  l i n g u i s t i c  community from 
o u r own. The o n ly  sense  w hich we can a t ta c h  to  th e  name, th e  o n ly  
sense  i t  has fo r  u s ,  depends on how we u se  i t ,  and t h i s  i s  re v e a le d  
by what we a re  p re p a re d  to  b e l ie v e  about A r i s t o t l e .  As we s h a l l  see 
in  s e c t io n  ( i i i ) ,  t h i s  n o tio n  o f 'e p is te m ic  e s s e n t ia l is m ’ can be made 
o u t fo r  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  to o .
So f a r  in  t h i s  s e c t io n  we have looked  o n ly  a t  K r ip k e 's  n e g a t iv e
rem arks about th e  th e o ry  o f  nam ing and n o t a t  h i s  p o s i t iv e  o n es .
I  have argued  th a t  even though h i s  argum ents may have some fo rc e  
a g a in s t  c e r t a in  d e s c r ip t iv e  t h e o r i e s ,  th e y  have v e ry  l i t t l e  a g a in s t
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th e  th e o ry  c o n ta in e d  in  (3*C ). In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  th e y  c e r t a in l y  do n o t 
t e l l  a g a in s t  (3*C) c o n s tru e d  a s  a  th e o ry  o f  how th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  
p ro p e r  name i s  to  be d e te rm in e d , K ripke does have h i s  own accoun t 
o f  how th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  p ro p e r  name i s  to  be d e te rm in ed .
F u rth erm o re , a lth o u g h  he d e n ie s  t h a t  names have m eaning o r  sense  o f  
th e  c o g n it iv e  k in d  th a t  we have been t a lk in g  a b o u t, he does make u se  
o f  a  fu n c tio n  which he s e e s  a s  p e r fo m in g  a  s im i la r  r o le  in  some 
co n te x ts*  What we now have to  do i s  to  see  w hether th e se  view s add
a n y th in g  to  th e  th e o ry  o f  (3*0) about what i t  i s  f o r  a  p ro p e r  name
to  r e f e r .
As I  have em phasised a l re a d y ,  o u r main concern  i s  w ith  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  what d e te rm in es  th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  name, fo r  we 
e v e n tu a lly  want to  c a s t  l i g h t  on how we can d ec id e  what n a tu r a l  k in d
p r e d ic a te s  have a s  t h e i r  e x te n s io n s .  I  s h a l l  th e r e f o r e  have l i t t l e
to  say  about K r ip k e 's  n o tio n  o f  m eaning. The p ic tu r e  he p r e s e n ts  in  
"Naming and N e c e s s ity "  i s  one in  which th e  m eaning o f  a  s in g u la r  o r  
g e n e ra l term  i s  a  fu n c tio n  from p o s s ib le  w orlds to  o b je c ts  o r  s e t s  
o f  o b je c t s .  Thus, th e  m eaning o f  th e  p ro p e r name 'A rchim edes' i s  a 
p a r t i a l  fu n c tio n  w hich a s s ig n s ,  to  each  p o s s ib le  w orld  f o r  which i t  
i s  d e f in e d , th e  o b je c t  w hich, in  th a t  p o s s ib le  w orld , i s  th e  r e f e r e n t  
o f  th e  name. The problem  w ith  t h i s  view  i s  t h a t  a lth o u g h  i t  m ight 
be  t e c h n ic a l ly  u s e f u l  in  th e  sem an tic s  o f  modal l o g i c ,  i t  in  no way 
e lu c id a te s  o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  what th e  m eaning o f  a  name i s .
B efore we can check to  see  which o b je c t  i s  a s s ig n e d  to  'A rch im edes' 
in  w orld  w^, we w i l l  have to  d ec id e  w hether o r  n o t w^  i s  a  p o s s ib le  
w orld  r e l a t i v e  to  t h i s  o n e . How a re  we to  d ec id e  t h i s ?  E v id e n tly  
i t  w i l l  depend on what co u n ts  a s  a  n e c e ssa ry  t r u t h ,  i . e . ,  on what 
i s  s t ip u l a te d  a s  t r u e  in  a l l  p o s s ib le  w o rld s . But what t h i s  means
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i s  t h a t  we w i l l  f i r s t  have to  d ec id e  such th in g s  as  w hether o r  n o t 
a  p a r t i c u l a r  a t t r i b u t i o n  to  'Archim edes* i s  p o s s ib le ,  and th e  o n ly  
way to  do t h i s  i s  by r e f l e c t i n g  on what m eaning, in  th e  c o g n it iv e  
sen se  o f  t h a t  te rm , th e  name 'A rch im edes' h a s .  In  o rd e r  to  dec id e  
w hether o r_ n o t 'Archim edes* m ight have r e f e r r e d  to  some p a r t i c u l a r  
in d iv id u a l ,  we -w ill need  to  r e f l e c t  on what can t r u l y  be s a id  o f  
A rchim edes, and t h i s  p resu p p o ses  t h a t  we a lre a d y  have an accoun t o f  
th e  d e s c r ip t iv e ,  c o g n it iv e  k in d  o f  what th e  m eaning o f  th e  name i s .
T urn ing  to  what K ripke say s  about how th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  name
i s  to  be d e te rm in e d , - it  must be n o te d  th a t  K ripke h im se lf  d e n ie s  th a t
he i s  g iv in g  n e c e s s a ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d itio n s  fo r  when a  name can
be s a id  to  r e f e r  to  a  p a r t i c u l a r  o b je c t .  H is c a u s a l acc o u n t, u n l ik e
th e  d e s c r ip t iv e  th e o r i e s  o f  th e  l a s t  s e c t io n ,  o f f e r s  no way o f
e l im in a t in g  th e  n o tio n  o f  r e f e r e n c e .  To see  why, we need  to  have an
o u t l in e  o f  th e  c a u s a l accoun t b e fo re  u s .  As K ripke o b se rv e s , i t  i s
d i f f i c u l t  to  s t a t e  p r e c i s e ly ,  b u t f o r  th e  p u rp o ses  o f  d is c u s s io n  I
s h a l l  assume as  s ta n d a rd  some such  account as th e  fo llo w in g : th e re
i s  a  nam e-g iv ing  ceremony in  which th e  o b je c t  i s  named by o s te n s io n ,
o r  th e  r e f e r e n t  f ix e d  by a  d e s c r ip t io n .  Subsequent sp eak ers  then
in te n d  to  u se  th e  name to  r e f e r  to  th e  same o b je c t .  In  t h i s  way a
c a u s a l netw ork  d e v e lo p s , and in  o rd e r  to  d e term in e  what a  name r e f e r s
to ,  as i t  i s  u se d  in  some community o f  s p e a k e rs , one has to  t r a c e
25back  th ro u g h  th e  netw ork  to  th e  o r ig in a l  cerem ony.
The in c lu s io n  in  t h i s  accoun t o f  th e  c o n d itio n  th a t  subsequen t 
u s e r s  o f  a  name m ust in te n d  to  r e f e r  to  th e  same o b je c t  means t h a t  
th e  n o tio n  o f  re fe re n c e  canno t be e l im in a te d . The rea so n  f o r  
in c lu d in g  th e  c o n d itio n  i s  s t r a ig h tfo rw a rd .  To ta k e  an example o f  
K r ip k e 's ,  i f  I  c a l l  my p e t a a rd v a rk  'N apo leon ' , t h i s  may be c a u s a l ly
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co n n ec ted  w ith  th e  u se  o f  th e  name fo r  th e  Em peror, h u t sho u ld  le a d
26to  no i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  Emperor w ith  my a a rd v a rk .
27Dummett has c r i t i c i z e d  K r ip k e 's  c a u sa l accoun t on two g rounds. 
The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  i t  f a i l s  to  e x p la in  what th e  re q u ire d  in te n t io n  i s  
an in te n t io n  to  do: "Each sp e a k e r must in te n d  to  r e f e r  to  th e  same 
o b je c t  as  th e  sp e a k e r from whom he h e a rd  th e  name; b u t what i s  i t  to
28r e f e r  to  an o b je c t? "  E v id e n tly  an answer to  t h i s  q u e s tio n  i s
r e q u ire d  b e fo re  we can e x p la in  what i t  i s  th a t  a  sp eak e r must in te n d
to  do in  o rd e r  t h a t  h i s  u se  o f  a  name count a s  a n o th e r  l i n k  in  th e
c a u s a l n e tw o rk . D e s c r ip tiv e  th e o r ie s  p ro v id e  answ ers to  t h i s
q u e s tio n  and so i t  would seem th a t  th e y  a re  th e o r ie s  o f  re fe re n c e
in  a  sense  in  which K r ip k e 's  c a u s a l account i s  no t*
The second  o b je c t io n  ÏXunmett r a i s e s  i s  t h a t  i t  seems in e v i ta b le
th a t  th e re  w i l l  b e  c a se s  where th e  in te n t io n  to  p re s e rv e  r e fe re n c e
i s  f u l f i l l e d ,  b u t even so th e  r e f e r e n t  i s  u n w it t in g ly  t r a n s f e r r e d .
In  such c a se s  i t  would n o t be p o s s ib le ,  even in  p r in c i p le ,  to  t r a c e
th e  c a u s a l netw ork  back  in  th e  way su g g es ted  by  K rip k e 's  a c c o u n t.
An a c tu a l  example where t h i s  ap p ea rs  to  have happened i s  g iven  by
29Evans in  a  re c e n t  p a p e r .  He q u o te s  from Isa a c  T a y lo r 's  book.
Names and t h e i r  H is to r y , " In  th e  case  o f  'M adagascar' a  h e a rsa y  
r e p o r t  o f  M alay o r  Arab s a i l o r s  m isunderstood  by Marco Polo  • • •  has 
had th e  e f f e c t  o f  t r a n s f e r r i n g  a  c o r ru p t form o f  th e  name o f  a 
p o r t io n  o f  th e  A fric a n  m ain land  to  th e  g r e a t  A fric a n  I s la n d ."  Such 
a  s i t u a t io n  i s  p e r f e c t ly  i n t e l l i g i b l e  to  u s  becau se  we have a  
c r i t e r i o n ,  a lth o u g h  im p re c is e , f o r  ' t h e  same g e o g ra p h ic a l a r e a ' ,  and 
we have a  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  d e te rm in in g  what g e o g ra p h ic a l a re a  a p la c e  
name i s  b e in g  u sed  as th e  name o f ,  in d e p en d en tly  o f  th e  a c tu a l  
o r ig in  o f  th e  name. A c l u s t e r  th e o ry  l i k e  (3 'C ) e x p la in s  what th e
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l a t t e r  c r i t e r i o n  i s .  As Dummett rem arks, th ough , K r ip k e 's  c a u s a l
accoun t " le a v e s  no room f o r  th e  o ccu rren c e  o f  a  m isu n d e rs tan d in g :
s in c e  to  speak  o f  .a  m isu n d e rs ta n d in g  would p resuppose  th a t  th e  name
d id  in  f a c t  have a  sen se  which co u ld  he m isu n d e rs to o d ."^ ^
C onsequen tly  i t  i s  u n a b le  to  make i n t e l l i g i b l e  to  u s  how what i s  now
a  name fo r  an i s la n d  was once a  name fo r  a  p a r t  o f  th e  m a in lan d .
M oreover, i t  a lso  f a i l s  as  an accoun t o f  what th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  name
i s  because a  c a u s a l netw ork  o f  th e  k in d  en v isag ed  does n o t g u a ran tee
31th a t  r e fe re n c e  i s  p re s e rv e d .
Dummett draws t h i s  c o n c lu s io n  about K r ip k e 's  rem arks on nam ing:
We a re  l e f t  w ith  t h i s ;  t h a t  a  name r e f e r s  to  an o b je c t  i f  th e r e
e x i s t s  a  ch a in  o f  com m unication, s t r e t c h in g  back  to  th e
in t ro d u c t io n  o f  th e  name as  s ta n d in g  fo r  t h a t  o b je c t ,  a t  each
s ta g e  o f  which th e re , was a  s u c c e s s fu l  in t e n t io n  to  p re se rv e  i t s
r e f e r e n c e .  T h is  p ro p o s i t io n  i s  in d is p u ta b ly  t r u e ;  b u t h a rd ly  
32i l lu m in a t in g .
But even i f  th e r e  i s  no c a u s a l th e o ry  o f  m eaning o r  r e f e r e n c e ,  i t
does n o t fo llo w  t h a t  K ripke has n o t succeeded  in  draw ing a t t e n t io n
to  one f e a tu r e  o f  what i t  i s  f o r  a  name to  r e f e r  t h a t  i s  an e s s e n t i a l
e lem ent o f  any a c c e p ta b le  th e o ry .  Ought we th e n  to  r e v is e  (3 'C ) to
ta k e  accoun t o f  t h i s  c a u s a l e lem en t?  The case  fo r  th e  a f f i rm a tiv e
i s  w e ll summed up by Evans:
There i s  som eth ing  ab su rd  in  supposing  th a t  th e  in te n d e d  r e f e r e n t  
o f  some p e r f e c t ly  o rd in a ry  u se  o f  a  name by a  sp eak er co u ld  be 
some item  u t t e r l y  i s o l a t e d  ( c a u s a l ly )  from th e  u s e r 's  community 
and c u l tu r e  sim ply  in  v i r t u e  o f  th e  f a c t  th a t  i t  f i t s  b e t t e r  th a n  
an y th in g  e l s e  th e  c l u s t e r  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s  he a s s o c ia te s  w ith  th e  
name.^^
At f i r s t  t h i s  argum ent does seem to  c a r ry  some w e ig h t. In  th e  
c o n te x t o f  a  th e o ry  l i k e  (3 * 0 ), th e  s o r t  o f  s i t u a t io n  which Evans
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has in  mind would be som ething l i k e  th e  fo llo w in g ; th e re  i s  a 
l i n g u i s t i c  community G in  which a  c e r t a in  c l u s t e r  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s  
i s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  name 'N * . Suppose t h a t  th e  o b je c t  w hich b e s t  
s a t i s f i e s  th e  c l u s t e r  i s  a ^ , b u t t h a t  a^ i s  c a u s a l ly  i s o la t e d  from C 
and th a t  some o th e r  o b je c t  (o r  o b je c ts )  i s  ( a r e )  c a u s a l ly  r e s p o n s ib le  
f o r  th o se  b e l i e f s  u n d e r ly in g  th e  c l u s t e r .  VJhich o b je c t  i s  deno ted  
by  *N '? The answ er su g g es ted  by (3*0) i s  a^ ; a lth o u g h  members o f  C 
m ight in te n d  to  r e f e r  to  a n o th e r  o b je c t ,  th e y  alw ays succeed  in  
r e f e r r in g  to  t h a t  o b je c t  w hich b e s t  f i t s  what i s  b e l ie v e d  about N 
in  0 .
On f u r th e r  r e f l e c t i o n ,  how ever, i t  can be shown th a t  th e  p o in t  
which t h i s  argum ent a tte m p ts  to  make i s  a l re a d y  encompassed by  (3 * 0 ) . 
The d i f f i c u l t y  w ith  th e  supposed s i t u a t i o n ,  c o n s tru e d  as an o b je c t io n  
to  a  c l u s t e r  th e o ry ,  i s  in  u n d e rs ta n d in g  how th e  o b je c t  which b e s t  
s a t i s f i e s  a  c l u s t e r  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s  cou ld  f a i l  to  be th e  one which 
i s  c a u s a l ly  re s p o n s ib le  fo r  th o se  b e l i e f s  u n d e r ly in g  th e  c l u s t e r .  
R e tu rn in g  to  th e  'A rch im edes’ exam ple, how co u ld  i t  be th a t  a  p e rso n  
who s a t i s f i e d  a  s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  d e s c r ip t io n s  'd is c o v e re d  th e  
Archimedean p r in c i p l e ,  l i v e d  most o f  h is  l i f e  in  S y racu se , ran  
th ro u g h  th e  s t r e e t s  sh o u tin g  'E u r e k a . ' ,  and in v e n te d  th e  A rchim idean 
w a te r-sc re w ' m ight tu rn  o u t to  be c a u s a l ly  i s o l a t e d  from th o se  v e ry  
deeds which a re  d e s c r ib e d  in  th e  c l u s t e r ?  The s i tu a t io n  i s  p a lp a b ly  
u n r e a l ,  and t h i s  m arks som eth ing  o f  im portance about d e s c r ip t iv e  
t h e o r i e s .  What a  name r e f e r s  to  depends on what i s  known and 
b e l ie v e d  about th e  b e a re r  o f  th e  name, b u t b e l i e f s  and item s o f  
knowledge th em se lv es  have a  c a u s a l o r ig i n .  As Evans s a y s , " th e  
im p o rtan t c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n  l i e s  betw een [ t h e  d e n o te d j i te m 's  s t a t e s  
and do ings and th e  s p e a k e r 's  body o f  in fo rm a tio n  —  n o t between th e
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i t e m 's  b e in g  dubbed w ith  a  name and th e  s p e a k e r 's  contem porary  u se  
o f  i t . " ^ ^  But e x p l i c i t  r e c o g n i t io n  o f  t h i s  c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n  i s  n o t 
som ething t h a t  has to  be added to  d e s c r ip t iv e  t h e o r i e s ,  i t  i s  a lre a d y  
c o n ta in e d  in  them . Hence, th e  d e s c r ip t iv e  t h e o r i s t ' s  u n d e rs ta n d in g  
o f  what i t  i s  f o r  a  p ro p e r  name to  r e f e r  to  an o b je c t  does n o t 
r e q u ir e  su p p lem en ta tio n  o f  t h i s  k in d .
D esp ite  th e  c r i t i c i s m s  b ro u g h t a g a in s t  th e  c a u sa l a cc o u n t, i t  
m ust be a d m itted  th a t  th e re  a re  s i tu a t io n s  in  which we can im agine 
c a u s a l o r ig in  p la y in g  an im p o rtan t p a r t  in  d is c o v e r in g  what th e  
r e f e r e n t  o f  a  name i s .  These a re  where th e re  i s  some d is p u te  o y e r 
who o r  what i s  b e in g  ta lk e d  a b o u t. Some o f  them m ight be re s o lv e d  
by  making u se  o f  th e  c a u s a l r e l a t i o n  which K ripke em phasises. 
C o n s id e r, f o r  exam ple, th e  fo llo w in g  c a s e . E rig e n a  was a n in th  
c e n tu ry  p h ilo so p h e r  a lso  known a s  John th e  S c o t. The l i t t l e  t h a t  i s  
known about him may have been t r u e  o f  v a r io u s  p e o p le , each o f-them  
hav in g  done some o f  th e  deeds a t t r i b u t e d  to  E rig e n a . What would seem 
to  count as  a  c r u c i a l  f a c to r  in  d e c id in g  E r ig e n a 's  i d e n t i t y ,  how ever, 
would be th e  d is c o v e ry  th a t  one o f  th o se  re g a rd e d  as p o s s ib le  b e a re r s  
o f  th e  name had in  f a c t  been named 'E r ig e n a ' . The c a u sa l r e l a t i o n  
betw een th e  in t ro d u c t io n  o f  a  name and l a t e r  u se  o f  i t  i s  o f  some 
im portance when th o se  d e s c r ip t io n s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  l a t e r  u se  tu rn  
o u t n o t to  be u n iq u e ly  t r u e  o f  som eth ing . In -su c h  c a ses  th e  l a t e r  
u s e r s  would p resum ably  a c c e p t ,  a s  hav ing  p a r t i c u l a r  re le v a n c e  to  
d e c id in g  th e  i s s u e ,  ev idence  a s  to  which o f  th e  v a r io u s  p o s s ib le  
b e a re r s  o f  th e  name was so c h r is te n e d .  This f a c t  i s  r e a d i ly  
accoun ted  f o r  by  a  c l u s t e r  th e o ry  —  one o f  th e  c l u s t e r  o f  d e s c r ip ­
t i o n s  b e l ie v e d  by  u s e r s  o f  th e  name 'N ' to  be t r u e  o f  a ^ , i f  a^ i s  
to  be coun ted  a s  th e  b e a r e r  o f  th e  name, i s  ' was c h r is te n e d  ' Ï Ï ' *.
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Which i s  n o t to  s a y , o f  c o u rs e , th a t  b e in g  c h r is te n e d  w ith  a  name i s  
n e c e s sa ry  in  o rd e r  f o r  som ething  to  count a s  th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  th e  
name —  l i k e  a l l  th e  r e s t  o f  th e  d e s c r ip t io n s  in  th e  c l u s t e r ,  i t  i s  
d e f e a s ib le .
What l i e s  b eh in d  t h i s  example i s  th e  p o in t  t h a t ,  f o r  a  name to  
be in tro d u c e d  in to  a  language a s  th e  name o f  some o b je c t ,  th e re  has 
to  be a  c a u sa l r e l a t i o n  betw een th a t  o b je c t and th o se  who in tro d u c e  
th e  name. The o b je c t  m ight n o t be  p re s e n t  a t  th e  tim e , b u t in  t h a t  
c a se  th e  o b je c t  m ust be c a u s a l ly  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  th o se  b e l i e f s  
u n d e r ly in g  th e  d e s c r ip t io n s  which a re  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  o b je c t  and 
which a re  th e r e f o r e 'u s e d  to  f i x  th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  th e  name. As re g a rd s  
t h i s  l a t t e r  ty p e  o f  c a s e ,  numerous in s ta n c e s  can be im agined where 
th e  c a u sa l o r ig in  o f  in fo rm a tio n  i s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  re le v a n c e  in  
d is c o v e r in g  who o r  what i s  b e in g  r e f e r r e d  t o .  By way o f  i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  
suppose t h a t  a  m an u sc rip t i s  found which d e t a i l s  c e r t a in  ev en ts  t h a t  
to o k  p la c e  in  a  m onastery  n e a r  F lo ren ce  d u rin g  th e  tw e l f th  c e n tu ry . 
One e n t ry ,  from around 1130, r e f e r s  to  a v i s i t i n g  p h ilo so p h e r  and 
th e o lo g ia n , b u t i t  i s  n o t c l e a r  from th e  s c r i p t  w hether i t  was P e te r  
A belard  o r  P e te r  Lombard. U n fo r tu n a te ly  th e  rem arks made co n ce rn in g  
t h i s  person  a re  i n s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  u s  to  d ec id e  which o f  th e  P e te r s  i t  
w as. Upon f u r th e r  in v e s t ig a t io n ,  how ever, i t  i s  re v e a le d  th a t  a t  th e  
tim e th e  e n t ry  was w r i t te n  P e te r  Lombard was s tu d y in g  in  nearby  
.B ologna, w hereas P e te r  A belard  was l e c tu r in g  in  P a r i s .  I t  would 
th e re f o r e  seem th a t  th e  l a t t e r  co u ld  n o t have been th e  one whom th e  
a u th o r  o f  th e  m a n u scrip t was r e f e r r in g  t o .
In  g e n e ra l we can say  t h a t ,  in  th o se  c a se s  where th e re  i s  
d isag reem en t o v e r who o r  what th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  p ro p e r  name i s ,  one 
f a c to r  which may re s o lv e  th e  d isag reem en t i s  which o f  th e  p o s s ib le
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b e a r e r s  o f  th e  name, i . e . ,  which o f  th o se  o b je c ts  s a t i s f y i n g  a  
s u i t a b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  d e s c r ip t io n s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  name, th e  
u s e r s  o f  th e  name co u ld  have been  c a u s a l ly  r e l a t e d  t o .  The p o in t  
m ight be ex p re ssed  in  te rm s o f  a  c o n d it io n :  f o r  a  p ro p e r  name ' 04' to  
be  u se d  by  members o f  a  l i n g u i s t i c  community G to  r e f e r  to  a ,  i t  i s  
n e c e s sa ry  t h a t  th e r e  b e  some c a u s a l  co n n ec tio n  betw een a  and members 
o f  G, nam ely th a t  betw een a  and what i s  b e l ie v e d  about th e  b e a re r  o f  
in  G. I t  i s  s im ply  n o t p o s s ib le  th a t  th e  members o f  G shou ld  be 
t a lk in g  about som ething  c a u s a l ly  i s o l a t e d  from them . For t h i s  re a so n  
th e  c o n d itio n  m ight a lso  be seen  as  an a  p r i o r i  c o n s t r a in t  on 
p o s s ib le  a t t r i b u t i o n s  o f  r e f e r e n t s  to  nam es.
What th e s e  rem arks go to  show i s  th a t  a lth o u g h  v a r io u s  f e a tu r e s  
p e r ta in in g  to  what m ight lo o s e ly  be term ed th e  c a u s a l account o f  
naming do n o t add a n y th in g  to  th e  c l u s t e r  th e o ry  o f  nam ing, th e y  a re  
o f  some im portance when i t  comes to  d is c o v e r in g  what a  p a r t i c u l a r  
name r e f e r s  t o .  That i s ,  th e y  a re  p e r t in e n t  n o t to  answ ering  
q u e s tio n  (3 * ) , b u t to  answ ering  th e  p ro p e r  name v e rs io n  o f  q u e s tio n  
( 2 ) —  th e  q u e s tio n
(2* ) How can we d is c o v e r  what th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  p ro p e r  name i s  as  
th a t  name i s  u se d  w ith in  a  l i n g u i s t i c  community?
What (3*G) su g g e s ts  by  way o f  answ er to  t h i s  q u e s tio n  i s  t h a t  we must 
c o n s id e r  th o se  b e l i e f s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  b e a re r  o f  th e  name w ith in  
th e  community. We can now add th a t  where such a  method does n o t 
en ab le  u s  to  d ec id e  which o f  s e v e ra l  o b je c ts  i s  th e  r e f e r e n t ,  th e  
c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s  betw een th o se  o b je c ts  and th e  community can some­
tim e s  dec id e  th e  i s s u e .  A lso , i t  can be s a id  t h a t  s a t i s f y i n g  th e  
c a u s a l c o n s t r a in t  n o te d  above i s  a  n e c e s sa ry  c o n d itio n  f o r  an 
o b j e c t 's  b e in g  co u n ted  th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  name. In  th e  n ex t s e c t io n
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I  s h a l l  argue t h a t  th e se  same rem arks h o ld  when we c o n s id e r  n a tu r a l  
k in d  p r e d ic a te s  in s te a d  o f  p ro p e r  nam es.
S e c tio n  ( i i i ) :  A Theory o f  R eference  f o r  N a tu ra l Kind P re d ic a te s
Q uestion  (3 ) i s  about n a t u r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s .  3h s e c t io n  ( i )  
o f  t h i s  c h a p te r  I  e x p la in e d  how n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  co u ld  be 
th o u g h t o f  as  c l u s t e r  te rm s . I  th e n  p o in te d  o u t t h a t  th e re  was an 
analogous q u e s tio n  to  (3 ) which concerned  p ro p e r  nam es, and th a t  
p ro p e r  names co u ld  a lso  be th o u g h t o f  as c l u s t e r  te rm s . In  b o th  th e  
rem ainder o f  t h a t  s e c t io n  and s e c t io n  ( i i )  I  d is c u s s e d  how t h i s  
analogous q u e s tio n  m ight be answ ered . The r e s u l t  was th e  c l u s t e r  
th e o ry  (3 * 0 ) . I f  t h i s  th e o ry  does p ro v id e  an adequa te  answ er to  th e  
q u e s tio n  o f  what i t  i s  f o r  a  name to  r e f e r  —  and we have n o t seen  
any re a so n  f o r  s e r io u s ly  d o u b tin g  th a t  i t  does — th e n  i t  would seem 
th a t  a  th e o ry  ju s t  l i k e  i t  sh o u ld  answer th e  q u e s tio n  o f  what i t  i s  
f o r  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  to  have an e x te n s io n . My p ro p o s a l, th e n , 
f o r  an answ er to  q u e s tio n  (3 ) i s
(3A) a n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  , as i t  i s  u se d  w ith in  a
l i n g u i s t i c  community C, can be c o r r e c t ly  a p p lie d  to  an o b je c t  
a  i f  and o n ly  i f  a  s a t i s f i e s  a s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  th o se  
d e s c r ip t io n s  which c o u ld  be c o n s i s te n t ly  a t t r i b u t e d  to  ^ ' s  
on th e  b a s i s  o f  what i s  b e l ie v e d  w ith in  G.
Let me b e g in  d is c u s s io n  o f  (3A) by  n o t in g  th a t  i t  does accoun t 
f o r  th a t  a sp e c t o f  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  t h a t  le a d s  u s  to  c a l l  them 
c l u s t e r  te rm s . By s p e c ify in g  th a t  o n ly  a s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  
d e s c r ip t io n s  have to  be t r u e  o f  an o b je c t  in  o rd e r  f o r  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  
p r e d ic a te  to  be c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d  to  i t ,  i t  i s  e x p l i c i t l y  a llow ed  
t h a t  th e  o b je c t  m ight n o t have a l l  th e  p r o p e r t i e s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith
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th e  k in d . As f o r  what co u n ts  a s  a  " s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty " ,  t h i s  i s  n o t 
som ething th a t  can always be s p e c i f i e d  in  advance. As a  m a tte r  o f  
f a c t ,  th e  q u e s tio n  does n o t o f te n  a r i s e .  J u s t  a s  in  th e  case  o f  a 
p ro p e r  name i t  i s  r a r e  to  f in d  more th a n  one o b je c t  which s a t i s f i e s  
a  la rg e  number o f  th e  d e s c r ip t io n s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  name, so too  
w ith  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  i t  i s  n o t o f te n  t h a t  an o b je c t  s a t i s f i e s  
o n ly  enough o f  th o se  d e s c r ip t io n s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  p re d ic a te  th a t  
i t  co u n ts  a s  what we m ight c a l l  a b o rd e r l in e  c a s e .
T his id e a  o f  an o b j e c t 's  s a t i s f y i n g  a  s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  
d e s c r ip t io n s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  a  p r e d ic a te  i s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  u se  when 
i t  comes to  e x p la in in g  th e  grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge. I t  a llow s 
f o r  e a r l i e r  s c i e n t i s t s  b e in g  p a r t l y  wrong in  what th e y  s a id  about 
members o f  n a tu r a l  k in d s .  At th e  end o f  th e  p re v io u s  s e c t io n  I  
in d ic a te d  how (3 'C ) p ro v id e s  th e  b a s i s  fo r  an answ er to  q u e s tio n  ( 2 ' ) j  
we d isc o v e r  what a  name r e f e r s  to  as  i t  i s  u sed  w ith in  some community *
by  lo o k in g  a t  what i s  b e l ie v e d  in  t h a t  community about whoever o r
w hatever i s  th e  b e a re r  o f  th e  name. (3A) lik e w is e  p ro v id e s  th e  b a s is  
f o r  an answ er to  q u e s tio n  ( 2 ) ;  we d isc o v e r  what a  n a tu r a l  k in d  
p r e d ic a te  has f o r  i t s  e x te n s io n  as i t  i s  u se d  w ith in  some community 
by  lo o k in g  a t  what i s  b e l ie v e d  in  th a t  community about th in g s  o f  th a t
k in d . By n o t making s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  every  d e s c r ip t io n  in  th e  c l u s t e r
n e c e s s a ry , o u r in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  what members o f  a  p re v io u s  s c i e n t i f i c  
community were t a lk in g  abou t when th e y  u sed  a  p a r t i c u l a r  n a tu r a l  k in d  
term  in  a th e o ry  can ta k e  in to  account th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  th e y  had 
some m istak en  id e a s  about th in g s  o f  th a t  k in d . T h is p o in t m ight be 
ex p ressed  more g e n e ra l ly  by  sa y in g  th a t  (3A) shows how a  n a tu r a l  k in d  
p r e d ic a te  m ight n o t be s t r i c t l y  t r u e  o f  an y th in g  b u t s t i l l  have an 
e x te n s io n .
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H erein  l i e s  th e  co re  o f  my answ er to  th e  s o r t  o f  problem  th a t  
prom pted, in  s e c t io n  ( i i )  o f  C hap ter 2 , th e  fo u r  q u e s t io n s .  There 
I  c i t e d  some exam ples o f  where o u r n a tu r a l  i n c l in a t io n  i s  to  say  th a t  
e a r l i e r  s c i e n t i s t s  were m istak en  in  t h e i r  th e o r ie s  —  Bohr th o u g h t 
t h a t  p a r t i c l e s  have s im u ltan eo u s  p o s i t io n  and momentum, M uller 
b e l ie v e d  genes to  be composed o f  p r o te in s .  In  f a c t  th e re  a re  
c o u n tle s s  o th e r  exam ples o f  t h i s ,  b o th  fo r  com m unities o f  s c i e n t i s t s  
and fo r  u s e r s  o f  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  g e n e ra l ly  —  P tolem y 
m a in ta in e d  t h a t  th e  p la n e ts  re v o lv e d  around th e  e a r th ,  D alton th o u g h t 
a l l  m o lecu les  were monatom ic, w hales were once th o u g h t to  be f i s h ,  
M endeleeff b e l ie v e d  th a t  chem ical e lem en ts were fundam ental and 
i r r e d u c ib le ,  a c c o rd in g  to  A r i s to t l e  th e  b r a i n 's  fu n c tio n  i s  to  
r e g u la te  th e  te m p e ra tu re  o f  th e  body, Maxwell h e ld  th a t  l i g h t  waves 
m ust be p ro p a g a te d  th ro u g h  a  m a te r ia l  e th e r ,  and so o n . These 
d e s c r ip t io n s  th em se lv es  in c l in e  u s  to  say  th a t  Bohr was r e f e r r i n g  to  
atom ic p a r t i c l e s ,  M u lle r to  g en es , P tolem y to  th e  p la n e ts ,  e t c .  The 
th e o ry  (3A) p ro v id e s  th e  b a s i s  o f  a  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  u s in g  such 
d e s c r ip t io n s .
I t  i s ,  how ever, o n ly  th e  co re  o f  my answ er. I t  rem ains to  be 
shown how we a re  to  d ec id e  what b e l i e f s  e a r l i e r  u s e r s  had about th e  
th in g s  to  which n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  co u ld  be c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d .  
Q u in e 's  argument fo r  th e  in d e te rm in a c y  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  r e le v a n t  
h e re .  Quine has argued  t h a t ,  in  a tte m p tin g  to  t r a n s l a t e  from one 
language to  a n o th e r ,  we w i l l  be a b le  to  g iv e  lo g i c a l l y  in co m p a tib le  
t r a n s l a t i o n s  which a re  in v a r i a n t  w ith  re s p e c t  to  a l l  d is p o s i t io n s  to  
a s s e n t  and d is s e n t  on th e  p a r t  o f  sp eak ers  o f  th e  language b e in g  
t r a n s l a t e d .  I f  we ap p ly  t h i s  to  th e  problem  o f  t r a n s l a t i n g  th e  
languages o f  e a r l i e r  s c i e n t i s t s ,  th e  co n c lu sio n  i t  su g g e s ts  i s  th a t
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i t  m ight he in d e te rm in a te  what th e y  were r e f e r r in g  t o ,  Q u in e 's  
argument w i l l  he th e  su b s tan ce  o f  th e  n ex t c h a p te r .  I f  Q iine were 
r i g h t ,  i t  co u ld  w e ll tu rn  o u t t h a t  any e x p la n a tio n  o f  what i t  i s  f o r  
a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p re d ic a te  to  be c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d  to  som ething w i l l  
be o f  l i t t l e  u se  when i t  comes to  d is c o v e r in g  which o b je c ts  b e lo n g  
to  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a  g iven  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te .  Not s u r p r i s in g ly ,  
I  s h a l l  a rgue  t h a t  Quine i s  n o t r i g h t ,  a lth o u g h  I  s h a l l  a lso  su g g es t 
t h a t  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  n o t alw ays d e te rm in a te . In  h i s  purview  o f  
t r a n s l a t i o n  Qnine o v erlo o k s  c e r t a in  p h y s ic a l  f a c t s  such  as th o se  
w hich can be o b ta in e d  by  im posing a  c a u s a l c o n d itio n  f o r  n a tu r a l  k in d  
p r e d ic a te s  l i k e  th a t  g iven  fo r  p ro p e r  nam es. Such a  c o n d itio n  would 
b e : in  o rd e r  f o r  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  to  be u sed  by  members 
o f  a  l i n g u i s t i c  community C to  d e s c r ib e  ^ ^ s ,  i t  i s  n e c e ssa ry  th a t  
th e re  be some c a u s a l c o n n ec tio n  betw een ^ ' s  and members o f  G, nam ely 
th a t  betw een ] ^ ' s  and what i s  b e l ie v e d  about ^ ' s  in  C. But b e fo re  
g e t t in g  on to  t h i s  we must see  i f  (3A) does a d e q u a te ly  answer 
q u e s tio n  ( 3 ) .
As was shown to  be th e  ca se  w ith  th e  th e o ry  o f  p ro p e r names 
(3 'C ) ,  (3A) i s  a  th e o ry  b o th  o f  how th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  
p re d ic a te  i s  f ix e d  and o f  what th e  sense  o f  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  
i s .  They a re  b o th  fu n c tio n s  o f  what i s  c o n s i s te n t ly  b e l ie v e d  w ith in  
th e  community in  w hich th e  n a t u r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  i s  u s e d . W ithin 
th e  l i n g u i s t i c  community o f  modem p h y s ic i s t s ,  f o r  exam ple, th e  term  
'e l e c t r o n '  has as  i t s  e x te n s io n  ju s t  th o se  th in g s  which s a t i s f y  a 
s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  what th e y  now b e l ie v e  to  be t r u e  o f  e l e c t r o n s .  
F u tu re  p h y s ic i s t s  may d is p u te  w hether some o f  th e s e  b e l i e f s  a re  t r u e  
o f  e le c t r o n s ;  th e y  m ight even acco rd  th e  b e l i e f s  d i f f e r e n t  w eigh ts  
and so a r r iv e  a t  a d i f f e r e n t  " s u i ta b l e  m a jo r i ty " ;  b u t none o f  t h i s
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would je o p a rd iz e  th e  c la im  th e y  may w ish to  make th a t  th e y  have 
developed  a  b e t t e r  th e o ry  o f  e l e c t r o n s .
The sense  o f  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  i s  g iven  by  th o se  
d e s c r ip t io n s  which a re  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  p r e d ic a te  as  i t  i s  u sed  
w ith in  a  community. As w ith  a  p ro p e r  name, t h i s  sen se  i s  n o t to  be 
th o u g h t o f  as g iven  by  th o se  d e s c r ip t io n s  which some member o f  th e  
community a s s o c ia te s  w ith  th e  te rm . Sense i s  c o g n i t iv e  and hence 
com m unicable, b u t o f  co u rse  a  member o f  a  community may n o t f u l l y  
u n d e rs ta n d  a  te rm , and what t h i s  means i s  th a t  he has o n ly  a  p a r t i a l ,
p e rh ap s im p e rfe c t ,  g rasp  o f  i t s  s e n s e .
T his s i t u a t io n  becomes more complex w ith  te rm s l ik e  'g o ld '
w hich a re  u se d  in  everyday  speech  b u t a lso  have a  u s e  in  more
te c h n ic a l  c o n te x ts .  Most o f  u s ,  most o f  th e  tim e s u c c e s s fu l ly  u se
th e  term  'g o ld * ,  b u t we would n o t be  a b le  to  d i s t i n g u is h  betw een a
g o ld  r in g  and a  c a r e f u l ly  p re p a re d  a l lo y  one w hich c o n ta in e d  no g o ld .
As Putnam has p o in te d  o u t ,  i t  would be absu rd  to  sa y , in  th e  l i g h t
o f  t h i s ,  t h a t  m ost o f  u s  ju s t  do n o t know what th e  m eaning o f  th e
term  i s . ^ ^  We need  n o t conclude from th e  exam ple, though , as Putnam
d o es , th a t  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  term  ' g o ld ' does n o t depend on what
i s  known, and th e r e f o r e  b e l ie v e d ,  about g o ld . We m ight fo llo w
Dummett in  h o ld in g  th a t  we do f u l l y  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  term  even though
37we have n o t f u l l y  g rasp ed  i t s  s e n se . One consequence o f  t h i s  view  
i s  t h a t , i f  th e  m eaning o f  a  term  i s  ju s t  what a  perso n  knows when 
th e y  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  term  f u l l y ,  th e n  a  wedge i s  d r iv e n  betw een sense  
and m eaning, f o r  as Dummett co n c lu d es , "The m eaning o f  th e  word 
' g o l d ' , as  a  word o f  th e  E n g lish  language , i s  f u l l y  conveyed n e i th e r  
by a  d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  c r i t e r i a  employed by  th e  e x p e r ts  n o r by a 
d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th o se  u se d  by o rd in a ry  sp e a k e rs ; i t  in v o lv e s  b o th .
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38and a  g rasp  o f  th e  r e l a t io n s h ip  betw een them ." To av o id  t h i s  
consequence we m ight s t i c k  to  th e  s im p le r  view  th a t  an o rd in a ry  
sp e a k e r , b ecau se  he has n o t f u l l y  g rasp ed  th e  sen se  o f  th e  term  
'go ld*  , does n o t fU lly  u n d e rs ta n d  i t  and so o n ly  knows a  p a r t  o f  i t s  
m eaning. On n e i th e r  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  how ever, i s  one fo rc e d  to  g iv e  up 
th e  view  th a t  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  term  depends on i t s  
s e n s e , and th a t  sen se  has to  do w ith  knowledge; th e  o n ly  d if f e r e n c e  
i s  t h a t ,  a c c o rd in g  to  Dummett, p a r t  o f  t h i s  knowledge c o n s is ts  in  
g ra s p in g  how everyday  u s e s  o f  a  terra l i k e  'go ld*  a re  r e l a t e d  to  i t s  
more te c h n ic a l  u s e s .
O ther exam ples d es ig n ed  to  c a s t  doubt on th e  c l u s t e r  th e o r y 's  
accoun t o f  th e  sen se s  o f  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  a re  o f f e r e d  by  b o th  
K ripke and P u t n a m . H a v i n g  n o te d  how d e f in i t i o n s  o f  n a tu r a l  k in d  
words m ention c l u s t e r s  o f  p r o p e r t i e s ,  K ripke a tte m p ts  to  show th a t  
" p o sse s s io n  o f  most o f  th e s e  p r o p e r t i e s  need n o t be a  n e c e ssa ry  
c o n d itio n  f o r  membership in  th e  k in d , no r need i t  be a  s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n d i t i o n . D e s p i t e  th e  way K ripke p h ra se s  t h i s  c la im , i t  i s  c l e a r  
t h a t  he in te n d s  h i s  exam ples to  be co n c lu s iv e  a g a in s t  any form o f  
d e s c r ip t iv e  th e o ry ,  i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f  w hether i t  i s  in  term s o f  m ost 
p r o p e r t ie s  o r  a  s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  p r o p e r t i e s .  What th e y  would 
have to  show, th e n ,  to  be c o n c lu s iv e  a g a in s t (3A) i s  th a t  g iven  how, 
s a y , th e  n a tu r a l  k in d  term  ' t i g e r '  i s  u sed  w ith in  a p a r t i c u l a r  
l i n g u i s t i c  community, i t  m ight tu rn  o u t b o th  t h a t  t i g e r s  shou ld  f a i l  
to  p o sse ss  a s u i t a b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  th o se  d e s c r ip t io n s  c o n s i s te n t ly  
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  them w ith in  th e  community, and th a t  som ething co u ld  
s a t i s f y  a s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  and y e t n o t be a  t i g e r .
K r ip k e 's  p u rp o r te d  coun ter-exam ple  to  th e  s u f f ic ie n c y  c o n d itio n  
re q u ir e s  u s  to  im agine an an im al b e in g  d isc o v e re d  which had a l l  th e
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e x te rn a l  p r o p e r t i e s  m entioned  in  th e  c l u s t e r  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  word 
' t i g e r ’ , h u t a  co m p le te ly  d i f f e r e n t  in t e r n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  Of c o u rse , 
K ripke i s  q u i te  r i g h t  to  say  th a t  we would n o t count such an anim al 
a s  a  t i g e r .  As i t  s ta n d s ,  th o u g h , t h i s  example does n o t even b eg in  
to  c a s t  doubt on a  c l u s t e r  th e o ry  p h rased  in  te rras  o f  a  s u i ta b le  
m a jo r i ty  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s .  O rd in a r i ly  we id e n t i f y  t i g e r s  by means o f  
p r o p e r t i e s  r e l a t i n g  to  e x te rn a l  ap p ea ran ce , l i k e  'h a v in g  fo u r le g s  
and a  tawny y e llo w  c o a t w ith  t r a n s v e r s e  b la c k  s t r i p e s ' . But t h i s  i s  
n o t to  say  t h a t  we acc ep t th e se  p r o p e r t i e s  as  d e f in i t i v e  o f  th e  
sp e c ie s  ' t i g e r ' ,  o r  t h a t ,  i f  i t  came to  p r e c i s e  d e f in i t i o n ,  we sho u ld  
a t ta c h  more w eight to  them th a n  to  p r o p e r t i e s  r e l a t i n g  to  in t e r n a l  
s t r u c t u r e .  M oreover, i f ,  sa y , ' r e p t i l e a n  t i g e r s '  s t a r t e d  a p p e a rin g , 
p r o p e r t i e s  which en ab led  u s  to  id e n t i f y  'mammalian t i g e r s '  would no 
doubt g a in  in  im p o rtan ce .
The case  which has to  be argued  in  o rd e r  to  c o n tro v e r t  th e  
s u f f ic ie n c y  c o n d it io n  o f  th e  c l u s t e r  th e o ry  I  have developed  would 
be t h a t  an o b je c t  co u ld  have a  s u i t a b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  th o se  p r o p e r t i e s  
a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  ^ ' s  on th e  b a s i s  o f  what i s  b e l ie v e d  w ith in  a 
l i n g u i s t i c  community G, and y e t n o t be som ething to  which th e  
p r e d ic a te  , g iven  how i t  i s  u sed  w ith in  0 , co u ld  be c o r r e c t ly  
a p p l ie d .  R ev is in g  K r ip k e 's  t i g e r  exam ple, what would have to  be 
m a in ta in ed  i s  th a t  som ething co u ld  have a l l  th e  p r o p e r t ie s  t h a t ,  e . g . ,  
contem porary  z o o lo g is ts  ( th e  e x p e r ts  to  whom we d e fe r )  accep t as 
d e f in i t i v e  o f  membership o f  th e  s p e c ie s ,  and y e t n o t be a  t i g e r .
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  see  t h a t  any sense  can be made o f  such a 
su g g e s tio n . There m ight come a  tim e when, as a  r e s u l t  o f  f u r th e r  
z o o lo g ic a l in v e s t ig a t io n ,  th e  s p e c ie s  i s  d e f in e d  d i f f e r e n t ly ;  t h i s  
happened w ith  w hales . S im i la r ly ,  th e  p r o p e r t i e s  now re g a rd e d  as
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d e f in i t i v e  were n o t so re g a rd e d  by  e a r l i e r  z o o lo g is t s .  B a t 'i n  th e se  
o ases  we a re  no lo n g e r  c o n s id e r in g  th e  u se  o f  th e  n a tu r a l  k in d  
p re d ic a te  't i g e r *  w ith in  o u r own l i n g u i s t i c  community.
The s i t u a t io n  h e re  i s  ju s t  l i k e  one we en co u n te red  in  connec­
t i o n  w ith  p ro p e r  nam es. The r e f e r e n t  o f  th e  name 'A rc h im e d e s ', as 
t h a t  name i s  u se d  w ith in  a  community G, i s  th a t  p erso n  who s a t i s f i e s  
a  s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  th o s e  d e s c r ip t io n s  b e l ie v e d  by  members o f  C 
to  be t r u e  o f  A rchim edes, even i f  i t  shou ld  l a t e r  tu rn  o u t ,  as a  
r e s u l t  o f  subsequen t in v e s t ig a t io n ,  th a t  one Anaximedes i s  so 
i d e n t i f i e d .  L a te r  u se  o f  b o th  nam es\ o u l d  no doubt r e f l e c t  t h i s  
d is c o v e ry , w ith  a  r e s u l t a n t  change in  sense  o f  th e  nam es. But in  so 
f a r  as  we a re  c o n s id e r in g  who members o f  G succeeded  in  r e f e r r in g  to  
when th e y  ta lk e d  abou t A rchim edes, we must say  i t  was Anaximedes.
Bummett has su g g es ted  a  way o f  s tre n g th e n in g  K r ip k e 's  exam ple:
Suppose t h a t  th e r e  a re  on Mars c r e a tu r e s  e x a c t ly  l i k e  t i g e r s ,  b o th  
s u p e r f i c i a l l y  and in  r e s p e c t  o f  in t e r n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  Then I  th in k  
th a t  th e y  would s t i l l  n o t be t i g e r s  (though  d o u b tle s s  th e y  would 
be c a l le d  'M a r tia n  t i g e r s ' ) ,  b ecause  th e y  would n o t be sprung  from 
th e  same s to c k  as r e a l  t i g e r s ,  i . e . .  E a r th  t i g e r s .  A d if f e r e n c e  
o f  i n t e r n a l  s t r u c tu r e  s e rv e s  to  show th a t  a  c r e a tu r e  i s  n o t a 
t i g e r  by  showing t h a t  i t  does n o t sh a re  a  common d escen t w ith  r e a l  
t i g e r s .  Eor th e  same rea so n  w hite  a n ts  a re  n o t r e a l l y  a n t s .  I t  
i s  a  p a r t  o f  th e  m eaning o f  a  word l i k e  ' t i g e r '  o r  'a n t '  t h a t  i t  
a p p l ie s  to  an anim al in  v i r t u e  o f  i t s  membership in  a  b reed  o r  
fam ily  ( 's p e c i e s '  i s  o f  co u rse  too  s p e c i f i c  a  te rm ) , i . e . ,  a  group 
connec ted  by  d e s c e n t .
P erhaps t h i s  v e rs io n  g a in s  some i n i t i a l  p l a u s i b i l i t y  from th e  f a c t
th a t  th e  environm ent on Mars i s  so d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  on E a rth  —
we cannot h e lp  b u t th in k  th a t  any anim al o r  p la n t  found th e re  must
be o f  a  q u i te  d i f f e r e n t  k in d  from any found h e r e .  But even i f  we
make a llow ance fo r  t h i s ,  Bum m ett's example i s  n o t c o n v in c in g . The
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a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  words l i k e  't i g e r *  and 'a n t '  u l t im a te ly  depends on
o u r concept o f  a  s p e c ie s .  Now 's p e c i e s '  i s  a  term  l i k e  'a c i d '  in
th a t  i t  has a  common u se  a s  w e ll a s  a  more s p e c ia l iz e d  one . We
som etim es u se  i t  to  r e f e r  to  a  group o f  in d iv id u a ls  which sh a re  a
d i s t i n c t i v e ,  common p ro p e r ty ,  th u s  fo llo w in g  i t s  u sag e  by  17^^ and 
th18 c e n tu ry  z o o lo g is ts  and b i o l o g i s t s .  In  modern b io lo g ic a l  s c ie n c e , 
th o u g h , a  specim en i s  coun ted  a  member o f  some s p e c ie s  i f  i t  can be 
m ated o r  in t e r - b r e d  w ith  re c o g n iz e d  members o f  th e  s p e c ie s  so a s  to  
produce f e r t i l e  o f f s p r in g .  T his i s  th e  reaso n  why w hite  a n ts  a re  n o t 
r e a l l y  a n t s ,  fo r  a lth o u g h  th e y  m ight resem ble them s u p e r f i c i a l l y  th e y  
canno t form a  b re e d in g  co lony  to g e th e r .  The c r u c i a l  t e s t  fo r  w hether 
o r  n o t an an im al found on Mars was a  t i g e r ,  i . e . ,  a  member o f  th e  
s p e c ie s  F e l i s  t i g r i s i would th e r e f o r e  be w hether o r  n o t i t  co u ld  mate 
w ith  t i g e r s  h e re  on E a rth  so as  to  produce f e r t i l e  o f f s p r in g .  I f  
Bumm ett's d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  a l i e n  c r e a tu r e s  i s  s t r i c t l y  adhered  to ,  
th e n , i t  would seem c e r t a in  t h a t  th e y  co u ld , and t h i s  would p ro v id e  
overw helm ing ev idence  in  fav o u r o f  th e  co n c lu sio n  th a t  th e re  were 
t i g e r s  on M ars. (T h e ir  p re se n c e  th e re  would th e n ,  fo r  a tim e anyway, 
be a  s c i e n t i f i c  anom aly .) I f ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, th e  c re a tu r e s  d id  
n o t m ate w ith  E a r th  t i g e r s ,  th e n  t h i s  would be ta k en  as  in d ic a t iv e  
o f  a  p h y s ic a l  d i f f e r e n c e  which would t e l l  a g a in s t  t h e i r  b e in g  c la s s e d  
a s  members o f  th e  s p e c ie s  F e l i s  t i g r l s .
A ll o f  t h i s ,  how ever, ta k e s  u s  f a r  beyond what K ripke has to  
s a y . His argum ent a g a in s t  p o sse ss io n  o f  a  s u i t a b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  
p r o p e r t i e s  b e in g  n e c e s s a ry  fo r  membership o f  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  i s  even 
more sk e tch y  than  th a t  a g a in s t  i t s  b e in g  s u f f i c i e n t .  He su g g e s ts  i t  
m ight tu rn  o u t t h a t ,  as a  r e s u l t  o f  o p t i c a l  i l l u s i o n s  o r  o th e r  e r r o r s ,  
t i g e r s  a c tu a l ly  have none o f  th o se  p r o p e r t ie s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y
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a s s o c ia te d  w ith  them . Now o f  co u rse  some th in g s  m ight n o t p o sse ss  
such  p r o p e r t i e s ,  and in  f a c t  most th in g s  do n o t p o sse ss  them —  o n ly  
t i g e r s  do; h u t how co u ld  i t  p o s s ib ly  tu rn  o u t t h a t  t i g e r s  m ight n o t 
p o sse ss  them? The p o in t  to  be made h e re  i s  analogous to  th e  one made 
in  th e  p re v io u s  s e c t io n  a g a in s t  K ripke*s c laim  t h a t  A r is to t l e  m ight 
n o t have done any o f  th o se  th in g s  commonly a t t r i b u t e d  to  him . I t  i s  
t i g e r s  we a re  c o n s id e r in g , and t i g e r s  ju s t  a re  th o s e  th in g s  which 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  have fo u r  l e g s ,  a  tawny y e llo w  c o a t ,  and so on*
The o n ly  sen se  which we can a t ta c h  to  th e  term  't i g e r *  —  th e  o n ly  
sense  i t  has f o r  u s  —  depends on how we u se  i t ,  and th i s - r e v e a l s  
what we b e l ie v e  about t i g e r s .
P u tnam 's  p u rp o r te d  cou n te r-ex am p les  to  c l u s t e r  th e o r ie s  a re
more e la b o r a te .  As in  th e  case  o f  th e  'go ld*  example a lre a d y
m entioned , P u tn am 's  aim i s  to  show th a t  one canno t h o ld  b o th  t h a t
" th e  m eaning o f  a  s p e a k e r 's  words does no t ex ten d  beyond what he
42knows and b e l i e v e s , "  and th a t  "m eaning d e te rm in es  e x te n s io n ."  
A ccep ting  (3A) does n o t commit one to  a c c e p tin g  th e  f i r s t  o f  th e s e  
th e s e s ;  in  f a c t ,  th e  rea so n  we r e je c te d  i t  was p r e c i s e ly  so as to  
ta k e  account o f  what Putnam c a l l s  th e  " p r in c ip le  o f  th e  d iv is io n  o f  
l i n g u i s t i c  la b o u r ."  C onsequen tly , we need n o t look  a t  th o se  exam ples 
which Putnam adduces in  su p p o rt o f  h is  p r in c ip le  and a g a in s t  th e
t h e s i s .
P u tnam 's  o th e r  re a so n  fo r  r e j e c t i n g  th e  c o n ju n c tio n  o f  b o th  
th e s e s  has to  do w ith  what he c a l l s  " th e  c o n t r ib u t io n  o f  th e  
environm ent" to  d e te rm in in g  th e -e x te n s io n  o f  th e  te rm s we u s e .  The 
example he p r e s e n ts  a s  an i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  would, i f  P u tnam 's  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  i t  were c o r r e c t ,  t e l l  a g a in s t  a c l u s t e r  th e o ry  l i k e  
(3A ). I t  goes l i k e  t h i s :  suppose t h a t ,  on a  d i s t a n t  p la n e t  v e ry
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s im i la r  to  o u rs  c a l l e d  'Twin E a r t h ' ,  th e  c o lo u r le s s ,  t a s t e l e s s  l i q u id  
t h a t  comes down in  r a i n ,  f i l l s  th e  oceans and la k e s ,  e t c . ,  i s  n o t 
composed o f  1^0 m o lecu les  h u t o f  XYZ m o le c u le s . R ir th e rm o re , th e  
T w in -E arth ian s  u se  th e  term  'w a te r ' to  r e f e r  to  th e  s a id  su b s ta n c e . 
Suppose a lso  t h a t  we a re  back  in  1750 and, b ecau se  c h em is try  i s  
u n d erd ev e lo p ed , n e i th e r  E a r th ia n s  n o r T w in -E arth ians  know th e  
chem ical s t r u c t u r e  o f  what th e y  r e s p e c t iv e ly  c a l l  w a te r . Thus, an 
E a r th ia n  and h i s  i d e n t i c a l  tw in  on Twin E a r th  can a s s o c ia te  e x a c t ly  
th e  same b e l i e f s  and item s o f  knowledge w ith  th e  term  'w a te r ' and i t s  
e x te n s io n . Y e t, say s  Putnam , th e  e x te n s io n  o f  'w a ter*  as u se d  by 
E a r th ia n s  i s  H^O, w hereas i t s  e x te n s io n  as u se d  .by T w in -E arth ian s  i s  
XYZ. T his su g g e s ts  a  dilemma, e i t h e r  horn o f  w hich seems to  le a d  to  
P u tn am 's  d e s i r e d  c o n c lu s io n . I f  we say  t h a t ,  b ecau se  E a rth ia n s  and 
T w in -E arth ian s  know and b e l ie v e  th e  same th in g s  about w a te r , 'w a ter*  
means th e  same f o r  b o th ,  th e n , s in c e  th e  e x te n s io n  i s  d i f f e r e n t  on 
th e  d i f f e r e n t  p la n e t s ,  th e re  must be som ething more to  d e te rm in in g  
e x te n s io n  th a n  lo o k in g  a t  what i s  known and b e l ie v e d .  I f ,  on th e  
o th e r  hand , we say  th a t  because  th e  ex ten s io n  i s  d i f f e r e n t  on th q  
d i f f e r e n t  p la n e ts  'w a ter*  means som ething d i f f e r e n t ,  th en  t h i s  
d i f f e r e n c e  has to  be e x p la in e d  in  te rm s o th e r  th a n  th o se  which r e l y  
s o le ly  on what i s  known and b e l ie v e d .  T h e re fo re , e i t h e r  m eaning does 
n o t ,  by i t s e l f ,  d e term ine  e x te n s io n , o r  th e  m eaning o f  a  word ex ten d s 
beyond what i s  known and b e l ie v e d  about what i t  can be c o r r e c t ly  
a p p l ie d  t o .44
O bviously  th e  c r u c i a l  q u e s tio n  to  be asked  about th e  example 
i s  w hether Putnam i s  j u s t i f i e d  in  assum ing th a t  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  
term  'w ater*  i s  d i f f e r e n t  on th e  two p la n e ts .  We can adm it t h a t  
a f t e r  E a r th ia n s  and T w in -E arth ian s  have become ch em ica lly
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s o p h is t ic a te d  th e  term  w i l l  have a  d i f f e r e n t  ex ten sio n *  But th e n , 
w ith  th e  h e lp  o f  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  th e  d iv is io n  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  la b o u r , 
i t  i s  c l e a r  th a t  we co u ld  d e s c r ib e  th e  s i tu a t io n  as  one in  which th e  
m eaning o f  th e  te rm  w i l l  be d i f f e r e n t  on, th e  two p la n e ts *  B efore 
such e n lig h ten m en t, how ever, E a r th ia n s  and T w in -E arth ians  would a g re e , 
ex h y p o th e s i , in  t h e i r  ev ery  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  th e  term  'w a te r* . So i t  
would seem incum bent upon u s  to  conclude th a t  when nobody knew what 
th e  chem ical n a tu re  o f  th e  s t u f f  c a l le d  'w a ter*  was, th e  e x te n s io n  
o f  th e  term  was th e  same on b o th  p la n e ts .  Once ag a in  we a re  rem inded 
o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  e x te n s io n  a  term  has i s  r e l a t i v e  to  i t s  u se  
w ith in  a g iven  l i n g u i s t i c  community.
A tte n tio n  has been drawn by Zemach to  an a c tu a l  case  v e ry  much 
l i k e  th e  one Putnam h y p o th e s ise s  —  th e  d isc o v e ry  o f  is o to p e s  o f  
w a te r .4^ Given th e  v a r io u s  forms o f  hydrogen and oxygen, to g e th e r  
w ith  t h e i r  v a r io u s  co m b in a tio n s , i t  seems th a t  we can now say  t h a t  
th e r e  a re  e ig h te e n  d i f f e r e n t  k in d s  o f  w a te r . A nother a c tu a l  case  
would be th e  d is c o v e ry  th a t  c h lo r in e  has two common is o to p e s .  These 
c a se s  d i f f e r  from P u tnam 's  b ecause  th e  c h lo r in e  is o to p e s ,  and some 
o f  th e  w ater is o to p e s ,  o ccu r to g e th e r  n a t u r a l l y  and a re  n o t d iv id e d  
betw een p la n e t s .  As a  r e s u l t  i t  seems t h a t ,  s in c e  i t  always was 
c o r r e c t  to  ap p ly  th e  n a tu r a l  k in d  te rm s 'w a ter*  and 'c h lo r in e *  to  
sam ples c o n ta in in g  th e  d i f f e r e n t  k in d s  b e fo re  is o to p e s  were 
d is c o v e re d , i t  alw ays w i l l  be c o r r e c t  so to  ap p ly  them .
Such exam ples a re  n o t l i k e l y  to  c u t much ic e  ( o f  any k in d l)  
w ith  Putnam . A ccording to  him n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  l i k e  'w a ter*
—  supposing  i t  to  be one —  a re  " in d e x ic a l" ,  i . e . ,  t h e i r  e x te n s io n  
i s  de term ined  in  v i r t u e  o f  some eq u iv a len ce  r e l a t i o n  which makes u se  
o f  an in d e x ic a l  word. In th e  ca se  o f  'w ater*  , Putnam su g g e s ts  " th e
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'sam e l i q u i d '  r e l a t i o n  to  o u r w a te r ."4^ T his r e l a t i o n  i s ,  he s a y s , 
a  th e o r e t i c a l  one whose d is c o v e ry  i s  to  he made th ro u g h  s c i e n t i f i c  
in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  w hatever i t  i s  t h a t  we now id e n t i f y  as  w a te r . Where 
th e  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  i s  a  su b stan ce  term  th e  r e l a t i o n  w i l l  
t y p i c a l l y  be a  s t r u c t u r a l  one —  chem ical fo rm ula in  th e  ca se  o f  
'w a t e r ' ,  a tom ic number in  th e  ca se  o f  'g o l d ' .
This n o tio n  o f  in d e x ic a l i ty  i s  one which Putnam i s  keen to  l i n k  
w ith  K ripke*s n o tio n  o f  a 'h i g i d  d e s ig n a to r " .4? K ripke a c c e p ts  th a t  
b o th  p ro p e r names and n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  a re  r i g i d  d e s ig n a to rs  —  
names d e s ig n a te  th e  same th in g ,  and n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  th e  same 
k in d  o f  th in g ,  in  d i f f e r e n t  p o s s ib le  w o rld s . As was n o te d  in  th e  
p re v io u s  s e c t io n ,  K ripke f i l l s  o u t th e  id e a  o f  sam eness in  term s o f  
a  t h i n g 's  o r ig in  and s t r u c tu r e  —  peo p le  co u ld  n o t have f a i l e d  to  
have th e  p a re n ts  th e y  do, and e lem en ts cou ld  n o t have f a i l e d  to  have 
th e  atom ic numbers th e y  do . P u tn am 's  view  about 'w ater*  —  th e  one 
he th in k s  h i s  Twin E a r th  example su p p o rts  —  i s  a  s h o r t  s te p  away; 
w a te r i s  w hatever has th e  same chem ical fo rm u la , g iven  th e  p re s e n t  
s t a t e  o f  o u r chem ical know ledge, as  th e  su b stan ce  we id e n t i f y  as  
w a te r .
R etu rn in g  to  th e  i s o to p e s ,  I  th in k  th a t  even i f  th e y  had been 
d isc o v e re d  on a n o th e r  p la n e t  and n o t on E a r th ,  Putnam would d is p u te  
th a t  th e y  were analogous o ase s  to  h i s  Twin E a r th  on e . The c r u c ia l  
q u e s tio n  i s :  w hich p r o p e r t i e s  a re  th e  e s s e n t i a l  ones?  I f  ' hav ing  
atom ic w eight x* i s  one, th e n  'w a te r ' and 'c h lo r in e *  a re  n o t n a tu r a l  
k in d  p r e d ic a te s ,  f o r  th e y  can be c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d  to  su b s tan ces  
w ith  d i f f e r e n t  atom ic w e ig h ts . But such a c o n c lu s io n  goes a g a in s t  
o u r o rd in a ry  u sag e  o f  th e  te rm s . Even c h e m is ts , when th e y  u se  th e  
te rm s , u se  them in  such a  way th a t  th e y  can be c o r r e c t ly  a p p lie d  to
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s e p a ra te  in s ta n c e s ,  a l l  o f  which sh a re  a  la rg e  ntunber o f  im p o rtan t 
p r o p e r t i e s .  F ir th e rm o re , ' h av in g  atom ic w eight seems n o t to  be 
an e s s e n t i a l  p ro p e r ty  ac c o rd in g  to  K ripke*s fav o u red  t e s t  fo r  
e s s e n t i a l i t y .  * Gould som ething  be c h lo r in e  and n o t have atom ic 
w eight 35?* A p p aren tly  so —  q u i te  a  l o t  o f  c h lo r in e  has atom ic 
w eight 37* And what t h i s  means i s  th a t  a  specim en o f  c h lo r in e  can 
p a ss  a l l  o f  th e  chem ica l t e s t s  f o r  b e in g  c h lo r in e  and y e t have a  
d i f f e r e n t  atom ic w eigh t from a n o th e r  specim en which has a lso  p assed  
a l l  o f  th e  t e s t s .  I t  would seem, th e n , t h a t  * hav in g  atom ic w eight x* 
i s  n o t a  p ro p e r ty  re g a rd e d  a s  e s s e n t i a l  r e l a t i v e  to  o u r system  o f  
c h e m is try , f o r  th e  chem ical p r o p e r t i e s  o f  a  su b s tan ce  a re  n o t 
d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to  i t s  a tom ic w eight*
When we lo o k  a t  th e  p r o p e r t i e s  * hav ing  th e  chem ica l fo rm ula x* 
and * h av in g  atom ic number x* , th e  p ic tu r e  i s  d i f f e r e n t .  I t  does seem 
th a t  we would now say  * Something co u ld  n o t be w a te r ( c h lo r in e ,  g o ld ) 
and n o t have th e  chem ical fo rm ula  (a tom ic number) H^ O (17 , 79)** 
A ccording to  o u r system  o f  c h e m is try , th e se  p r o p e r t i e s  do seem to  be 
e s s e n t i a l .  What t h i s  shows, how ever, i s  n o t t h a t  such  s ta te m e n ts  
a r e ,  in  K ripke*s p h ra s e , " n e c e ssa ry  t r u th s  in  th e  s t r i c t e s t  p o s s ib le  
s e n s e ,"4® b u t t h a t  th e y  a re  n e c e s s a ry  r e l a t i v e  to  o u r system  o f  
c h em is try  o r ,  more b ro a d ly , to  o u r way o f  lo o k in g  a t  th e  w orld .
Zemach p o in ts  o u t t h a t  th e r e  have been r a d ic a l  changes in  what
49sc ie n c e  c o n s id e rs  to  be o f  th e  essen ce  o f  th in g s .  The v e ry  
p r e s e n ta t io n  which Putnam g iv e s  o f  h is  Twin E a rth  example goes to  
su p p o rt t h i s  v iew . D esp ite  th e  q u o ta tio n  ju s t  g iv e n , K ripke too  
seems to  r e a l i z e  t h i s ,  "Any w orld  in  which we im agine a  su b stan ce  
which does n o t have th e s e  p r o p e r t i e s  i s  a  w orld in  which we im agine 
a  su b stan ce  which i s  n o t g o ld , p ro v id ed  th e s e  p r o p e r t i e s  form th e
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50b a s i s  o f  what su b s tan ce  i s ." ^  I f  we gave up atom ic th e o ry , p erhaps  
in  favou r o f  sub -a tom ic  th e o ry  o r  o f  some n o n -c o rp u sc u la r  th e o ry , 
th e n  no doubt ' h av ing  atom ic number x* would cea se  to  be o f  c e n t r a l  
im p o rtan ce . L ik ew ise , b e fo re  1750 th e r e  was n o th in g  l i k e  th e  modem 
n o tio n  o f  an e le m e n t, and so n o th in g  cou ld  be s a id  f o r  d is t in g u is h in g  
su b s ta n c e s  ac c o rd in g  to  chem ica l fo rm u la . Hence th e  term s * water* ,
* gold* and * ch lo rin e*  d id  n o t ,  p r io r  to  th e  in t ro d u c t io n  o f  th e  
th e o r ie s  and te c h n iq u e s  o f  chem ical a n a ly s i s ,  have m eanings which 
de term ined  th e  co u rse  to  be fo llo w ed . Once t h i s  i s  r e a l i z e d ,
Putnam*s Twin B arth  exam ple, f a r  from showing th a t  th e s e s  l i k e  th e  
two he b e g in s  by d i s t i n g u is h in g  cannot be h e ld ,  a c tu a l ly  goes to  
su p p o rt them!
R e tu rn in g  to  Dummett* s exam ples co n ce rn in g  th e  terras * t ig e r*  
and * a n t* , we can make a  s im i la r  rem ark about membership o f  a  s p e c ie s .  
The c u r re n t  s t a t e  o f  th e  b io lo g ic a l  s c ie n c e s  su g g e s ts  th a t  f e r t i l e  
in te r - b r e e d in g  i s  an e s s e n t i a l  p ro p e r ty  o f  a member o f  a  s p e c i e s , i . e . ,  
t h a t  i t  i s  n e c e s s a ry  th a t  an an im al o r  p la n t ,  i f  i t  i s  to  be c o r r e c t ly  
d e sc r ib e d  as  b e lo n g in g  to  a  s p e c ie s  * S*, i s  a b le  to  in te r - b r e e d  o r  
mate w ith  re c o g n iz e d  members o f  *S* so as to  p roduce f e r t i l e  o f f ­
s p r in g .  But i f  we gave up th e  D arw inian t r a d i t i o n ,  o r  maybe ju s t  
augmented i t  w ith  a  s tro n g  Lam arckian component, th en  t h i s  p ro p e r ty  
may no lo n g e r be re g a rd e d  as  e s s e n t i a l .  Our u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  what 
a  s p e c i e s , i s  may change, and w ith  i t  th e  m eaning o f  th e  term
* s p e c ie s * . One d if f e r e n c e  betw een s p e c ie s  term s and su b stan ce  te rm s , 
though , i s  th a t  we seem f a r  more r e lu c ta n t  to  deny th a t  an i n f e r t i l e  
anim al o r  p la n t  i s  a  member o f  a  s p e c ie s  th a n  we do to  deny th a t  a 
specim en o f  some su b s tan ce  w ith  an u n u su a l s t r u c tu r e  i s  a  su b stan ce  
o f  th e  u s u a l  k in d .  P erhaps t h i s  marks a  d if f e r e n c e  betw een th e
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b io lo g ic a l  and th e  p h y s ic a l  s c ie n c e s .
However m a tte r s  s ta n d  w ith  th e s e  " r e l a t i v e l y  e s s e n t i a l " ,  o r  
" e p is te m o lo g ic a lly  e s s e n t i a l " ,  p r o p e r t i e s ,  a c c e p tin g  th a t  th e re  a re  
such  does n o t im ply th a t  th e re  i s  a  r i v a l  th e o ry  o f  re fe re n c e  to  (3A) 
o r  t h a t  (3A) i s  in  some way in c o m p le te . (3A) e x p l i c i t l y  acco u n ts  f o r  
Putnam ’ s o b s e rv a tio n s  about th e  im portance o f  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry  in  
f ix in g  th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  by  d e a l in g  w ith  
s u i ta b le  m a jo r i t i e s  o f  p r o p e r t i e s  and w ith  what i s  b e l ie v e d  w ith in  
th e  community in  which a  p r e d ic a te  i s  u se d . * S u itab le*  a llow s u s  to  
a t t a c h  more w eight to  some d e s c r ip t io n s ,  and th e s e  m ight w e ll be 
th o se  su g g es ted  by  th e  th e o r ie s  s c i e n t i s t s  a c c e p t .  More g e n e ra l ly ,  
a l l  o f  th o se  d e s c r ip t io n s  w hich can be a s s o c ia te d  w ith  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  
p r e d ic a te ,  and hence th o se  —  i f  any —  re g a rd e d  as  m en tion ing  
e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t i e s ,  w i l l  e v e n tu a lly  be d ec id ed  on th e  b a s is  o f  what 
i s  b e l ie v e d  w ith in  a  community.
The in d e x ic a l  elem ent o f  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  th a t  Putnam ’ s 
th e o ry  a tte m p ts  to  c h a r a c te r iz e  means th a t  th e  e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t ie s  
a re  th o se  o f  what i s  i d e n t i f i e d  w ith in  a  community a s  b e lo n g in g  to  
th e  k in d . B ecause o f  t h i s  u se  o f  th e  n o tio n  o f  ' i d e n t i f i c a t i o n * ,  
Putnam ’ s th e o ry  canno t be re g a rd e d  as  an account o f  what i t  i s  f o r  
a  p r e d ic a te  to  be c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d  to  an o b je c t  o r  in s ta n c e  o f  some 
k in d . As I  have in t e r p r e te d  Putnam , he i s  draw ing a t t e n t io n  to  
c e r t a in  c o n tin g e n t f a c t s  about o u r u se  o f  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s ,  
n o t g iv in g  a  th e o ry  o f  what i t  i s  fo r  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  to  be 
c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d  to  an o b je c t .
One way to  av o id  m en tio n in g  what i s  id e n t i f i e d  w ith in  a  
community a s  b e lo n g in g  to  a  k in d , w h ile  a t  th e  same tim e r e ta in in g  
an in d e x ic a l  e lem en t, would be to  h o ld  t h a t  th e  r e l a t i o n  o f  e s s e n t i a l
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s i m i l a r i t y  h o ld s  betw een w hatever o b je c ts  a r e ,  in  th e  K ripkean s e n s e , 
c a u sa l a n c e s to rs  o f  th e  p re s e n t  u s e  o f  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te ,  and 
th o se  o b je c ts  which have th e  same e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t i e s .  Such an 
acc o u n t, how ever, would a lso  f a i l  to  be a  th e o ry  o f  re fe re n c e  fo r  
n a tu r a l  k in d s .  One reaso n  fo r  t h i s  i s  th e  same as  th e  one g iven  f o r  
why K ripke*s accoun t o f  naming f a i l e d  to  be a  th e o ry  o f  r e fe re n c e  for- 
p ro p e r  nam es: e lu c id a t io n  o f  th e  n o tio n  o f  a  c a u s a l a n c e s to r  
n e c e s s i t a t e s  m ention  o f  an in t e n t io n  to  r e f e r  to  th e  same k in d  o f  
th in g .  The a p p ro p r ia te  c a u s a l a n c e s to r  o f  o u r u se  o f  th e  term  
•e le c tro n *  would c l e a r ly  n o t be S toney’ s ,  f o r  he d id  n o t u se  
•e le c tro n *  to  r e f e r  to  any k in d  o f  p a r t i c l e  a t  a l l l  To ta k e  a n o th e r  
exam ple, e a r ly  u s e r s  o f  th e  term  * gold* co u ld  n o t d is t in g u is h  r e a l  
g o ld  from * f o o l ’ s g o ld * , i . e . ,  from iro n  p y r i t e s ,  so ag a in  th e  
a p p ro p r ia te  c a u s a l a n c e s to r  has to  be t r a c e d  u s in g  some o th e r  th e o ry .  
The e x te n s io n  o f  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  can change, ju s t  as  th e  
re fe re n c e  o f  p ro p e r  names can , A second reaso n  why such  an accoun t 
w i l l  n o t do a s  a  th e o ry  o f  re fe re n c e  fo r  n a tu r a l  k in d s  i s  t h a t ,  
where t h e o r e t i c a l  p r o p e r t ie s  a re  in v o lv e d , a  change in  th e o ry  means 
a  change in  th o se  p r o p e r t i e s  re g a rd e d  as e s s e n t i a l ,  A c l u s t e r  th e o ry , 
th ough , can e x p la in  b o th  o f  th e s e  f e a tu r e s .
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CHAPTER 6 INTERPRETING PREVIOUS SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 
S e c tio n  ( i ) :  In d e te rm in acy  o f  T ra n s la t io n
Let me b e g in  by  r e p e a t in g  th e  answer I  gave in  th e  p re v io u s  
c h a p te r  to  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  what i t  i s  f o r  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p re d ic a te  
to  have an e x te n s io n !
(3A) a n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  , a s  i t  i s  u se d  w ith in  a  
l i n g u i s t i c  community G, can be c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d  to  an 
o b je c t  a  i f  and o n ly  i f  a  s a t i s f i e s  a  s u i t a b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  
th o se  d e s c r ip t io n s  w hich c o u ld  be c o n s i s te n t ly  a t t r i b u t e d  
to  ^ * s  on th e  b a s i s  o f  what i s  b e l ie v e d  w ith in  C.
What im p lic a t io n s  does t h i s  th e o ry  have f o r  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  how we
can d is c o v e r  w hich o b je c ts  b e lo n g  to  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
n a t u r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  as  t h a t  p r e d ic a te  i s  u se d  w ith in  a  g iven  
l i n g u i s t i c  community? I t  c l e a r l y  im p lie s  t h a t  we a re  to  d isc o v e r  
t h i s  th ro u g h  an in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  what d e s c r ip t io n s  c o u ld  be 
c o n s i s te n t ly  a t t r i b u t e d  to  ^ * s  on th e  b a s is  o f  what i s  b e l ie v e d  
abou t 8 w ith in  C» The f i r s t  t a s k  o f  such an e p is te m o lo g ic a l 
in v e s t ig a t io n ,  th e n , w i l l  be to  f in d  o u t what members o f  th e  g iven  
l i n g u i s t i c  community b e l ie v e ,  o r  b e l ie v e d ,  about j^*s.
What in fo rm a tio n  w i l l  be a v a i la b le  to  one engaged on such a
ta s k ?  A p p aren tly  t h i s  w i l l  depend on th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  l i n g u i s t i c
community whose language he i s  in v e s t ig a t in g #  In  d is c u s s in g  th e  
grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge, th e  com m unities w i l l  f r e q u e n t ly  be 
o nes  l i k e  *17^^ c e n tu ry  F rench  c h e m is ts ',  * l a t e  19^^ c e n tu ry  
p h y s ic is ts *  and * 19^^ c e n tu ry  M endelian g e n e t i c i s t s * ,  i . e . ,  
com m unities p r i o r  to  o u r  own. In  such  c a ses  th e  in fo rm a tio n  w i l l
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g e n e ra l ly  be l im i te d  to  what can be deduced from p h y s ic a l  o b je c ts  
w hich have endured  s in c e  t h a t  tim e —  books, a r t i c l e s ,  s c i e n t i f i c  
in s tru m e n ts ,  and so o n . For com m unities n o t so d i s t a n t  th e re  m ight 
a ls o  be memories p a sse d  on —  th e  " o ra l  t r a d i t i o n "  so to  sp eak .
The problem  fa c e d  by  th e  i n v e s t ig a to r  i s  t h a t  o f  a r r iv in g  a t  a 
c h a r a c te r i z a t io n  o f  th e  i n t e n t i o n a l  s t a t e s  —  p r im a r i ly  th e  b e l i e f  
s t a t e s  —  o f  e a r l i e r  t h e o r i s t s  g iv en  such  l im i te d  in fo rm a tio n .
One way o f  s e e in g  t h i s  a tte m p t to  u n d e rs ta n d  p re v io u s  
s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s  i s  a s  a  s p e c ia l  case  o f  t r a n s l a t i n g  from a  
fo re ig n  lan g u ag e . R a th e r th a n  la n g u ag es , how ever, th e  in v e s t ig a to r  
w i l l  adopt as b a s ic  p re v io u s  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s .  B eg inn ing  w ith  
e s ta b l i s h e d  t r a n s l a t i o n s  o f  r e l a t i v e l y  o b s e rv a tio n a l  te rm s , he 
p ro ceed s  to  t r a n s l a t e  th e  more t h e o r e t i c a l  ones u n t i l  he a ch iev es  
a  co h eren t t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  s ta te m e n ts  about ^ * s ,  on th e  b a s is  o f  
w hich he i s  a b le  to  im pute b e l i e f s  abou t ^ * s  to  th e  e a r l i e r  
t h e o r i s t s .  What i s  assumed th ro u g h o u t i s  t h a t  th e  in te n t io n a l  
s t a t e s  a re  th e r e  to  be in v e s t ig a t e d .  The r e a l i s t  v iew s them as  
form ing  an o b je c t iv e  s u b je c t  m a t te r ,  a l b e i t  one whose 
in v e s t ig a t io n  p o ses  d i f f i c u l t  m e th o d o lo g ica l p ro b lem s.
In  t h i s  c h a p te r  I  w ish  to  c o n s id e r  an argum ent o f  Quine*s 
w hich aims to  show t h a t ,  g iven  th e  m e th o d o lo g ica l problem s fa c in g  
a  t r a n s l a t o r ,  n o t o n ly  i s  t r a n s l a t i o n  u n d e rd e te rm in ed  by  a l l  
p o s s ib le  e v id en ce , b u t th a t  th e r e  i s  no f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  f o r  th e  
t r a n s l a t o r  to  be r i g h t  o r  wrong a b o u t. T ra n s la t io n  i s ,  to  u se  
Quine*s e x p re s s io n , in d e te rm in a te .  The c o n c lu s io n  he draws i s ’ 
t h a t  we must adopt a  non—r e a l i s t  a t t i t u d e  to  i n t e n t io n a l  s t a t e s .
I f  he i s  r i g h t ,  t h e o r i e s  o f  th e  k in d  e n c a p su la te d  in  (3A) must 
b e  r e j e c te d .
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What does Quine mean when he say s  t h a t  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s
in d e te rm in a te ?  We r e c a l l  from C h ap te r 3 t h a t ,  a c c o rd in g  to  Q uine,
a  s p e a k e r 's  knowledge o f  a  language —  th e  m eanings he a t ta c h e s  to
h i s  words —  i s  m a n ife s te d  p r im a r i ly  in  h i s  d i s p o s i t io n s  to  a s s e n t
to  and d is s e n t  from sen ten ces*  I f  we w ish to  in v e s t ig a te  t h i s
knowledge we must th e r e f o r e  a t t a c h  m eanings to  h i s  words in  a  way
t h a t  a cc o rd s  w ith  h i s  v e rb a l  d i s p o s i t i o n s .  The r e s u l t  i s  an
in t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  h i s  words t h a t  i s  e x p re s s iv e  o f  an i n t e l l i g i b l e
b e l i e f  s e t .  Given t h i s  p ic tu r e  o f  v e rb a l  b e h a v io u r , Quine sa y s :
m anuals f o r  t r a n s l a t i n g  one language in to  a n o th e r  can be s e t
up in  d iv e rg e n t w ays, a l l  com patib le  w ith  th e  t o t a l i t y  o f
speech  d i s p o s i t i o n s ,  y e t in c o m p a tib le  w ith  one a n o th e r .
In  c o u n tle s s  p la c e s  th e y  w i l l  d iv e rg e  in  g iv in g ,  a s  t h e i r
r e s p e c t iv e  t r a n s l a t i o n s  o f  a  se n te n c e  o f  th e  one lan g u ag e ,
se n te n c e s  o f  th e  o th e r  language w hich s ta n d  to  each  o th e r  in*}no p la u s ib le  s o r t  o f  e q u iv a le n c e  however lo o s e .
As t h i s  fo rm u la tio n  o f  th e  t h e s i s  s u g g e s ts ,  Quine ad o p ts  th e  
idiom  o f  r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  i . e . ,  t r a n s l a t i o n  from a  co m p le te ly  
a l i e n  la n g u ag e . But a s  w ith  th e  gavagai exam ple, r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t i o n  
i s  r e a l l y  a  s t r a t e g y  f o r  e s ta b l i s h in g  f e a tu r e s  abou t o u r own home 
la n g u ag e . The t r a n s l a t o r  i s  th e n  c o n s tru e d  as  one who i s  concerned  
to  u n d e rs ta n d  o th e r  sp e a k e rs  o f  a  language w ith  w hich he i s  f a m i l i a r .  
As a  fe llo w  sp e a k e r he ap p ea rs  to  be  in  a  p r iv i le g e d  p o s i t io n ,  f o r  
he can r e s o r t  to  homophonie t r a n s l a t i o n  and o th e r  a i d s .  Quine 
m a in ta in s  though th a t  th e s e  a re  m ere ly  " r e g u la t iv e  maxims" which 
h e lp  to  s e t t l e  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  which t r a n s l a t i o n  to  a d o p t, n o t 
which t r a n s l a t i o n  c a p tu re s  th e  r e a l  m eanings. The m e th o d o lo g ica l 
problem s a re  c la im ed  to  h o ld  e q u a l ly  f o r  th e  r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t o r  and
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th e  fe llo w  sp e a k e r o f  E n g lis h . The th e s i s  may he  r e - s t a t e d  as
th e  i n f i n i t e  t o t a l i t y  o f  se n te n c e s  o f  any g iv en  s p e a k e r 's
language can he so perm uted , o r  mapped on to  i t s e l f ,  th a t
(a )  th e  t o t a l i t y  o f  th e  s p e a k e r 's  d is p o s i t io n s  to  v e rb a l
b eh av io u r rem ains i n v a r i a n t ,  and y e t  (b ) th e  m apping i s  no
mere c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  s e n te n c e s  w ith  e q u iv a le n t s e n te n c e s ,
2in  any p la u s ib le  sense  o f  e q u iv a le n c e  however lo o s e .
So f a r  i t  m ight seem t h a t  Quine i s  t r y in g  to  e s t a b l i s h  an 
e p is te m o lo g ic a l p o in t  to  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  a l l  p o s s ib le  o b s e rv a tio n s  
o f  v e rb a l  b eh a v io u r f a i l  to  d e te rm in e  a  un ique  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  
th e  se n te n c e s  o f  a  la n g u ag e . But what makes Q u in e 's  whole argument 
so c o n te n tio u s  i s  t h a t  he w ishes to  make th e  much s tro n g e r  
o n to lo g ic a l  o r  m e ta p h y s ic a l p o in t  th a t  th e re  i s  sim ply  no q u e s tio n  
o f  one o f  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  b e in g  t r u e  and th e  r e s t  f a l s e :
"The p o in t  i s  n o t t h a t  we canno t be s u re  w hether th e  a n a ly t ic a l  
h y p o th e s is  i s  r i g h t ,  b u t t h a t  th e r e  i s  n o t even , a s  th e r e  was in  
th e  case  o f  [ t h e  o c c a s io n  s e n te n c e ]  'G a v a g a i ',  an o b je c t iv e  m a tte r  
to  be r ig h t  o r  wrong about What argument does Quine have to  
su p p o rt t h i s  co n c lu s io n ?
What Quine c a l l s  " the r e a l  ground" o f  th e  d o c t r in e  th a t
t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  in d e te rm in a te  i s  an in fe re n c e  from th e
u n d e rd e te rm in a tio n  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry  by a l l  p o s s ib le
o b s e rv a t io n s .  He d e s c r ib e s  t h i s  as fo llo w s :
I f  o u r  p h y s ic a l  th e o ry  can v a ry  though a l l  p o s s ib le  o b s e rv a tio n s  
be f ix e d ,  th e n  o u r  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  [ a  fo re ig n e r*  s ]  p h y s ic a l  th e o ry  
can v a ry  though o u r  t r a n s l a t i o n s  o f  a l l  p o s s ib le  o b se rv a tio n  
r e p o r ts  on h i s  p a r t  be f ix e d .  Our t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  h i s  o b s e rv a tio n  
se n te n c e s  no more f ix e s  o u r  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  h i s  p h y s ic a l  th e o ry  
th a n  o u r  own p o s s ib le  o b s e rv a tio n s  f i x  o u r own p h y s ic a l  th e o r y .4
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The c r a o ia l  p o in t ,  how ever, i s  h i s  in s is te n c e  t h a t  "The in d e te rm in acy  
o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  n o t ju s t  an in s ta n c e  o f  th e  e m p ir ic a l ly  u n d e r -
5d e te rm in ed  c h a r a c te r  o f  p h y s ic s ."  Thus, in  an o f te n  quo ted  p assag e
from h i s  r e p ly  to  Chomsky, Quine sa y s :
Though l i n g u i s t i c s  i s  o f  co u rse  a  p a r t  o f  th e  th e o ry  o f  n a tu re ,  
th e  in d e te rm in a c y  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  n o t ju s t  i n h e r i t e d  a s  a  
s p e c ia l  ca se  o f  th e  u n d e rd e te rm in a tio n  o f  o u r  th e o ry  o f  n a tu r e .
I t  i s  p a r a l l e l  h u t a d d i t io n a l . -  Thus, adopt f o r  now my f u l l y  
r e a l i s t i c  a t t i t u d e  tow ard  e le c t r o n s  and muons and cu rved  s p a c e -  
t im e , th u s  f a l l i n g  in  w ith  th e  c u r re n t  th e o ry  o f  th e  w orld  
d e s p i te  knowing t h a t  i t  i s  in  p r in c ip le  m e th o d o lo g ic a lly  u n d e r -  
d e te rm in e d . C o n s id e r , from t h i s  r e a l i s t i c  p o in t  o f  v iew , th e  
t o t a l i t y  o f  t r u t h s  o f  n a tu r e ,  known and unknown, o b se rv a b le  and 
u n o b se rv a b le , p a s t  and f u tu r e .  The p o in t abou t in d e te rm in acy  
o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  t h a t  i t  w ith s ta n d s  even a l l  t h i s  t r u t h ,  th e  
whole t r u t h  about n a tu r e .  T h is  i s  what I  mean by  say in g  t h a t ,  
where in d e te rm in a c y  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  a p p l ie s ,  th e r e  i s  no r e a l  
q u e s tio n  o f  r i g h t  c h o ic e ; th e r e  i s  no f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  even 
to  w ith in  th e  acknow ledged u n d e r d é te rm in â t io n  o f  a  th e o ry  o f  
n a tu re
T h is  s ta g e  o f  th e  argum ent w i l l  be d is c u s s e d  a t  le n g th  in  th e  t h i r d  
s e c t io n .  B efo re  we come to  i t ,  l e t  me make some f u r th e r  
c l a r i f i c a t o r y  p o in t s .
D esp ite  h i s  c a l l i n g  th e  argum ent from u n d e rd e te rm in a tio n  o f  
th e o ry  by  ev idence  " th e  r e a l  ground" o f  th e  d o c tr in e  o f  in d e te rm in a c y , 
Quine n e v e r th e le s s  h o ld s  t h a t  th e  gavagai example su g g e s ts  a n o th e r  
g round . S ince  *G av ag a iI ' i s  an o b s e rv a tio n a l  s e n te n c e , i t  has a  
s tim u lu s  synonymous t r a n s l a t i o n  and i s  i t s e l f  "an example o n ly  o f  
th e  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  te rm s , n o t o f  th e  in d e te rm in acy  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n
Yo f  s e n te n c e s ."  To see  where i t  does su p p o rt in d e te rm in a c y , we need  .
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to  im agine " th a t  some le n g th y  n o n -o h se rv a tio n a l se n te n c e s  c o n ta in in g  
g av ag a i co u ld  he found which would go in to  E n g lish  in  m a te r ia l ly  
d i f f e r e n t  ways a c c o rd in g  a s  g avaga i was eq u a ted  w ith  one o r  a n o th e r
Qo f  th e  te rm s ' r a b b i t * , * r a b b i t  s ta g e * ,  e t c . "  Yet h e re  we must b e a r  
in  mind th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f  C hap ter 3 —  th a t  even i f  we acc ep t 
Q i in e 's  s t r i c t u r e  th a t  o n ly  b e h a v io u ra l f a c t s  a r e  r e le v a n t  in  
t r a n s l a t i o n ,  we can e s t a b l i s h  a  u n iq u e  t r a n s l a t i o n  f o r  a  p re d ic a te  
l i k e  g a v a g a i. I t  w i l l  th e n  be i r r e l e v a n t  w hether we a re  t a lk in g  
abou t i t s  u se  in  o b s e rv a t io n a l  o r  n o n -o b s e rv a tio n a l s e n te n c e s .
F o r th e se  re a s o n s , I  s h a l l  c o n fin e  my a t te n t io n  to  th e  u n d e r -  
d e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e o ry  by  ev idence  when d is c u s s in g  what argument 
Quine g iv e s  in  su p p o rt o f  h i s  d o c t r in e  o f  in d e te rm in acy  o f  
t r a n s l a t i o n .
Having s a id  t h i s ,  th e  r e l a t i o n  betw een in d e te rm in acy  o f
t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  se n te n c e s  and i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  r e fe re n c e  o f  te rm s
s t i l l  rem ains u n c le a r .  Quine say s  " th e  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  term s
need  n o t alw ays b r in g  in d e te rm in acy  o f  sen ten c e  t r a n s l a t i o n  in  i t s  
gt r a i n . "  A p p aren tly  th e n  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  does n o t im ply in d e te rm in a c y . 
From t h i s  i t  fo llo w s  th a t  de te rm in acy  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  does n o t im ply  
*s c r u ta b i l i ty *  o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  i . e . ,  we m ight be a b le  to  d é te rm in â te ly  
t r a n s l a t e  some fo re ig n  se n te n c e  w ith o u t b e in g  a b le  to  's c ru te *  th e  
re fe re n c e  o f  i t s  te rm s . T h is  makes sen se  o f  what Quine says about 
h i s  exam ples o f  th e  Japanese  c l a s s i f i e r s  and d e f e r r e d  o s te n s io n .^ ^
In  th e  c o n te x t o f  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  th e  im p o rtan t q u e s tio n  i s  
w hether th e  con v erse  im p lic a tio n  h o ld s ,  i . e . ,  w hether s c r u t a b i l i t y  
o f  re fe re n c e  im p lie s  d e te rm in acy  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n .  One o f  my aims i s  
to  e s t a b l i s h  what th e  te rm s o f  e a r l i e r  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  had as  
t h e i r  e x te n s io n s .  I f  s c r u t a b i l i t y  im p lie s  d e te rm in acy , in d e te rm in acy
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im p lie s  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y ,  and c o n seq u en tly  o u r i n a b i l i t y  to  
d é te rm in â te ly  t r a n s l a t e  s e n te n c e s  would mean th a t  we cannot be 
a s s u re d  o f  e s ta b l i s h in g  what th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  t h e i r  te rm s are*  
M oreover, i t  would seem th a t  in d e te rm in acy  o f te n  p erv ad es o u r 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  p re v io u s  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s .  We a r e ,  e . g . ,  
u n su re  a s  to  p r e c i s e ly  what was b e l ie v e d  by  Mendel about " fo rm a tiv e  
e le m e n ts" , even though we in t e r p r e t  them as b e l i e f s  about g en es .
I f  th e  im p lic a t io n  h o ld s ,  and i f  th e re  i s  no f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  
abou t what Mendel b e l ie v e d ,  such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  s e r io u s ly  
q u e s tio n e d . The s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  be l i k e  th e  one fa c e d  by  th e  
r e a l i s t  in  th e  wake o f  th e  in co m m en su rab ility  t h e s i s .  Given th e  
in co m m en su rab ility  o f  two com peting o r  su c c e s s iv e  s c i e n t i f i c  
t h e o r i e s ,  i t  was c la im ed  th a t  th e r e  was no f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  as  
to  w hether th e y  a re  about th e  same th in g s .  T h is  was h e ld  to  be so 
on th e  grounds t h a t  th e r e  would be too few " t r a n s la t io n s "  —  in  
f a c t  none —  betw een th e  t h e o r i e s .  Should i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  
re fe re n c e  be h e ld  to  fo llo w  from in d e te rm in acy  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  th e  
r e a l i s t  w i l l  fa c e  th e  same c o n c lu s io n , a lth o u g h  t h i s  tim e th e  re a so n  
w i l l  be t h a t  th e r e  a re  too  many t r a n s l a t i o n s  a l l  com patib le  w ith  
th e  b e h a v io u ra l e v id e n c e .
I f ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, s c r u t a b i l i t y  does n o t im ply d e te rm in acy , 
th e n ,  by  s im i la r  re a so n in g  to  t h a t  app ea led  to  in  th e  l a s t  p a rag rap h  
b u t o n e , in d e te rm in acy  does n o t im ply  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y .  I t  would th e n  
be  p o s s ib le  f o r  th e  r e a l i s t  to  concede th a t  t r a n s l a t i o n  m ight n o t be 
f u l l y  d e te rm in a te  w ith o u t th e re b y  je o p a rd iz in g  h i s  c la im s to  have 
e s ta b l i s h e d  what th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  te rm s from p re v io u s  th e o r ie s  w ere . 
And in d eed  th e re  does seem to  be good i n t u i t i v e  su p p o rt f o r  t h i s  v iew .
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Sim ply b ecause  a  r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t o r  can t e l l ,  by  u s in g  p ro ced u res  
l i k e  th o se  o u t l in e d  in  C hap ter 3 , th a t  members o f  an a l ie n  t r i b e  
a re  r e f e r r in g  to  r a b b i t s ,  and n o t r a b b i t  s ta g e s ,  e t c . ,  when th e y  
u s e  th e  terra g a v a g a i, i t  does n o t fo llo w  th a t  he w i l l  th e re b y  be 
a b le  to  i n t e r p r e t  t h e i r  whole " th e o ry "  o f  r a b b i t s .  I t  m ight be 
th e  c a s e , e . g . ,  t h a t  th e y  have b e l i e f s  o f  a  r e l i g io u s  k in d  about 
r a b b i t s ,  b e l i e f s  w hich rem ain in d e te rm in a te  g iven  t h e i r  s tim u lu s  
re s p o n s e s .  L ikew ise someone m ight be ab le  to  show th a t  D alton  had 
a  th e o ry  about atoms w ith o u t b e in g  a b le  to  s t a t e  th e  t o t a l i t y  o f  
h i s  b e l i e f s  about them —  i f  he can e s t a b l i s h  a  s u i t a b le  m a jo r i ty ,  
t h a t  i s  enough. T h is  i s  c l e a r l y  n o t Q u in e 's  v iew . I  su g g es t i t  
o n ly  a s  one l i n e  o f  argum ent w hich m ight be fo llo w ed  i f  t r a n s l a t i o n  
c o u ld  n o t be shown to  be in d e te rm in a te  in  a  way a d d i t io n a l  to  th e  
u n d e rd e te rm in a tio n  o f  p h y s ic s .  We s h a l l  r e tu r n  to  i t  l a t e r .
For th e  moment, l e t  u s  c o n c e n tra te  on th e  f i r s t  two s ta g e s  
o f  th e  argum ent Quine c a l l s  " th e  r e a l  g round". These a re :  ( i)a ssu m e  
t h a t  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry  —  " th e  th e o ry  o f  n a tu re "  —  i s  u n d e r -  
de te rm in ed  by a l l  p o s s ib le  o b s e rv a t io n s ,  th e n  ( i i ) i t  fo llo w s  th a t  
t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  u n d erd e te rm in ed  by  a l l  p o s s ib le  o b s e rv a t io n s .
A f i r s t  query  m ight be r a i s e d  o v e r th e  p h ra se  " a l l  p o s s ib le  
o b s e rv a tio n s " :  how, one m ight a s k , co u ld  we ev e r b e  in  a  p o s i t io n  
to  r u le  o u t a l l  f u tu r e  ev id en ce?  But th e re  i s  a  w eaker fo rm u la tio n  
o f  which Quine can a v a i l  h im s e lf .  There i s  no re a so n  to  th in k  th a t  
a t  any s ta g e  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  e n q u iry  th e  t o t a l i t y  o f  o b s e rv a tio n s  we 
have made w i l l  fo rc e  u s  to  a c c e p t ju s t  one th e o ry ; a l t e r n a t iv e s  
w i l l  always be a v a i la b l e .
.187.
In c re a s e d  r e c o g n i t io n  o f  th e  work o f  IXihem has r e s u l t e d  in
g e n e ra l accep tan c e  o f  t h i s  v iew . In d eed , in  most q u a r te r s  i t  has
come to  he  re g a rd e d  a s  som eth ing  o f  a  p l a t i t u d e .  Now a lth o u g h  I
th in k  th e re  a re  i n t e r e s t i n g  q u e s tio n s  to  he r a i s e d  abou t p a r t i c u l a r
p u rp o r te d  in s ta n c e s  o f  u n d e rd e te rm in a tio n  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry ,
i t  does seem t h a t  th e r e  a re  numerous exam ples w hich a re  c o r r e c t ly
11in t e r p r e te d  in  t h i s  way. Hence I  s h a l l  fo llo w  th e  v a s t  m a jo r i ty  
o f  Quinean com m entators in  conced ing  t h i s  f i r s t  a ssum ption .
T urn ing  now to  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  we need  to  b eg in  by exam ining 
th e  m e th o d o lo g ica l s i t u a t i o n  o f  th e  r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t o r .  H is aim 
i s  to  d e f in e  a  fu n c tio n  which maps se n te n c e s  o f  th e  a l i e n  language 
o n to  se n te n c e s  o f  th e  t r a n s l a t o r ' s  home la n g u ag e . The b a s ic  d a ta ,  
a s  a lre a d y  n o te d , a re  th e  a l i e n s '  d is p o s i t io n s  to  a s s e n t  to  and 
d is s e n t  from s e n te n c e s ,  i t  b e in g  assumed th a t  n a t iv e  a s s e n t and 
d is s e n t  can b e  in t e r p r e te d  a s  such  by  th e  t r a n s l a t o r .  In  a d d i t io n  
to  t h i s  e v id e n c e , Quine th in k s  th e r e  a re  c e r t a in  c o n s t r a in ts  w hich 
th e  t r a n s l a t o r  i s  m e th o d o lo g ic a lly  j u s t i f i e d  in  im posing on th e  
fu n c t io n .  O b se rv a tio n  se n te n c e s  must be mapped on to  sen ten c es  o f  
th e  home language g e n e ra l ly  a s s e n te d  to  in  th e  same c irc u m s ta n c e s . 
T ru th - fd n c t io n a l  lo g ic  sh o u ld  be im puted to  th e  a l i e n s .  F in a l ly ,  
s t im u lu s - a n a ly t ic  ( - c o n t r a d ic to r y )  sen te n c e s  o f  th e  a l i e n  language 
sh o u ld  be t r a n s l a t e d  by  s t im u lu s - a n a ly t ic  ( - c o n t r a d ic to r y )  se n te n c e s  
o f  th e  home la n g u ag e . The r e s u l t a n t  p o s s ib le  fu n c tio n s  Quine c a l l s  
a n a ly t i c a l  h y p o th e se s .
Two problem s a f f e c t in g  t h i s  s ta g e  o f  th e  argum ent may be 
d is t in g u is h e d .  The p r io r  one i s  w hether Quine has d e sc r ib e d  th e  
m e th o d o lo g ica l s i t u a t i o n  c o r r e c t ly .  The second i s  w h ether, g iven  a
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c o r r e c t  d e s c r ip t io n ,  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  u n d erd e te rm in ed  by  o b s e rv a tio n .
D iscu ssio n  o f  th e  f i r s t  c e n tr e s  on th e  is s u e  o f  what th e  c o r re c t
c o n s t r a in t s  bn t r a n s l a t i o n  a r e .  Some c r i t i c s  have su g g es ted  th a t
Q iine  i s  u n j u s t i f i e d  in  im posing  th e  th r e e  t h a t  he d o e s . Thus
Hookway n o te s ,  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e  t h i r d ,  t h a t  th e  body o f  s t im u lu s -
a n a ly t ic  s e n te n c e s  changes o v e r  tim e , w ith  th e  r e s u l t  th a t  a
sen ten c e  l i k e  'T he sun c i r c l e s  th e  e a r t h ' ,  w hich may have been
s t im u lu s - a n a ly t ic  in  th e  m iddle a g e s , i s  now more l i k e l y  to  be
12re g a rd e d  as  s t im u lu s - c o n tr a d ic to r y .  The more f re q u e n t c r i t i c i s m■n.
o f  Quine though  i s  t h a t  he ig n o re s  o th e r  a c c e p ta b le  c o n s t r a in t s .
I  s h a l l  c o n s id e r  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  in  d e t a i l  in  s e c t io n  ( i i ) .  The 
p ro b le n  o f  how d e te rm in a te  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s ,  g iv en  a  c o r r e c t  
d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  m e th o d o lo g ica l s i t u a t i o n ,  w i l l  be d is c u s s e d  in  
th e  t h i r d  s e c t io n .
S e c tio n  ( i i ) :  R ad ic a l T ra n s la t io n  v s .  R ad ica l I n te r p r e ta t i o n
Quine h a s  f r e q u e n t ly  drawn a t t e n t io n  to  th e  c lo se  co n n ec tio n s  
betw een b e l i e f  and m eaning. In  o rd e r  to  d e term in e  what sen ten c es  
o f  an a l i e n  language mean we must d ec id e  what b e l i e f s  th e y  e x p re s s .  
But how can we b eg in  to  a t t r i b u t e  b e l i e f s  w ith o u t some means o f  
in t e r p r e t i n g  th e  language? A s t a r t  has to  be made somewhere, y e t 
any p a r t i c u l a r  p o in t  would seem to  exceed what i s  j u s t i f i e d  by th e  
b e h a v io u ra l f a c t s .
In  C hap ter 3 , I  n o te d  one r e p ly  to  t h i s  l i n e  o f  argument 
w hich tu rn e d  on th e  c o n t r a s t  betw een a  th e o ry  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  and 
a  th e o ry  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  A tte n tio n  was drawn to  th e  f a c t  t h a t
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b e l i e f s  i n t e r a c t  w ith  d e s i r e s  to  d e term ine  a c t io n s .  T h is su g g e s ts  
a  way in  which th e  d a ta  u se d  to  e s t a b l i s h  t r a n s l a t i o n  can be 
e n la rg e d . In  t r a n s l a t i o n  th e  " v a r ia b le s "  a re  b e l i e f  and 'm eaning; 
in  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  a c t io n  th e y  a re  b e l i e f  and d e s i r e .
P e rh ap s  i t  would be p o s s ib le  to  " p la y  o f f "  v e rb a l  b eh av io u r and 
a c t io n  in  such  a  way a s  to  f i x  on b e l i e f .
U n fo r tu n a te ly  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  see  how such  a  r e p ly  co u ld
o f f e r  r e a l  a id ,  in  th e  form o f  f u r th e r  c o n s t r a in t s ,  to  th e  r a d ic a l
t r a n s l a t o r .  I t  i s  as though in s te a d  o f  hav ing  one e q u a tio n  w ith
two v a r ia b le s  he now h as  two e q u a tio n s  w ith  th r e e  v a r ia b le s ;  f o r  a
u n iq u e  s o lu t io n  he needs one more eq u a tio n  w ith  no more v a r i a b le s .
Of c o u rse , he co u ld  impose c e r t a in  a  p r i o r i  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e
p l a u s i b i l i t y  and com p lex ity  o f  th e  d e s i r e s  a s c r ib a b le ,  b u t any
such  assum ptions about in t e n t io n a l  s t a t e s  would seem to, beg  th e
q u e s tio n  a g a in s t  Q u in e 's  argum ent. For t h i s  rea so n  i t  seems to
me th a t  th e  approaches o f  Lewis^^ and Grandy^^^ whereby a l i e n s '
b e l i e f s ,  d e s i r e s ,  and w orld  p ic tu r e s  a re  sim ply  assumed to  be as
s im i la r  to  o u r  own as p o s s ib le ,  r e q u ir e  f u r th e r  c l a r i f i c a t i o n .
M oreover, a s  Hookway h as  n o te d , even assum ptions made about th e
in t e n t io n a l  s t a t e s  o f  th o se  b e lo n g in g  to  th e  same l i n g u i s t i c
community as a  t r a n s l a t o r ,  assum ptions he m ight in te n d  to  im pute
to  th e  a l i e n s ,  s ta n d  in  need  o f  independen t su p p o rt : " I f
p sy c h o lo g ic a l g e n e r a l iz a t io n s  a re  grounded in  o b s e rv a tio n s  o f  th e
b eh av io u r o f  th o s e  whose b e h a v io u r we u n d e rs ta n d , th e y  cannot
p ro v id e  an e s s e n t i a l  e m p ir ic a l c o n s t r a in t  re n d e r in g  in t e r p r e t a t i o n  
15d e te rm in a te ."
.190,
A more p ro m isin g  approach  to  th e  b e lie f /m e a n in g  problem  in  
r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  su g g e s te d , somewhat i r o n i c a l l y ,  by  Quine 
h im s e lf .  In  h i s  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  s e n te n t i a l  
c o n n e c tiv e s ,  he n o te s  t h a t  th e r e  w i l l  be c a se s  where th e  t r a n s l a t o r  
i s  o b lig e d  to  re o o n s tru e  th e  b e h a v io u ra l e v id e n c e . T h is  w i l l  be so 
where th e  im p lie d  t r a n s l a t i o n s  r e s u l t  in  " a s s e r t io n s  s t a r t i n g l y  
f a l s e  on th e  fa c e  o f  them ."^^  He c i t e s  ap p ro v in g ly  W ilso n 's  
" p r in c ip le  o f  c h a r i ty " :  "We s e le c t  as  designatum  th a t  in d iv id u a l  
which w i l l  make th e  la r g e s t  p o s s ib le  number o f  . . .  s ta te m e n ts  
true."^*^  T h is  p r in c ip le  i s  so s tro n g  t h a t ,  even in  t r a n s l a t i o n  a t  
home, "We w i l l  c o n s tru e  a  n e ig h b o u r 's  word h é té ro p h o n ie  a l l y  now 
and ag a in  i f  th e re b y  we see  o u r way to  making h i s  m essage le s s  
a b su rd .
M axim izing t r u t h  in  t h i s  way i s  n o th in g  more th a n  m axim izing
agreem ent betw een sp eak e r and i n t e r p r e t e r  o v e r p a r t i c u l a r
s ta te m e n ts ,  f o r  th e  t r u t h  o f  th o se  s ta te m e n ts  i s  judged by  th e
l a t t e r .  The p r in c ip le  o f  c h a r i ty ,  t h e n , i s  a  c o n s t r a in t  on
t r a n s l a t i o n ,  one w hich r e s t s  on th e  id e a  t h a t  sp eak e r and
i n t e r p r e t e r  a re  to  be  assumed a s  sh a r in g  c e r t a in  b e l i e f s .  Davidson
h a s  r e c e n t ly  arg u ed  th a t  t h i s  p r in c ip le  i s  th e  key  to  overcom ing
19sy s te m a tic  in d e te rm in a c y . ^ H is c laim  i s  th a t  a  th e o ry  o f  r a d ic a l
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  can , w ith  th e  a id  o f  th e  p r in c i p l e ,  be c o n s tru c te d
in  a  way fo rm a lly  analogous to  T a r s k i 's  d e f in i t i o n  o f  t r u t h .
Where he d i f f e r s  from Quine o v e r th e  p r in c ip le  i s  in  h o ld in g  th a t
20i t  has to  be a p p l ie d  " a c ro s s - th e -b o a rd " ,  n o t ju s t  in  co n n ec tio n  
w ith  th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  p u re ly  s e n t e n t i a l  c o n n e c tiv e s .  The 
rem ain d er o f  t h i s  s e c t io n  w i l l  be spen t exam ining th e s e  view s o f  
D a v id so n 's .
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F o llow ing  Q uine, D avidson m a in ta in s  t h a t  th e  c r u c i a l  n o tio n
f o r  a  th e o ry  o f  r a d ic a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  th a t  o f  a c c e p tin g
se n te n c e s  as  t r u e .  Given th e  c lo s e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n  o f  b e l i e f  and
m eaning, th e  o n ly  way to  th e n  b e g in  i n t e r p r e t i n g  a  s p e a k e r 's  words
i s  by  assum ing g e n e ra l agreem ent on b e l i e f s :
We g e t a  f i r s t  ap p rox im ation  to  a  f in i s h e d  th e o ry  by a s s ig n in g  
to  se n te n c e s  o f  a  sp eak e r c o n d itio n s  o f  t r u t h  t h a t  a c tu a l ly  
o b ta in  ( in  o u r  own o p in io n )  ju s t  when th e  sp eak e r h o ld s  th o se  
se n te n c e s  t r u e .  The g u id in g  p o l ic y  i s  to  do t h i s  as f a r  as  
p o s s ib le ,  s u b je c t  to  c o n s id e ra t io n s  o f  s im p l ic i ty ,  hunches 
about th e  e f f e c t s  o f  s o c ia l  c o n d i t io n in g , and o f  co u rse  o u r
21common s e n s e , o r  s c i e n t i f i c ,  knowledge o f  e x p l ic a b le  e r r o r .
Such a  p ro ced u re  " i s  n o t d e s ig n ed  to  e l im in a te  d isag ree m en t, n o r
can  i t ;  i t s  p u rpose  i s  to  make m ean ingfu l d isag reem en t p o s s ib le ,
and t h i s  depends e n t i r e l y  on a  fo u n d a tio n  —  some fo u n d a tio n  —
22in  ag reem en t."  Here we have th e  b a s i s  f o r  a  t r a n s c e n d e n ta l
argum ent in  su p p o rt o f  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  c h a r i ty :
S ince c h a r i ty  i s  n o t an o p t io n ,  b u t a  c o n d itio n  o f  hav ing  a
w orkable th e o ry ,  i t  i s  m ean in g le ss  to  su g g est t h a t  we m ight f a l l
in to  m assive e r r o r  by  en d o rs in g  i t .  U n t i l  we have s u c c e s s fu l ly
e s ta b l is h e d  a  s y s te m a tic  c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  s e n te n c e s  h e ld  t r u e  w ith
se n te n c e s  h e ld  t r u e ,  th e r e  a re  no m istak es  to  make. C h a r i ty  i s
fo rc e d  on u s ;  w hether we l i k e  i t  o r  n o t ,  i f  we want to  u n d e rs ta n d
o th e r s ,  we must count them r ig h t  in  most m a t te r s .  I f  we can
produce a  th e o ry  t h a t  r e c o n c i le s  c h a r i ty  and th e  form al
c o n d itio n s  f o r  a  th e o ry ,  we have done a l l  t h a t  co u ld  be done to
en su re  com m unication. N oth ing  more i s  p o s s ib le ,  and n o th in g  
23more i s  n eeded .
One p e rso n  to  have q u e s tio n e d  t h i s  argument o f  D av id so n 's  i s  
C o lin  McGinn. He c la im s th a t
we may ec jua lly  p ro v id e  a  b a s i s  f o r  d e r iv in g  th e  m eanings o f
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se n te n c e s  h e ld  t r u e  by u n c h a r i ta b ly  im pu ting  f a l s e  b e l i e f s  to
o u r sp e a k e r . We sim ply  su ppose , w ith  o r  w ith o u t good re a so n ,
t h a t  he has made a  m is tak e  and i s  e x p re ss in g  a  f a l s e  b e l i e f
24w ith  a  c o rre sp o n d in g ly  f a l s e  s e n te n c e , ^
D avidson, how ever, ap p ea rs  to  have fo re se e n  t h i s  r e p ly ,  f o r  he 
say s  e lsew here
The m e th o d o lo g ica l ad v ice  to  i n t e r p r e t  in  a  way t h a t  o p tim iz e s
agreem ent sh o u ld  n o t be co n ce iv ed  a s  r e s t i n g  on a  c h a r i ta b le
assum ption  abou t human in t e l l ig e n c e  th a t  m ight tu r n  ou t to  be
f a l s e .  I f  we cannot f in d  a  way to  in t e r p r e t  th e  u t te r a n c e s  and
o th e r  b eh av io u r o f  a  c r e a tu r e  a s  r e v e a l in g  a  s e t  o f  b e l i e f s
la r g e ly  c o n s is te n t  and t r u e  by  o u r own s ta n d a rd s ,  we have no
reaso n  to  count t h a t  c r e a tu r e  a s  r a t i o n a l ,  a s  h av ing  b e l i e f s ,
25o r  a s  sa y in g  a n y th in g .
McGinn a ls o  draws a t t e n t i o n  to  a n o th e r  argum ent Davidson has
f o r  c h a r i ty ,  t h a t  b e fo re  someone can be s a id  to  have a  b e l i e f  about
som ething  i t  has to  be shown t h a t  th e y  have many o th e r  t r u e  b e l i e f s
abou t t h a t  t h i n g . H e  r i g h t l y  p o in ts  ou t t h a t  t h i s  c o n d itio n  i s
to o  s tro n g  a s  i t  s ta n d s ,  f o r  th e r e  do seem to  be c a se s  where we can
j u s t i f i a b l y  say  t h a t  a  p e rso n  has a  b e l i e f  about som ething w ith o u t
h i s  h av ing  many b e l i e f s  about i t  a t  a l l .  I  f a i l  to  u n d e rs ta n d
M cGinn's f u r th e r  p o in t  though  t h a t
I t  may s t i l l  be m a in ta in e d  . . .  t h a t  p o sse ss io n  o f  a  concept 
r e q u ir e s  a  c e r t a in  minimum o f  t r u e  b e l i e f s  abou t members o f  i t s  
e x te n s io n , so t h a t  th e r e  cannot be sh a red  co n ce p ts  w ith o u t a 
m easure o f  sh a re d  b e l i e f s ;  b u t t h i s  f a l l s  s h o r t  o f  what Davidson 
w an ts , b ecause  now we see  t h a t  d isag reem en t co n ce rn in g  an o b je c t  
i s  p o s s ib le  unm ed iated  by  common con cep ts  w ith  re s p e c t  to  t h a t  
o b je c t .
To r e fa s h io n  an example o f  D a v id so n 's , what co nv inces  u s  th a t  some 
a n c ie n ts  b e l ie v e d  o f  th e  e a r th  t h a t  i t  was f l a t  i s  t h a t  th e y  made
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a la rg e  n im te r  o f  s ta te m e n ts  which we in t e r p r e t  as  t r u e  s ta te m e n ts  
co n o em in g  th e  e a r th  and which we ta k e  a s  e x p re s s in g  t r u e  b e l i e f s ;  
s ta te m e n ts  a b o u t, e . g . ,  th e  p h y s ic a l  shape and c l im a t ic  c o n d itio n s  
o f  p a r t i c u l a r  p a r t s  o f  i t s  s u r f a c e .  C e r ta in ly  we have good re a so n  
f o r  th in k in g  th a t  th e y  d id  n o t sh a re  o u r concep t o f  th e  e a r th  a s  a  
l a r g e ,  c o o l , s o l i d  body c i r c l i n g  around a  v e ry  la r g e ,h o t  s t a r ,  b u t 
a s  I  have em phasised a l l  a lo n g , i d e n t i t y  o f  r e fe re n c e  i s  d i f f e r e n t  
from id e n t i t y  o f  s e n s e , and when we t a l k  about "common co n cep ts"  
we u n d e rs ta n d  th e  l a t t e r  to  be th e  c a s e . I f  t h i s  i s  so th e n , c o n tra  
MoGinn, such  exam ples do seem to  su p p o rt D avidson’ s c laim  th a t  
"F a ls e  b e l i e f s  te n d  to  underm ine th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  s u b je c t -  
m a t te r ;  to  underm ine, th e r e f o r e ,  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  a  d e s c r ip t io n  o f  
th e  b e l i e f  a s  b e in g  about t h a t  s u b je c t .  And so , in  tu r n ,  f a l s e
28b e l i e f s  underm ine th e  c la im  th a t  a  connec ted  b e l i e f  i s  f a l s e . "
The p o in t  h e re  i s  ju s t  l i k e  th e  one I  made in  re sp o n se  to  
K rip k e ’ s p u rp o r te d  coun terexam ples to  th e  account g iven  by  th e  
c l u s t e r  th e o ry  o f  how th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  p ro p e r name o r  th e  e x te n s io n  
o f  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  i s  f ix e d .  B efore we can make s e n s e 'o f  
a s s e r t io n s  about what A r i s to t l e  m ight n o t have done, o r  about what 
p r o p e r t i e s  t i g e r s  m ight n o t have p o sse sse d , we have to  have some 
way o f  p ic k in g  o u t th e  r e le v a n t  s u b je c t -m a t te r ,  and t h i s  l i m i t s  th e  
b e l i e f s  we m ight w ish  to  e n t e r t a i n .  C onsequen tly  i t  would seem th a t  
i f  we r e p la c e ,  in  th e  l a s t  q u o ta tio n  from McGinn’ s a r t i c l e ,  th e  
p h ra se  "a  c e r t a in  minimum o f  t r u e  b e l i e f s "  w ith  th e  p h rase  "a  s u i t a b le  
m a jo r i ty  o f  t r u e  b e l i e f s " ,  and u n d e rs ta n d  " a  s u i t a b le  m a jo r ity "  in  th e  
way su g g es ted  in  C hap ter 5» we have an o th e r  good argument in  fav o u r o f  
th e  p r in c ip le  o f  c h a r i ty .  M oreover, i t  w i l l  be an argument su p p o rted  
by what was s a id  in  C hap ter 5*
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In  th e  l i g h t  o f  th e s e  argum ents, c o n s id e ra b le  c h a r i ty  ap p ea rs
to  be o b l ig a to ry  on th e  i n t e r p r e t e r .  The n ex t q u e s tio n  i s ,  how i s
he to  ap p ly  i t  a c ro s s - th e -b o a rd ?  To answer t h i s  we need  to  examine
D avidson’ s  th e o ry  o f  r a d ic a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  more c lo s e ly .  One o f
h i s  main id e a s  i s  t h a t  a  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  f o r  a  language sho u ld
e n ab le  a  p e rso n  to  u n d e rs ta n d  any d e c la r a t iv e  se n te n c e  u t t e r e d  by
a  sp eak e r o f  t h a t  la n g u ag e . I f  one knows t h a t  when a  sp eak er u t t e r s
X what he say s  i s  t r u e  i f  and o n ly  i f  £ ,  one can g rasp  what he i s
c la im in g  to  be t r u e ,  i f  he i s  a s s e r t in g  X. I t  would seem to  fo llo w
from t h i s  t h a t  one would be  j u s t i f i e d  in  co n c lu d in g  th a t  X means £ .
But h e re  D avidson say s  th a t  we have to  s e r io u s ly  m odify th e  i n i t i a l
id e a  t h a t  a  th e o ry  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  to  be b ased  on a  th e o ry  o f
t r u t h .  T a r s k i’ s  C onvention  T demands o f  a  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  t h a t  a l l
s e n te n c e s  o f  w hich a  t r u t h  p r e d ic a te  i s  p r e d ic a te d  e n t a i l  o th e rs  o f
a  c e r t a in  fo rm . T h is  g iv e s  se n te n c e s  l ik e  th e  f a m i l i a r  ’ "Frege
d ie d  in  1925’' i s  t r u e  i f  and o n ly  i f  F rege d ie d  in  1925’ # F o llow ing
D avidson, l e t  u s  c a l l  th e se  T -se n te n c e s . In  T a r s k i’ s  th e o ry ,
T -sen ten o es  a re  to  be rec o g n iz e d  by t h e i r  s y n ta c t ic  form , b u t in
r a d ic a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a  s y n ta c t i c a l  t e s t  i s  n o t a v a i la b le  s in c e  i t
would p resuppose  an u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  language to  be
in t e r p r e t e d .  As Davidson sa y s :
th e  s y n ta c t i c a l  t e s t  i s  m ere ly  meant to  fo rm a liz e  th e  r e l a t i o n
o f  synonymy o r  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  and t h i s  r e l a t i o n  i s  ta k en  as
u n p ro b lem atic  in  T a r s k i’ s work on t r u t h .  Our o u tlo o k  in v e r t s
T a r s k i’ s :  we want to  ach iev e  an u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  meaning o r
t r a n s l a t i o n  by  assum ing a  p r i o r  g rasp  o f  th e  concep t o f  t r u t h .
What we r e q u i r e ,  th e r e f o r e ,  i s  a  way o f  ju d g in g  th e  a c c e p ta b i l i t y
o f  T -sen te n o es  t h a t  i s  n o t s y n ta c t i c a l ,  and makes no u se  o f  th e
co n cep ts  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  m eaning o r  synonymy, b u t i s  such th a t
29a c c e p ta b le  T -se n te n c e s  w i l l  in  f a c t  y ie ld  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s .
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Such a  way i s  a f fo rd e d ,  a c c o rd in g  to  D avidson, by  th e  p r in c ip le  
o f  c h a r i ty .
I f  sp eak e rs  o f  a  language h o ld  a  sen ten c e  to  be t r u e  u n d er 
c e r t a in  c irc u m stan c es  o b serv ed  by  th e  i n t e r p r e t e r ,  th e n  t h i s  i s  to  
be ta k e n  a s  p rim a f a c ie  ev idence  th a t  th e  sen ten c e  i s  b e l ie v e d  by 
th e  sp eak e rs  to  be t r u e  u n d er th o se  c ircu m stan ces*  A sp eak er i s  
th e re b y  assumed to  be t r u t h f u l  a s  f a r  as  p o s s ib le .  In  t h i s  way 
th e  i n t e r p r e t e r  can hope to  e s t a b l i s h ,  v i a  numerous p o s i t iv e  
in s ta n c e s ,  g e n e r a l iz a t io n s  l i k e
( x ) ( t ) ( i f  X i s  a  member o f  th e  German l i n g u i s t i c  community 
th e n  (x  h o ld s  'E s  s c h n e i t '  t r u e  a t  t  i f  and o n ly  i f  
i t  i s  snowing n e a r  x  a t  t ))  
which in  tu rn  su p p o rt T -se n te n c e s  l i k e
'E s  sch n e it*  i s  tru e -in -G erm an  f o r  a  sp eak er x  a t  tim e t  i f
and o n ly  i f  i t  i s  snowing n e a r  x  a t  t .
Here we see  an im p o rtan t d i f f e r e n c e  betw een r a d ic a l  in t e r p r e t a t i o n  
and r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t i o n :  such r e fe re n c e  to  o b je c t iv e  f e a tu r e s  o f
th e  w orld  which a l t e r  in  c o n ju n c tio n  w ith  changes in  a t t i t u d e  '
tow ards th e  t r u t h  o f  se n te n c e s  r e p la c e s  Q uine’ s  n o tio n  o f  s tim u lu s  
meaning* N o tic e  a lso  t h a t  th e  ap p ea l to  th e  n o tio n  o f  a  l i n g u i s t i c  
community begs no q u e s tio n ,  f o r  sp eak e rs  can be s a id  to  b e lo n g  to  
th e  same l i n g u i s t i c  community i f  th e  same th e o ry  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
works f o r  them#
As D avidson i s  th e  f i r s t  to  ad m it, t h i s  s t r a t e g y  p re s e n ts  
obv ious e m p ir ic a l d i f f i c u l t i e s .  Speakers may be wrong about 
w hether i t  i s  snowing n e a r  them ; th e re  w i l l  be d i f f e r e n c e s  from 
sp eak e r to  sp e a k e r , and from tim e to  tim e f o r  th e  same sp e a k e r,
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w ith  re s p e c t  to  th e  c irc u m stan c es  u n d er w hich-a sen ten c e  i s  h e ld  
t r u e ;  and so o n . Davidson r e p l i e s  by  p o in t in g  o u t th a t  a  th e o ry  
o f  in t e r p r e t a t i o n  w i l l  have to  ta k e  account o f  th e  h o l i s t i c  n a tu re  
o f  a  la n g u ag e . T h is  g iv e s  a n o th e r  (p o s s ib ly  u n in te n d e d )  sense  to  
h i s  rem ark t h a t  c h a r i ty  has to  b e  a p p lie d  a c ro s s - th e -b o a rd .  
T -se n te n c e s  a re  n o t to  be e s ta b l i s h e d  one a t  a  tim e  b u t r a th e r  as  
e lem en ts  o f  a  p a t t e r n  which s a t i s f i e s  th e  fo rm al c o n s t r a in ts  o f  a  
th e o ry  o f  t r u t h .  The aim i s  to  g e t a  th e o ry  o f  b e s t  f i t ,  a lth o u g h  
th e r e  w i l l  be no re a so n  to  suppose t h a t  th e re  i s  ju s t  one such 
th e o ry .
T his r a i s e s  th e  im p o rtan t q u e s tio n  o f  how much in d e te rm in acy  
th e r e  w i l l  be in  r a d ic a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  B efore we can a s s e s s  t h i s  
we need  to  lo o k  more a t  th e  fo rm al c o n s t r a in t s .  B eginning  w ith  
th o s e  se n te n c e s  alw ays h e ld  t r u e  o r  alw ays h e ld  f a l s e ,  i . e . ,  th o s e  
i d e n t i f i e d  in  Quinean r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t i o n  as  s t im u lu s - a n a ly t ic  o r  
s t im u lu s - c o n tr a d ic to ry ,  and p a t te r n s  o f  in f e r e n c e ,  th e  r a d ic a l  
i n t e r p r e t e r  lo o k s  fo r  th e  b e s t  way to  f i t  h is  lo g i c ,  to  th e  e x te n t  
r e q u ire d  to  g e t a  th e o ry  s a t i s f y i n g  Convention T, on to  th e  a l ie n  
la n g u ag e . Logic i s  h e re  t r e a t e d  "as  a g r id  to  be f i t t e d  on to  th e  
language in  one f e l l  s w o o p . I t  seems th a t  t h i s  w i l l  be p o s s ib le  
o n ly  i f  he can f in d ,  in  th e  a l i e n  lang u ag e , s t r u c tu r e s  o f  f i r s t -  
o rd e r  lo g ic  r e q u ir e d  by  th e  th e o ry  f o r  th e  p ro o fs  o f  T -se n te n c e s .
So ev e ry  lan g u ag e , i f  i t  i s  to  be  coun ted  a  language a t  a l l ,  w i l l  
have an u n d e r ly in g  lo g ic  i d e n t i c a l  to  o u r own, and t h i s  w i l l  
im mensely l im i t  th e  ad ra issab le  t r a n s l a t i o n s ’. Id e n t i fy in g  
c o n n e c tiv e s , s in g u la r  te rm s , p r e d ic a te s ,  q u a n t i f i e r s ,  and id e n t i t y  
s e t t l e s  m a tte r s  o f  lo g i c a l  form . In d e x io a l s e n te n c e s , whose 
t r u th - v a lu e  i s  r e l a t i v e  to  th e  env ironm ent, a re  in t e r p r e te d  n e x t ,  
in  th e  way o u t l in e d  two p a rag rap h s  ago . F in a l ly ,  th e  i n t e r p r e t e r
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t a c k le s  th o se  s e n te n c e s  whose t r u th - v a lu e  n e i th e r  commands un ifo rm
agreem ent n o r  depends s y s te m a t ic a l ly  on changes in  th e  env ironm en t.
The hope i s  t h a t  th e  re c u r s io n  demanded by  th e  th e o ry  w i l l  le a d  to
t h e i r  d e te rm in a te  in te r p r e ta t io n *
D esp ite  th e s e  rem ark s, i t  must be s a id  t h a t  Davidson rem ains
v ague , perh ap s  even u n s u re ,  about how d e te rm in a te  t r a n s l a t i o n  w i l l
b e .  He comments:
There may, as  Quine has p o in te d  o u t in  h i s  d is c u s s io n s  o f
o n to lo g ic a l  r e l a t i v i t y ,  rem ain  room fo r  a l t e r n a t iv e  o n to lo g ie s ,
and so fo r  a l t e r n a t i v e  system s f o r  in t e r p r e t i n g  th e  p r e d ic a te s
o f  th e  o b je c t  lan g u ag e . I  b e l ie v e  th e  range o f  a c c e p ta b le
th e o r ie s  o f  t r u t h  can be red u ced  to  th e  p o in t  where a l l
a c c e p ta b le  th e o r ie s  w i l l  y ie ld .T -s e n te n o e s  t h a t  we can t r e a t  a s
g iv in g  c o r r e c t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,  by  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  f u r th e r
re a so n a b le  and n o n -q u e s tio n -b e g g in g  c o n s t r a i n t s .  But th e
31d e t a i l s  must be  re s e rv e d  f o r  a n o th e r  o c c a s io n .
So f a r  th e  o c c a s io n  ap p ea rs  n o t to  have p re s e n te d  i t s e l f .  In  th e  
n e x t s e c t io n  I  s h a l l  q u e s tio n  Davidson* s co n ce ss io n  to  Quine h e re  
and p ropose  two "n o n -q u e s tio n -b e g g in g  c o n s t r a in t s " ,  b ased  on 
rem arks made in  p re v io u s  c h a p te r s ,  which a re  p e r t in e n t  to  th e  , 
problem  o f  i n t e r p r e t i n g  p re v io u s  s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s .  I  s h a l l  
a ls o  c o n s id e r  o th e r  o b je c t io n s  to  D av id so n 's  s t r a t e g y  and f i n i s h  
w ith  a  recom m endation about how we sho u ld  view  t r a n s l a t i o n .
B efo re  do ing  so, though , l e t  me b r i e f l y  summarize th e  argument o f  
th e  c h a p te r  up to  t h i s  p o in t .
■Quine m a in ta in s  t h a t ,  b o th  in  r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t i o n  and in  
t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  o u r own home lan g u ag e , i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  e s t a b l i s h ,  
g iv en  a l l  th e  b e h a v io u ra l e v id e n c e , in co m p a tib le  t r ^ s l a t i o n  m anuals 
w hich " s ta n d  to  each o th e r  in  no p la u s ib le  s o r t  o f  eq u iv a len ce
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however lo o s e ."  H is argum ent f o r  t h i s  view  depends on p h y s ic a l 
th e o ry  b e in g  u n d erd e te rm in ed  by  e v id en ce . He adm its  th a t  some . 
se n te n c e s  ( th e  o b s e rv a t io n a l  o n e s ) ,  and th e  lo g i c a l  c o n n e c tiv e s , 
w i l l  be d é te rm in â te ly  t r a n s l a t a b l e ,  b u t d e n ie s  t h a t  th e re  i s  any 
-p a th  le a d in g  from them to  d e te rm in a te  t r a n s l a t i o n s  o f  more 
t h e o r e t i c a l  s e n te n c e s .  M oreover, g iven  th e  in te rd ep en d en c e  o f  
b e l i e f  and m eaning, th e r e  w i l l  be no way o f  a s c r ib in g  b e l i e f s  to  
sp eak e rs  o r  m eanings to  t h e i r  w ords. One i s  th e n  in v i te d  to  
conclude th a t  th e r e  i s  no f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  abou t c o r re c t  
t r a n s l a t i o n .  I f  Quine i s  r i g h t , and i f  in d e te rm in acy  im p lie s  
i n s c r u t a b i l i t y ,  th e n  se v e re  l im i t a t i o n s  a re  im posed on any a ttem p t 
to  d is c o v e r ,  in  th e  way su g g es ted  in  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  th e  e x te n s io n s  
o f  te rras  from p re v io u s  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s .
D avidson, b ro ad en in g  th e  scope o f  th e  en q u iry  from t r a n s l a t i o n  
o f  language to  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  b eh av io u r and e x te n d in g  some o f  
f i n e ’ s e a r l i e r  rem ark s, a rg u es  th a t  th e re  a re  c e r t a in  assum ptions 
t h a t  must be made i f  we a re  to  be a b le  to  i n t e r p r e t  a  language a t  
a l l .  I t  must have q u a n t i f ic a t io n  th e o ry  as a  b a s e ,  and th e  sp eak e rs  
o f  th e  language must be assumed to  be r ig h t  as o f te n  as p la u s ib ly  
p o s s ib le .  The l a t t e r  assum ption  so lv e s  th e  problem  o f  th e  i n t e r ­
dependence o f  b e l i e f  and m eaning "by h o ld in g  b e l i e f  c o n s ta n t a s  f a r
22 ias  p o s s ib le  w h ile  s o lv in g  fo r-m ea n in g ."  The fo rm er assum ption  |
paves th e  way f o r  m o d e llin g  a th e o ry  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  on a  th e o ry  j
o f  t r u t h .  In  c o n ju n c tio n  w ith  such  a  m odel, th e  assum ptions so c o n s t r i c t  !
th e  p o s s ib le  t r a n s l a t i o n  m anuals t h a t ,  f a r  from s ta n d in g  to  each  i
o th e r  " in  no p la u s ib le  s o r t  o f  eq u iv a len ce  however lo o s e ,"  th e  o n ly  
in d e te rm in acy  i s  t h a t  which a f f e c t s  th e  p r e d ic a te s .
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S e c tio n  ( i i i ) :  How D eterm inate  i s  T ra n s la t io n ?
Since D avidson’ s th e o ry  o f  r a d ic a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s
in te n d e d  as  a  r e p ly  to  a  d o c tr in e  o f  Q u in e 's ,  a  good p la c e  to
b e g in  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  th e o ry  would be w ith  what Quine has to  say
about i t *  F o r tu n a te ly  Quine has  r e c e n t ly  p u b lish e d  some comments
33on D avidson’ s  p ro p o sa ls*  He pronounces h im se lf  in  agreem ent
w ith  th e  s t r a t e g y  o f  ta k in g  th e  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  a s  b a s ic ,  and
ap p ea rs  w e ll-d is p o se d , i f  e m p ir ic a l ly  s c e p t i c a l ,  about a p p ly in g
c h a r i ty  a c ro s s - th e -b o a rd  as  a  means o f  d is e n ta n g lin g  b e l i e f  and
m eaning . D esp ite  t h i s ,  he s t i l l  fo re s e e s  two a re a s  where
in d e te rm in acy  w i l l  a r i s e .
The f i r s t  o f  th e s e  in v o lv e s  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  r e f e r e n c e .
Quine ag re e s  w ith  Davidson th a t  " T a r s k i 's  t r u t h  c o n s tru c t io n  c a n 't
be c a r r i e d  th ro u g h  u n t i l  w e've d ec id ed  what to  count as
q u a n t i f i c a t io n ,  o r  th e  e q u iv a le n t r e f e r e n t i a l  a p p a ra tu s ,  in  th e
o b je c t  l a n g u a g e , b u t  p o in ts  o u t th a t  in  Word and O b jec t he argued
th a t  such d e c is io n s  depend on a n a ly t ic a l  h y p o th eses  and so a re  n o t
u n iq u e . He c o n fe s se s  th o u g h , as  we n o te d  in  C hap ter 3 , t h a t  r e c e n t
r e f l e c t i o n  on s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  q u a n t i f ic a t io n  has made him more
t e n t a t i v e  on t h i s  p o in t ,  "So maybe one shou ld  be more h o p efu l about
th e  n e a r-u n iq u e n e ss  o f  th e  manual up to  th e  p o in t  where th e  t r u t h
35d e f in i t i o n  can be b rough t to  b e a r . "  None o f  t h i s  i s  s a id  to  
impugn o n to lo g ic a l  r e l a t i v i t y ,  how ever, s in c e  th e  v a lu e s  o f  th e  
v a r ia b le s  a re  n o t f ix e d  by  d e c is io n s  about q u a n t i f i e r s .  Iilhat i s  
m ore, one can have d i f f e r e n t  T a rsk ia n  t r u t h  d e f in i t i o n s ,  d e l iv e r in g  
th e  same t o t a l i t y  o f  e x p re s s io n s  as t r u e ,  y e t d i f f e r i n g  in  v a lu e s
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a s s ig n e d  to  v a r i a b l e s .  A ccording  to  Q uine, th e n ,  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  
o f  re fe re n c e  th r e a te n s  even in  th e  th e o ry  o f  r a d ic a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
In  C hap ter 3 , I  d is c u s s e d  a t  le n g th  Q uine’ s  argum ents 
co n ce rn in g  o n to lo g ic a l  r e l a t i v i t y ,  and th e  c o n c lu s io n s  drawn may 
now be advanoed to  su p p o rt D avidson’ s  p o s i t i o n .  To b eg in  w ith , I  
g av e , a t  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  s e c t io n  ( i i i )  o f  C hap ter 3 , s e v e ra l  
g u id e l in e s  w hich co u ld  be  u se d  by  th e  r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t o r  to  deduce 
w hich a l i e n  e x p re s s io n s , i f  any , co rresp o n d  to  o u r  s in g u la r  te rm s .
I  th e n  e x p la in e d  how he co u ld  ap p ly  t h i s  in fo rm a tio n , to g e th e r  w ith  
t h a t  su g g es ted  by  some o f  Q uine’ s  r e f l e c t i o n s  on s u b s t i tu t io n a l  
q u a n t i f i c a t io n ,  in  a  way th a t  would a llo w  him to  p re se rv e  lo g ic a l  
form in  t r a n s l a t i o n .  And t h i s  i s  e x a c t ly  what D avidson r e q u i r e s ,  
g iven  h i s  i n i t i a l  assu m p tio n s, in  o rd e r  fo r  th e  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  h i s  
p roposed  c o n s tru c t io n  o f  th e  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  f o r  th e  a l ie n  language 
to  go th ro u g h . % iine r i g h t l y  p o in ts  ou t t h a t  even though we m ight 
have to  assume t h a t  th e  a l i e n  language has q u a n t i f i c a t io n  th e o ry  as 
a  base  D avidson has g iven  no e x p la n a tio n  o f  how to  d ec id e  which 
a l i e n  e x p re s s io n s  count as  q u a n t i f i e r s .  C hap ter 3 , how ever, dbes 
c o n ta in  such an e x p la n a tio n .
The t h i r d  s ta g e  o f  th e  argument in  C hap ter 3 made u se  o f  some 
argum ents o f  E vans’ s  which em phasised th e  deep co n n ec tio n  betw een 
i d e n t i t y  and p r e d ic a t io n .  They su g g es ted  how, g iven  th e  t r a n s l a t o r ’ s 
n ew ly -ac q u ired  knowledge o f  lo g i c a l  form in  th e  a l ie n  language , i t  
would be p o s s ib le  to  d e term in e  w hether o r  n o t th e  a l i e n  i d e n t i t y  
p r e d ic a te  i s  to  be t r a n s l a t e d  by  o u r i d e n t i t y  p r e d ic a te .  Then, in  
th e  f i n a l  s ta g e ,  i t  was shown how to  re s o lv e  th e  cpiandary ov er 
t r a n s l a t i n g  th e  p r e d ic a te  g a v a g a i« F u rth erm o re , i t  was p o in te d  ou t
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t h a t  a t  no s ta g e  o f  th e  argum ent i s  i t  n e c e s sa ry  to  assume th e  
t r a n s l a t o r  has a n y th in g  o th e r  th a n  b e h a v io u ra l ev idence  w ith  w hich 
to  w ork. He can acc ep t t h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  and s t i l l  f in d  n o th in g  
r e l a t i v e  abou t th e  a l ie n  o n to lo g y . We can th e r e f o r e  meet « f in e ’ s 
f i r s t  o b je c t io n  to  D avidson’ s p ro p o s a ls ,  a s  w e ll as ease  D avidson’ s 
own co n sc ien ce  on th e  m a t te r .
H is second o b je c t io n  r e l a t e s  to  th e  l a t e r  s ta g e s  o f  th e  . 
c o n s tru c t io n  o f  a  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  f o r  an a l ie n  la n g u ag e . W hilst 
conced ing  t h a t  "We can s e t t l e  th e  t r u t h  o f  [ t h e  T -sen tenoe  fo r  ’Es 
s c h n e i t ’3  a s  w e ll as  we can s e t t l e  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  ’Es s c h n e i t ’ 
in to  ’ I t ’ s snow ing’ ,"  Quine th in k s  t h a t  "when we g e t o f f  to  se n te n c e s  
rem ote from o b s e rv â tio n a l i t y  we’r e  go ing  to  have th e  problem  o f  
in d e te rm in acy  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n . " ^ ^  C le a r ly  th e  is s u e  h e re  i s  th e  
u n d e rd e te m in a t io n  o f  th e o ry  by  e v id e n c e . A llow ing f o r  d e te rm in a te  
t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  w hat, f o r  th e  sake o f  argum ent, we m ight ag ree  to  c a l l  
o b s e rv a t io n a l  s e n te n c e s ,  Quine i s  c la im in g  th a t  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  n o n - 
o b s e rv a t io n a l  se n te n c e s  s t i l l  rem ains in d e te rm in a te  —  th e re  i s  no 
f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  about i t .
In r e p ly ,  Davidson concedes th a t  in d e te rm in acy  w i l l  p ro b ab ly
e n te r  h e re ,  b u t he th in k s  th e  fo rm al c o n s t r a in ts  imposed by a  th e o ry
o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  w i l l  keep i t  to  a  minimum. The id e a  u n d e r ly in g
t h i s  c la im  i s  b e s t  ex p re ssed  in  th e  fo llo w in g  p a ssa g e :
I f  we c o n s id e r  any one T -se n te n c e , t h i s  p ro p o sa l [ t h a t  T -sen te n ces  
shou ld  be t r u e ]  r e q u ir e s  o n ly  th a t  i f  a  t r u e  sen ten c e  i s  
d e sc r ib e d  as  t r u e ,  th e n  i t s  t r u t h  c o n d itio n s  a re  g iven  by some 
t r u e  s e n te n c e . But when we c o n s id e r  th e  c o n s tr a in in g  need  to  
m atch t r u t h  w ith  t r u t h  th ro u g h o u t th e  lan g u ag e , we r e a l i z e  t h a t  
any th e o ry  a c c e p ta b le  by  t h i s  s ta n d a rd  may y i e ld ,  in  e f f e c t ,  a 
u s a b le  t r a n s l a t i o n  manual ru n n in g  from o b je c t  language to
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m eta language . The d e s i r e d  e f f e c t  i s  s ta n d a rd  in  th e o ry  b u i ld in g :  
to  e x t r a c t  a  r i c h  concep t (h e re  som ething re a so n a b ly  c lo se  to  
t r a n s l a t i o n )  from th i n  l i t t l e  b i t s  o f  ev idence  (h e re  th e  t r u t h  
v a lu e s  o f  s e n te n c e s )  by  im posing a  form al s t r u c tu r e  on enough
bits.37
The form al s t r u c tu r e  i s  de te rm in ed  by  th e  f a c t  t h a t  any adequa te  
th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  b a se d  on th e  T a rsk ia n  paradigm  has to  be f i n i t e l y  
a x io m a tiz a b le  and s a t i s f y  C onvention T. I t  fo llo w s  from t h i s  t h a t  
th e  th e o ry  w i l l  be r e c u r s iv e .  A pparen tly , th e n ,D av id so n ’ s  hope i s  
th a t  i f  we a t te n d  to  enough ’’th i n  l i t t l e  b i t s  o f  ev id en ce"  we s h a l l  
be  a b le  to  t r a n s l a t e  more and more complex s e n te n c e s .
These rem arks a re  b r i e f  and h ig h ly  s p e c u la t iv e .  In  th e  f i r s t  
p la c e  we have to  d i s t in g u is h  betw een complex se n te n c e s  and n o n - 
o b s e rv a t io n a l  s e n te n c e s .  One can g e n e ra te  a r b i t r a r i l y  complex 
se n te n c e s  u s in g  s e n t e n t i a l  c o n n e c tiv e s  and o b s e rv a t io n a l  s e n te n c e s , 
b u t as  we saw in  C h ap te r 1 th e r e  i s  in  g e n e ra l no re d u c tio n  o f  th e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  to  th e  o b s e r v a t io n a l .  D av id so n 's  p o s i t io n  needs 
supp lem en ting  h e re :  how a re  we to  g e t from th e  " b i t s  o f  ev idence" 
to  th e  " r ic h  co n ce p t"?
A p ro m isin g  approach  i s  su g g e s te d , ag a in  somewhat i r o n i c a l l y ,
by ta k in g  s e r io u s ly  th e  Duhem/Quine netw ork model o f  th e o r ie s  and
38e x te n d in g  i t ,  a s  Quine does in  "Two Dogmas o f  B n p ir ic is m ,"  to  
language a s  a  w hole. The p ic tu r e  which Quine p r e s e n ts  th e re  i s  
one o f  language a s  an a r t i c u l a t e d  s t r u c tu r e  w hich makes c o n ta c t 
w ith  r e a l i t y  o n ly  a t  th e  p e rip h e ry *  Such a  p ic tu r e  i s  in te n d e d  to  
e x p re ss  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  s e n te n c e s  o f  a language a re  r e l a t e d  by 
v a r io u s  i n f e r e n t i a l  c o n n e c tio n s , and th a t  o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  any 
one sen ten c e  in v o lv e s  o u r ap p reh en sio n  o f  such  c o n n e c tio n s . I t  i s
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n o t n e c e ssa ry  to  d is c u s s  th e  r a m if ic a t io n s  o f  t h i s  view  ju s t  now.
I  in tro d u c e  i t  o n ly  a s  a  way o f  making more v iv id  th e  p o in t  th a t  
even th e  l e a s t  o b s e rv a t io n a l  o f  s e n te n c e s , i . e . ,  th o se  f a r th e s t  
from th e  p e r ip h e ry ,  a re  i n f e r e n t i a l l y  l in k e d  to  o th e r s  l e s s  f a r  
from th e  p e r ip h e ry .
We must a lso  b e a r  in  mind an o th e r  p o in t  made in  C hap ter 1 ;
th e r e  i s  no f irm  d i s t i n c t i o n  to  be drawn betw een th e o r e t i c a l  and
o b s e rv a tio n a l  te rm s . A sen ten c e  i s  commonly d e s c r ib e d  as
" th e o r e t i c a l "  b ecause  one o r  more o f  i t s  te rm s a re  th o u g h t o f  as
t h e o r e t i c a l .  But i f  no sen se  can be made o f  any firm  d i s t i n c t i o n
betw een t h e o r e t i c a l  and o b s e rv a t io n a l  te rm s , th e n  presum ably  none
can be made o f  a  f irm  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een t h e o r e t i c a l  and
o b s e rv a tio n a l  s e n te n c e s .  Q uine, i t  i s  t r u e ,  o f te n  t a l k s  o f
" o b se rv a tio n  s e n te n c e s " ,  g iv in g  th e  im p ressio n  th a t  he th in k s  th e y
c o n s t i tu te  a  d i s t i n c t  c l a s s ,  b u t when he i s  p r e c i s e  he recommends
th a t  one speak  r a th e r  o f  " o b se rv a tio n a l se n te n c e s"  o r  in  te rm s o f
39" d e ^ e e s  o f  o b se rv â t i o n a l i t y . "
What th e s e  rem arks su g g est i s  t h a t  th e  t r a n s l a t o r  w i l l  have 
to  a t te n d  c lo s e ly  to  th e  v a r io u s  ways in  which l i n g u i s t i c  ev idence  
can in t e r s e c t  w ith  t h e o r e t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e .  Theory i s  underd e te rm in ed  
by ev id en ce , b u t any body o f  se n te n c e s  d e se rv in g  to  be c a l le d  a 
th e o ry  has o b s e rv a t io n a l  consequences and so h as  l in k s  w ith  
o b s e rv a tio n a l  s e n te n c e s .  The form al s t r u c tu r e  o f  th e  t r u t h  th e o ry  
r e q u ir e s  a  r e c u r s iv e  g e n e ra tio n  o f  T -sen ten o es  a c ro s s - th e -b o a rd ,  
from th e  r e l a t i v e l y  o b s e rv a t io n a l  th ro u g h  th e  whole spectrum  to  th e  
r e l a t i v e l y  n o n -o b s e rv a t io n a l . H opefu lly , then , th e  o v e r a l l  p a t te r n  
g iv e s  r i s e  to  th e  r i c h  co n ce p t.
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The need  to  a t te n d  to  th e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  betw een th e  
o b s e rv a tio n a l  and th e  n o n -o b s e rv a tio n a l i s  a  p o in t  t h a t  was b r i e f l y  
d is c u s s e d  in  s e c t io n  ( i i i )  o f  C hap ter 2 . We were c o n s id e r in g  how 
i t  was t h a t  D a lto n 's  a tom ic th e o ry  o f  gases  co u ld  be u n d e rs to o d  by  
h i s  c o n te m p o ra r ie s ,p a r tic u la r ly  by  Avogadro who proposed  a  th e o ry  
w hich c o n f l i c te d  w ith  D a l to n 's .  The p o in t was made th a t  D a lto n 's  
th e o ry ,  l i k e  any o th e r ,  d id  n o t sudden ly  a p p e a r, couched in  a  
language q u i te  removed from t h a t  o f  th e  p h y s ic a l  s c ie n c e  a t  th e  
t im e . To p u t th e  m a tte r  in  a r a th e r  F eyerabend ian  way, te rm s u se d  
in  th e  th e o ry  had  m eanings p a r t l y  de term ined  by  t h e i r  l in k s  w ith  
o th e r  s c i e n t i f i c  te rm s in  u se  a t  th e  tim e . D alton  t a l k s ,  e . g . ,  o f  
th e  "atom s" o r  " u lt im a te  p a r t i c l e s "  o f  a gas as_ b e in g  th o se  which 
a re  i r r e d u c ib le  g iven  th e  known te c h n iq u e s  o f  "chem ical a n a ly s is  
and s y n t h e s i s E x p e r i m e n t s  a re  th e n  d e s c r ib e d  in v o lv in g  th e s e  
p a r t i c l e s ,  and D alton  comments on th e  f in d in g s  o f  Gay-Lussac and 
o th e r s  in  t h e i r  work on g a s e s .  T h e o re tic a l  te rm s a re  c o n s ta n t ly  
u sed  in  d is c u s s in g  e x p e rim en ta l consequences and in  th e  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  p re v io u s  work, and hence th e  th e o ry  was i n t e l l i g i b l e  
to  a  w ider a u d ie n c e .
Towards th e  end o f  th e  same s e c t io n  i t  was n o te d  th a t  t h i s  made 
sen se  o f  P a rs o n s ' p ro p o sa l to  t e s t  a  "h y p o th e s is"  as  to  th e  e x te n s io n  
o f  a  s c i e n t i f i c  p r e d ic a te  a g a in s t  th e  " in fo rm a tio n a l background" o f  
th e  th e o ry  in  which i t  o c c u rs .  P a rso n s  says  t h a t  i t  may prove 
n e c e ssa ry  to  defend  such  a  h y p o th e s is  " a g a in s t th e  a c tu a l  argum ents 
g iven  by th e  a u th o r  in  q u e s tio n  (o r  u nder th e  th e o ry  in  q u e s t io n ) , 
and t h i s  I  ta k e  to  be in  th e  s p i r i t  o f  D av id so n 's  rem arks th a t  
co n fo rm ity  to  a l i e n  b e l i e f s  i s  o n ly  a  f i r s t  assum ption  and th a t  
r e v is io n  m ight l a t e r  be c a l le d  f o r  a t  c e r t a in  p o in t s .
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In  t a lk in g  o f  e a r l i e r  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  we a re  moving away 
from th e  f i e l d  o f  r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t i o n  o r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and coming 
c lo s e r  to  home; o u r concern  i s  n o t w ith  p re s e n t sp eak e rs  o f  an a l ie n  
language h u t w ith  p a s t  sp e a k e rs  o f  a  language v e ry  s im i la r  to  o u r 
own. Such a move w i l l  mean t h a t  th e  t r a n s l a t o r  w i l l  no lo n g e r he 
a h le  to  o b serv e  re sp o n ses  to  v e rb a l  p rom pting , a lth o u g h  qua 
i n t e r p r e t e r  h i s  p rim ary  concern  w i l l  s t i l l  be w ith  se n te n c e s  h e ld  
t r u e  and th e  p r in c ip le  o f  c h a r i ty  w i l l  s t i l l  a p p ly . T his s i m i l a r i t y  
m ight in c l in e  one to  adopt a  Quinean p o s i t io n  to  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  th e  
o n ly  s ig n i f i c a n t  d if f e r e n c e  l i e s  in  th e  r e g u la t iv e  maxims we a re  
p re p a re d  to  a p p ly . I  s h a l l  d is c u s s  t h i s  s h o r t ly .  F i r s t  I  want to  
c o n s id e r  one more p o s s ib le  o b je c t io n  to  D av id so n 's  approach  which 
draws on what was s a id  in  an e a r l i e r  c h a p te r ,  and th en  t r y  to  re a c h  
some co n c lu s io n  about how d e te rm in a te  r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t i o n  w i l l  be 
in  th e  l i g h t  o f  what has been  d is c u s s e d  so f a r .
The o b je c t io n  can be p u t in  th e  fo llo w in g  way; In C hap ter 4 
you argued  t h a t  T a r s k i 's  th e o ry  i s  a co rrespondence th e o ry  and t h a t  
i t  p resu p p o ses  a  d e te rm in a te  r e l a t i o n  o f  r e fe re n c e  between 
e x p re s s io n s  o f  a  language and p a r t s  o f  th e  w orld ; r e f e r e n c e ,  you 
s a id ,  in  t h i s  way u n d e rw r ite s  t r u t h .  What you c la im ed  th e  th e o ry  
f a i l s  to  e x p la in  i s  how we a re  to  d isc o v e r  which o b je c t ,  i f  any , a  
s in g u la r  terra r e f e r s  t o ,  and which o b je c ts ,  i f  any , b e lo n g  to  th e  
e x te n s io n  o f  a p r e d ic a te .  ITiis le d  you to  e n q u ire  in to  th e  problem s 
o f  what i t  i s  f o r  a p ro p e r  name to  r e f e r  o r  f o r  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  
p r e d ic a te  to  have an e x te n s io n . Your answ ers in v o lv ed  c l u s t e r  
th e o r ie s  o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  and th e se  th e o r ie s  a re  p h ra sed  in  term s o f  
th e  b e l i e f s  t h a t  can be a s c r ib e d  to  u s e r s  o f  th e  p ro p e r  name o r
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p r e d ic a te .  Yet h e re  you a re  in  th e  fo llo w in g  c h a p te r  en d o rs in g  
D av id so n 's  u se  o f  T a r s k i 's  th e o ry  to  re s o lv e  problem s o f  b e l i e f  
a s c r ip t io n .  I s  th e r e  n o t som ething c i r c u l a r  in  t h i s ?
My resp o n se  to  t h i s  charge  i s  th a t  i t  r e s t s  on a  co n fu sio n  
o f  q u e s tio n s  (2 ) and ( 3 ) ,  th e  v e ry  co n fu sio n  th a t  was warned a g a in s t  
in  C hap ter 2 . D av id so n 's  p ro p o sa ls  a re  in te n d e d  to  f in d  a  way round 
some argum ents o f  Q i in e 's  d e s ig n ed  to  show th a t  th e r e  i s  no f a c t  o f  
th e  m a tte r  about how to  t r a n s l a t e  c e r t a in  s e n te n c e s .  The re le v a n c e  
o f  Q u in e 's  c o n c lu s io n  to  th e  fo u r  q u e s tio n s  a t  th e  h e a r t  o f  t h i s  
t h e s i s  l i e s  in  th e  su g g e s tio n  t h a t  we have no good reaso n  fo r  
th in k in g  t h a t ,  in  g e n e ra l ,  we s h a l l  be a b le  to  d is c o v e r  what th e  
e x te n s io n s  o f  n a t u r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  o c c u rr in g  in  p re v io u s  
s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s  a r e .  C hap ter 5 c o n ta in e d  my answ ers to  th e  
c o n ce p tu a l q u e s tio n s  (3 ) and ( 3 ’ ) co n ce rn in g  what i t  i s  f o r  a  name 
to  r e f e r  o r  f o r  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  to  have an e x te n s io n .
The im p lic a tio n  o f  (3A) —  my answ er to  (3 ) — f o r  q u e s tio n  ( 2 ) ,  th e  
e p is te m o lo g ic a l q u e s tio n  o f  how we can d is c o v e r  what a  p a r t i c u l a r  
n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  ' ? '  has a s  i t s  e x te n s io n , was s a id  to  b e , t h a t  
we have to  d ec id e  what b e l i e f s  u s e r s  o f  'P '  had about th o se  th in g s  
to  which th e y  a p p lie d  th e  term  ' P ' . I f  Quine were a b le  to  show t h a t  
we a re  fo rc e d  to  adopt a  n o n - r e a l i s t  a t t i t u d e  to  b e l i e f s ,  such a  
p o s i t io n  would be m oribund. But b o th  he and Davidson reco g n ize  th a t  
some lo g ic a l  th e o ry  h as  to  be im puted to  a l i e n  sp eak e rs  i f  we a re  
to  u n d e rs ta n d  t h e i r  language a t  a l l ,  and th a t  t h i s  can o n ly  be done 
i f  we a re  p re p a re d  to  a s c r ib e  b e l i e f s  to  them in  a  c h a r i ta b le  m anner. 
In  b o th  r a d ic a l  t r a n s l a t i o n  and r a d ic a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  th e n , i t  
does make sense  to  a s c r ib e  b e l i e f s ,  so (3A) i s  n o t r u le d  ou t on
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a p r i o r i  g ro u n d s. The main p o in t  o f  th e  argum ent o f  C hap ter 4 was 
to  show th a t  T a r s k i’ s  d e f in i t i o n  does no t g iv e  a  th e o ry  o f  r e fe re n c e  
b u t p resu p p o ses  o n e . C hap ter 5 e x p la in s  what such  a  th e o ry  would 
lo o k  l i k e .  The problem s o f  r e c u r s iv e ly  d e f in in g  T -sen te n ces  f o r  an 
a l i e n  language and answ ering  th e  e p is te m o lo g ic a l q u e s tio n  (2 ) can 
th e n  be ta c k le d  s im u lta n e o u s ly ; we wonder what th e  ex te n s io n  o f  th e  
Greek was; we make c h a r i t a b le  d e c is io n s  about T -sen ten o es
in  which i t  o c c u rs  in  such a  way a s  to  maximize agreem ent w ith  o th e r  
T -se n te n c e s . The im p o rtan t p o in t  i s  th a t  a s c r ip t io n s  o f  b e l i e f ,  and 
hence t r a n s l a t i o n s  r e s u l t i n g  from p a r t i c u l a r  T -se n te n c e s , a re  
r é v is a b le  —  f u r th e r  ev idence  can alw ays be accommodated. The 
r e s id u a l  problem  th e n  i s  o f  how d e te rm in a te  we can be in  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  
and t h i s  a f f e c t s  o u r answ er to  q u e s tio n  ( 2 ) .
Let u s  see  i f  we can re a c h  some t e n t a t i v e  c o n c lu s io n  about how 
d e te rm in a te  t r a n s l a t i o n  w i l l  be i f  th e  programme o f  r a d ic a l  i n t e r ­
p r e ta t io n  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t .  S ince  q u a n t i f ic a t io n a l  s t r u c tu r e  i s  
p resupposed  in  th e  a l ie n  language th e  r a d ic a l  i n t e r p r e t e r  w i l l  be 
a b le  to  overcom e, as  n o te d  ab o v e , problem s o f  lo g ic a l  form and ' 
o n to lo g ic a l  r e l a t i v i t y  (o f  th e  p e rv a s iv e  k in d  su g g es ted  by Q uine’ s 
gavaga i example anyw ay). D avidson i s  th u s  m isgu ided  in  h is  reaso n  
f o r  th in k in g  th e r e  m ight s t i l l  be in d e te rm in acy  a t  th e  le v e l  o f  
p r e d ic a te s .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  i t  i s  n o t c l e a r  from what he says t h a t  
th e r e  w i l l  be no rea so n  fo r  th in k in g  th a t  th e r e  w i l l  be no 
in d e te rm in acy  a t  th e  p r e d ic a te  l e v e l .  And d e s p i te  th e  above rem arks 
about th e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  o f  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  and th e  o b s e rv a t io n a l ,  
one m ight s t i l l  f e e l  t h a t  Quine has g iv e n , in  h i s  second o b je c t io n ,  
good reaso n  f o r  th in k in g  th e r e  w i l l .  A lthough th e re  cannot be two
.206.
t r a n s l a t i o n s  o f  a  s e n te n c e , o n e , sa y , in  s u b je c t - p r e d ic a te  form and 
th e  o th e r  n o t ,  we have a s  y e t seen  no co n c lu s iv e  rea so n  fo r  th in k in g  
th e re  w i l l  n o t be many c a se s  where an a l i e n  sen ten c e  b  —  "rem ote 
from o b se rv â t io n a l i t y "  —  may be  t r a n s l a t e d  by  e i t h e r  o f  th e  home 
sub j e c t - p r e d i c a te  se n te n c e s  £  and q ,  even though £  and £  have 
d i f f e r e n t  t r u th - v a lu e s .
Hacking has a rgued  t h a t  such  a  s i tu a t io n  co u ld  n o t a r i s e  in
4.2r a d ic a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  The req u irem en t o f  r a d ic a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
i s  t h a t  such s ta te m e n ts  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  must m atch w ith  T -se n te n c e s ,
So th e re  w i l l  be n o th in g  to  choose between a  T -sen tenoe  ' s i s  t r u e  
i f  and o n ly  i f  £ ' ,  p ro v id e d  in  one system , and ’ s i s  t r u e  i f  and 
o n ly  i f  £* , p ro v id e d  in  a n o th e r  system . Yet we had th e  i n i t i a l  
o v e r r id in g  req u irem en t t h a t  T -sen te n ces  a re  t r u e .  S ince £  and £  
may be c o n t r a r i e s ,  b o th  T -se n te n c e s  cannot be t r u e .  Prom 
D avidson’ s  s ta n d p o in t ,  t h i s  i s  a  re d u o tio  ad  absurdum o f  
in d e t erm inacy •
What Hacking o v e rlo o k s , th o u g h , is  th e  e m p ir ic a l n a tu re  o f  r a d ic a l
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  Davidson em phasizes th a t  th e  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  f o r  an
a l i e n  language " i s  t e s t e d  by ev idence  th a t  T -se n te n c e s  a re  . . .  t r u e . " ^ ^
E lsew here he sa y s :
I f  we t r e a t  T -sen te n ces  a s  v e r i f i a b l e , then  a  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  shows
how we can go from t r u t h  to  som ething l i k e  m eaning —  enough l i k e
meaning so t h a t  i f  someone had a  th e o ry  f o r  a  language v e r i f i e d
o n ly  in  th e  way I  p ro p o se , he would be a b le  to  u se  th a t  language in  
45co m m u n ica tio n .^
So on th e  b a s i s  o f  a l l  th e  b e h a v io u ra l ev idence we s t i l l  m ight n o t be 
a b le  to  d ec id e  betw een in c o m p a tib le  th e o r i e s  o f  t r u t h ,  and hence 
betw een in c o m p a tib le  t r a n s l a t i o n  m anuals, d e s p i te  t h e i r  b e in g  e q u iv a le n t 
to  each o th e r  in  p o in t  o f  lo g i c a l  form .
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D av id so n 's  th e o ry  o f  r a d ic a l  in t e r p r e t a t i o n  m ight he th o u g h t o f  
a s  an a b s t r a c t  r e p ly  to  an a b s tru s e  d o c t r in e .  I f  D avidson i s  r i g h t ,  
Q u in e 's  d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  m e th o d o lo g ica l s i t u a t io n  o f  th e  r a d ic a l  
t r a n s l a t o r  i s  n o t so much wrong a s  in a p p ro p r ia te .  Yet even i f  we 
ag ree  t h a t  th e  r a d ic a l  i n t e r p r e t e r  i s  more f a i t h f i l  to  o u r p ic tu r e  o f  
one s t a r t i n g  from s c r a tc h  to  u n d e rs ta n d  an a l i e n  language , th e  c la im  
th a t  in d e te rm in acy  w i l l  be g r e a t ly  reduced  s t i l l  lo o k s h ig h ly  
s p e c u la t iv e .  R eco g n itio n  o f  th e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  su g g es ted  by  th e  
netw ork  model o f  language m ight h e lp  to  a l l e v i a t e  some s c e p tic is m , 
b u t i t  s c a r c e ly  c o n s t i tu te s  a  t e l l i n g  r e p ly  to  Q u in e 's  rem arks on th e  - 
u n d e rd e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e o ry  by  e v id en ce . What I  p ropose to  do now 
i s  to  make some f i n a l  p o in ts  on t h i s  i s s u e ,  c o n c e n tra t in g  on how i t  
a f f e c t s  o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  e a r l i e r  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r i e s .
Suppose we a re  t r y i n g  to  i n t e r p r e t  D a lto n 's  atom ic th e o ry  o f  
g a s e s .  The p rim ary  ev idence  we have a v a i la b le ,  l e t  u s  im ag ine, 
c o n s is ts  o f  h i s  p u b lish e d  w r i t in g s  d e a lin g  w ith  th e  th e o ry , w r i t t e n  
com m unications w ith  o th e r s ,  some la b o ra to ry  n o te b o o k s, d is c u s s io n s  
and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  h is  work by  o th e r s ,  and some s c i e n t i f i c  , 
in s tru m e n ts  he was known to  have u s e d . Prom h is  own w r it in g s  we 
manage to  deduce a  body o f  se n te n c e s  a s s e r te d  by  him and h ence , we 
assum e, b e l ie v e d  by  him to  be t r u e .  We b eg in  to  in t e r p r e t  th e se  
s e n te n c e s ,  s t a r t i n g  w ith  th e  more o b s e rv a t io n a l ,  in  such a  way a s  to  
make D alton  c o n s i s te n t ,  and c o r r e c t  as  o f te n  as  p o s s ib le .  S ince we 
have no d i f f i c u l t y  in  re c o g n iz in g  and t r a n s l a t i n g  th e  s e n te n t i a l  
c o n n e c tiv e s  and q u a n t i f i c a t io n a l  d e v ic e s , t h i s  p ro ceed s  q u i te  sm ooth ly , 
a lth o u g h  we w i l l  d o u b tle s s  have to  r e v is e  e a r l i e r  t r a n s l a t i o n s  and 
b e l i e f  a s c r ip t io n s  a s  we go a lo n g . In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  we must remember
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t h a t  we a re  g u id ed  by  o u r own s c i e n t i f i c  l i g h t s  h e r e .  Our p re s e n t  
th e o r ie s  c o n s t i tu t e  o u r " th e o ry  o f  n a tu re "  and so we must reckon them 
th e  s ta n d a rd  by  which we a re  to  judge p a s t t h e o r i e s .
I f  Quine i s  r i g h t  in  m a in ta in in g  th a t  th e r e  i s  no d if f e r e n c e  in
p r in c ip le  betw een a t te m p ts  to  u n d e rs ta n d  a l i e n  languages and a t te m p ts
to  u n d e rs ta n d  any o th e r s ,  th e n  th e r e  w i l l  be d e f in i t e  l im i t s  to  how
f a r  we can go in  th u s  u n d e rs ta n d in g  D alton :
In s o fa r  a s  th e  t r u t h  o f  a  p h y s ic a l  th e o ry  i s  u n d erd e te rra in ed  by 
o b s e rv a b le s , th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  th e  f o r e ig n e r 's  p h y s ic a l  th e o ry  i s  
u n d erd e te rm in ed  by t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  h i s  o b se rv a tio n  s e n te n c e s . I f  
o u r p h y s ic a l  th e o ry  can v a ry  though a l l  p o s s ib le  o b s e rv a tio n s  be 
f ix e d ,  th e n  o u r  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  h i s  p h y s ic a l  th e o ry  can v a ry  though 
o u r t r a n s l a t i o n s  o f  a l l  p o s s ib le  o b s e rv a tio n  r e p o r ts  on h i s  p a r t  
be f ix e d .  Our t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  h i s  o b s e rv a tio n  se n te n c e s  no more 
f ix e s  o u r t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  h i s  p h y s ic a l  th e o ry  th a n  o u r own p o s s ib le  
o b s e rv a tio n s  f i x  o u r own p h y s ic a l  th e o ry ,
The i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  o f  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  and th e  o b s e rv a tio n a l  su g g es ted
one reaso n  f o r  d o u b tin g  t h i s .  In  s im i la r  v e in  we m ight draw a t t e n t i o n
to  th e  wide range  o f  w r i t in g s  a v a i la b le  as e v id e n c e . A ll o f  th e s e
w i l l  have t h e i r  own s i t u a t i o n s ,  some in v o lv in g  co n n ec tio n s  w ith  o th e r
s c i e n t i f i c  com m unities which w i l l  in  tu rn  be i n t e r r e l a t e d  w ith  la r g e r
l i n g u i s t i c  com m unities. We m ight c a l l  t h i s  's e c o n d a ry  e v id e n c e '.
What has to  be remembered i s  t h a t  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  b ased  on a
th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  f o r  a lan g u ag e , and so i t  sho u ld  n o t be s u r p r is in g  i f
th e  e v id e n c e .is  v a s t .
Are th e r e  any o th e r  re a so n s  f o r  d o u b tin g  Q u in e 's  c la im ? A nother 
i s  fo rthcom ing  when we r e f l e c t  on th e  f a c t  t h a t  we th in k  th e re  a r e ,  a t  
m ost, o n ly  a  sm a ll number o f  th in g s  D alton co u ld  p o s s ib ly  have been 
t a lk in g  a b o u t. Given o u r knowledge o f  th e  s t a t e  o f  p h y s ic a l s c ie n c e
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a t  th e  tim e , we can make e m p ir ic a l ly  j u s t i f i e d  s ta te m e n ts  abou t what 
D alton  co u ld  have a c q u ire d  knowledge o f .  We can form some id e a ,  th a t  
i s ,  o f  what he co u ld  have been  c a u s a l ly  a c q u a in te d  w ith .  T his i s  
where h i s  la b o ra to ry  no tebooks and s c i e n t i f i c  in s tru m e n ts  a re  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  v a lu a b le  to  u s .  From them we a re  a b le  to  r e a l i z e ,  e . g . ,  
t h a t  because  h i s  a p p a ra tu s  was n o t n e a r ly  s o p h is t ic a te d  enough he 
c e r t a in l y  co u ld  n o t have con fused  th in g s  a t  th e  atom ic le v e l  w ith  
th in g s  a t  th e  su b -a tom ic  l e v e l .  We a re  a ls o  a b le  to  e s t a b l i s h  —  
from in t e r p r e t i n g  o b s e rv a tio n  r e p o r ts  a lo n e ! —  e x a c t ly  what 
" te c h n iq u e s  o f  chem ical a n a ly s i s  and s y n th e s is "  D alton  was f a m i l i a r  
w ith .  So i f  D alton  s a y s , as  he d o es , th a t  "atom s" were i r r e d u c ib le  
g iven  th e  known te c h n iq u e s ,  we can even re p e a t h i s  experim en ts  in  
o rd e r  to  b e t t e r  u n d e rs ta n d  what p a r t i c l e s  he was d e a l in g  w ith .
In  th e  l a s t  c h a p te r  I  su g g e s te d , apropos o f  some rem arks abou t 
how to  d is c o v e r  th e  r e f e r e n t  o f  a  p ro p e r  name, th e  fo llo w in g  
p r in c ip le  g o v ern in g  th e  u s e  o f  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  w ith in  a  
l i n g u i s t i c  community; f o r  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  to  be u se d  
by  members o f  a  l i n g u i s t i c  community C to  d e s c r ib e  i t  i s
n e c e ss a ry  t h a t  th e re  be some c a u s a l co n n ec tio n  betw een ^ ' s  and 
members o f  C, nam ely th a t  betw een ^ ' s  and what i s  b e l ie v e d  about 
^ * s  in  C. As i t  s ta n d s  t h i s  i s  a  somewhat ro u g h -an d -read y  p r in c i p l e ,  
b u t th e  id e a  b eh in d  i t  seems to  h o ld  good. For D alton  to  have 
propounded a  th e o ry ,  and hence to  have had b e l i e f s ,  about what we 
c a l l  atoms and m o le c u le s , and what he c a l le d  "a tom s", he must have 
been in  a  p o s i t io n  to  c a u s a l ly  o b ta in  knowledge o f  them th rough  
ex p erim en t. To ta k e  a n o th e r  c a s e ;  f o r  u s  to  t r a n s l a t e  M endel's  
' b i ld u n g s fa h ig  E lem ent' as  ' g e n e ' ,  i t  must be th e  case  t h a t  genes a re  
r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  phenomena which he o b served  in  h is  experim en ts
.212.
on v a r i e t i e s  o f  Fismn sativum  and which he t r i e d  to  in t e r p r e t  in  h i s  
1865 p ap e r on p la n t  h y b r id iz a t io n .
T his id e a  r e c e iv e s  c o n s id e ra b le  su p p o rt from th e  w r it in g s  o f
Putnam and K rip k e . In  "E x p la n a tio n  and R e fe re n c e ,"  Putnam b eg in s  by
a rg u in g  th a t  what i s  im p o rtan t in  d is c o v e r in g  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a
p h y s ic a l  m agnitude term  l i k e  'e l e c t r i c  c h a rg e ' i s  knowing th a t  th e re
sh o u ld  have been an " in tro d u c in g  ev en t"  in  which th e  term  was
c o r r e c t ly  a p p l i e d . S i c h  an ev en t i s  one where th e r e  i s  a  c a u s a l
c o n n ec tio n  betw een th e  in t ro d u c e r  o f  th e  term  and what we reco g n ize
a s  an in s ta n c e .  By way o f  èxam ple, he asks th e  re a d e r  to  im agine
him s ta n d in g  n e x t to  F ra n k lin  a s  he perform ed h i s  famous experim ent
w ith  th e  k i t e .  From t h i s ,  he s a y s ,  he i s  a b le  to  a c q u ire  th e  term
'e l e c t r i c i t y ' ,  and co n se q u e n tly  th e  term  ' e l e c t r i c  ch a rg e* . He th e n
ex ten d s  h i s  argum ent to  n a t u r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s :
For n a tu r a l  k in d  words to o ,  th e n ,  l i n g i i s t i o  com petence i s  a  
m a tte r  o f  knowledge p lu s  c a u s a l  co n n ec tio n  to  in tro d u c in g  e v e n ts  
(and  u l t im a te ly  to  members o f  th e  n a tu r a l  k in d  i t s e l f ) .  And t h i s  
i s  so f o r  th e  same reaso n  a s  in  th e  case  o f  p h y s ic a l  m agnitude 
te rm s; nam ely, t h a t  th e  u se  o f  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  word in v o lv e s  in  
many c a se s  membership in  a  'c o l l e c t i v e '  which has c o n ta c t  w ith  
th e  n a tu r a l  k in d , w hich knows o f  t e s t s  f o r  membership in  th e
4.9n a tu r a l  k in d , e t c . ,  o n ly  as a  c o l l e c t i v e .
The c a u s a l accoun t o f  how th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a  p re d ic a te  i s  e s t ­
a b l is h e d  su g g e s ts  an im p o rtan t c o n s t r a in t  on d is c o v e r in g  what e a r l i e r  
s c i e n t i s t s  were t a lk in g  a b o u t, and hence on in t e r p r e t i n g  t h e i r  
t h e o r i e s .  In  th e  case  o f  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  i t  i s  c l e a r  how th e  
c a u s a l netw ork i s  s e c u re d , f o r  as  I  s a id  b e f o r e ,  such  p r e d ic a te s  ap p ly  
to  th in g s  in  v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  p h y s ic a l  p r o p e r t i e s .  D esp ite  P u tn am 's  
c la im s to  th e  c o n t r a ry ,  how ever, th e  c a u sa l accoun t i s  n o t so obv ious
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in  th e  case  o f  n o n -n a tu ra l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  l i k e  p h y s ic a l  m agnitude
teirnis. P u tn am 's  d is c u s s io n  and example seem to  s l id e  from th e
p h y s ic a l  m agnitude te rm  'e l e c t r i c  c h a rg e ' to  th e  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te
' f l o w  o f  e l e c t r i c  c h a r g e ',  and th e n ce  to  ' e l e c t r i c i t y ' .  In th e  n e x t
c h a p te r  I  s h a l l  c o n s id e r  p h y s ic a l  m agnitude te rm s a t  g r e a te r  le n g th ,
When Putnam p u b lish e d  "E x p lan a tio n  and R eference" in  1973* he was
an advoca te  o f  a  " c a u sa l th e o ry  o f  r e f e r e n c e " ,  an e x p re ss io n  th e
accu racy  o f  which was c h a lle n g e d  in  th e  p re v io u s  c h a p te r .  D uring th e
n e x t th r e e  y e a rs  he changed h i s  mind and came to  re g a rd  i t  as "a  th e o ry
50o f  how re fe re n c e  i s  s p e c i f i e d ," ^  n o t o f  what r e fe re n c e  i s .  With t h i s
new a p p e l la t io n  we can w e ll a g re e , f o r  an im p o rtan t f a c to r  in
d is c o v e r in g  what th e  r e f e r e n t  o r  e x te n s io n  o f  a  term  i s ,  i s  how i t  came
to  be s p e c i f i e d .  As we have se e n , t h i s  in v o lv e s  c e r t a in  p h y s ic a l  f a c t s
about th e  r e l a t i o n  o f  th e  in t ro d u c e r  o r  s p e c i f i e r  to  th e  w o rld . But
s in c e  th e re  a re  such  p h y s ic a l  f a c t s ,  one may wonder why i t  i s  t h a t
Quine ex c lu d es  them in  h is  purv iew  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n .
In th e  f i r s t  s e c t io n  o f  t h i s  c h a p te r  we c i t e d  Quine as  e x p la in in g
th e  d if f e r e n c e  betw een in d e te rm in acy  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  and underdeterm  in -"
a t io n  o f  p h y s ic a l  th e o ry  by  ev idence u s in g  th e s e  w ords;
C onsider, from t h i s  r e a l i s t i c  p o in t  o f  v iew , th e  t o t a l i t y  o f  t r u t h s
o f  n a tu r e ,  known and unknown, o b se rv a b le  and u n o b se rv a b le , p a s t  and
f u tu r e . The p o in t  about in d e te rm in acy  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  t h a t  i t
w ith s ta n d s  even a l l  t h i s  t r u t h ,  th e  whole t r u t h  about n a tu r e .  T his
i s  what I  mean by  sa y in g  t h a t ,  where in d e te rm in acy  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n
a p p l ie s ,  th e r e  i s  no r e a l  q u e s tio n  o f  r ig h t  c h o ic e ; th e r e  i s  no
f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  even to  w ith in  th e  acknow ledged u n d e r -
51d e te rm in a tio n  o f  a  th e o ry  o f  n a tu r e .
The t o t a l i t y  o f  p h y s ic a l  f a c t s ,  Quine i s  s a y in g , f a i l s  to  d e term ine  
th e  c o r r e c t  t r a n s l a t i o n .  But th e r e  i s  a  s t r i k i n g  c o n t ra s t  betw een
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such  t a l k  about " th e  whole t r u t h  o f  n a tu re "  and th e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  
t h i s  t r u t h ,  in  d is c u s s io n  o f  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  and in d e te rm in a c y , to  
f a c t s  about behav iour*  We ag reed  e a r ly  on th a t  th e o ry  i s  u n d e r -  
de te rm in ed  by ev idence and th a t  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  o b s e rv a tio n a l  
se n te n c e s  i s  d e te rm in ed  by  th e  b e h a v io u ra l f a c t s .  Suppose we now 
ag ree  th a t  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  o b s e rv a tio n a l  se n te n c e s  does n o t 
d e te rm in e  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  s e n te n c e s .  Even so , to  g e t 
th e  re q u ir e d  c o n c lu s io n  th a t  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  se n te n c e s  
i s  n o t de te rm in ed  by  th e  t o t a l i t y  o f  p h y s ic a l  f a c t s ,  Quine needs th e  
a d d i t io n a l  p rem ise  t h a t  th e  o n ly  p h y s ic a l  f a c t s  r e le v a n t  to  t r a n s l a t i o n  
a re  b e h a v io u ra l . But c l e a r ly  th e  t o t a l i t y  o f  b e h a v io u ra l f a c t s  form s 
o n ly  a  sm all p a r t  o f  th e  t o t a l i t y  o f  p h y s ic a l  f a c t s .  So why i s  i t  t h a t  
Quine th in k s  o n ly  th e  b e h a v io u ra l ones a re  r e le v a n t  to  t r a n s l a t i o n ?
We to u ch ed  on what I  th in k  i s  th e  answ er in  C hapter 3 . There we 
ag reed  to  fo llo w  Q iine in  n o t r e q u i r in g ,  in  d is c u s s io n  o f  in s c r u t ­
a b i l i t y ,  f a c t s  o th e r  th a n  th o se  w hich r e l a t e  to  th e  b eh av io u r o f  
language u s e r s .  Quine b e g in s  th e  P re fa c e  to  Word and O b jec t as  
fo llo w s ;
Language i s  a  s o c ia l  a r t .  In  a c q u ir in g  i t  we have to  depend 
e n t i r e l y  on in te r s u b je o t iv e ly  a v a i la b le  cues a s  to  what to  say  and 
and when. Hence th e re  i s  no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  c o l l a t i n g  l i n g u i s t i c  
m eanings, u n le s s  in  te rm s o f  m en 's d i s p o s i t io n s  to  respond  o v e r t ly  
to  s o c ia l ly  o b se rv a b le  s t im u la t io n s .  An e f f e c t  o f  re c o g n iz in g  t h i s  
l im i t a t i o n  i s  t h a t  th e  e n te r p r i s e  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  found to  be 
in v o lv ed  in  a  c e r t a in  sy s te m a tic  in d e te rm in a c y .
Ten y e a rs  l a t e r  he r e a f f i rm s  th e  same p o in t :
Meanings a r e ,  f i r s t  and fo rem o st, m eanings o f  lan g u ag e . Language 
i s  a  s o c ia l  a r t  w hich we a l l  a c q u ire  on th e  ev idence  s o le ly  o f  
o th e r  p e o p le 's  o v e r t  b eh av io u r u n d er p u b l ic ly  re c o g n iz a b le
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c irc u m s ta n c e s . M eanings, t h e r e f o r e ,  th o se  v e ry  models o f  m en ta l 
e n t i t i e s ,  end up a s  g r i s t  f o r  th e  b e h a v io u r i s t 's  m i l l .  Dewey was
e x p l i c i t  on th e  p o in t ;  M eaning . . .  i s  n o t a  p sy ch ic  e x is te n c e ;
52i t  i s  p r im a r i ly  a  p ro p e r ty  o f  b e h a v io u r . "
In  one se n se , o f  c o u rs e , Quine i s  r i g h t  to  say  th a t  we a c q u ire  language 
from o u r o b s e rv a tio n s  o f  o th e r  p e o p le 's  o v e r t  b e h a v io u r . But i t  seems 
obv ious t h a t  a lth o u g h  we b eg in  to  a c q u ire  language in  t h i s  way, we can 
p ro g re s s  by  r e l a t i n g  th e s e  o b s e rv a tio n s  to  th e  w ider body o f  p h y s ic a l  
in fo im a tio n  we a re  a b le  to  o b ta in  about them and th e  w o rld . In  l i k e  
m anner we develop  a  th e o ry  o f ,  s a y , q u a sa rs  n o t ju s t  from o b se rv in g  
t h e i r  b eh av io u r b u t by r e l a t i n g  i t  to  a  w ider body o f  p h y s ic a l  th e o ry .  
S im ila r ly ,  when i t  comes to  t r a n s l a t i o n  o u r p a ram e te rs  a re  f ix e d  by 
o u r " th e o ry  o f  n a tu r e " ,  by  th e  t o t a l i t y  o f  known p h y s ic a l f a c t s ,  and - 
th e s e  may o u tru n  th e  b e h a v io u ra l o n es .
T his le a d s  u s  back  to  th e  t h i r d  s ta g e  o f  Q u in e 's  argum ent, to  
w hether t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  in d e te rm in a te ,  as he say s  i t  i s ,  o r  ju s t  
u n d e rd e t errained , a s  th e  r e s t  o f  p h y s ic a l th e o ry  i s .  F p l le s d a l  has 
c la im ed  th a t  th e  e s s e n t i a l  p o in t  f o r  t h i s  s ta g e ,  one " th a t  nobody who
has d is c u s se d  Q u in e 's  view s ap p ea rs  to  have f u l l y  u n d e rs to o d ,"  i s  t h a t
53" a l l  th e  t r u t h s  th e re  a r e ,  a re  in c lu d e d  in  o u r th e o ry  o f  n a tu re .""^
He goes on , " in  o u r  th e o ry  o f  n a tu re  we t r y  to  account fo r  a l l  o u r
e x p e r ie n c e s .  And th e  o n ly  e n t i t i e s  we a re  j u s t i f i e d  in  assum ing a re  
th o se  th a t  a re  ap p ea led  to  in  th e  s im p le s t th e o ry  th a t  acco u n ts  f o r  
a l l  t h i s  e v i d e n c e I f  what I  have s a id  i s  r i g h t ,  th e n  some o f  o u r 
e x p e rie n c e s  —  th in k  h e re  o f  Putnam s ta n d in g  n e x t to  F ra n k lin  — a re  
o n ly  to  be f u l l y  e x p la in e d  by c o n s id e r in g  th e  p h y s ic a l  f a c t s  in  
a d d i t io n  to  th e  b e h a v io u ra l o n e s . Our " th e o ry  o f  n a tu re "  i s  what i t
say s  i t  i s ,  n o t a  th e o ry  o f  b e h a v io u rI The c o n c lu s io n , I  s u g g e s t,  i s
t h a t  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  l i k e  th e  r e s t  o f  p h y s ic a l  th e o ry ,  i s  u n d erd e te rm in ed
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b y  e v id en ce , b u t has so f a r  n o t been shown to  be in d e te rm in a te .
In  t h i s  s e c t io n  i t  h as  been  m a in ta in ed  t h a t  th e r e  i s  no re a so n  
f o r  th in k in g  th a t  D av id so n 's  th e o ry  o f  r a d ic a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  w i l l  
r e s o lv e  a l l  problem s o f  d e te rm in a cy , even g iven  th e  d iv e r s i ty  and 
com plex ity  o f  th e  p o s s ib le  l i n g u i s t i c  e v id en ce . As f o r  th e  c o n s t r a in t  
su g g es ted  by  th e  c a u s a l accoun t o f  how re fe re n c e  i s  s p e c i f i e d ,  t h i s  
o n ly  p e rm its  th e  s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  r e fe re n c e ;  i t  does n o t g u a ra n te e  th a t  
we s h a l l  be a b le  to  c a p tu re  th e  f u l l  sense  o f  th e  te rm . B eing a b le  to  
d is c o v e r  what was c a u s a l ly  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  knowledge th a t  D a lto n , 
M endel, F ra n k lin ,  e t c . ,  had i s  n o t th e  same a s  b e in g  a b le  to  re s o lv e  
a l l  problem s a s  to  th e  m eanings th e y  a t ta c h e d  to  th e  term s th e y  u s e d .  
F or we a re  r e ly in g  on a  th e o ry  o f  how re fe re n c e  i s  s p e c i f i e d ,  and t h i s  
i s  q u i te  d i f f e r e n t  from a  th e o ry  o f  how m eanings a re  to  be a t t r i b u t e d .  
Even u n d er th e  th e o ry  o f  r a d ic a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  th e n ,  th e  p a th  from 
r e fe re n c e  to  m eaning i s  narrow  a t  b e s t  and m ight sometimes p e te r  o u t .  
So i t  seens we a re  o b lig e d  to  h o ld  t h a t  s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  re fe re n c e  
does n o t im ply  th a t  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  d e te rm in a te . Our cho ice  o f  a  
th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  f o r  a  language m ight to  t h i s  e x te n t be u n d e rd e t erm ined 
by th e  p h y s ic a l  e v id en ce .
T his r e c a l l s  an argum ent from s e c tio n  ( i ) .  I  s a id  t h a t  i f  
s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  r e fe re n c e  d id  im ply d e t erm inacy o f  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  th e n  
in d e te rm in acy  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  im p lie s  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  in  
w hich case  o u r b e in g  u n a b le  to  d é te rm in â t e ly  t r a n s l a t e  would p re c lu d e  
o u r  a s s ig n in g  r e f e r e n t s  o r  e x te n s io n s  to  a l ie n  te rm s . In t h i s  s e c t io n  
we have seen  th a t  s c r u t a b i l i t y  does n o t ,  in  g e n e ra l ,  im ply d e term inacy  
o f  t r a n s l a t i o n .  C onsequen tly  i t  cannot be s a id  th a t  f a i l u r e  to  
d é te rm in â te ly  t r a n s l a t e  im p lie s  i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  r e f e r e n c e .  A th e o ry
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o f  t r u t h  f o r  a  language m ight he u n d erd e te rm in ed , b u t t h i s  does n o t 
in  i t s e l f  g iv e  u s  a  rea so n  f o r  th in k in g  th a t  we cannot d is c o v e r  what 
-the names o f  th e  language r e f e r  to  o r  what th e  p r e d ic a te s  o f  th e  
language have as  t h e i r  e x te n s io n s .  On th e  o th e r  hand , o f  c o u rse , we 
have n o t e s ta b l i s h e d  th e  much s tro n g e r  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  we s h a l l  
alw ays be a b le  to  d is c o v e r  t h i s .  We have to  ta k e  each  case  s e p a r a te ly  
and weigh th e  e v id e n c e . In  d o ing  so we a re  w ith  Quine when he say s  
"know ledge, m ind, and m eaning a re  p a r t  o f  th e  same w orld  th a t  th e y  
have to  do w ith , and . . .  th e y  a re  to  be s tu d ie d  in  th e  same e m p ir ic a l 
s p i r i t  t h a t  an im ates  n a tu r a l  s c i e n c e , t h o u g h  we m ight beg  to  d i f f e r  
o v e r what th o se  words mean.
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CHAPTER 7 A BROADER PERSPECTIVE
S eo tio n  ( i ) s  The S to ry  So Ear
In  C hap ter 2 , I  posed  fo u r  in te rc o n n e c te d  q u e s tio n s  w hich, I  
a rg u ed , a  r e a l i s t  would have to  answ er in  o rd e r  to  su p p o rt h is  
account o f  th e  grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge. H aving answ ered 
q u e s tio n s  (3 ) and (4 ) ,  and d is c u s s e d  how to  i n t e r p r e t  th e  language 
o f  p re v io u s  t h e o r i s t s ,  we a re  now in  a  p o s i t io n  to  sum up o u r answer 
to  th e  second , to  th e  q u e s tio n
( 2 ) How can we d is c o v e r  which o b je c ts  b e lo n g  to  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  
a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  a s  t h a t  p re d ic a te  i s  u sed  w ith in  a  
l i n g u i s t i c  community?
The key to  o u r answ er i s  t h a t  we have to  d e term ine  what b e l i e f s  
members o f  th e  l i n g u i s t i c  community who u se d  th e  p re d ic a te  had about 
th in g s  to  which th e y  though t i t  c o u ld  be c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d . ( I  h e re  
c o n fin e  m y se lf to  te rm s o f  p a s t  t h e o r i e s . )  We need  to  look  a t  what 
Johannsen ( th e  b io l o g i s t  who co in ed  th e  term  *gene ' )  and th o se  
fo llo w in g  him b e l ie v e d  about what th e y  c a l le d  g en es , a t  what o u r 
a n c e s to rs  b e l ie v e d  about w hales , a t  what b e l i e f s  Bohr h e ld  about th e  
th in g s  he c a l le d  e le c t ro n s  in  I 9 II»  and so o n . Of c o u rse , i t  w i l l  
n o t alw ays be th e  case  t h a t  ou r p re d e c e sso rs  u s e d  th e  same term  th a t  
we do fo r  a  g iven  n a tu r a l  k in d  ( th in k  h e re  o f  D alton  c a l l in g  
m o lecu les  o f  g ase s  "a to m s" ) , a lth o u g h  when we b eg in  to  in t e r p r e t  
t h e i r  th e o ry  o r  language we m ight a t  f i r s t  assume th a t  th e y  do .
B efore we a c tu a l ly  b eg in  o u r i n t e r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  d a ta  we can 
s t a t e ,  a s  a  g e n e ra l a  p r i o r i  c o n s t r a in t  on p o s s ib le  a t t r i b u t io n s  o f  
e x te n s io n s  to  p r e d ic a te s ,  t h a t  members o f  th e  l i n g u i s t i c  community
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u n d er c o n s id e ra t io n  must have been  in  an a p p ro p r ia te  c a u s a l r e la t io n  
to  th in g s  o f  w hatever k in d  we d ec id e  th e y  were ap p ly in g  a  p re d ic a te  
to  (a  s im i la r  c o n s t r a in t  h o ld s  f o r  th e  a t t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e f e r e n t s  to  
s in g u la r  te rm s ) .  For u s  to  say  th a t  Bohr was t a lk in g  about e le c t r o n s ,  
he must have perform ed  ex perim en ts  w ith  them , o r  a t  l e a s t  have been 
a c q u a in te d  w ith  th e  r e s u l t s  o b ta in e d  by  o th e rs  who had perform ed such 
e x p e rim en ts . Members o f  th e  n a tu r a l  k in d  —  and h e re  i t  i s  we who 
d e c id e , on th e  b a s i s  o f  o u r own " th e o ry  o f  n a tu r e " ,  what th e  members 
a re  —  have to  be ( c a u s a l ly )  " a t th e  ro o t o f"  b e l i e f s  i f  th e se  
b e l i e f s  a re  to  be p ro p e r ly  d e s c r ib e d  as b e in g  about th in g s  o f  t h a t  
k in d . Here we see  th e  im portance to  th e  r e a l i s t  o f  th e  co n n ec tio n  
betw een words and th e  w o rld . In  o rd e r  fo r  members o f  a l i n g u i s t i c
community C to  be in t e r p r e te d  a s  u s in g  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d i c a t e ; ’^ ’
to  d e s c r ib e  s ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a ry  th a t  th e re  be some c a u sa l connec­
t i o n  between s and members o f  0 , nam ely th a t  betw een " ^ ’ s and what
i s  b e l ie v e d  about j^’ s w ith in  G. T his i s  a  p o in t r i g h t l y  em phasised
by th o se  who argue f o r  a  c a u s a l account o f  r e f e r e n c e .
B earing  t h i s  " c a u sa l c o n s t r a in t"  in  m ind, we b eg in  to  i n t e r p r e t .  
The d a ta  on which we p r im a r i ly  c o n c e n tra te  a re  th e  se n te n c e s  a cc ep ted  
a s  t r u e  by  members o f  th e  l i n g u i s t i c  community in  q u e s tio n . I f  we 
w ish to  i n t e r p r e t  a  lan g u ag e , th e n  o u r aim i s  to  e s t a b l i s h  a  th e o ry
o f  t r u t h  f o r  t h a t  language; i f  we w ish to  i n t e r p r e t  a  s c i e n t i f i c
th e o ry , th en  o u r aim i s  to  e s t a b l i s h  a  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  fo r  se n te n c e s
o f  th e  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry .  With re g a rd  to  th e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  though ,
i t  must be remembered th a t  any th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  f o r  a  p a r t  o f  a 
language must cohere  w ith  a  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  f o r  th e  w hole. As we 
have seen , th e  more t h e o r e t i c a l  sen ten c es  i n t e r r e l a t e  w ith  th e  le s s  
t h e o r e t i c a l  to  fo m  th e  netw ork  o f  lan g u ag e .
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To b eg in  w ith , we have to  assume th a t  members o f  th e  community 
a re  c o r r e c t ,  from o u r p o in t  o f  v iew , as  o f te n  a s  p o s s ib le ;  hence th e  
assum ption  about t h e i r  u s in g  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  to  d e sc r ib e  
th e  same s o r t  o f  th in g  th a t  we u se  i t  to  d e s c r ib e .  In  m axim izing 
agreem ent in  t h i s  way we a t t r i b u t e  to  them many o f  o u r own b e l i e f s .  
U n less  we th e re b y  o b ta in  some p u rch ase  on th e  n o t io n  o f  meaning we 
cannot b e g in  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  p ro p e r .
F i r s t - o r d e r  lo g ic  i s  a t t r i b u t e d  to  members o f  th e  community. 
Working w ith  th o se  se n te n c e s  alw ays h e ld  t r u e  o r  alw ays h e ld  f a l s e ,  
and v a l id  p a t te r n s  o f  in fe re n c e ,  we f i t  o u r o rth o d o x  lo g ic  to  th e  
language b e in g  i n t e r p r e t e d .  Having s e t t l e d  m a tte r s  o f  lo g ic a l  form , 
we tu rn  to  th e  most o b s e rv a tio n a l  s e n te n c e s , i . e . ,  to  th o se  whose 
t r u t h —v a lu e  b e a rs  th e  most obv ious r e l a t i o n  to  changes in  th e  
env ironm en t. To g iv e  a  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  f o r  a  language i s  to  s t a t e  
a  p roced u re  t h a t  w i l l  g e n e ra te ,  f o r  any sen ten c e  o f  th e  lan g u ag e , 
a  T -sen tenoe  th a t  i s  t r u e .  In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e  we g a th e r  ev idence 
f o r  th o se  T -se n te n c e s  where th e  o b je c t  language sen ten c e  i s  most 
o b s e rv a t io n a l .  We th en  p ro ceed  to  th e  l e s s  o b s e r v a t io n a l .  Here we 
a re  h e lp ed  by  th e  i n f e r e n t i a l  l in k s  between more and l e s s  o b se rv a ­
t i o n a l  s e n te n c e s .  There i s  a lso  l i k e l y  to  be a  v a s t  amount o f  
p rim ary  and secondary  l i n g u i s t i c  in fo rm a tio n  a v a i la b le ,  b o th  in  th e  
ca se  o f  in t e r p r e t i n g  a  la n g ia g e  a s  a  whole and a lso  in  th e  case  o f  
i n t e r p r e t i n g  a  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o ry .  F in a l ly ,  th e re  i s  th e  o th e r  
n o n - l i n g u is t i c  p h y s ic a l  ev idence  o f  th e  k in d  I  su g g es ted  would be 
o f  u s e ,  i f  ta k e n  to g e th e r  w ith  th e  c a u sa l c o n s t r a i n t ,  in  in t e r p r e t i n g  
D alton*s atom ic th e o ry  o f  g a s e s .
In th e  l i g h t  o f  t h i s  f u r th e r  in fo im a tio n  and th e  su g g es ted  
in t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,  i t  m ight p rove n e c e ssa ry  to  r e v i s e ,  in  c e r t a in
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p la c e s ,  o u r o r ig i n a l  c h a r i t a b le  a ssu m p tio n s . T h is in  tu rn  m ight 
le a d  u s  to  a l t e r  some o f  o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,  and so o n . In  g e n e ra l 
th e r e  i s  no ground f o r  assum ing t h a t  th e re  w i l l  be ju s t  one 
a d m is s ib le  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  f o r  a  language on th e  b a s is  o f  th e  
a v a i la b le  d a ta  (o r  even on th e  b a s i s  o f  a l l  th e  p o s s ib le  d a ta  in  
Quine*s s e n s e ) .  To r e tu r n  to  th e  Quinean id iom , sen ten ce  t r a n s l a t i o n  
may w e ll tu rn  o u t n o t to  be d e te im in a te .  I t  may even tu rn  o u t to  be 
in d e te rm in a te ;  though none o f  Quine*s argum ents show th a t  i t  w i l l .
In  th e m se lv es , n e i th e r  i s  a  cause  f o r  concern  to  th e  r e a l i s t ,  f o r  he 
i s  s a t i s f i e d  w ith  o p tim a l t r a n s l a t i o n ,  t r a n s l a t i o n  th a t  i s  c o n s is te n t  
w ith  a l l  th e  ev id en ce ; he need  n o t i n s i s t  on th e r e  b e in g  p e r f e c t  o r  
u n iq u e  t r a n s l a t i o n .  What would be a  cause fo r  h i s  concern  would be 
i f  such la c k  o f  d e term inacy  im p lie d  th a t  we cannot * sc ru te*  th e  
r e fe re n c e  o r  e x te n s io n  o f  te rm s o f  th e  o b je c t  la n g u ag e . As I  argued  
in  th e  p re v io u s  c h a p te r ,  how ever, in d e te rm in acy  o f  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  
se n te n c e s  and i n s c r u t a b i l i t y  o f  re fe re n c e  o f  te rm s a re  lo g i c a l ly  
independent d o c t r in e s .
A pplying t h i s  s t r a t e g y  to  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s ,  th e  r e a l i s t  can 
hope to  d is c o v e r  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  as i t  i s  
u se d  w ith in  a  g iven  l i n g u i s t i c  community. He can hope to  d is c o v e r ,  
f o r  exam ple, t h a t  Mendel* s  * b i l  dun gs f a h i  g E lem ent* was u n d e rs to o d  by 
him to  ap p ly  to  th o se  th in g s  w hich were re s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  
tra n s m is s io n  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  from one g e n e ra tio n  
to  th e  n e x t .  T h is  m ight be ex p ressed  more fo rm a lly  as  fo llo w s ,
( i )  For any a , *b i ld u n g s fa h ig  E lem ent* i s  t r u e  o f  a  in  Mendel* s 
th e o ry  o f  in h e r i ta n c e  i f  and o n ly  i f  a  i s  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  
tra n s m is s io n  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  from one 
g e n e ra tio n  to  th e  n e x t .
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S ta t in g  what th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a  p re d ic a te  i s ,  i s  done th ro u g h  a  
m eta lan g u ag e . Here we a re  rem inded o f  th e  p o in t  made tow ards th e  
end o f  C hapter 2 , t h a t  in  o rd e r  to  compare th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  r e le v a n t  
n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  from d i f f e r e n t  . s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  we must 
s t a t e  what th e y  a re  in  th e  same m e ta -  o r  background lan g u ag e .
Suppose t h a t  th e  r e a l i s t  w ishes to  compare Mendel*s th e o ry  
w ith  M u lle r* s . He w i l l  th e n  be hoping  to  d is c o v e r  th a t  th e  fo llo w in g  
i s  t r u e ,
( i i )  For any a ,  *gene* i s  t r u e  o f  a  in  M u lle r* s th e o ry  o f  g e n e t ic s  
i f  and o n ly  i f  a  i s  re s p o n s ib le  fo r  th e  tra n sm is s io n  o f  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  from one g e n e ra tio n  to  th e  
n e x t .
Assuming th a t  ( i )  and ( i i )  a re  ex p ressed  in  th e  same language , i t  
fo llo w s  th a t  what Mendel c a l le d  *b ild u n g s fa h ig e n  E lem en ts*, M u lle r 
c a l le d  * genes* ; o r ,  more fo rm a lly , th a t
( i i i )  For any a , *b ild u n g s fa h ig  E lem ent* i s  t r u e  o f  a in  M endel’ s 
th e o ry  o f  in h e r i ta n c e  i f  and o n ly  i f  ’ gene* i s  t r u e  o f  a  in  
M u lle r*8 th e o ry  o f  g e n e t ic s .
And t h i s  w i l l  be so even though many o f  th e  b e l i e f s  h e ld  by Mendel 
and M ulle r abou t t h e i r  s u b je c t -m a t te r  m ight be d i f f e r e n t .  That i s ,  
i t  w i l l  be so even though th e  se n se s  th e y  a t ta c h e d  to  th e  term s th e y  
u se d  m ight be  d i f f e r e n t .
The complex p a th  le a d in g  to  ( i i i )  c o n s t i tu t e s  an answ er to  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  in s ta n c e  o f  q u e s tio n  (1 ) in  i t s  m a te r ia l  mode. T his i s  
th e  p rim ary  q u e s tio n  in  th e  r e a l i s t * s  account o f  th e  grow th o f  
s c ie n c e .  I f  ( i )  and ( i i )  a re  t r u e ,  th en  Mendel and M ulle r were 
ta lk in g  about th e  same th in g s .  P e rh ap s th e  most d i f f i c u l t  ta s k  i s  
e s ta b l i s h in g  th a t  what Mendel and M ulle r re g a rd e d  as  th e  d i f f e r  en—
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t i a t i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a  s p e c ie s  were more o r  l e s s  th e  same. 
N a tu ra l ly  t h i s  would i t s e l f  in v o lv e  in t e r p r e t a t i o n  th a t  would su g g es t 
s ta te m e n ts  o f  th e  same form a s  ( i )  and ( i i ) .  But n o t ic e  th a t  
* d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s *  i s  a  l e s s  t h e o r e t i c a l ,  more 
t r a c t a b l e  term  th a n  *gene* (o r  *b ild u n g s fa h ig  E lem ent* ) .  We m ight 
th e r e f o r e  ex p ec t to  be a b le  to  make more u se  o f  la b o ra to ry  n o teb o o k s, 
o b s e rv a tio n  r e p o r t s ,  and a lso  o f  th e  k in d  o f  in fo rm a tio n  a f fo rd e d  by  
exam ining th e  a p p a ra tu s  u se d  by  M ulle r when c o n s id e re d  a lo n g  w ith  
th e  c a u sa l c o n s t r a i n t .
In  g e n e ra l ,  how s u c c e s s fu l  th e  r e a l i s t  w i l l  be i f  he p u rsu es  
th e  s t r a t e g y  I  have been a rg u in g  f o r  a s  an e x p la n a tio n  o f  th e  grow th 
o f  s c ie n c e  i s  n o t som ething t h a t  can be s p e c i f ie d  in  advance; i t  i s  
a  c o n tin g e n t m a t te r .  There may be many c a ses  where he cannot 
e s t a b l i s h  th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  p r e d ic a te s  from p re v io u s  s c i e n t i f i c  
th e o r i e s .  And even where he can i t  m ight tu rn  o u t t h a t  subsequent 
o r  com peting th e o r ie s  a re  n o t abou t th e  same th in g s .
So f a r  in  t h i s  t h e s i s  I  have c o n c e n tra te d  on c a ses  where th e  
r e le v a n t  s c i e n t i f i c  p r e d ic a te  i s  a n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  and where 
one’ s i n t u i t i v e  view  i s  th a t  subsequen t th e o r ie s  a re  about th e  same 
th in g s .  I  have argued  f o r  a  number o f  p h ilo s o p h ic a l  p o in ts  which 
make sense  o f  t h i s  i n t u i t i o n .  By way o f  co n c lu s io n  I  w ish to  make 
some rem arks on two c a se s  o f  r a th e r  d i f f e r e n t  s o r t s ,  one where we 
now say  th a t  th e r e  i s  n o th in g  o f  th e  k in d  p o s tu la te d  by  e a r l i e r  
t h e o r i s t s ,  and one where th e  r e le v a n t  p re d ic a te  i s  n o t a  n a tu r a l  
k in d  p r e d ic a te .  Though my d is c u s s io n  o f  th e s e  c a se s  w i l l  no t be 
e x te n s iv e ,  I  hope t h a t  th e  way th e y  c o n t ra s t  w ith  th o se  co n s id e re d  
so f a r  w i l l  make c l e a r  th e  l i m i t s  o f  th e  fo re g o in g  argum ents and 
th e re b y  su g g es t in  what d i r e c t io n  f h r th e r  work m ight p ro ceed .
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S eo tio n  ( i i ) :  ’P h lo g is to n *
The f i r s t  oase tu r n s  on th e  d if f e r e n c e  betw een two s o r t s  o f  
e r r o r  we m ight w ish to  a s c r ib e  to  o u r a n c e s to r s :  a  p r e d ic a te  th e y  
u se d  f a i l i n g  to  have any e x te n s io n  a t  a l l  a c c o rd in g  to  o u r c o n ce p tu a l 
scheme, and i t s  hav in g  an e x te n s io n  b u t t h e i r  h o ld in g  f a l s e  b e l i e f s  
about what th e y  c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d  i t  t o .  I  have a lre a d y  m entioned  
s e v e ra l  c a se s  which app ea r to  be o f  th e  l a t t e r  k in d  —  Bohr th o u g h t 
t h a t  a t  a l l  tim es  e le c tr o n s  have p r e c is e  p o s i t io n s  and momenta, 
M u lle r b e l ie v e d  th a t  genes were composed o f  p r o te in s ,  P tolem y h e ld  
th a t  th e  o th e r  p la n e ts  re v o lv e d  around th e  e a r th ,  and so o n . Less 
a t t e n t io n  has been  p a id  to  th o se  c a se s  where we now a s s ig n  a  n u l l  
e x te n s io n  to  p r e d ic a te s  from p re v io u s  s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  —  from 
o u r p o in t  o f  view  th e r e  i s  no p h lo g is to n ,  no lu m in ife ro u s  e th e r  
su rro u n d in g  th e  e a r th ,  no c a lo r i c  su rro u n d in g  atom s, and so o n .
I s  th e re  a  c l e a r  d iv id in g  l i n e  betw een th e s e  two s o r t s  o f  c a se s?
How do we d ec id e  betw een them?
We have to  be c a r e fu l  h e re  to  d i s t in g u is h  betw een q u e s tio n s  o f  
th e  fo m  *What, a c c o rd in g  to  i s  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  p r e d ic a te  
*(^*?* and q u e s tio n s  o f  th e  fo m  'D id  members o f  l i n g u i s t i c  community 
0 succeed  in  d e s c r ib in g  a n y th in g  when th e y  u sed  th e  te rn  *^' ?* . 
A ccording  to  u s ,  th e  p r e d ic a te  'p h lo g is to n *  has n u l l  ex te n s io n  —  
th e r e  i s  no such  th in g  as  p h lo g is to n ,  th o se  who b e l ie v e d  th a t  th e re  
was were m is ta k e n . N e v e r th e le s s ,  chem ists  d u rin g  most o f  th e  18^^ 
c e n tu ry  d e s c r ib e d  th e  r e s u l t s  o f  some o f  t h e i r  experim en ts  u s in g  th e  
p r e d ic a te ,  and in  so do ing  were th o u g h t by t h e i r  con tem p o raries  to  
have made t r u e  s ta te m e n ts .  Thus, suppose th a t  one such  chem ist 
o f f e r s  th e  fo llo w in g  r e p o r t  o f  a  f a m i l ia r  la b o ra to ry  o b s e rv a tio n :
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(0R1 ) On a d d i t io n  o f  o i l  o f  v i t r i o l  to  g ra n u la te d  z in c , e v o lu tio n
o f  p h lo g is to n  was o b se rv ed .
Such a  r e p o r t  would have been a c c e p te d  as t r u e  by  o th e r-c h e m is ts  o f
th e  tim e . To u s  i t  seems obv ious what th e  chem ist in  f a c t  o b se rv ed ,
nam ely, th e  e v o lu tio n  o f  hydrogen on a d d it io n  o f  s u lp h u r ic  a c id  to
g ra n u la te d  z in c .  ( We can i n t e r p r e t  t h e i r  la b o ra to ry  n o te b o o k s .)
Yet i f  we f a i l  to  d i s t in g u is h  betw een th e  above q u e s tio n s  —  i f  we
1f a l l  v ic tim  to  " th e  chauvinism  o f  tim e" —  th e n  s in c e  th e re  i s  
( t e n s e le s s )  no such  th in g  as p h lo g is to n ,  th e re  can be no such even t 
a s  an e v o lu tio n  o f  p h lo g is to n ,  and so th e  r e p o r t  canno t be s a id  to  
d e s c r ib e  any even t a t  a l l .
Such f a i l u r e  to  d is t in g u is h  le a d s  to  two p rob lem s. The f i r s t  
i s  t h a t  n o t b e in g  a b le  to  a s s ig n  th e  v a lu e  * tru e*  to  many o f  t h e i r  
o b se rv a tio n  r e p o r ts  c o n f l i c t s  w ith  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  c h a r i ty .  We 
m ight now say  th a t  th e r e  i s  no such th in g  as  p h lo g is to n ,  b u t i f  we 
h o ld  th a t  i t  fo llo w s  from t h i s  th a t  th e  p r e d ic a te  la ck ed  an e x te n s io n  
f o r  e a r ly  18 c e n tu ry  c h e m is ts , th en  ou r in t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  
s c ie n c e  w i l l  d iv e rg e  in  c o u n tle s s  p la c e s  from t h e i r  own u n d e rs ta n d in g . 
The s o r t  o f  g e n e r a l iz a t io n  which r e p o r ts  l i k e  (0R1 ) w i l l  te n d  to  
su p p o rt i s
( x ) ( i f  X i s  a  member o f  th e  community o f  e a r ly  18^^ ce n tu ry
ch em ists  th e n  (x  h o ld s  *0R1* t r u e  i f  and o n ly  i f  x o b se rv es  
an e v o lu tio n  o f  hydrogen when s u lp h u r ic  a c id  i s  added to  
g ra n u la te d  z i n c ) ) .
T h is in  tu rn  su p p o rts  th e  T -sen ten ce
*0R1* i s  t r u e  in  th e  language o f  e a r ly  18^^ c e n tu ry  ch em is try  
fo r  a  sp e a k e r x i f  and o n ly  i f  x  o b serv es  an e v o lu tio n  o f  
hydrogen when s u lp h u r ic  a c id  i s  added to  g ra n u la te d  z in c .
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But n e i th e r  th e  g e n e r a l iz a t io n  n o r  th e  T -sen ten ce  a re  su p p o rted  i f  
we re fu s e  to  a s s ig n  an e x te n s io n  to  th e  p r e d ic a te  *p h lo g is to n ' as 
u se d  by  them .
The second problem  i s  r e l a t e d  to  th e  f i r s t  and can a lso  be 
s t a t e d  b r i e f l y .  I f  such  o b se rv a tio n  r e p o r ts  f a i l  to  d e s c r ib e  
a n y th in g  a t  a l l ,  th en  th e  w idesp read  agreem ent by  chem ists  o f  th e  
tim e o v er what t r u th - v a lu e  th e y  a re  to  be a s s ig n e d  must s t r i k e  u s  
a s  n o th in g  s h o r t  o f  m ira c u lo u s . How cou ld  th e y  ag ree  i f  th e re  was
n o t a n y th in g  th e r e  fo r  them to  c o r r e c t ly  ap p ly  t h e i r  p re d ic a te s  to ?
2T his p o in t  i s  made by  N ick J a rd in e  in  a  re c e n t p a p e r , where he 
le v e ls  i t  a g a in s t  a  p r in c ip le  f o r  making r e t r o s p e c t iv e  assignm en ts  
o f  e x te n s io n  which Putnam c a l l s  th e  " p r in c ip le  o f  b e n e f i t  o f  th e  
d o u b t" .^  A ccording to  P u tn am 's  p r in c i p l e ,  we a re  p e rm itte d  to  
i d e n t i f y  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a  p r e d ic a te  o f  o u r s c ie n c e  w ith  t h a t  
o f  a  sim ple p r e d ic a te  ( l i k e  'g e n e ' o r  ' a t o m ' )  o f  a  p a s t  s c ie n c e  
p ro v id ed  o n ly  th a t  th e  d e s c r ip t io n s  which p ro ta g o n is ts  o f  th e  p a s t  
s c ie n c e  u sed  to  c h a r a c te r iz e  ^ * s  w ould, when " re a so n a b ly  refo rm ­
u la te d " ,  c h a r a c te r iz e  Y ^ 's .  T h is  p r in c i p le ,  say s  Putnam , would 
a llo w  u s  to  " a s s ig n  a  r e f e r e n t  to  'g r a v i t a t i o n a l  f i e l d '  in  Newtonian 
th e o ry  from th e  s ta n d p o in t o f  r e l a t i v i t y  th e o ry  (though  n o t to  
'e t h e r '  o r  'p h l o g i s t o n ') ;  a  r e f e r e n t  to  M endel's  ' g en e ' ( s i c ) from 
th e  s ta n d p o in t o f  p re s e n t-d a y  m o lecu la r b io lo g y ; and a  r e f e r e n t  to  
D a lto n 's  'atom* from th e  s ta n d p o in t o f  quantum m ech an ic s ."^  What 
J a rd in e  c la im s i s  th a t  a c c e p tin g  t h i s  p r in c ip le  r e q u ir e s  u s  to  
acknow ledge, in  c a se s  l i k e  'p h l o g i s t o n ',  t h a t  th e re  can be m ira c le s ]  
He a lso  se e s  a n o th e r  d i f f i c u l t y  in  i t s  a c c e p ta n c e . The p r in c ip le  
fo rc e s  u s  in to  a  dilemma when i t  comes to  i n t e r p r e t i n g  sim ple 
p r e d ic a te s  o f  a  p a s t  s c ie n c e .  E i th e r  we must eq u a te  i t s  e x te n s io n
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w ith  th a t  o f  a  sim ple  p r e d ic a te  o f  o u r own s c ie n c e , o r  we must adm it
th a t  i t  has n u l l  e x te n s io n . I t  fo rc e s  u s  to  a c c e p t th a t  th e re  i s  a
c l e a r  d iv id in g  l i n e  betw een th e  two s o r t s  o f  o a s e s .
Seeking  to  av o id  th e  p o s tu la t io n  o f  m ira c le s ,  J a rd in e  i s  le d
to  argue " th a t  i t  i s  a  p re c o n d it io n  fo r  assignm ent o f  e x te n s io n  to  
th e  p r e d ic a te s  o f  a  p a s t  s c ie n c e  t h a t  th a t  assignm ent be such a s  to  
make many such o b s e rv a tio n  r e p o r t s  [ a s  (0R1 ) J  come o u t t r u e . " ^  We 
a re  w e ll p la c e d  to  ag ree  w ith  J a rd in e  h e re ,  fo r  n o t o n ly  do we too  
w ish to  av o id  ta lk in g  o f  m ir a c le s ,  we a lso  have to  defend  a  p r in c ip le  
o f  c h a r i ty  u n d e r ly in g  o u r th e o ry  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  Let me now 
e x p la in  how what I  have s a id  e a r l i e r  in  t h i s  t h e s i s  m eets J a r d in e *s 
p re c o n d i t io n .
The th e o ry  o f  r e fe re n c e  f o r  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  th a t  I  
adum brated in  C h ap te r 5 was a  th e o ry , o f  what i t  i s  f o r  an o b je c t  a  
to  b e lo n g  to  a  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  as th a t  p r e d ic a te  i s  u se d  
w ith in  a l i n g u i s t i c  community G. In  keep ing  w ith  t h i s ,  s p e c ify in g  
th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  p r e d ic a te s  in  s ta te m e n ts  ( i )  and ( i i )  from th e  
l a s t  s e c t io n  was accom plished  u s in g  a  th r e e -p la c e  r e l a t i o n  h o ld in g  
betw een a  te rm , a  s e t  o f  o b je c ts  and a  th e o ry . I f  i t  shou ld  tu rn  
o u t t h a t ,  sa y , c e r t a in  o c c u rre n c e s  o f  hydrogen s a t i s f y  a  s u i ta b le  
m a jo r i ty  o f  th o s e  d e s c r ip t io n s  which cou ld  be c o n s i s te n t ly  a t t r i b u t e d  
to  p h lo g is to n  on th e  b a s i s  o f  what was b e l ie v e d  by  e a r ly  18^^ c e n tu ry  
ch em is ts  about p h lo g is to n ,  th e n  t h i s  th e o ry  o f  r e fe re n c e  w i l l  reckon 
th o se  in s ta n c e s  to  form p a r t  o f  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  'p h lo g is to n *  as  
u se d  by  e a r ly  18^^ c e n tu ry  c h e m is ts . The r e a l i s t  co u ld  th u s  hope 
to  d is c o v e r  t h a t  th e  fo llo w in g  i s  t r u e ;
th( iv )  For any a ,  'p h lo g is to n *  i s  t r u e  o f  a in  e a r ly  18 c e n tu ry  
c h em is try  i f  a  i s  an o ccu rren c e  o f  hydrogen r e s u l t i n g  from
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th e  a d d i t io n  o f  s u lp h u r ic  a c id  to  g ra n u la te d  z in c .
A nother o b s e rv a tio n  r e p o r t  on which G eorgian ch em ists  a lso  
ag ree d  i s  t h a t  p h lo g is to n  i s  ev o lved  when c e r t a in  su b s tan ces  a re  
b u rn t in  a i r .  What in  f a c t  happens, a cc o rd in g  to  u s ,  i s  th a t  oxygen 
combines w ith  th e  s u b s ta n c e s .  U sing  th e  same p ro ced u re  as was u se d  
to  d is c o v e r  th e  t r u t h  o f  ( i v ) ,  th e  r e a l i s t  co u ld  hope to  e s t a b l i s h  
a s  t r u e
(v ) For any a ,  'p h lo g is to n *  i s  t r u e  o f  a  in  e a r ly  18^^ c e n tu ry  
ch em is try  i f  a  i s  an o ccu rren c e  o f  oxygen which combines w ith  
a  su b s tan ce  when i t  i s  b u rn t in  a i r .
Combining ( iv )  and (v ) he th e n  o b ta in s
( v i )  For any a ,  'p h lo g is to n *  i s  t r u e  o f  a  in  e a r ly  18^^ c e n tu ry  
ch e m is try  i f  a  i s  an- o ccu rren c e  o f  m a tte r  which i s  e i t h e r  
hydrogen r e s u l t i n g  from th e  a d d i t io n  o f  s u lp h u r ic  a c id  to  
g ra n u la te d  z in c ,  o r  oxygen com bining w ith  a  su b stan ce  when 
i t  i s  b u r n t .
Now as  a  m a tte r  o f  f a c t  G eorgian chem ists  b e l ie v e d  th a t  s e v e ra l  o th e r  
experim en ts  le d  to  th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f  p h lo g is to n .  Once th e s e  have
been  accoun ted  fo r  th e  r e a l i s t ,  a s  J a rd in e  a lso  n o te s ,^  w i l l  s p e c ify
th e  e x te n s io n  o f  t h e i r  sim ple  p r e d ic a te  u s in g  a complex d is .ju n c tiv e  
p r e d ic a te .  That i s ,  what he f i n a l l y  comes to  a c c e p t a s  t r u e  w i l l  
be som ething o f  th e  form 
( v i i )  F ar any a ,  'p h lo g is to n *  i s  t r u e  o f  a  in  e a r ly  18^^ c e n tu ry  
ch e m is try  i f  and o n ly  i f  a  i s  an o ccu rren c e  o f  m a tte r  which 
i s  e i t h e r  hydrogen r e s u l t i n g  from th e  a d d i t io n  o f  s u lp h u r ic  
a c id  to  g ra n u la te d  z in c , o r  oxygen com bining w ith  a  su b s tan ce  
when i t  i s  b u r n t ,  o r  . . .
Such a  r e t r o s p e c t iv e  assignm ent o f  e x te n s io n  en su re s  th a t  (0R 1), and
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o th e r  w e ll e s ta b l i s h e d  r e p o r t s  l i k e  i t ,  a re  a s s ig n e d  th e  v a lu e  't ru e *  
in  th e  language o f  18^^ c e n tu ry  c h e m is ts .
A ccep ting  ( v i i )  a lso  e n a b le s  th e  r e a l i s t  to  av o id  th e  dilemma 
fo rc e d  on one who a c c e p ts  P u tn am 's  " p r in c ip le  o f  b e n e f i t  o f  th e  
d o u b t" . He i s  f r e e  to  re c o g n iz e  t h a t  contem porary  ch em ists  have no 
one sim ple p r e d ic a te  to  w hich th e y  a s s ig n  th e  same e x te n s io n  as  was 
a s s ig n e d  by  e a r ly  18^^ c e n tu ry  ch em is ts  to  t h e i r  sim ple  p r e d ic a te  
'p h lo g is to n * , w ith o u t th e re b y  com m itting  h im se lf  to  th e  co n c lu s io n  
th a t  t h e i r  p r e d ic a te  has a  n u l l  e x te n s io n . More g e n e ra l ly ,  i t  i s  
to  be exp ec ted  th a t  th e  th e o ry  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  which I  have 
p re s e n te d , b a sed  as  i t  i s  on a  c l u s t e r  th e o ry  o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  w i l l  
alw ays u rg e  u s  to  a s s ig n  a  non-em pty e x te n s io n  to  p re d ic a te s  o f  
p re v io u s  th e o r ie s  p ro v id e d  we can d e te c t  a  c o n s is te n t  u se  o f  th e  
p r e d ic a te .  I f  we r e p e a te d ly  end up w ith  in c o n s i s te n t  assignm ents  
o f  b e l i e f s  to  u s e r s  o f  th e  p r e d ic a te ,  then  we have no reaso n  fo r  
th in k in g  th a t  th e re  a re  th in g s  to  which th e y  b e l ie v e d  i t  co u ld  be 
c o r r e c t ly  a p p l ie d .  J a rd in e  su g g e s ts  th a t  G a sse n d i 's  p re d ic a te  'atom*
7m ight tu rn  o u t to  be such a  c a se ; perhaps 'p h lo g is to n *  as u se d  by  
l a t e  18^^ c e n tu ry  ch em is ts  would be a n o th e r  But where a  p r e d ic a te  
i s  u se d  c o n s i s te n t ly  w ith in  a  community th e re  a re  good i n t u i t i v e  
and m e th o d o lo g ica l re a so n s  fo r  a s s ig n in g  an e x te n s io n  to  i t  r e l a t i v e  
to  t h a t  community.
In  betw een th e s e  two p o s s i b i l i t i e s  th e re  ap p ea rs  to  be a  t h i r d :  
we may be u n s u re ,  g iven  th e  v a g a r ie s  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  w hether o r  
n o t a  p r e d ic a te  was u se d  c o n s i s t e n t ly .  We m ight be ab le  to  v a ry  
assignm en ts  o f  t r u th - v a lu e s  to  se n te n c e s  and so s p e c ify  d i f f e r e n t  
e x te n s io n s  f o r  t h e i r  p r e d ic a te s .  P erhaps th e  e a r l i e r  t h e o r i s t s  were 
n o t as  t r u t h f u l  as  we a t  f i r s t  c h a r i ta b ly  assumed; p erhaps th e
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ev idence  a t  hand w i l l  he ju s t  to o  th in  to  re s o lv e  th e  m a tte r .  I f  
t h i s  i s  a  p o s s i b i l i t y  th en  th e r e  i s  no c le a r  d iv id in g  l in e  betw een 
c a se s  in v o lv in g  f a l s e  b e l i e f s  and th o se  in v o lv in g  non—i n s t a n t i a t e d  
p r e d ic a te s .
The accoun t I  have g iven  o f  how we sh o u ld  a s s ig n  e x te n s io n s
to  p r e d ic a te s  o f  p a s t  th e o r ie s  le a d s  to  th e  fo llo w in g  p ic tu r e  o f  th e
grow th o f  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge. Suppose th e re  i s  a  th e o ry  T^  which
c o n ta in s  a  n a t u r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  *P* and which comes to  be r e p la c e d  
2by th e o ry  T c o n ta in in g  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te  ’Jg*. The q u e s tio n
a r i s e s  as to  w hether th o se  th in g s  d e sc r ib e d  a s  P ' s  by  u s e r s  o f  T^
2a re  th e  same as th o se  d e sc r ib e d  a s  ^ ' s  by  u s e r s  o f  T . A ccording to  
my a c c o u n t, an a f f i rm a t iv e  answ er sho u ld  be g iven  to  t h i s  q u e s tio n  
when a  s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  th o se  d e s c r ip t io n s  b e l ie v e d  to  be t r u e
io f  P 's  by  u s e r s  o f  T a lso  c o n s t i tu t e s  a  s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  th o se
2d e s c r ip t io n s  b e l ie v e d  to  be t r u e  o f  ^ ' s  by u s e r s  o f  T , As an 
example o f  t h i s  I  su g g e s te d , in  th e  p rev io u s  s e c t io n ,  th a t  what 
M u lle r d e sc r ib e d  as g en es , Mendel had d e sc r ib e d  a s  b ild u n g s fa h ig e n  
E lem ente; th e  ' s u i t a b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  d e s c r ip t io n s ' b e in g  'w h a tev e r i s  
r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  tra n s m is s io n  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
from one g e n e ra tio n  to  th e  n e x t ' . In  t h i s  s e c t io n  I  have co n s id e re d  
th e  case  o f  p h lo g is to n  th e o ry .  A f te r  L a v o is ie r  and th e  d isc o v e ry  o f  
oxygen, p h lo g is to n  th e o ry  was g iven  u p . A ccord ing  to  p o s t- l8 ^ ^  
c e n tu ry  c h e m is ts , no one th in g  s a t i s f i e d  a  s u i ta b le  m a jo r i ty  o f  
th o se  d e s c r ip t io n s  w hich th e y  co u ld  c o n s i s te n t ly  a t t r i b u t e  to  
p h lo g is to n  on th e  b a s is  o f  what th e y  b e l ie v e d .  P ro b ab ly  th e  main 
re a so n  fo r  t h e i r  h av in g  ad op ted  t h i s  view  i s  t h a t  as  ex p erim en ta l 
te c h n iq u e s  im proved tow ards th e  end o f  th e  18^^ c e n tu ry  i t  was 
dem onstra ted  t h a t ,  s in c e  a l l  m e ta ls  ga ined  w eight on c a lc in a t io n ,
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p h lo g is to n ,  which was th o u g h t to  cause  c a lc in a t io n  by  b e in g  ev o lv ed , 
must have n e g a t iv e  w e ig h t. But th e  id e a  o f  an elem ent hav ing  
n e g a t iv e  w eight seemed th e n , as  i t  has ever s in c e ,  to  be o f  dubious 
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y .  There was no q u e s tio n ,  m oreover, o f  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  
b e in g  overcom e. I t  was n o t j u s t  a  m a tte r  o f  one f a l s e  b e l i e f  
amongst many t r u e  o n e s . P h lo g is to n 's  hav ing  n e g a t iv e  w eight was a 
consequence o f  th e  th e o ry  i t s e l f  and n o t som eth ing  which co u ld  be 
sh e lv e d  o r  l e f t  f o r  f u tu r e  s c ie n c e  to  r e s o lv e .  The th e o ry  was 
abandoned and no one sim ple p r e d ic a te  w ith  th e  same e x te n s io n  was 
su b se q u en tly  u s e d .
None o f  t h i s ,  how ever, p re v e n ts  u s  from in t e r p r e t i n g  th e  
lan g u ag e , and making sense  o f  th e  a c t io n s ,  o f  e a r ly  18^^ c e n tu ry  
ch em is ts  in  th e  way su g g e s te d . The r e a l i s t  need  n o t be a c h a u v in is t .  
He can make sen se  o f  e r r o r s  on th e  p a r t  o f  e a r l i e r  s c i e n t i s t s .  He 
can a lso  re n d e r  i n t e l l i g i b l e  such  s ta te m e n ts  as  * In th e  dark  ages 
th e y  ta lk e d  abou t w itc h e s , a lth o u g h  in  f a c t  such  p eo p le  were m ain ly  
s c h iz o p h r e n ic s ', b u t to  d is c u s s  t h i s  would ta k e  me too  f a r  a f i e l d .
S e c tio n  ( i i i ) :  'M ass'
The f i n a l  example I  want to  d is c u s s  le a d s  u s ,  in  a  s e n se , back  
to  o u r s t a r t i n g  p o in t ,  f o r  i t  i s  one o f  th e  main exam ples c o n s id e re d  
by  Eeyerabend in  a rg u in g  a g a in s t  acco u n ts  o f  th e  grow th o f  s c ie n c e  
w hich were b ased  on th e  n o tio n  o f  th e  re d u c tio n  o f  an e a r ly  th e o ry  
to  a  l a t e r  o n e . From C hap ter 1 we r e c a l l  th a t  he d is c u s s e s  a  number 
o f  p u rp o r te d  re d u c t io n s  o f  t h i s  k in d  which N agel c la im ed  to  be in  
accordance w ith  th e  c o n d itio n s  o f  d e d u c ib i l i ty  —  ' t h e  laws o f  th e  
reduced  th e o ry  must be l o g i c a l l y  d e r iv a b le  from th e  red u c in g  th e o ry  
to g e th e r  w ith  c e r t a in  c o o rd in a tin g  d e f in i t i o n s ' —  and meaning
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in v a r ia n c e  —  ' t h e  m eanings o f  th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s c o n ta in e d  in  
th e  d e r iv e d  law s a re  th e  same a s  th o se  o f  th e  te rm s as th e y  o ccu r 
in  th e  red u ced  th e o ry ' . As an example o f  re d u c t io n  where m eanings 
a re  supposed to  have rem ained  in v a r i a n t ,  Feyerabend c o n s id e rs  th e  
rep lacem en t o f  c l a s s i c a l  m echanics by r e l a t i v i t y  th e o ry , c o n c e n tra t in g
Qon th e  term  'm a ss ' a s  i t  o ccu rs  in  each . The e s s e n t i a l  d if f e r e n c e  
betw een th e  two th e o r ie s  i s  t h a t  c l a s s i c a l  m echanics assumes th a t  
th e  mass o f  a  p a r t i c l e  i s  c o n s ta n t w hereas in  r e l a t i v i t y  th e o ry  i t  
i s  s a id  to  be p ro p o r t io n a l  to  a  fram e o f  r e f e r e n c e .  A ccording to  
Feyerabend th e r e  i s  a  change o f  m eaning h e re  because  c l a s s i c a l  mass 
i s  a  p ro p e r ty  o f  an o b je c t  i t s e l f  w hereas r e l a t i v i s t i c  mass i s  a  
r e l a t i o n ,  and b ecau se  (a p p a re n t ly )  in c o m p a tib le  e q u a tio n s  about mass 
h o ld  in  th e  two th e o r i e s .
I  n o te d  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  C hap ter 2 c e r t a in  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
which a r i s e  w ith  F e y e rab e n d 's  p o s i t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w ith  re g a rd  to  
c la im s about th e  in c o m p a t ib i l i ty  o f  incom m ensurable t h e o r i e s .  In  
p a r t  th e se  were t r a c e d  back  to  a  g e n e ra l s c e p tic ism  about th e  n o tio n  
o f  m eaning. Aiming to  av o id  t h i s ,  w h ile  a t  th e  same tim e p re s e rv in g  
a  sen se  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  p ro g re s s ,  I  tu rn e d  to  what a  r e a l i s t  m ight say  
in  re sp o n se . The nub o f  th e  r e a l i s t ' s  view  i s  t h a t  su c c e ss iv e  
s c i e n t i f i c  th e o r ie s  a re  o f te n  th e o r ie s  o f  th e  same k in d s  o f  th in g .  
S c i e n t i s t s  u s u a l ly  a c t  in  accordance w ith  t h i s  v iew  when fo rm u la tin g  
new th e o r ie s  and , says th e  r e a l i s t ,  sc ie n c e  p ro g re s s e s  as a  r e s u l t .
We have seen  th a t  th e  r e a l i s t  canno t f u l l y  a b ju re  meaning —  he makes 
u se  o f  th e  n o tio n  in  e x p la in in g  how we come to  u n d e rs ta n d  what 
th e o r i e s  a re  a b o u t. But he i s  n o t com m itted to  th e  c o n d itio n  o f  
m eaning in v a r ia n c e .  A ll th a t  a  r e a l i s t  need  c la im  rem ains in v a r ia n t  
a re  th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  p r e d ic a te s .
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In  d is c u s s in g  th e  r e a l i s t ' s  g e n e ra l view  I  c o n c e n tra te d  on
n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s .  One in t e r e s t i n g  f e a tu r e  o f  them i s  th a t
th e y  do n o t u s u a l ly  adm it o f  s im p le , p r e c is e  d e f i n i t i o n s .  To connote
t h i s  f e a tu r e  I  adop ted  th e  e x p re s s io n  'c l u s t e r  t e r m ',  which Putnam
u s e s  to  d e s c r ib e  th e s e  p r e d ic a te s .  The p o in t  i s  t h a t  n a tu r a l  k in d
p re d ic a te s  a re  d e f in e d  u s in g  a  c l u s t e r  o f  p r o p e r t i e s ,  n o t a l l  o f
w hich need  be  t r u e  o f  an o b je c t  in  o rd e r  f o r  i t  to  be reckoned one
o f  th e  k in d . Of some re le v a n c e  to  th e  p re s e n t  c o n te x t i s  th e  f a c t
t h a t  P u tnam 's  in t e n t io n ,  in  f i r s t  in tro d u c in g  th e  e x p re s s io n , i s  to
u se  i t  to  c h a r a c te r iz e  te rm s l i k e  'e n e r g y ',  'm a s s ',  't e m p e r a tu r e ',
and so on which f r e q u e n t ly  Occur in  s c i e n t i f i c  la w s . These he c a l l s
10" la w -c lu s te r  c o n c e p ts " . A ccording  to  Putnam ,
L a w -c lu s te r  c o n ce p ts  a re  c o n s t i tu te d  n o t by  a  bund le  o f  p r o p e r t i e s
as  a re  th e  ty p i c a l  g e n e ra l names l i k e  'm an' and 'c r o w ',  b u t by
a  c l u s t e r  o f  law s w hich, a s  i t  w ere, d e term in e  th e  i d e n t i t y  o f
th e  c o n c e p t. The concep t ' en e rg y ' i s  an e x c e l le n t  example o f  a
la w -c lu s te r  c o n c e p t. I t  e n te r s  in to  a  g re a t  many law s. I t  p la y s
a  g re a t  many r o l e s ,  and th e s e  law s and in fe re n c e  r o le s  c o n s t i tu t e
11i t s  m eaning c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  n o t in d iv id u a l ly .
This f e a tu r e ,  w hich goes to  make such  term s la w - c lu s te r  c o n c e p ts ,
le a d s  Putnam to  draw th e  fo llo w in g  c o n c lu s io n  abou t th e o ry  change.
In  g e n e ra l ,  any one law can be abandoned w ith o u t d e s tro y in g  th e  
id e n t i t y  o f  th e  la w - c lu s te r  concep t in v o lv e d , ju s t  as a  man can 
be i r r a t i o n a l  from b i r t h ,  o r  can have a  grow th o f  f e a th e r s  a l l  
o v e r h i s  body, w ith o u t c e a s in g  to  be a  man. A pplying t h i s  to  
o u r example —  'k i n e t i c  en e rg y ' -  'k i n e t i c '  +  'e n e rg y ' — th e  
k in e t i c  energy  o f  a  p a r t i c l e  i s  l i t e r a l l y  th e  energy  due to  i t s  
m o tio n . The e x te n s io n  p f  th e  term  'k i n e t i c  en erg y ' has no t 
changed. I f  i t  had , th e  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  term  ' en erg y ' would 
have to  have changed . But th e  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  term  ' en e rg y ' has 
n o t changed. The forms o f  energy  and t h e i r  b eh av io u r a re  th e  
same as th e y  alw ays w ere, and th e y  a re  what p h y s ic i s t s  ta lk e d
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about b e fo re  and a f t e r  E in s te in ,  On th e  o th e r  hand, I  want to
su g g es t th a t  th e  term  'energy*  i s  n o t one o f  w hich i t  i s  happy
to  a sk , What i s  i t s  in te n s io n ?  The term  'i n t e n s i o n ' su g g e s ts  th e
id e a  o f  a  s in g le  d e f in in g  c h a r a c te r  o r  a  s in g le  d e f in in g  law , and
t h i s  i s  n o t th e  model on w hich co n cep ts  l i k e  energy  a re  to  be 
12c o n s tru e d .
I f  Putnam i s  r ig h t  h e re  th e n  t h i s  i s  o f  g re a t  im portance to  
th e  r e a l i s t  in  th e  fa c e  o f  th e  p re s e n t  p rob lem . I t  su g g e s ts  t h a t  he 
can accep t th a t  th e  m eaning o f  th e  term  'm ass ' m ight n o t have s ta y e d  
th e  same in  th e  change from c l a s s i c a l  m echanics to  r e l a t i v i s t i c  
m echanics b u t t h a t  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  terra h a s .  What m ight be a 
cause fo r  s c e p tic is m , th o u g h , i s  P u tnam 's b o ld  c la im  th a t  " th e  forms 
o f  energy  and t h e i r  b e h a v io u r a re  th e  same as th e y  alw ays w ere ."
What e x a c t ly  does he mean by  " th e  foim s o f  energy  and t h e i r  
b e h a v io u r"?  And how a re  we to  d ec id e  what th e  b eh av io u r o f  som ething 
i s  i f  n o t th ro u g h  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  th e  laws i t  i s  s a id  to  obey?
B efore d is c u s s in g  th e  problem  f u r th e r ,  l e t  me make some more g e n e ra l 
rem ark s•
One im p o rtan t d i f f e r e n c e  betw een n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s  and 
la w - c lu s te r  te rm s i s  t h a t  th e  form er a re  u se d  to  r e f e r  to  th in g s  o f  
a  k in d  w hereas th e  l a t t e r  a re  u se d  to  ex p ress  p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  th in g s  
h av e . That i s ,  la w - c lu s te r  te rm s a re  t y p i c a l l y  u se d  to  ex p ress  
m easurem ents. For t h i s  re a so n  th e y  a re  more c o r r e c t ly  s a id  to  be 
two (o r  m o re )-p la c e  p r e d ic a te s ;  n a tu r a l  k in d  p r e d ic a te s ,  on th e  o th e r  
hand , a re  o n e -p la c e . The c l a s s i c a l  mass o f  a  p a r t i c l e ,  e . g . ,  i s  
ex p re ssed  by  a  f u n c t io n a l  r e l a t i o n  between th a t  p a r t i c l e  and a  
num ber. T h is  c o n t r a s t  u n d e r l i e s  th e  one Putnam e x p re sse s  in  te rm s 
o f  a  d if f e r e n c e  betw een "a  bu n d le  o f  p r o p e r t i e s "  and "a  c l u s t e r  o f  
la w s" .
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S ince te rm s fo r  m easurem ents a re  tw o(o r m o re )-p la c e  p r e d ic a te s ,  
t h e i r  e x te n s io n s  c o n s is t  o f  o rd e re d  p a i r s ( o r  n - t u p l e s ) .  I t  would 
ap p e a r , th e n , t h a t  th e  r e a l i s t ' s  c la im  o f  " re fe re n c e  in v a r ia n c e " , 
a p p l ie d  to  them , amounts to  th e  c la im  th a t  th e  la w - c lu s te r  p r e d ic a te s  
o f  su c c e s s iv e  th e o r i e s  have th e  same s e t s  o f  o rd e re d  p a i r s ( n - tu p l e s )  
in  t h e i r  e x te n s io n s .  Where b e fo re  we asked  q u e s tio n s  l i k e  w hether 
th e  e x te n s io n  o f  N ew ton 's 'p l a n e t '  was th e  same as  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  
o u r s ,  we now have to  a sk  w hether th e  v a lu e s  a s s ig n e d  t o ,  sa y , ' t h e  
mass o f  p la n e t  x* w ith in  N ew ton 's th e o ry  o f  g r a v i t a t i o n  co rresp o n d  
to  v a lu e s  a s s ig n e d  by  any p r e d ic a te  o f  o u rs  o f  th e  form 't h e  ^  o f  
p la n e t  x ' . I t  m ight be th e  ca se  t h a t  we do n o t b e l ie v e  some th in g s  
abou t w hich N ew tonians b e l ie v e d  about 'm a s s ',  b u t in  p o in t  o f
e x te n s io n  th e y  have to  be  th e  same.
T his c o n t r a s t  betw een p r e d ic a te s  th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  which a re  
th in g s  and p r e d ic a te s  th e  e x te n s io n s  o f  which a re  o rd e re d  n - tu p le s  
su g g e s ts  a  d i f f e r e n c e  in  th e  i n t u i t i v e  app ea l o f  th e  r e a l i s t ' s  
account o f  th e o ry  change fo r  th e  d i f f e r e n t  ty p e s  o f  c a s e .  In  th e  
f i r s t  th e  r e a l i s t  can sa y , e . g . ,  t h a t  Mendel and M ulle r were b o th  
t a lk in g  about ju s t  th e s e  th in g s  —  g en es , o r  th a t  P tolem y and Newton 
were t a lk in g  about ju s t  t h i s  p la n e t  —  Venus. In  th e  second , though , 
he seems to  be l im i te d  to  sa y in g  th in g s  l i k e  t h a t  Newton and E in s te in  
would b o th  have a s s ig n e d  th e  v a lu e  6 to  t h i s  o b je c t .  The m easure­
m ents have to  be  made; th e  k in d s  o f  th in g  t h a t  a re  m easured a re  
a lre a d y  t h e r e .
The d i f f e r e n c e  h e re  can be made c l e a r e r  i f  we c o n c e n tra te  on 
th e  n o tio n  o f  a  c a u s a l r e l a t i o n .  T h is  formed an im p o rtan t p a r t  o f  
my account o f  how we can d is c o v e r  what th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a  n a tu r a l  
k in d  p r e d ic a te  i s .  I  a rgued  th a t  in  o rd e r  fo r  members o f  some
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l i n g u i s t i c  community to  be s a id  to  u se  a  n a t u r a l  k in d  p re d ic a te
to  d e s c r ib e  s ,  th e y  (o r  t h e i r  a n c e s to rs )  must have been c a u s a l ly
r e l a t e d  to  ^ * s .  Numbers, how ever, do n o t s ta n d  in  c a u sa l r e l a t i o n s
to  peo p le  (o r  to  a n y th in g  f o r  t h a t  m a t te r ) .  P to lem y and Newton m ight
b o th  have o b se rv ed  th e  p la n e t  Venus —  i t  r e f l e c t e d  l i g h t  from th e
sun on to  t h e i r  r e t i n a s  —  ju s t  a s  Mendel and M u lle r b o th  observ ed
th e  e f f e c t s  o f  g en es . But th e re  i s  no sense  in  s a y in g  th a t  Newton
o r  E in s te in  c o u ld  have o b serv ed  6 o r  i t s  e f f e c t s  (though  o f  co u rse
th e y  co u ld  have o b se rv ed  a  p o in te r  in d ic a t in g  ’6 ' on a  s c a l e ) .  T h is
d if f e r e n c e ,  i t  seems to  me, l a r g e ly  accoun ts  f o r  th e  s p e c ia l  problem s
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e o ry  change where th e  r e le v a n t  p r e d ic a te  i s  a  
13la w - c lu s te r  te rm . The co n n e c tio n  between words and th e  w orld  i s  
more com plex.
R e tu rn in g  to  th e  'm ass ' exam ple, t h i s  has been d is c u s se d  a t
le n g th  by  H a r try  F ie ld  in  a  p ap e r e n t i t l e d  "Theory Change and th e
14.In d e te rm in acy  o f  R e fe re n c e ."  As th e  t i t l e  s u g g e s ts .  F ie ld  th in k s  
i t  has som ething to  do w ith  a  d o c tr in e  o f  Q r in e 's  ( e x a c t ly  which 
d o c tr in e  i s  a  p o in t  d is c u s s e d  b e lo w )* T his i s  made c l e a r  from th e  
o u ts e t  where he s t a t e s  h is  g e n e ra l th e s i s  as  b e in g  " th a t  c o n s id e r ­
a t io n s  about s c i e n t i f i c  r e v o lu t io n s  show th a t  many s c i e n t i f i c  te rm s 
a re  r e f e r e n t i a l l y  in d e te rm in a te  —  th e re  i s  no f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  
a s  to  what th e y  deno te  ( i f  th e y  a re  s in g u la r  te rm s) o r  as  to  what 
t h e i r  e x te n s io n  i s  ( i f  th e y  a re  g e n e ra l te rm s ) ."  ^ His so le  
argum ent in  su p p o rt o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  r e s t s  on th e  example we have 
been d is c u s s in g .
The e ssen ce  o f  F i e l d 's  c la im  i s  t h i s .  In  r e l a t i v i t y  p h y s ic s  
th e re  a re  two p r o p e r t i e s  —  p ro p e r  mass and r e l a t i v i s t i c  mass —  
each o f  which resem b les  c l a s s i c a l  m ass, though in  d i f f e r e n t  r e s p e c t s .
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Thus, th e  r e l a t i v i s t i c  mass o f  a  p a r t i c l e ,  when m u l t ip l ie d  by i t s  
v e lo c i ty ,  i s  e q u iv a le n t to  i t s  momentum; t h i s  i s  n o t so fo r  p ro p e r  
m ass. The p ro p e r  mass o f  a  p a r t i c l e ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, i s  th e  same 
in  a l l  fram es o f  r e f e r e n c e ;  i t s  r e l a t i v i s t i c  mass i s  n o t .  So no 
m a tte r  which p ro p e r ty  i s  chosen a s  th e  " su c c e sso r"  to  c l a s s i c a l  m ass, 
c l a s s i c a l  p h y s ic s  must be judged wrong in  some r e s p e c t  o r  o th e r  when 
view ed from th e  s ta n d p o in t o f  r e l a t i v i t y  p h y s ic s .  M oreover, acco rd ­
in g  to  F ie ld  th e re  i s  no ,fa c t o f  th e  m a tte r  a s  re g a rd s  which ch o ice  
sh o u ld  be made. H is c o n c lu s io n  i s  t h a t  we have an in s ta n c e  o f  " th e  
in d e te rm in acy  o f  r e f e r e n c e " .
I t  seems to  me th a t  th e  i n i t i a l  r e a c t io n  to  t h i s  argument by 
anyone w ith  some u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  modem p h y s ic s  would be th a t  F ie ld  
i s  p la in ly  wrong. Almost ev e ry  modem te x tb o o k  on p h y s ic s  goes to  
some le n g th  to  p o in t  o u t t h a t  what Newton c a l le d  'm ass ' modem 
p h y s ic i s t s  c a l l  'p ro p e r  m ass' o r  ' r e s t  m a s s '.  But th e  q u e s tio n  
rem a in s , what su b s ta n c e  can be g iven  to  t h i s  c la im ?  In  a re c e n t
r e p ly  to  F ie ld ,  John Barman h o ld s  th a t  th e re  i s  an "e x a c t p a r a l le l is m "
betw een some c e n t r a l  p r in c ip le s  o f  Newtonian and s p e c ia l  r e l a t i v i s t i c  
m e c h a n i c s . T o  see  th e  p a r a l le l i s m  i t  i s  n e c e s sa ry  to  fo rm u la te
b o th  th e o r i e s  in  what Barman c a l l s  " a  fo u r-d im e n s io n a l,  i n t r i n s i c
1Y( i . e . ,  c o o rd in a te  f r e e )  fo rm ."  The th re e  p r in c ip le s  c e n t r a l  to  
New tonian m echanics can th e n  be w r i t t e n  as 
(N1) m^ i s  a  s c a la r  in v a r ia n t  
(H2)
(N3) P„ =
where m , P , V , F , A a r e ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  th e  N ewtonian m ass, th en '  n '  n '  n '  n  * ^
Newtonian four-momentum, f o u r - v e lo c i ty ,  f o u r - fo r c e  and f o u r - a c c e le r ­
a t io n .  B arm an's p o in t  i s  t h a t  in  th e  s p e c ia l  th e o ry  o f  r e l a t i v i t y
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" th e re  a re  ex ac t analogues (R 1), (H 2), (R3) o f  (N l) ,  (N 2), (N3) w ith  
p ro p e r  mass ra  ^ in  p la c e  o f  m^, th e  r e l a t i v i s t i c  fournnomentum in  
p la c e  o f  e tc ." ^ ^  So i t  would seem th a t  w h ile  F ie ld  was r ig h t  
to  say  th a t  in  th e  u s u a l  fo rm u la tio n  o f  th e  s p e c ia l  th e o ry , p ro p e r  
mass m u l t ip l ie d  by  v e lo c i ty  does n o t equal momentum, th e  th e o ry  can 
be w r i t te n  in  an a l t e r n a t iv e  " fo u r-d im e n s io n a l, i n t r i n s i c  form" in  
w hich th e  e q u a tio n  does h o ld .
Let u s  a c c e p t th a t  Barman i s  r ig h t  about th e re  b e in g  t h i s  
" ex ac t p a r a l le l i s m " .  Why sh o u ld  i t  convince u s  t h a t  c l a s s i c a l  mass 
i s  to  be i d e n t i f i e d  w ith  p ro p e r  m ass? Barman’ s r e p ly  r e l i e s  on i t s  
b e in g  th e  case  t h a t  (N1) -  (N3) and (R1 ) -  (R3) occupy p o s i t io n s  o f  
g re a t  im portance w ith in  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  t h e o r i e s .  He c la im s th a t  
" i f  any te n e t s  a re  c e n t r a l  to  th e  Newtonian concep t o f  mass and th e  
r e l a t i v i s t i c  concep t o f  p ro p e r  m ass, i t  i s  (N1) -  (N3) and (R1) -  
(R3) r e s p e c t iv e ly ." ^ ^  What i s  p h i lo s o p h ic a l ly  i n t e r e s t i n g  about 
t h i s  i s  th e  id e a  th a t  in  c a se s  o f  th e o ry  com parison where th e  
r e le v a n t  p r e d ic a te  i s  a  la w - c lu s te r  p r e d ic a te ,  we sho u ld  pay 
p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t io n  to  th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  law s s t a t e d  in  th e  
th e o r i e s .  T h is su g g e s ts  a  f u r th e r  c r i t e r i o n  w hich co u ld  be u se d  in  
re s o lv in g  problem s a r i s i n g  in  such  c a s e s .  We m ight p h ra se  i t  as 
fo llo w s : where th e re  i s  a  p rim a f a c ie  cho ice  o v e r which p r e d ic a te  
from one th e o ry  i s  to  be s a id  to  have th e  same e x te n s io n  as  a 
p re d ic a te  from a n o th e r ,  choose th e  one which would b e s t  p re se rv e  th e  
m ath em atica l s t r u c tu r e  betw een th e  th e o r i e s .  I t  w i l l  s t i l l  be th e  
ca se  t h a t ,  a s  F ie ld  s a y s ,  c l a s s i c a l  p h y s ic s  w i l l  be judged wrong 
from th e  s ta n d p o in t o f  r e l a t i v i t y  p h y s ic s ,  b u t i f  Barman i s  r ig h t  
th e n  we can a t  l e a s t  see  in  th e  l a t t e r  a  su c c e sso r  to  th e  fo rm er.
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What th e n  becomes o f  in d e te rm in acy ?  Even w ith  th e  added 
c r i t e r i o n ,  we have no g u a ran tee  th a t  we s h a l l  alw ays be a b le  to  
d e te rm in a te ly  t r a n s l a t e  s ta te m e n ts  o f  Newton* s ,  o r ,  more g e n e ra l ly ,  
t h a t  we s h a l l  always be a b le  to  p ic k  o u t th e  e x te n s io n  o f  a  law - 
c l u s t e r  p r e d ic a te  from a n o th e r  th e o ry .  But n e i th e r  from th e  f a c t  
th a t  t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  n o t d e te rm in a te ,  n o r  even from th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  
can  be in d e te rm in a te ,  do we g e t t h a t  re fe re n c e  i s  in s c r u ta b le .  T h is 
i s  where F ie ld  goes wrong. We m ight n o t be su re  how to  t r a n s l a t e  a  
N ewtonian a s s e r t io n  l i k e  ' The mass o f  a  p a r t i c l e  i s  eq u a l to  tw ic e  
i t s  k in e t i c  energy  d iv id e d  by  th e  square  o f  i t s  v e lo c i ty * , even 
a f t e r  we have a p p re c ia te d  what Barman has to  s a y . We m ight even 
concede th a t  th e r e  i s  no f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  as  re g a rd s  i t s  t r a n s l a ­
t i o n .  Yet none o f  t h i s  would show th e  e x te n s io n  o f  Newton’ s ’mass* 
to  be i n s c r u t a b le .  So in  one sen se  F ie ld  i s  r i g h t  — th e o ry  change 
m ight r e s u l t  in  th e re  b e in g  no f a c t  o f  th e  m a tte r  a s  to  how to  
t r a n s l a t e  —  b u t t h i s  i s  n o t to  say  th a t  th e re  i s  " in d e te rm in a cy  o f  
r e f e r e n c e " .
L a s t ly ,  what about Feyerabend*s v iew s? He too  has an o b je c t io n
to  id e n t i f y in g  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  ’ c l a s s i c a l  m ass’ w ith  th a t  o f
’p ro p e r  m ass’ . In  C hap ter 1, I  quo ted  him as  sa y in g  "a lth o u g h  b o th
may have th e  same n u m erica l v a lu e , th e y  cannot be re p re s e n te d  by th e  
20same c o n c e p t."  I f  t h i s  i s  in te n d e d  to  e x p re ss  th e  p o in t th a t  n o t 
e v e ry th in g  s a id  o f  ’m ass’ in  c l a s s i c a l  p h y s ic s  i s  accep ted  as t r u e  
o f  ’p ro p e r  m ass’ in  r e l a t i v i t y  p h y s ic s ,  th en  t h i s  m ight w ell be 
a c c ep ted  by  a  r e a l i s t .  But t h i s  v e ry  claim  i s  one th a t  p resu p p o ses  
th a t  th e  two th e o r ie s  a re  com m ensurable, a  p re s u p p o s itio n  o f  which 
th e  r e a l i s t  a lo n e  can make s e n s e .
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